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by Charles R. Keeton1 and David A. Comett2
1. \Vhat is VETA?
UETA is the Uniform Electronic Signatures Act, approved by the National
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws ("NCCUSL") at its annual
meeting in July, 1999 as a body of legislation validating the use of electronic records and
electronic signatures.3 .
NCCUSL is a 109 year old nonprofit, unincorporated association of
commissioners on uniform laws from the 50 states, the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico
and the u.s. Virgin Islands. NCCUSL's primary task is to determine which areas of the
law would benefit from uniformity, and to write and recommend uniform laws to state
legislatures for enactment. NCCUSL has written more than 200 uniform laws, including
its most famous (and successful) product, the Uniform Commercial Code,4 the Uniform
Partnership Act, the Uniform Trade Secrets Act, the Uniform Probate Code and the
Uniform Limited Partnership Act. 5
UETA is procedural in nature, not substantive. It does not require anybody to use
electronic signatures or to rely upon electronic records and signatures. It does not
prohibit paper records and manual signatures. Basic rules of law, like the general and
statutory rules ofcontracts, continue to apply.6
1 Charles R Keeton is a member in Frost Bro\vn Todd LLC. He co-chairs the fmn's Commercial
Transactions, Financial Restructuring, and E-Business and Teclmology Practice Groups. He practices in
the finn's Louisville, Kentucky office. Mr. Keeton is a 1975 graduate of the University ofKentucky
College ofLa\v.
2 David A Cornett is an associate in Frost Bro\vn Todd LLC. He practices in the finn's Louisville,
Kentucky office. Mr. Cornett is a 2000 graduate ofthe Louis D. Brandeis School ofLa\v at the University
ofLouisville.
3Fry, Patricia B., "A Preliminary Analysis ofFederal and State Electronic Commerce Laws," Chair ofthe
VETA Drafting Committee, July 7, 2000, accessed online at http://\V\\'\v.uetaonline.comldocs/pfry700.html
on JanuaIy 24,2001.
4 NCCUSL sponsors the UCCjointly with the American Law Institute. .
"'5. http://,,,,,,,,,.webcom.com/legaledIETAFomm/bkgd.html, accessed February 14, 2001.
6http://\,,,,,v.nccusl.org/unifonnaet_summarieslunifonnacts-s-ueta.htm, 4'Uniform Electronic Transactions
Act," accessed January 24, 2001.
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UETA.applies only to transactions in which each party has agreed by some means
to conduct them electronically. Agreement is an essential element. Parties that are
subject to UETA may also opt out. They may vary, waive or disclaim most of the
provisions ofUETA by agreement, even if it is agreed that business will be transacted by
electronic means. The rules in UETA are almost all default rules that apply only in the
eventthat the terms ofan agreement do not govern.7 .
Section 7 ofUETA provides its four basic rules: (1) a record or signature may not
be denied legal effect or enforceability solely because it is in electronic fonn; (2) a·
contract may not be denied legal effect or enforceability solely because an electronic
record was used in its formation; (3) any law that requires a writing will be satisfied by
an electronic record; and (4) any signature requirement in the law will be met if there is
an electronic signature.!
(a) Background and History
UETA is a response to NCCUSL's recognition that electronic commerce
transcends .both state and national boundaries, that non-uniform legislation passed
by various individual states is not an optimal method for the development of such
commerce, and that there is a need for a uniform law validating electronic
commerce. Prior to the drafting ofUETA, some states had already enacted laws
dealing with electronic technologies. Legislation ofUtah, California and Illinois,
while varying significantly from the final product, was relied upon as models by
the drafters ofUETA.9
A good summary ofthe reasons behind the drafting ofUETA is provided
in the Reporter's Memorandum for the first submitted draft ofUETA:
"On July 1, 1997, President Clinton announced the
Administration's 'Framework for Global Electronic Commerce.'
The Framework indicates that global commerce via Internet
transactions is anticipated to reach 'tens of billions of dollars by
the tum of the century.' That estimate does not include electronic
commerce being conducted today over so-called 'closed systems'
such as electronic data interchange. Clearly the magnitude of the
economic activity being conducted electronically is huge, and
growing rapidly. This activity is currently being conducted amid
legal uncertainty regarding the validity and efficacy of the
electronic records and documents being used to evidence the
commercial transactions and relationships being created.
'ld
lId .
9 Fty, ~atri~ B., 4Cjhe Medimn Sball Not Be The Message: Securing Legal eertaintyFor Electronic
Transactions WithThe Unifonn ElectronicTransactions Act,"'bttp:ll\\~v,\'.abanet.orglbusla,,,,/mo/premium­
cllprogramslspIOO/abc.asp, accessed January 30, 2001.
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• Supportive, not Prescriptive - The law was to be supportive ofelectronic
commerce, enabling it to grow and mature in a sound legal environment, but
should not be prescriptive or regulatory.
• Minimalism - The law was to not impose any greater restrictions on electronic
communications than it imposes on paper-based communications.
'-...
-. Technology Neutral- The law was to adopt provisions that accommodated
existing technologies and allowed new technology. No technology was to be
favored over another, nor inhibit development ofnew technologies.
• Implementation Neutrality - The law was to not favor one business
implementation over~other.
• Non-Interference with Substantive Rules - The law was to not restate
substantive legal rules but was to assure, as much as possible, that there were
no barriers because ofthe form in which messages or records were
communicated or stored in transactions.
• Freedom ofContract - Participants in electronic commerce were to be given
the freedom to structure their transactions and relations among thelnselves
contractually, with a minimum ofinterference from the law.11
(b) Enactment ofUETA by States
As ofFebruary 6, 2001, UETA has been adopted in 23 states and has been
introduced in 10 others, it has also been introduced in the U.S. Virgin Islands. 12
The first state to adopt UETA was California, however, they are now in the
process ofadopting a conforming version ofUETA.
(c) Kentucky's UETA Enactment
Kentucky's enactment ofUETA became effective August 1, 2000. A full
copy ofthe text ofthe bill ofenactment (HB 571), 13 the amendments, and the
. time-line for its enactment is attached to this document as Appendix A. Appendix
B ofthis document contains Chapter 369 ofthe Kentucky Revised Statutes, the
statutorily enacted version ofUETA. Salient provisions ofHB 571 provide that
it:
electronic nledia should be treated as the equal o!lvrittell media.
••• ,,10 (Emphasis added.)
r The guiding principles for the drafting ofUETA included the following:
r


















Recognizing this void, the Framework calls for the creation of a
'Uniform Commercial Code' for Electronic Commerce. '
This draft has been prepared to address that uncertainty and
fill the legal void' by creating a basic legal structure recognizing
and effectuating records and signatures generated electronically.
The jUl1danlentaipolicy rumiing throughout this Act is to establish
the legal equivalence oj electronic records and signatures with
paper writings and manually signed sigtlatures. At its most basic,
this policy focuses on overcoming perceived bias against electronic·
records and signatures because of their ethereal nature and lack of
concrete substance. The concern in this regard relates to the sense
that something as seemingly fleeting as electronic 'beeps and
chirps' is insufficient to support and evidence commercial
activities involving potentially large sums ofmoney.
Whether the concern manifests itself in the context of
existing writing and signature requirements such as the Statute of
Frauds, or evidentiary requ~rements to prove the existence and
terms of a transaction, the Concerns are real for many. Notwith-
standing these concerns, however, the economic benefits of
electronic commercial activity, e.g. time, efficiency and storage
savings, have caused many commercial actors to proceed with
implementing electronic commerce in the face of these concerns.
This is largely due to the recognition among commercial actors
that electronic commerce is generally as reliable and safe as paper,
and justifies the risks inherent in the legal uncertainty.
The legal uncertainties surrounding electronic commerce
relate principally to the media in which these transactions are
conducted, i.e., electronic records as opposed to paper and ink
writings. For most commercial activity, once electronic media are
recognized, the substantive· body of commercial law, whether
derived from statutes such as the Uniform Commercial Code or the
common law as reflected in Restatemellt (Second) Contracts,
provides the applicable and appropriate rule of law....
Part 2 reflects the jUl1danlel1tal premise of this Act that
. ---
11 Boss, Amelia K., "Unifonn Electronic Transaction Act," accessed at the Busine~s La\V Home Page at
http://\\'\\'\v.abanetorg on January 30, 2001.
12 http://\\,V\v.uetaonline.com'hapstate.html, accessed Febnwy 14,2001. States enacting UETA include
. Arizona, California, Dela\\'3re, Florida, Ha\\'aii, Idaho, Indiana, 10\\'3, Kansas, Kentucky, Maine, Mar)yland,
Michigan Minnesota,Neb~ Nol$ Caro~Ohio, Oklahoma, .P~nnsyl\'ania, Rhode Island, South
Dakota, Utah, and VJrginia. States introducing UETA include'AtkaDsas~CaIifomia (confoni1ing,~on).
Connectieut.,Mississippi, Mont3na.,Ne\v Jersey, Ne\v Menco~ North Dakota, Oregon, Texas, andVennonl






















• creates new sections of KRS Chapter 369 to adopt VETA to provide
uniform rules to govern transactions in electronic commerce;
• defines "electronic signature" as an electronic sound, symbol, or
process attached to or logically associated with a record and executed
or adopted by a person with the intent to sign the record;
• defines "transaction" as an action or set of actions occurring between
two or more persons relating to the conduct of business, commercial,
or governmental affairs; .
• directs that VETA apply to electronic records and electronic signatures
relating to a transaction;
• provides that UETA apply to electronic records or electronic
signatures created, generated, sent, communicated, received, or stored
on or after the effective date [August 1, 2000] of this Act;
• directs that UETA does not require the creation or use of an electronic
record or electronic signature;
• directs that UETA apply only to transactions in which each party has
agreed by some means to conduct them electronically;
• allows a party who agrees to conduct a transaction by electronic means
to refuse to conduct other transactions electronically;
• permits the provisions ofUETA to be varied by agreement;
• describes how UETA is to be construed and applied;
• provides that a record or signature may not be denied legal effect or
enforceability solely because it its in electronic form;
• provides that a contract may not be denied legal effect or
enforceability solely because an electronic record was used in its
formation;
• directs that any law that requires a record to be in writing will be
satisfied by an electronic record;
• directs that any signature requirement in the law will be satisfied by an
electronic signature;

















• creates new sections of KRS Chapter 369 to adopt UETA to provide
uniform rules to govern transactions in electronic commerce;
• defines "electronic signature" as an electronic sound, symbol, or
process attached to or logically associated with a record and executed
or adopted by a person with the intent to sign the record;
• defines "transaction" as an action or set of actions occurring between
two or more persons relating to the conduct of business, commercial,
or governmental affairs; .
• directs that VETA apply to electronic records and electronic signatures
relating to a transaction;
• provides that VETA apply to electronic records or electronic
signatures created, generated, sent, communicated, received, or stored
on or after the effective date [August 1, 2000] of this Act;
• directs that VETA does not require the creation or use of an electronic
record or electronic signature;
• directs that VETA apply only to transactions in which each party has
agreed by some means to conduct them electronically;
• allows a party who agrees to conduct a transaction by electronic means
to refuse to conduct other transactions electronically;
• permits the provisions ofVETA to be varied by agreement;
• describes how VETA is to be construed and applied;
• provides that a record or signature may not be denied legal effect or
enforceability solely because it its in electronic form;
-- -rttl'.:idnIL~I..-..llc-uovetnot-s unlce tor Technology to specify the
manner and format;
.• authorizes governmental agencies to specify the type of electronic
signature required, the manner and format in which it is affixed to a
record, and the identity ot: or criteria that must be met by, any third
party used by a person filing a document;
• allows a governmental agency to specify any other required attributes
for electronic records;
• directs· that VETA does not require a govemmentalagency to use or





















• designates the Governor's Office for Technology to set standards for
the use of electronic records and signatures that promote consistency
and interoperability between governmental agencies; and
• directs that UETA applies to contracts created or renegotiated on and
after the effective date ofthis Act.
Kentucky's enactment ofUETA also contained amendments that
are not a part of the uniform version ofUETA. HB 571 amendments
include the following:
• Exempts certain consumer protection statutes from application of the
Act;
• regarding consumer contracts entered for personal, family, or
household reasons, establishes circumstances by which an electronic
agent provides an opportunity for the prevention or correction of an
error;
• establishes rules that apply to a transaction entered into by an
individual for personal, family, or household purposes.14
(i) Differences Between Kentucky UETA Enactment And Uniform
VETA
The differences between the Kentucky UETA enactment and the uniform
version ofUETA as drafted by NCCUSL in 1999 are found in Section 3 (KRS §
369.103). The uniform version ofUETA provides in pertinent part that:
"(b) This [Act] does not apply to a transaction to the extent
it is govemedby:
(1) a law governing the creation and execution of
wills, codicils, or testamentary trusts;
(2) [The Uniform Commercial Code other than
Sections 1-107 and 1-206, Article 2, and Article
2A];
(3) [the Uniform Computer Information
Transactions Act]; and
(4) [other laws, ifany, identified by State]."
The Kentucky enactment ofUETA, however, provides the following
(KRS 369.103(2)):
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"(2) KRS 369.101 to 369.120 does not apply to a
transaction to the extent it is governed by:
(a) A law governing the creation and execution of
wills,codicils, -or testamentary trusts; .
(b) KRS Chapter 355 other than KRS 355.1-107
and 355.1-206, and Articles 2 and 2A of KRS
Chapter 355;
(c) A [my governil1g the conveyal1ce ofany interest
in realproperty; and
(d) A law gover/ling the creation or trallsfer ofany
negotiable instrumellt or al'Y illstrument
establishing title or all illterest ill title." (Emphasis
added.)
The Official Comments to Section 3 ofthe NCCUSL uniform version of
UETA specifically discusses the exemption of real estate transactions from
_UETA's scope (KRS 369. 103(2)(c». It provides that:
"Real Estate Transactions. It is important to distinguish
between the efficacy of paper documents involving real
estate between the parties, as opposed to their effect on
third parties. As between the parties it is unnecessary to
maintain existing barriers to electronic contracting. There
are no unique characteristics to contracts relating to real
property as opposed to other business and commercial
(including consumer) contracts. Consequently, the decision
whether to use an electronic medium for their agreements
should be a matter for the parties to determine. Of course,
to be effective against third parties state law generally
requires filing with a governmental office. Pellding
adoptiol1 ofelectronic filillg systems by States, the 11eedfor
a piece of paper to file to perfect rights agaillst third
parties, lyill be a COllsideratiol1 for the parties. In the event
notarization and acknowledgment are required under other
laws, Section 11 provides a means for such actions to be
accomplished electronically." (Emphasis added.)
It appears likely that the Kentucky legislature has heeded the advice ofthe
Drafting Committee and considered the lack ofan electronic filing system for real
estate transactional documents and the need for a piece ofpaper for enforcement.
KRS 369.103(2)(d) is somewhat more problematic. Although this section
ofthe statute exempts "[a] law governing the creation or transfer ofany
negotiable- instrument or any instrument establishing title or an interest in title"
from Kentuc~'s UETA enactment, Section 160fUETA (KRS369.116)
specifically includes a ''transferable record," which is defined.as an electronic






















under Article 70fKRS Chapter 355 if the electronic record were~ writing;"
subject to the requirements that (1) "[t]he issuer ofthe electronic record expressly
has agreed it is a transferable record," and (2) a person has "reliably established"
control of the transferable record. Section 16 (KRS 369.116) further defines how
a person is deemed to have reliably established control of the transferable record.
2. UETA Requirements
(a) Limited to Transactions
UETA applies only to electronic records and electronic signatures relating
to a transaction. In the absence of these elements, UETA does not apply. IS
An "electronic record" is one created, generated, sent, communicated,
received or stored by electronic means including facsimile, e-mail, voice mail,
audio records, internet transmissions, or any other technology with
electromagnetic or similar capability. 16
An "electronic signature" is any electronic sound, symbol or process
attached to or logically associated with a record which is executed or adopted by a
person with the intent to sign the record. It must include three elements: (1) an
affirmative act; (2~ an intention to sign a record; and (3) logical association with
the signed record. 7
UETA defines a "transaction" as "an action or set of actions occurring
between two or more persons relating to the conduct ofbusiness, commercial, or
governmental affairs.,,18 .
(b) Agreement/Consent
UETA § 5(b) provides that "[t]his Act applies only to transactions .
between parties each ofwhich has agreed to conduct transactions by electronic
means. Whether the parties agree to conduct a transaction by electronic means is
determined from the context and surrounding circumstances, including the
parties' conduct."
The parties do not have to enter into a formal written agreement to utilize
electronic transactions. The term "agreement" is to be given broad construction
under UETA. The Official Comments to UETA provide the following examples
ofwhere the parties are found to have agreed to conduct business transactions
electronically:
IS See UETA § 3(a).
16 SeeUETA"§§ 2(S), (7). (l3).
11 See UETA"§ 2(8).
18 See UETA § 2(16).
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"A Automaker and supplier enter into a Trading Partner
Agreement setting forth·the terms, conditions and methods
for the conduct ofbusiness between them electroni~ally.
B. Joe gives out his business card with his business e-mail
address. It may be reasonable, under the circumstances, for
a recipient of the card to infer that Joe has agreed to
communicate electronically for business purposes.
However, in the absence of additional facts, it would not
necessarily be reasonable to infer Joe's agreement to
communicate electronically for purposes outside the scope
ofthe business indicated by use ofthe business card.
c. Sally may have several e-mail addresses-home.main
office, office of a non-profit organization on whose board
Sally sits. In each case, it may be reasonable to infer that
Sally is willing to communicate electronically with respect
to business related to the business/purpose associated with
the respective e-mail addresses. However, depending on the
circumstances, it may not be reasonable to communicate
with Sally for purposes other than those related to the
purpose for which she maintained a particular e-mail
account.
D. Among the circumstances to be considered in finding an
agreement would be the time when the assent occurred
relative to the timing of the use of electronic communica-
tions. If one orders books from an on-line vendor, such as
Bookseller.com, the intention to conduct that transaction
and to receive any correspondence related to the transaction
electronically can be inferred from the conduct. Accord-
ingly, as to information related to that transaction it is
reasonable for Bookseller to deal with the individual
electronically.
The examples noted above are intended to focus the inquiry
on the party's agreement to conduct a transaction
electronically. Similarly, if two people are at a meeting and
one tells the other to send an e-mail to confirm a
transaction - the requisite agreement under subsection (b)
would exist. In each case, the use of a business card,
statement at a meeting, or other evidence of willingness to
conduct a transaction electronically must be viewed in light
of all the surrounding circumstances with a view toward























Attribution involves the methods involved to attribute electronic
communications to their senders.
VETA § 9 provides that an electronic record or electronic signature is
attributable to a person if it was the act ofthe person. This may be proven by any
means, including a showing ofthe efficacy ofa security procedure which has
been applied. VETA is technology neutral in that one form ofsecurity procedure
(such as dual key encryption) is not preferred over any other. The type ofsecurity
procedure utilized goes to the quality ofthe evidence indicating that an electronic
record or signature is to be attributed to a certain person. VETA does not
contradict or disturb any existing digital signature legislation.
VETA defines a "security procedure" as:
"a procedure employed for the purpose of verifying that an
electronic signature, record, or performance is that of a
specific person or for detecting changes or errors in the
information in an electronic record. The term includes a
procedure that requires the use of algorithms or other
codes, identifying words or numbers, encryption, or
callback or other acknowledgement procedures."
(d) Electronic Agents
VETA defines an "electronic agent" as "a computer program or an
electronic or other automated means used independently to initiate an action or
respond to electronic records or performances in whole or in part, without review
or action by an individual.,,19
VETA clearly validates contracts formed by electronic agents. Section 14
ofVETA provides that a person may form a contract by using an electronic agent.
That means that the principal, which is the person or entity that provides the
program to do business, is bound by the contract that its agent makes.20
(e) Exclusions
The list ofexcluded transactions in the VETA is limited, although an
enacting state is free (but not encouraged) to enlarge upon these exceptions. The
exclusions to VETA are found in Section 3(b) and include the following:
• Laws governiJ;lg the creation and execution ofwills, codicils, or testamentary
tru~. Because testamentary documents .are intended to be effective and.. ~.
]9 See UETA § 2(6).
20 See UETA § 14.
A-II
binding on third parties following the death ofthe testator, the significance of
the document for the testator, and the fact that such documents are intensely
personal and only incidentally ofcommercial value, the decision was made to
exclude records governed by such statutes.21 .
• The Uniform Commercial Code other than § 1-107 (Waiver or Renunciation
ofClaim or Right After Breach) and § 1-206 (Statute ofFrauds for Kinds of
Personal Property Not Otherwise Covered) and Articles 2 and 2A.
• The Uniform Computer Information Transactions Act ("UCITA"). UCITA
applies to transactions in computer information. It contains its own provisions
validating the use ofelectronic records and transactions and are thought to be
consistent with UETA.22
3. \Vhat is E-SIGN?
(a) Federal Enactment, Background and History
The Electronic Signatures in Global and National Commerce Act ("E-
SIGN"), S. 761, Pub. L. No. 106-229, 114 Stat. 464, was adopted by Congress on
June 16, 2000, signed by President Clinton on June 30, 2000, and became
effective on October 1,2000. It is codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 7001-7006, 7021 and
7031.
The fundamental purpose ofthe law is to establish that a signature,
contract, or record relating to a transaction involving interstate or foreign
commerce may not be denied legal effect or enforceability simply because it is in
electronic form. Several states, but not all, have adopted their own legislation
concerning electronic transactions. As a means to eliminate the obstacles to
efficient interstate online transactions posed by the different states' laws and the
uncertainties created by the absence ofsuch laws, E-SIGN prescribes uniform
national standards while also allowing states to maintain their own measures if
they conform to the federal standards.23 E-SIGN is intended to preempt any state
law that gives greate~ legal status or effect to the use ofany specific technology.
E-SIGN includes four titles; Title I establishes the fundamental rules
governing the use ofelectronic signatures and the rights and obligations attendant
to those rules, particularly as they affect consumers; Title II sets forth specific
provisions regarding electronic negotiable instruments or "transferable records;"
21 FlY, Patricia B., "The Medium Shall Not Be The Message: Securing Legal Certainty For Electronic
Transactions With The UniformElectr~c Tmnsactions Act," http://W\V\\'.abanetorglbusla\\'/mo/premium-
cVprogramslsp100/abc.asp, accessedJ8nUaly30~200 1.
7.21d
23 Perkins, NancyL., "'New Electronic SignatureLegislationVali&tes Online Contracting," The Computer






















Title ill prescribes principles for the promotion ofinternational electronic
commerce; and Title IV amends the Child Online Protection Act.24
4. E-SIGN Requirements25
(a) Electronic Legal Validity
A signature, contract, or other record relating to a transaction in or
affecting interstate or foreign commerce may not be denied legal effect, validity,
or enforceability solely because it is in electronic form.
(b) Consent
Electronic records may be substituted for records otherwise required to be
in writing only if the consumer has affirmatively consented to receive an
electronic record and such consent has not been withdrawn; and prior to
consenting the consumer is provided with a clear and conspicuous statement
informing the consumer of rights or options to have the record provided or made
available on paper, and the right of the consumer to withdraw the consent to
electronic records and ofany conditions, consequences (which may include
termination of the parties' relationships) or fees in the event ofwithdrawal of
consent.
(c) Notice
If the consumer has consented to the receipt of electronic records and a
change in the hardware or software needed to access or retain the records creates a
risk that the consumer will not be able to access or retain a record that was the
subject of the consent, the person providing the electronic record must provide the
consumer with a statement of the revised hardwar~ and software requirements for
access to and retention ofthe electronic records, and the right to withdraw consent
without the imposition of any fees for such withdrawal and without the imposition
ofany condition or consequence that was not disclosed.
(d) Preemption of State Law
E-SIGN preempts state law llnless such law: (1) constitutes an adoption or
enactment of the UETA as approved and recommended by NCCUSL in 1999; or
(2) specifies alternative procedures or requirements for the use or acceptance of
electronic signatures or records for establishing the legal effect, validity, and
enforceability ofcontracts or records, and those alternative procedures or
requirements are (a) consistent with Titles I and II ofE-SIGN, and (b) do not
require, or give greater legal status or effect to use or application ofa specific
~·Nimmer, Raymond'T.,~ectronic Signatures andRecon1s: 'TheNe\\'US 'Perspective," .The Computer &
Internet Lawyer, Vol. 17, No. 12, December 2000, pp. 8-28.
2S Id. -
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technology or technological specification for creating, storing, generating,
receiving, communicating, or authenticating electronic signatures or records.
(e) Exemptions
(i) Transactions Covered by Certain Other Laws
E-SIGN does not apply to:
• a statute, regulation, or rule of law governing the creation and execution of
wills, codicils, or testamentary trusts;
• a statute, regulation, or other rule of law governing adoption, divorce, or other
matters offamily law; or
• the Uniform Commercial Code as in effect in any state, other than § 1-107 and
§ 1-206 and Articles 2 and 2A.
(ii) Legal Orders and Certain Notices
E-SIGN also does not apply to:
• court orders, notices, or official court documents required to be executed in
connection with court proceedings;
• notices of cancellation or termination ofutility services; or
• notices of default, acceleration, repossession, foreclosure or eviction, or the
right to cure under a credit agreement secured by, or a rental agreement for, a
primary residence ofan individual or the cancellation or termination ofhealth
insurance, benefits, or life insurance benefits (excluding annuities).
(I) Federal and State Agency Implementing Authority
A federal or state regulatory agency, or a self-regulatory organization, may
specify standards or formats for the filing ofrecords with that agency or
organization, including requiring paper filings or records. Further, a federal or
state regulatory agency that is responsible for rulemaking under any other statute
may interpret E-SIGN with respect to such statute through the issuance of
regulations, orders, or guidance ifthe agency finds that: (1) there is a justified
purpose for the regulation, order, or guidance; (2) the methods selected to cany
out that purpose are substantially equivalent to the requirements imposed on
records that are not electronic records and will not impose unreasonable costs on
the use .andaeceptance ofelectronic records; and (3) themethods .selected to carry






















technology or technological specification for creating, storing, generating,
receiving, communicating, or authenticating electronic signatures or records.
(g) Transferable Records
DefIDed as electronic records that would be promissory notes or
documents if in written form, may be executed using an electronic signature. A
person is deemed to have control ofa transferable record if a single authoritative
copy ofthe transferable record exists and identifies the person to whom the
transferable record was issued or most recently transferred and copies and
revisions are properly identifiable and authorized.
(h) Promotion of International Electronic Commerce
The Secretary of Commerce is directed to "take all actions" necessary to
eliminate impediments to electronic commerce on a global scale.
(i) Studies
The Department of Commerce must conduct a study of the effectiveness
of the delivery ofelectronic records to consumers via e-mail as compared to
postal mail, and together with the Federal Trade Commission, must conduct a
study on the benefits and burdens of specific elements of the consumer consent
requirements ofE-SIGN.
S. Uniform UETA and E-SIGN's Exemption to Preemption.26
Generally, federal law preempts overlapping state law under the Supremacy
Clause of the United States Constitution. E-SIGN specifically provides that if state has
adopted the uniform version ofUETA §§ 1 - 16 as promulgated by NCCUSL in 1999,
then such state's law is not preempted. The pertinent language ofE-SIGN providing for
this exemption to preemption is found in E-SIGN § 102(a):
"(a) IN GENERAL- A State statute, regulation, or other rule of law may
modify, limit, or supersede the provisions of section 101 with respect to
State law only if such statute, regulation, or rule of law--
(1) constitutes an enactment or adoption of the Uniform
Electronic Transactions Act as approved and recommended
for enactment in all the States by the National Conference
of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws in 1999, except
that any exception to the scope of such Act enacted by a
State under section 3(b)(4) of such Act shall be preempted
to the extent such exception is inconsistent with this title or
.. .
26 FIY, Patricia B., "A Preliminary Anal)~S ofFederal and State Electronic Commerce La"'S,9t accessed
online at http://\V\vw.uetaonline.comldocslpfry700.html on January 24, 2001.
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title IT, or would not be permitted under paragraph
(2)(A)(ii) ofthis subsection; or
(2)(A) specifies the alternative procedures or requirements
for the use or acceptance (or both) of electronic records or
electronic signatures to establish the legal effect, validity,
or enforceability ofcontracts or other records, if--
(i) such alternative procedures or
requirements are consistent with this title
and title II; and .
(ii) such alternative procedures or
requirements do not require, or accord
greater legal status or effect to, the
implementation or application of a specific
technology or technical specification for
performing the functions of creating,
storing, generating, receiving,
communicating, or authenticating electronic
records or electronic signatures; and
(B) if enacted or adopted after the date of the enactment of
this Act, makes specific reference to this Act."
There are two important caveats to this exemption, the first being that if a state
has accepted the invitation in UETA § 3(b)(4) to exclude bodies ofstate law other than
those listed by the drafters, E-SIGN § 102(a)(1) specifies that those exclusions are
preempted to the extent that they are inconsistent with Title I (electronic contracting) and
Title II (transferable records) ofE-SIGN. E-SIGN does not affect a state's uniform
enactment ofUETA §§ 1-16. This caveat prevents states from enacting UETA while
simultaneously undermining the key goals ofE-SIGN. Because UETA § 3(b)(4) enables
a state to prevent the use or acceptance ofelectronic signatures or records for a variety of
transactions, some states have used this "loophole" to exclude important transactions,
such as insurance transactions. Congress has closed this "loophole" through E-SIGN §
102(a)(I) by preempting any exception that is "inconsistent" with E-SIGN.
The second caveat is that any state's other laws or non-uniform provisions of
UETA are to be evaluated under E-SIGN § 102(a)(2)'s two-part test. If the other law or
non-uniform UETA provision is consistent with Titles I and II ofE-SIGN and does not
favor any specific technology it will survive federal preemption. Existing federal
preemption doctrine prescribes that any inconsistent, non-uniform provision ofa state's
enactment ofUETA or other law that violates the E-SIGN § 102(a)(2) two-part test will
be ineffective but the remainder ofsuch enactment or law will be enforceable to the























E-SIGN has other provisions to limit the authority ofa state to override its
provisions. UETA § 8(b) provides that ifa state law requires records to be posted or
displayed, sent or communicated, or provides for specific formatting for stated
information, the method provided in that state law must be followed. E-SIGN § I02(c)
states that this UETA provision may not be used by the state to circumvent E-SIGN by
imposing "nonelectronic delivery means" which would be enforced under UETA § 8(b).
It is important to note that E-SIGN's § 102 exemption to preemption provision
applies only to the electronic contracting provisions-ofE-SIGN. To the extent that any
other titles ofthe statute overlap state law, the federal law will prevail.
6. Comparison of UETA and E-SIGN27
(a) VETA is More Comprehensive Than E-SIGN
(i) Attribution
E-SIGN contains no provisions dealing with the attribution ofelectronic
records or electronic signatures. VETA § 9 provides that an electronic record or
electronic signature is to be attributed to a person if it was the act of the person,
which can be shown by any relevant evidence.
(ii) Effect of Other State Law
VETA is procedural in nature and explicitly defers to the provisions of
other state law for most substantive determinations. Questions of authority,
agency, forgery, contract formation, etc. are to be determined by other state law.
E-SIGN states that it does not affect any legal requirement beyond requirements
for writings, signatures, and the like.
(iii) Agreement of the Parties
UETA recognizes that the parties are free to enter into agreements
concerning their use ofelectronic media and applies only when the parties have
agreed to transact electronically. UETA § 5(d) provides that parties have the
power to vary its provisions by contract. E-SIGN confmes itself to the legal
effect, validity and enforceability of electronic records and signatures. It contains
no provisions on variation by agreement. Any mandatory provisions ofE-SIGN,
such as the consumer notice provisions of § 101(c), are not susceptible to
variation by agreement, even in cases where state law might otherwise have
permitted the parties to defme or speci~ymatters in their contracts.
27 14.
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(iv) The "e-Mailbox Rule"
UETA § 15 ties the determination as to whether an electronic record is
sent or received to the communications system used by the·parties and, unless
otherwise agreed, they are sent or received from the parties' principal place of
business or residence, regardless ofthe actual location ofthe computer, server or
other communications equipment. E-SIGN does not address time and place of
receipt or transmission ofan electronic record.
(v) l\fistake or Error
UETA § 10 contains specific provisions governing the effect of the failure
to use an agreed security procedure, the impact ofmistakes made by an individual
while dealing with an electronic agent, and specifies that, except as specifically
provided, the rules of mistake otherwise apply. E-SIGN does not contain
provisions dealing with mistakes or errors in electronic communications.
(vi) Admissibility into Evidence
UETA § 13 specifies that electronic records are not to be denied
admissibility into evidence solely because the records are in electronic format. E-
SIGN does not address the admissibility of electronic records.
(vii) Transferable Records
UETA would allow all documents which would, if on paper, be either a
promissory note under UCC Article 3 or a document oftitle under uee Article 7.
E-SIGN provides only for electr9nic negotiable notes in transactions secured by
real property. Both, UETA and E-SIGN condition the application ofthe statutory
provisions on (1) express consent by the issuer of the note, and (2) the existence
ofa system which will "reliably establish" the person in "control" of the
electronic transferable record. Furthermore, because the UETA and E-SIGN
provisions do not overlap here, the federal statute will not preempt UETA.
(b) Differences between UETA and E-SIGN
(i) Consumer Protection
A. UETA Focuses on Parties' Compliance With State Consumer
Protection Rules
• UETA does not apply to electronic records in the absence ofan agreement
to transact electronically. Agreement is not required to be explicit but can




















• UETA § 8 specifies that the legal requirements to provide, send or deliver
information in writing may be satisfied with an electronic record capable of
retention at the time ofreceipt. Such a record is not capable ofretention if
the sender, or its information processing system, inhibits the ability ofthe
addressee to print or store the record.
• UETA preserves the requirements ofother state law concerning the manner
ofsending, posting, displaying and formatting of information.
B. E-SIGN Emphasizes Regulating the Manner of Consumer Assent to
Deal Electronically
• E-SIGN does not require consumer consent before all electronic dealings.
• E-SIGN § IOI(c) applies only where the law requires information to be
provided or made available to the consumer in writing.
• The consumer must be notified of any right or option to receive paper.
• The consumer must be notified of the right to withdraw consent to receive
electronic notice and ofany consequences (including termination ofthe
relationship) and fees upon termination.
• The consumer must be notified whether the consent is to the specific
transaction or to notices during the course ofthe parties' relationship.
• The consumer must be informed how to obtain a paper copy ofan electronic
record and ofany fee to be charged.
• The consumer must be furnished, prior to obtaining consent, with a
statement ofhardware and software needed for access to and retention of
the records.
• The consumer must consent electronically or confum the assent
electronically "in a manner that reasonable demonstrates that the consumer
can access information in the electronic form that will be used ..."
• The consumer must be provided with another statement ofhardware and
software requirements and be given the right to withdraw the consent
without any fees being imposed or any other conditions ifa system change
raises a material risk that the consumer will not be able to access or retain
an electronic record. The consumer must also consent once again
electronically or confirm the assent electronically.
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• E-SIGN § 101(c)(3) provides that the failure to obtain consent in
compliance with its terms does not, ofitself: affect the effectiveness,
validity or enforceability,ofany contract entered into with the consumer.
(ii) Record Keeping
VETA merely requires that the record ·remain accessible for later
reference. E-SIGN requires that the record remain accessible to "all persons who
are entitled to access by statute, regulation, or rule of law" for the time specified
in such a rule.
(iii) Automated Transactions
UETA § 14 provides that the use ofone or more electronic agents will not
defeat the formation ofcontracts, even in cases where no individual is aware ofor
reviews the operations ofthe agents or resulting terms and that a contract may be
formed by the interaction ofan individual and an agent, including actions in
which the individual performs voluntarily, having knowledge or reason to know
that such action will cause the agent to complete the performance (e.g. clicking an
"I Agree" button).
UETA also addresses errors in the transmission ofelectronic records and
failure to use available security procedures to detect changes and/or errors and
contains a special provision for mistakes made by individuals dealing with
electronic agents. There are no comparable E-SIGN provisions.
E-SIGN § lOl(h) provides that a contract or other record may not be
denied effect, validity or enforceability solely because an electronic agent was
involved in its formation, creation or delivery, provided that the agent is
attributable "to the person to be bound." E-SIGN does not provide that a contract
may be formed by the interaction between an individual and an agent.
(iv) Exclusions
E-SIGN contains additional exclusions that are not found in VETA. These
exclusions -include:
• Statutes, regulations or other rules of law governing adoption, divorce or other
matters offamily law.
• Court orders, notices, and items required to be executed in connection with
judicial proceedings. (VETA does not consider these as "transactional
. documents.")
'. Cancellatic;ln·or termination ofutility services, ···healthinsurance~dhealth























• Default, acceleration, repossession, foreclosure, eviction, or right to cure a
credit agreement or a rental agreement relating to a primary residence and
notice ofrecall or material failure ofa product which might endanger health
or safety.
• Any document required to accompany the shipping or handling ofhazardous
or toxic materials.
Unlike UETA, however, E-SIGN contains no exception for UCITA.
7. Digital Signatures, Negotiable Instruments, VETA and E-SIGN
(a) Digital Signatures, What Are They?
Digital signatures are, in their most basic form, mathematical algorithms.
They are electronic substitutes for manual signatures that serve the same functions
as manual signatures.28 The main functions ofdigital signatures are signer
authentication, non-alteration, and non-repudiation which correspond to the
requirements ofa written signature; namely, evidentiary, cautionary, deterrent and
channeling functions. 29 More specifically, a digital signature is "the sequence of
bits that is created by running an electronic message through a one-way hash
function and the encrypting the resulting message digest with the sender's private
key.,,30 Therefore, a digital signature is unique to each document signed, but not
necessarily unique to the signer. However, because each signature is unique to a
document, it can provide additional security as to the authenticity and integrity
(i.e. non-alteration) ofthe communication. A digital signature is not a digitized
image ofa handwritten signature or a typed signature.
(b) UETA, E-SIGN and Digital Signatures
Neither UETA nor E-SIGN are digital signature legislation. The use of
dual key encryption, Secure Socket Layer™, or a personal identification number
is not mandated or prescribed by UETA or E-SIGN. This is consistent with their
drafting philosophies oftechnology neutrality and minimalism. The use of
specific technology is relevant where the attribution or accuracy ofa record is
disputed. .
UETA allows other state law concerning digital signatures. It does not
contradict or disturb such laws. The UETA drafting committee considered state
laws requiring the use ofspecific technology as useful experiments for the future
28 Cocco, Anthony, "Digital Signatures, Effects on Marketplace & Teclmology," The Lawyer's PC, Vol.
17~ No. 23~ September 1,2000. II
29 Dorney, Maureen S., "Digital Signature Legislation," (Derived from anarticle funded bJr CommerceNet),
June, 1997.
30 Cocco, Anthony, "Digital Signatures, EffectsDn Marketplace & Teclmology," The Ltnlyer's PC, Vol.
17, No. 23, September I, 2000.
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legal treatment ofsecurity techniques and did not wish to alter such existing
legislation.31 .
E-SIGN, however, is intended to preempt any mandatory state digital
signature legislation.32 The primary motivation for such preemp.tion is to prevent
barriers to electronic commerce.that are perceived to be erected by individual
states' legislation regarding digital signatures: The result under Section 101(a) of
E-SIGN is that electronics using the "state mandatoty technology" and electronics
using any other technology are enforceable under law as altered by E-SIGN.33
(c) Negotiable Instruments Under UETA and E-SIGN
VETA Section 16 provides that notes under Article 3 and documents
under Article 7 ofthe vec are "transferable records" when in electronic form.
These are negotiable instruments.34 VETA provides that a transferable record
which meets certain requirements for "control," as found in Section 16, is
enforceable and that the person in "control" has the same rights as a holder ofa
note under the UCC.35 The Official Comments to VETA § 16 provide that
"Section 16(b) allows control to be found so long as 'a system employed for
evidencing the transfer of interests in the transferable record reliably establishes
[the person claiming control] as the person to which the transferable record was
issued or transferred. '" The Official Comments go on to state that "[t]he key
point is that a system, whether involving third party registry or technological
safeguards, must be shown to reliably establish the identity of the person entitled
to payment" and that "[g]enerally, the transferable record must be unique,
identifiable, and except as specifically permitted, unalterable."
Presently, a system "... which dates, encrypts, and stores all the electronic
information in the transferable record in a manner which lender can demonstrate
reliably establishes lender as the person to which the transferable record was
issued,,36 is apparently not commercially available on a cost-effective basis.37
31 Fry, Patricia B., "The Medium Shall Not Be The Message: Securing Legal Certainty For Electronic
Transactions With The Unifonn Electronic Transactions Act," http://WW\v.abanet.orglb~la\v/mo/premium­
cllprogramslspIOO/abc.asp, accessed January 30, 2001.
3~ Fry, Patricia B., "A Preliminary Analysis ofFederal and State Electronic Commerce La\"S," Chair of the
VETA Drafting Committee, July 7, 2000, accessed online at http://WW\v.uetaonline.com/docs/pfry700.html
on January 24, 2001.
33 Nimmer, Raymond T., "Electronic Signatures and Records: The New US Perspective," The Computer &
Internet Lawyer, Vol. 17, No. 12, December 2000, pp. 8-28.
34 http://\lWW.nccusl.orgluniformaet_summaries/unifonnaets-s-uetahtm, "Unifonn Electronic Transactions
Act," accessed January 24, 2001. ..
35 Stem, SandIa, "The Future Is Here: The Electronic Closing In 2000," Banking Law Journal, October,
2000.
36uETASection16 Official Comment3., .






















Many ofthe "technological safeguards" required by Section 16 for
transferable records are found in digital signature technology. However, as
described above, digital signature technology aids in signer authentication and
non-alteration, but non-repudiation (because a digital signature is not unique to
the "signer") is troublesome. Dual-key encryption, the present D;lost popular form
ofdigital signature technology, utilizes a public-private key pair.38 The sender of
a transferable record transmits the public key along with the message to the
recipient. The recipient, however, must be able to know, in fact, that the public
key he or she has received belongs to the sender in order to avoid repudiation
problems. Certification Authorities are one possible solution to this problem.
Certification Authorities are trusted third-party entities that ascertain the identity
ofa person, called a subscriber, and certify that the public key ofa public-private
key pair used to create digital signatures belong to that person.39 Such systems
are currently in place with regard to the transfer ofsecurity entitlements under
Article 8 ofthe uec and in the transfer of cotton warehouse receipts under the
program sponsored by the US Department ofAgriculture.4o Such systems are
also being developed for electronic commerce by ffiM, Verisign, GTE's
CyberTrust and, the U.S. Post Office has announced plans to begin acting as a
Certification Authority.41 The use ofelectronic negotiable instruments, while
theoretically allowable under the uniform version ofUETA, is possible, albeit a
complicated and expensive proposition involving third-parties at this time.
Another hurdle in the use ofelectronic negotiable instruments is, as now
exists, the situation where UETA has not been enacted in each jurisdiction ofthe
United States. A court sitting in a non-UETA state, which has established
jurisdiction over a dispute among the parties, may hold an electronic negotiable
instrument non-enforceable.42 This situation may be somewhat alleviated by E-
SIGN. E-SIGN provides for an "electronic negotiable instrument," but it applies
only to promissory notes secured by real property that the issuer has expressly
agreed is covered by E-SIGN.43 E-SIGN's other "transferable record" provisions
are modeled after UETA and so long as any such security provisions "reliably
38 A complete description ofdual-key encryption and public-private key pairs is beyond the scope of this
paper. Please refer to Stem, Sandra, "The Future Is Here: The Electronic Closing In 2000," Banking Law
Journal, October, 2000; Dorney, Maureen S., "Digital Signature Legislation," (Derived from an article
funded by CommerceNet), June, 1997; and Cocco, Anthony, "Digital Signatures, Effects on Marketplace &
Technology," The Lawyer's PC, Vol. 17, No. 23, September 1,2000, for a more in-depth analysis ofthis
technology.
39 Cocco, Anthony, "Digital Signatures, Effects on Marketplace & Technology," The Lawyer's PC, Vol.
17, No. 23, September 1, 2000.
..0 UETA Section 16 Official Comment 3.
..1 Stem, Sandra, "The Future Is Here: The Electronic Closing In 2000," Banking Law Journal, October,
2000, EN 15.
0421d
~SeeE-SIGN §~OlandWIttie,'"Robert A,Wmn,J~e·x.,~-S~GN oftheTunes,'"" published in the
August, 2000 issue ofE-Commerce Law Report, accessed 1rt
http://WW\v.kl.comlpraeticeareasltechnology/pubs/page20.stm on February 14, 2001.
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establish" the person under "control" ofthe instrument, the electronic version of
the promissory note will be treated as equivalent to a paper note.44
It remains to be seen how Kentucky's enactment ofVETA, providing that
it does not apply to a transaction to the extent it is governed by c"[a] law governing
the creation or transfer ofany negotiable instrument ... ,,,45 is affected by, or will
affect, the "transferable records" provision of-VETA Section 16 (KRS 369.116)
or whether it will be considered to be contradictory to E-SIGN as a "non-uniform
enactment" ofVETA and thus preempted. .
8. Going Fonvard 'Vith Both, UETA and E-SIGN
E-SIGN includes provisions in its Title III to encourage international recognition
ofelectronic signatures and records in accordance with principles outlined in E-SIGN §
301(a). It directs the Secretary ofCommerce to take an active role in bilateral and
multilateral talks to promote the use and acceptance ofelectronic signatures and
electronic records worldwide. The E-SIGN § 301(a) principles are as follows:
• Remove paper based obstacles to electronic transactions by adopting relevant
principles from the Model Law on Electronic Commerce adopted in 1996 by the
United Nations Commission on International Trade Law.
• Permit parties to a transaction to determine the appropriate authentication
technologies and implementation models for their transactions, with assurance that
those technologies and implementation models will be recognized and enforced.
• Permit parties to a transaction to have the opportunity to prove in court or in other
proceedings that their authentication approaches and their transactions are valid.
• Take a nondiscriminatory approach to electronic signatures and authentication
methods from other jurisdictions.
E-SIGN requires two federal agency studies. First, it requires the Department of
Commerce to conduct a study ofthe delivery ofelectronic records to consumers via e-
mail as compared with delivery ofwritten records via US Postal Service. This study is
due June 30, 2001. The second study is to be conducted jointly with the Commerce
Department and the Federal Trade Commission and is to analyze the effectiveness ofthe
consumer consent provisions ofE-SIGN. This study is also due on June 30, 2001.
Furthermore the Commerce Department is required to report by June 30, 2003, whether
the E-SIGN exclusions are necessary to protect consumers.
Congress has made provisions for E-SIGN to interface harmoniously with a
state's enactment ofthe uniform version ofUETA Furthermore, there are incentives for
"'Id.



















































"HB S71/FN (BR 841) - C. Geveden, J. Richards, S. Riggs
AN ACT adopting the Uniform Electronic Transactions
Act, and making changes incidental thereto.
Create new sections of KRS Chapter 369 to adopt the Uniform
Electronic Transactions Act (VETA) drafted by the National Conference
of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws to provide uniform rules to
govern transactions in electronic commerce in every state; defme
"electronic signature" as an electronic sound, symbol, or process attached
to or logically associated with a record and executed or adopted by a
person with the intent to sign the record; define "transaction" as an action
or set of actions occurring between two or more persons relating to the
conduct of business, commercial, or governmental affairs; define various
additional terms; direct that VETA apply to electronic records and
electronic signatures relating to a transaction; provide exemptions; provide
that VETA apply to electronic records or electronic signatures created,
generated, sent, communicated, received, or stored on or after the effective
date of this Act; direct that VETA does not require the creation or use of
an electronic record or electronic signature; direct that VETA apply only
to transactions in which each party has agreed by some means to conduct
them electronically; allow a party who agrees to conduct a transaction by
electronic means to refuse to conduct other transactions electronically;
permit the provisions of VETA to be varied by agreement; describe how
VETA is to be construed and applied; provide that a record or signature
may not be denied legal effect or enforceability solely because it its in
electronic form; provide that a contract may not be denied legal effect or
enforceability solely because an electronic record was used in its
formation; direct that any law that requires a record to be in writing will be
satisfied by an electronic record; direct that any signature requirement in
the law will be satisfied by an electronic signature; describe the
relationship between UETA and other law; prescribe attribution and effect
of an electronic record or electronic signature; establish rules regarding
errors and changes in messages; provide for notarization and
acknowledgment by electronic signature under certain conditions; set forth
rules for retention of electronic records; allow a governmental agency to
specify additional requirements for record retention subject to the
agency's jurisdiction; prohibit, in a proceeding, exclusion of evidence of a
record or signature solely because it is in electronic form; prescribe rules
for. automated transactions; establish when and from what place
.. informatiot;l is legally 'sent or·received in ~lectronicform;prescribe rules
for transferable records, as defined in the Uniform Commercial Code;
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direct each governmental agency to determine whether, and the extent to
which it will create electro~c records and direct the Department of
Libraries and Archives to determine whether, .and the extent to which, the
Commonwealth will retain electronic records and convert written records
to electronic records; allow each governmental agency, in compliance with
standards established by the Governor's Office for Techilology, to
determine its use of sending and accepting electronic records; authorize
the Governor's Office for Technology to specify the manner and format;
authorize governmental agency to specify the type of electronic signature
required, the manner and format in which it is affixed to a record, and the
identity at: or criteria that must be met by, any third party used by a
person filing a document; allow a governmental agency to specify any
other required attributes for electronic records; direct that UETA does not
require a governmental agency to use or permit the use of electronic
records or electronic signatures; designate the Governor's Office for
Technology to set standards for the use of electronic records and
signatures that promote consistency and interoperability between
governmental agencies; provide severability clause; direct that UETA
applies to contracts created or renegotiated on and after the effective date
of this Act; provide that contracts based on the repealed KRS 369.010 to
369.030 shall continue under their terms until those contracts expire or are
renegotiated and direct that the application of the repealed electronic
signature statutes to those contracts shall continue as if the specified
statutes had not been repealed; make technical amendment; repeal KRS
369.010 (Legislative intent of KRS 369.010 to 369.030), 369.020
(Definitions for KRS 369.010 to 369.030), and 369.030 (Use of electronic
record or electronic signature--Construction and scope of); establish
August 1, 2000, as the effective date of this Act.
HB 571 - AMENDMENTS
SFA(l, W. Blevins) - Exempt certain consumer protection statutes
from application of the Act; regarding consumer contracts entered for
personal, family, or household reasons, establish circumstances by which
an electronic agent provides an opportunity for the prevention or
correction of an error; establish rules that apply to a transaction entered
into by an individual for personal, family, or household purposes.
Feb 3-introduced in House
Feb 4-to State Government (H)
Feb 9-posted in committee
























Feb 23-2nd reading, to Rules
Feb 25-recommitted to Appropriations and Revenue (H)
Mar I-posted in committee
Mar 9-reported favorably, to Rules
Mar 10-posted for passage in the Regular Orders of the Day for Monday, .
March 13, 2000
Mar 13-3rd reading, passed 95-0
Mar 14-received in Senate
Mar 16-to Economic Development, Tourism & Labor (5)
Mar 20-reported favorably, 15t reading, to Calendar
Mar 21-2nd reading, to Rules; floor amendment (I) filed
Mar 22-posted for passage in the Regular Orders ofthe Day for Thursday,
March 23,2000
Mar 24-3rd reading; floor amendment {l) withdrawn; passed 34-0
Mar 27-received in House; enrolled, signed by each presiding officer,
delivered to Governor






















Kentucky's Enacted Version ofUETA
Kentucky Revised Statutes Chapter 369
369.101 Short title for KRS 369.101 to 369.120.
KRS 369.101 to 369.120 may be cited as the Uniform Electronic Transactions Act.
Effective: August 1, 2000
History: Created 2000 Ky. Acts ch. 301, sec. 1, effective August 1, 2000.
369.102 Definitions for KRS 369.101 to 369:120.
As used in KRS 369.101 to 369.120, unless the context requires otherwise:
(1) "Agreement" means the bargain ofthe parties in fact, as found in their language
or inferred from other circumstances and from rules, regulations, and procedures
given the effect ofagreements under laws otherwise applicable to a particular
transaction;
(2) "Automated transaction" means a transaction conducted or peIformed, in whole
or in part, by electronic means or electronic records, in which the acts of records
ofone (1) or both parties are not reviewed by an individual in the ordinary course
in forming a contract, performing under an existing contract, or fulfilling an
obligation required by the transaction;
(3) "Computer program" means a set of statements or instructions to be used directly
or indirectly in an information processing system in order to bring about a certain
result;
(4) "Contract" means the total legal obligation resulting from the parties' agreement
as affected by KRS 369.101 to 369.120 and other applicable law;
(5) "Electronic" means relating to technology having electrical, digital, magnetic,
wireless, optical, electromagnetic, or similar capabilities;
(6) "Electronic agent" means a computer program or an electronic or other automated
means used independently to initiate an action or respond to electronic records or
performances in whole or in part, without review or action by an individual;
(7) "Electronic'record"'means a record created, generated, sent communicated,
received, or stored by electronic means;
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(8) "Electronic signature" means an electronic sound, symbol, or process attached to
or logically associated with a record and executed or adopted by a person with the
intent to sign the record;
(9) "Governmental agency" means an executive, legislative, or judicial agency,
department, board, commission, authority, institution, or instrumentality ofthe
federal government or ofa state or ofa county, municipality, orother political
subdivision ofa state;
(10) "Information" means data, text, images, sounds, codes, computer program"s,
software, databases, or the like;
(1 1) "Information processing system" means an electronic system for creating,
generating, sending, receiving, storing, displaying, or processing information;
(12) "Person" means an individual, corporation, busines.s trust, estate, trust,
partnership, limited liability company, association, joint venture, governmental
agency, public corporation, or any other legal or commercial entity;
(13) "Record" means information that is inscribed on a tangible medium or that is
stored in an electronic or other medium and is retrievable in perceivable form;
(14) "Security procedure" means a procedure employed for the purpose ofverifying
that an electronic signature, record, or performance is that ofa specific person or
for detecting changes or errors in the information in an electronic record. The
term includes a procedure that requires the use ofalgorithms or other codes,
identifying words or numbers, encryption, or callback or other acknowledgment
procedures;
(15) "State" means a state ofthe United States, the District ofColumbia, Puerto Rico,
the United States Virgin Islands, or any territory or insular possession subject to
the jurisdiction of the United States. The term includes an Indian tribe or band, or
Alaskan native village, which is recognized by federal law or formally
acknowledged by a state; and
(16) "Transaction" means an action or set ofactions occurring between two (2) or
more persons relating to the conduct ofbusiness, commercial, or governmental
affairs.
Effective: August 1, 2000














Except as otherwise provided in subsection (2) ofthis section, KRS 369.101 to
369.120 applies to electronic records and electronic signatures relating to a
transaction.
-
KRS 369.101 to 369.120 does not apply to a transaction to the extent it is
governed by:
(a) A law governing the creation and execution ofwills, codicils, or
testamentary trusts;
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369.104 Prospective application of KRS 369.101 to 369.120.
Effective: August 1, 2000
History: Created 2000 Ky. Acts ch. 301, sec. 3, effective August 1, 2000.
369.105 Use of electronic records and electronic signatures - Variation by
agreement.
A law governing the conveyance ofany interest in real property; and
KRS Chapter 355 other than KRS 355.1-107 and 355.1-206, and Articles
2 and 2A ofKRS Chapter 355;
A law governing the creation or transfer of any negotiable instrument or




KRS 369.101 to 369.120 applies to an electronic record or electronic signature
otherwise excluded from the application ofKRS 369.101 to 369.120 under
subsection (2) ofthis section to the extent it is governed by a law other than those
specified in subsection (2) of this section.
Effective: August 1, 2000
History: Created 2000 Ky. Acts ch. 301, sec. 4, effective August 1, 2000.
(3)
(4) A transaction subject to KRS 369.101 to 369.120 is also subject to other
applicable substantive law.
KRS 369.101 to 369.120 applies to any electronic record or electronic signature created, .
generated, sent, communicated, received, or stored on or after August 1, 2000.
.(1) KRS 369.101 to.369.120doesnoti-equire a record or-Sipturetobe.created,
generated, sent, communicated, received, stored, or otherwise processed or used














(2) KRS 369.101 to 369.120 applies only to transactions between parties each of
which has agreed to conduct transactions by electronic means. Whether the parties
agree to conduct a transaction by electronic means is determined from the context
and surrounding circumstances, including the parties' conduct. .
(3) A party that agrees to conduct a transaction by electronic means-may refuse to
conduct other transactions by electronic means. The right granted by this
subsection may not be waived by agreement,.
(4) Except as othelWise provided in KRS 369.101 to 369.120, the effect ofany of its
provisions may be varied by agreement. The presence in certain provisions of
KRS 369.101 to 369.120 ofthe words "unless othelWise agreed," or words of
similar import, does not imply that the effect ofother provisions may not be
varied by agreement.
(5) Whether an electronic record or electronic signature has legal consequences is
determined by KRS 369.101 to 369.120 and other applicable law.
Effective: August 1, 2000
History: Created 2000 Ky. Acts ch. 301, sec, 5, effective August 1, 2000.
369.106 Construction and application of KRS 369.161 to 369.120.
KRS 369.101 to 369.120 must be construed and applied:
(1) To facilitate electronic transactions consistent with other applicable law;
(2) To be consistent with reasonable practices concerning electronic transactions and
with the continued expansion ofthose practices; and
(3) To effectuate its general purpose to make uniform the law with respect to the
subject ofKRS 369.101 to 369.120 among states enacting it.
Effective: August 1, 2000
History: Created 2000 Ky. Acts ch. 301, sec. 6, effective August 1, 2000.
369.107 Legal recognition of electronic records, electronic signatures, and electronic
contracts.
(1) A record or signature may not be denied legal effect or enforceability solely
because it is in electronic form.
. .
(2) A contractmay notbe denied legal effect or enforceability solely because an
electronic record was used in its formation.
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369.108 Provision of information in writing - Presentation of records.
(2) If a law other than KRS 369.101 to 369.120 requires a record to be posted or
displayed in a certain manner, to be sent, communicated, or transmitted by a
specified method, or to contain information that is formatted in a certain manner,
the following rules apply:
(1) Ifparties have agreed to conduct a transaction by electronic means and a law
requires a person to provide, send, or deliver information in writing to another
person, the requirement is satisfied if the information is provided, sent, or
delivered, as the case may be, in an electronic record capable of retention by the
recipient at the time of receipt. An electronic record is not capable ofretention by
the recipient if the sender or its information processing system inhibits the ability
of the recipient to print or store the electronic record.
(a) The record must be posted or displayed in the manner specified in the
other law.
(b) Except as otherwise provided in subsection (4)(b) ofthis section, the
record must be sent, communicated, or transmitted by the method





















Ifa law requires a record to be in writing, an electronic record satisfies the law.
If a law requires a signature, an electronic signature satisfies the law.
Effective: August 1, 2000
History: Created 2000 Ky. Acts ch. 301, sec..7, effective August 1, 2000.
(c) The record must contain the information formatted in the manner specified
in the other law.
Ifa sender inhibits the ability ofa recipient to store or print an electronic record,
the electronic record is not enforceable against the recipient.






(a) To the extent a law other than KRS 369.101 to 369.120 requires
information to be provided, sent, or delivered in writing but permits that
requirement to be varied by agreement, the requirement under subsection
(1) ofthis section that the inform.ation be in the form ofan electronic
re~ord capable ofretention may also be varied ~y agreement; and
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(b) A requirement under a law other than KRS 369.101 to 369.120 to send,
communicate, or transmit a record by United States mail may be varied by
agreement to the extent permitted by the other law.
Effective: August 1, 2000
History: Created 2000 Ky. Acts ch. 301, sec. 8, effective Augu~t 1, 2000.
369.109 Attribution and effect of electronic record and electronic signature.
(1) An electronic record or electronic signature is attributable to a person if it was the
act of the person. The act ofthe person may be shown in any manner, including a
showing ofthe efficacy ofany security procedure applied to determine the person
to which the electronic record or electronic signature was attributable.
(2) The effect ofan electronic record or electronic signature attributed to a person
under subsection (1) ofthis section is determined from the context and
surrounding circumstances at the time of its creation, execution, or adoption,
including the parties' agreement, if any, and otherwise as provided by law.
Effective: August I, 2000
History: Created 2000 Ky. Acts ch. 301, sec. 9, effective August 1, 2000.
369.110 Effect of change or error.
If a change or error in an electronic record occurs in a transmission between parties to a
transaction, the following rules apply:
(1) Ifthe parties have agreed to use a security procedure to detect changes or errors
and one (1) party has conformed to the procedure, but the other party has not, and
the nonconforming party would have detected the change or error had that party
also conformed, the conforming party may avoid the effect of the changed or
erroneous electronic record.
(2) In an automated transaction involving an individual, the individual may avoid the
effect ofan electronic record that resulted from an error made by the individual in
dealing with the electronic agent ofanother person ifthe electronic agent did not
provide an opportunity for the prevention or correction ofthe error and, at the
time the individual learns ofthe err Of, the individual:
(a) Promptly notifies the other person ofthe error and that the individual did
not intend to be bound by the electronic record received by the other
person;
.
(1)) T.es reasonaole steps, Including steps that conform. to the other person's
_~easonableinstruetions, to return to the other person or, if instructed by the
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369.111 Notarization and acknowledgment.
369.112 Retention of electronic records -- Originals.
AppendixB
(b) Remains accessible for later reference.
(c) Has not used or received any benefit or value from the consideration, if
any, received from the other person.
Ifneither subsection (1) ofthis section nor subsection (2) ofthis section applies,
the change or error has the effect provided by other law, including the law of
mistake, and the parties' contract, ifany.
A person may satisfy subsection (1) ofthis section by using the services of
another person ifthe requirements ofthat subsection are satisfied.
Ifa law requires a record to be presented or retained in its original fonn,.or
provides consequences1fthe record is not presented or retained in Its original
(3)
Effective: August 1t 2000
History: Created 2000 Ky. Acts ch. 301, see. 10, effective August 1, 2000.
other person, to destroy the consideration received, ifany, as a result of
the erroneous electronic record; and
(a) Accurately reflects the information set forth in the record after it was first
generated in its fmal form as an electronic record or otherwise; and
(4) Subsections (2) and (3) of this section may not be varied by agreement.
Effective: August 1, 2000
History: Created 2000 Ky. Acts ch. 301, sec. 11, effective August 1, 2000.
Ifa law requires a signature or record to be notarized, acknowledged, verified, or made
under oath, the requirement is satisfied if the electronic signature ofthe person authorized
to perform those acts, together with all other information required to be included by other
applicable law, is attached to or logically associated with the signature or record.
(1) Ifa law requires that a record be retained, the requirement is satisfied by retaining
an electronic record of the information in the record which:
(2) A requirement to retain a record in accordance with subsection (1) ofthis section
does not apply to any information the sole purpose ofwhich is to enable the























form, that law is satisfied by an electronic record retained in accordance with
subsection (1) ofthis subsection.
(5) Ifa law requires retention of a" check, that requirement is satisfied by retention of
an electronic record ofthe information on the front and back ofthe check in
accordance with subsection (1) ofthis subsection.
(6) A record retained as an electronic record in accordance with subsection (1) ofthis
section satisfies a law requiring a person to retain a record for evidentiary, audit,
or like purposes, unless a law enacted after August 1, 2000, specifically prohibits
the use ofan electronic record for the specified purpose.
(7) This section does not preclude a governmental agency of this state from
specifying additional requirements for the retention ofa record subject to the
agency's jurisdiction.
Effective: August 1, 2000
History: Created 2000 Ky. Acts ch. 301, see. 12, effective August 1, 2000.
369.113 Admissibility in evidence.
In a proceeding, evidence ofa record or signature may not be excluded solely because it
is in electronic form.
Effective: August 1, 2000
History: Created 2000 Ky. Acts ch. 301, see. 13, effective August 1, 2000.
369.114 Automated transaction.
In an automated transaction, the following rules apply:
(1) A contract may be formed by the interaction ofelectronic agents ofthe parties,
even if no individual was aware ofor reviewed the electronic agents' actions or
the resulting terms and agreements.
(2) A contract may be formed by the interaction ofan electronic agency and an
individual, acting on the individual's own behalf or for another person, including
by an interaction in which the individual performs actions that the individual is
free to refuse to perform and which the individual knows or has reason to know
will cause the electronic agent to complete the transaction or perfonnance.
(3) The terms ofthe contract are determined by the substantive law applicable to it.
Effective: August 1,2000






369.115 Time and place of sending and receipt.
(1) Unless otherwise agreed between the sender and the recipient, an electronic
record is sent when it: .
Unless otherwise agreed between a sender and the recipient, an electronic record
is received when:
(c) Enters an information processing system outside the control of the sender
or ofa person that sent the electronic record on behalfof the sender or
enters a region ofthe information processing system designated or used by










Is addressed properly or othelWise directed properly to an information
processing system that the recipient has designated or uses for the purpose
ofreceiving electronic records or information ofthe type sent and from
which the recipient is able to retrieve the electronic record;














(a) It enters an information processing system that the recipient has
designated or uses for the purpose of receiving electronic records or
information ofthe type sent and from which the recipient is able to
retrieve the electronic record; and
(b) It is in a form capable ofbeing processed by that system.
Subsection (2) of this section applies even if the place the information processing
system is located is different from the place the electronic record is deemed to be
received under subsection (4) of this section.
Unless otherwise expressly provided in the electronic record or agreed between
the sender and the recipient, an electronic record is deemed to be sent from the
sender's place ofbusiness and to be received at the recipient's place ofbusiness.
For purposes ofthis subsection, the following rules apply:
(a) If the sender or recipient has more than one (1) place ofbusiness, the place
ofbusiness ofthat person is the place having the closest relationship to the
underlying transaction.
(b) Ifthe sender or the recipient does not have a place ofbusiness, the place of
bus}ness is the s~nder's or recipient's residence, as the case may be.
An electronic record is received under subsection (2) ofthis section even ifno
individual is aware of its receipt.
A-39
AppendixB
(6) Receipt ofan electronic acknowledgment from an information processing system
described in subsection (2) ofthis section establishes that a record was received
but, by itself: does not establish that the content sent corresponds to the content
received.
(7) Ifa person is aware than an electronic record purportedly sent under subsection
(1) ofthis section, or purportedly received under subsection (2) ofthis section,
was not actually sent or received, the legal effect ofthe sending or receipt is
determined by other applicable law. Except to the extent permitted by the other
law, the requirements of this subsection may not be varied by agreement.
Effective: August 1, 2000
History: Created 2000 Ky. Acts ch. 301, sec. 15, effective August 1, 2000.
369.116 Transferable records. (Effective until July 1, 2001)
(1) In this section, "transferable record" means an electronic record that:
(a) Would be a note under Article 3 ofKRS Chapter 355 or a document under
Article 7 ofKRS Chapter 355 if the electronic record were in writing; and
(b) The issuer of the electronic record expressly has agreed is a transferable
record.
(2) A person has control ofa transferable record ifa system employed for evidencing
the transfer of interests in the transferable record reliably establishes that person
as the person to which the transferable record was issued or transferred.
(3) A system satisfies subsection (2) of this section, and a person is deemed to have
control ofa transferable record, if the transferable record is created, stored, and
assigned in such a manner that:
(a) A single authoritative copy ofthe transferable record exists which is
unique, identifiable, and, except as otherwise provided in paragraphs (d),
(e), and (f) ofthis subsection, unalterable;
(b) The authoritative copy identifies the person asserting control as:
1. The person to which the transferable record was issued; or
2. Ifthe authoritative copy indicates that the transferable record has













The authoritative copy is communicated to and maintained by the person
asserting control or its designated custodian;
Copies ofrevisions that add or change an identified assignee ofthe
authoritative copy can be made only with the consent ofthe person
asserting control; .
Each copy ofthe authoritative copy and any copy ofa copy is readily
identifiable as a copy that is not the authoritative copy; and
369.116 Transferable records. (Effective July 1, 2001)
(1) In this section, "transferable record" mean~ an electronic record that:
Effective: August 1, 2000
History: Created 2000 Ky. Acts ch. 301, sec. 16, effective August 1, 2000.
(5) Except as otherwise agreed, an obligor under a transferable record has the same
rights and defenses as an equivalent obligor under equivalent records or writing
under KRS Chapter 355.
(f) Any revision of the authoritative copy is readily identifiable as authorized
or unauthorized.
Except as otherwise agreed, a person having control ofa transferable record is the
holder, as defined in KRS 355.1-201(20), ofthe transferable record and has the
same rights and defenses as a holder ofan equivalent record or writing under KRS
Chapter 355, including, if the applicable statutory requirements under KRS
355.3302(1),355.7501, or 355.9-308 are satisfied, the rights and defenses ofa
holder in due course, a holder to which a negotiable document oftitle has been
duly negotiated, or a purchaser, respectively. Delivery, possession, and
indorsement are not required to obtain or exercise any of the rights under this
subsection.
(4)
(a) Would be a note under Article 3 ofKRS Chapter 355 or a document under
Article 7 ofKRS Chapter 355 ifthe electronic record were in writing; and
(b) Theissuer ofthe electronic record expressly has agreed is a transferable
record.
(6) If requested by a person against which enforcement is sought, the person seeking
to enforce the transferable record shall provide reasonable proofthat the person is
in control of the transferable record. Proofmay include access to the authoritative
copy ofthe transferable record and related business records sufficient to review
the terms ofthe transferable record and to establish the identity ofthe person

















(2) A person has control ofa transferable record ifa system employed for evidencing
the transfer of interests in the transferable record reliably establishes that person
as the person to which the transferable record was issued Of transferred.
(3) A system satisfies subsection (2) ofthis section, and a person is deemed to have
control ofa transferable record, ifthe transferable record is created, stored, and
assigned in such a manner that:
(a) A single authoritative copy of the transferable record exists which is
unique, identifiable, and, except as otherwise provided in paragraphs (d),
(e), and (f) ofthis subsection, unalterable;
(b) The authoritative copy identifies the person asserting control as:
1. The person to which the transferable record was issued; or
2. Ifthe authoritative copy indicates that the transferable record has
been transferred, the person to which the transferable record was
most recently transferred;
(c) The authoritative copy is communicated to and maintained by the person
asserting control or its designated custodian;
(d) Copies of revisions that add or change an identified assignee ofthe
authoritative copy can be made only with the consent of the person
asserting control;
(e) Each copy ofthe authoritative copy and any copy ofa copy is readily
identifiable as a copy that is not the authoritative copy; and
(t) Any revision ofthe authoritative copy is readily identifiable as authorized
or unauthorized.
(4) Except as otherwise agreed, a person having control ofa transferable record is the
holder, as defmed in KRS 355.1-201(20), ofthe transferable record and has the
same rights and defenses as a holder ofan equivalent record or writing under KRS
Chapter 355, including, if the applicable statutory requirements under KRS
355.3302(1), 355.7-501, or 355.9-330 are satisfied, the rights and defenses ofa
holder in due course, a holder to which a negotiable document oftitle has been
duly negotiated, or a purchaser, respectively. Delivery, possession, and




Effective: August 1, 2000
History: Created 2000 Ky. Acts ch. 301, sec. 17, effective August 1, 2000.
369.117 Creation and retention of electronic records by governmental agencies
Conversion of written records by governmental agencies.
369.118 Acceptance and distribution of electronic records by governmental
agencies.
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To the extent that a governmental agency uses electronic records and electronic
signatures under subsection (1) ofthis section:
(a) The Governor's 'Officefor teclmol~gy,giving due consideration to
_security, may specify the manner and format in which the electronic
(6) Ifrequested by a person against which enforcement is sought, the person seeking
to enforce the transferable record shall provide reasonable proofthat the person is
in control ofthe transferable record. Proofmay include access to the authoritative
copy ofthe transferable record and related business records sufficient to review
the terms ofthe transferable record and to establish the identity of the person
having control of the transferable record.
Effective: July 1, 2001
History: Created 2000 Ky. Acts ch. 301, see. 16, effective July 1, 2001.
Legislative Research Commission Note (7/14/2000). Effective July 1, 2001, the
referenc~ to former KRS 355.9-308 in subsection (4) ofthis statute changes to
KRS 355.9-330, to reflect the location of the relevant text in Kentucky's adoption
ofRevised Article 9 ofthe Uniform Commercial Code. See 2000 Ky. Acts ch.
301, see. 23, and ch. 408, sec. 191.
(5) Except as otherwise agreed, an obligor under a transferable record has the same
rights and defenses as an equivalent obligor under equivalent records or writing
under KRS Chapter 355.
Each governmental agency of this Commonwealth shall determine whether, and the
extent to which, it will create electronic records. The Kentucky Department for Libraries
and Archives shall determine whether, and the extent to which, the Commonwealth will
retain electronic records and convert written records to electronic records.
(1) Except as otherwise provided in KRS 369.112(6), each governmental agency of
this state, in compliance with standards established by the Governor's Office for
Technology, shall determine whether, and the extent to which, it will send and
accept electronic records and electronic signatures to and from other persons and
otherwise create, generate, communicate, store, process, use, and rely upon






















records must be created,generated, sent, communicated, received, and
stored and the systems established for those purposes;
(b) Ifelectronic records must be signed by electronic means, each
governmental agency, giving due consideration to security, may specify
the type ofelectronic signature required, the manner and format in which
the electronic signature must be affixed to the electronic- record, and the
identity ot: or criteria that must be met by, any third party used by a
person filing a document to facilitate the process;
(c) The Governor's Office for Technology and the Department for Libraries
and Archives, giving due consideration to security, may specify control
processes and procedures as appropriate to ensure adequate preservation,
disposition, integrity, security, confidentiality, and auditability of
electronic records; and
(d) Each governmental agency, giving due consideration to security, may
specify any other required attributes for electronic records which are
specified for corresponding nonelectronic records or reasonably necessary
under the circumstances.
(3) Except as otherwise provided in KRS 369.112(6), KRS 369.101 to 369.120 does
not require a governmental agency ofthis state to use or permit the use of
electronic records or electronic signatures.
Effective: August 1, 2000
History: Created 2000 Ky. Acts ch. 301, sec. 18, effective August 1, 2000.
369.119 Interoperability.
The Governor's Office for Technology, w~ich adopts standards pursuant to KRS
369.118(2)(a), may encourage and promote consistency and interoperability with similar
requirements adopted by other governmental agencies ofthis and other states and the
federal government and nongovernmental persons interacting with governmental
agencies ofthis state. Ifappropriate, those standards may specify differing levels of
standards from which governmental agencies ofthis state may choose in implementing
the most appropriate standard for a particular application.
Effective: August 1, 2000
History: Created 2000 Ky. Acts ch. 301, sec. 19, effective August 1, 2000.
369.120 Severability ofprovisions.
-.1f'anyprovisionofKRS3"69:101to~69.120 ~rit~appli~tiontoany person or






















applications ofKRS 369.101 to 369.120 which can be given effect without the invalid
provision or application, and to this end the provisions ofKRS 369. 101 to 369.120 are
severable.
Effective: August 1, 2000
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What Is a Limited Liability Company?
A limited liability company (LLC) is a new non-corporate entity. It combines features of
corporations, and general and limited partnerships. Owners ofLLCs, called "members,"
receive partnership tax treatment, but are not personally liable for the LLC's debts
and obligations.
Partnership Treatment
A primary advantage of the LLC is its partnership tax treatment. Until recently, under
Internal Revenue Service (IRS) regulations, this meant LLCs could not have all the
Internal Revenue Code (IRe) characteristics ofa corporation:
• Limited liability;
• Continuity of life;
• Free transferability of interests; and
• Centralized management.
LLCs did not have to avoid all four -- only two. Since LLCs were designed to have
limited liability, they had to avoid two ofthe other elements. The original LLC statutes
addressed this problem by mandating:
• No transferability of interests, by requiring unanimous consent to admit a new
member; and
• No continuity of life, again by requiring unanimous consents to avoid dissolution.
These rules were called "BulletproofActs," and were adopted by Colorado, Nevada,
South Dakota, Virginia, West Virginia and Wyoming and approved by the IRS. By 1993,
the IRS was willing to allow some flexibility. It approved what were called "Flexible
Acts" that did not require unanimous consent for transfers or to avoid dissolution.
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Nevertheless, early LLCs had many of the characteristics ofpartnerships. In addition to
avoiding the above corporate characteristics, LLCs generally gave members the right to:
• Voluntarily withdraw and receive payment for their interests;
• Manage the LLC's affairs; and
• Bind the LLC by their acts.
These are similar to the rights ofpartners and are not generally shared by corporate
stockholders.
The IRS treatment ofLLCs continued to evolve. In December 1994, it" issued
Rev.Proc.95-10, which expanded the safe harbors that LLCs could use to avoid continuity
of life and dissolution. In Notice 95-14, the IRS announced a proposal to allow business
entities to select whether to be treated as a partnership or corporation for federal tax
purposes. On May 13, 1996, the IRS proposed "check-the-box" regulations allowing such
election. They became effective January 1, 1997. Under these regulations, LLCs no
longer need to avoid two of the corporate characteristics. They simply elect how to be
treated. In light of the relaxed IRS treatment, many states adjusted their statutes to allow
greater flexibility in continuity, management and transferability.
Nevertheless, in most instances, an LLC will be structured as a partnership. Accordingly,
partnership tax rules regarding contributions, distributions, and capital accounts, for
example, will be applicable to LLCs.
Comparing it to a corporation can show the kinship ofan LLC to a partnership. The
closest corporate analogy to an LLC is an S corporation. Both have flow-through taxation
but limited liability. Although they share these two characteristics, LLCs and S
corporations are different in significant respects:
Members ofan LLC usually cannot freely transfer their interests in the LLC, but are
generally limited to transferring the rights to profits and distributions associated with
their interests;
In many LLCs, members have the power to bind the LLC by their acts:
• Management ofmost LLCs will be infonnal and tailored to the LLC members'
desires. There may be no officers, boards ofdirectors, or annual stockholders' and
directors' meetings; and
• Members ofLLCs will generally have the statutory right to withdraw from the LLC







































LLC member liability, on the other hand, is comparable to that of corporate stockholders.
Each member is personally liable for its individual actions, but not actions committed by
it as a member or manager ofthe LLC. This rule applies to torts and contracts. There are
several e~ceptions:
• Members must pay amounts they agreed to contribute;
• Some states require members to return distributions -- even though rightfully
received;
• Members personally involved in the LLC may be treated as "operators" under the
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act;
• "Responsible person" in the LLC may be liable for unpaid taxes;
• Under a "piercing the veil" doctrine, the LLC may be ignored; and
• Some states impose liability on members ofprofessional LLCs.
Apart from these areas of liability, however, LLC members are not personally liable for
the LLC's debts and obligations. This liability limitation distinguishes LLCs from
general and limited partnerships, and makes them similar to corporati~ns.
Characteristics of a Limited Liability Company
In this section, we discuss the principal characteristics ofan LLC. As with any new
entity, LLCs are subject to a new language. Key LLC terms are printed in boldface type.
Formation
An LLC is formed by filing articles of organization with the secretary of state in the
state where the LLC will be fonned. The articles of organization are comparable to a
corporation's articles of incorporation or a limited partnership's certificate of limited
partnership.
Members ofan LLC will generally enter into an operating agreement. Together with the
articles oforganization, the operating agreement is a contract among members ofan LLC.
Although similar to the bylaws ofa corporation, the operating agreement is more like the
partnership agreement ofa general or limited partnership. An operating agreement
describes the basic rules governing the LLC, including contributions, management,




An LLC is owned by its members, equivalent to the stockholders of a corporation or the
partners of a partnership. Under most LLC statutes, membership interests may be
represented by certificates, like stock. However, because of restrictions on transfers of
ownership interests under many LLC statutes, most LLCs, like partnerships, do not issue
ownership certificates.
Management
LLCs will generally be managed either by their members or by managers. If member-
managed, the members will be comparable to general partners of a general or limited
partnership. Members in a manager-managed LLC are equivalent to limited partners.
Although LLC statutes allow LLC members to elect the equivalent ofa board of directors
and officers, most do not.
Entity Aspects of Limited Liability Companies
LLC statutes create a separate entity, much like a corporation; not an aggregate of the
owners like a general partnership. LLC property is owned by the LLC. This means
members' creditors can not attach LLC property for members' debts. Suits by and against
LLCs must be brought in the name of the LLC, and not in the names of the members of
the LLC.
Dissociation of Members; Dissolution of Limited Liability Companies
Members ofan LLC generally have the right to voluntarily withdraw from an LLC and to
receive payment for their LLC interests. Prior to the easing of IRS rules, withdrawal, as
well as the death or bankruptcy ofan LLC member, caused the dissolution ofthe LLC.
The remaining members, however, had the right to continue the LLC after such
dissolution.
Formation of Limited Liability Companies
An LLC is formed by filing articles oforganization. The articles must comply with
statutory requirements, and are filed with the secretary ofstate in the state of fonnation.
Under several statutes, substantial compliance with statutory requirements is sufficient to
create the LLC.
Generally, LLCs are formed at the time the articles oforganization are filed by the
secretary ofstate. Under a few statutes, the formation date is the date the articles of






















the secretary ofstate approves and files the articles later. Several statutes permit articles
oforganization to contain an effective date later than the date of filing.
Under most statutes, an LLC may be formed, that is, the articles of organization may be
executed and filed,by non-LLC members. This is similar to the filing requirements for
corporations, and facilitates the formation ofLLCs. In contrast, a certificate of limited
partners~p, the document that must be filed to fonn a limited partnership, must be filed
by general partners of the limited partnership. Where a non-member files articles of
organization, the operating agreement (or consent by the person filing the articles of
organization) must transfer the LLC to the initial members or managers.
For corporations, articles of incorporation must be filed by an incorporator who is not a
director, officer or stockholder. Under most statutes, the filing does not complete the
organization of the corporation. Directors must be named, stock subscribed, and
preliminary actions taken by the incorporator, initial stockholders and directors. Until
organization is completed, the corporation does not officially exist, and in some cases
there is no right to carry on business.
For LLCs, there is no case or statutory law on this point. Therefore, the authority and
potential liability ofa person fonning an LLC before the operating agreement is signed
are not clear. Under LLC statutes that do not require LLCs to have operating agreements,
no other "organization" activities may be required. Nevertheless, the person filing the
articles oforganization should sign a statement transferring the LLC to members and
managers. If members execute an operating agreement before or along with the articles of
organization, they may direct someone to file the articles, and expressly reserve all other
power and authority for themselves.
Under a few LLC statutes, signatures on the articles of organization must be
acknowledged or verified.
Contents of the Articles of Organization
Certain infonnation must be included in LLC articles oforganization. In all states, the
LLC's name, registered agent, and registered or principal office are required. In addition,
one or more of the following are required under various LLC statutes: purpose, names
and addresses of initial organizers, period ofduration, and whether managed by members
or managers.
Because ofthe lack ofuniformity in this area, it is critical to check and 'comply with the
applicable statute. Certain statutes require, for example, the articles to set forth any:
• Contributions required ofmembers;
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• Limitation on members' ability to bind the LLC;
• Rules for continuing the LLC after dissolution; and
• Nonstatutory events causing dissolution as agreed to by members.
Several LLC statutes pennit articles oforganization to include additional infonnation.
Under these statutes, an LLC can provide actual notice of information to third parties who
read the articles. Under several LLC statutes and a few court interpretations, inclusion of
required information is constructive notice to third parties.
Operating Agreement
LLC members may enter into an operating agreement (under some LLC statutes,
"regulations," "limited liability company agreement," or "member control agreement").
The operating agreement serves the same function as a limited partnership agreement. In
it, members may set out the terms governing contribution, management, distributions and
allocations, fiduciary duties and indemnification, transfers of interest, dissociation and
dissolution.
The terms ofmost LLC statutes may be varied by agreement of the LLC's members. The
agreement can be in the LLC's articles oforganization or operating agreement. Under
some LLC statutes, an operating agreement must be in writing. Under these statutes,
provisions varying the LLC from statutory default rules must be in writing to be
enforceable.
Number of Members Required
An LLC must have two or more members at the time of formation. Under certain statutes,
it is enough to simply state in the articles that the LLC has two or more members. Under
other statutes, two or more members must exist at the time of formation, or must sign the
articles oforganization.
It is important to time the execution ofthe operating agreement and the filing of the
articles oforganization. Where two members are required at the time offormation, the
LLC's operating agreement should be executed before or along with filing articles of
organization. Ifthe articles oforganization are filed before the operating agreement is
signed, the LLC may not be legally formed.
Because of lack ofcase law on LLCs, the effect ofsuch a defect cannot be predicted. As
with some defectively fonned corporations and partnerships, members ofa defectively
fonned LLC may be liable to third party creditors. Accordingly, it is safer for an






















Some statutes permit ownership ofan LLC by one member. Under these statutes, a
single-member LLC will receive the benefit oflimited liability and other statutory
provisions appli~able to LLCs. In Rev.Proc.9S-10, the Internal Revenue Service indicated
that a one-member LLC was not a partnership for tax purposes. This appears consistent
with the Internal Revenue Code, which defines a partnership as a "syndicate, group, pool,
joint venture, or other unincorporated organization" carrying on business. Multiparty
entities .or organizations are implicit in this definition.
Names of Limited Liability Companies
LLC statutes require that the name ofevery LLC contain certain words or letters
identifying the entity as an LLC. The specific identifiers vary from state to state, but
commonly include "limited liability company," "LLC," and "LC." The purpose ofthese
words is to give notice to third parties of the nature (specifically the lack ofowner
liability) ofthe entity with which they are dealing.
Most LLC statutes prohibit the use ofnames that are deceptively similar to the names of
other LLCs -- and in some cases, other corporations or limited partnerships - fonned in
the jurisdiction. Under most LLC statutes, names may be reserved for a short period.
Assumed or fictitious name statutes often apply to LLCs. Accordingly, LLCs may be
required to comply with filing and notification requirements under applicable assumed or
fictitious name statutes.
Registered Agent and Office
LLC statutes require LLCs to maintain registered offices and registered agents for service
ofprocess. Each LLC statute specifies who may serve as a registered agent. Generally, an
individual residing in the applicable state, a domestic or foreign corporation, and, often,
foreign and domestic LLCs may serve as registered agents.
Amendment ofArticles of Organization
LLCs may amend their articles oforganization. Many statutes also provide that an LLC's
articles oforganization must be amended if they become or are discovered to be
erroneous. This amendment requirement comes from limited partnership statutes, but is
not really relevant to LLCs.
Under limited partnership statutes, the certificate oflimited partnership is filed with a
secretary ofstate, and puts creditors on notice about the parties that are liable for
partnership obligations. Under fanner statutes, the certificate also specified the amounts
required to be contributed by partners.
B-7
For LLCs, creditors are aware that no party is generally liable for LLC obligations, and
under only a few statutes are contributions to an LLC required to be included in the
LLC's articles oforganization. Accordingly, the reasons for requiring amendment ofa
limited partnership certificate have little application to LLCs.
Purposes of Limited Liability Companies
LLCs may engage in any lawful business, except as limited in its articles oforganization
or in other statutes. Many LLC statutes also prohibit LLCs from engaging in certain
specified businesses. In several states, LLCs may not engage in certain professional
practices. Other prohibited purposes include insurance, banking, and farming and
agriculture.
Powers of Limited Liability Companies
Most LLC statutes contain a broad list ofpowers that LLCs have to carry out their
business. The powers are usually comparable to those given to corporations. Other LLC
statutes provide that LLCs have all powers necessary to effectuate their purposes.
Capital Structure
Flexibility is a hallmark of the LLC entity. The LLC's capital structure is a prime
example.
An important characteristic distinguishing LLCs from S corporations is flexibility in
allocations and distributions. S corporations are limited to one class of stock. This means
stockholders of S corporations cannot structure their distributions and allocations in the
way LLC members can.
LLC statutes contain default provisions on sharing profits and distributions. However,
every operating agreement should include profit sharing and distribution rules. Unless it
chooses to be treated as a corporation under the Internal Revenue Service check-the-box
regulations, an LLC will be taxed as a partnership. This includes the treatment ofcapital
accounts. To ease compliance with the regulations, it is better to borrow capital structures
from limited and general partnerships rather than corporations. For example, it would be
better for operating agreements to use preferential returns rather than a preferred stock
equivalent, and cash percentage distributions rather than dividends.
Form and Amounts of Contributions







































• Agreements to contribute cash, property or services; and
• Guarantees ofLLe's obligations.
Such contribution flexibility is in line with current trends in corporate and partnership
statutes. In the past, corporate and limited partnership statutes assumed that creditors in
providing credit would rely on the articles of incorporation or limited partnership
certificate. Accordingly, historic corporate statutes required minimum capital levels, and
limited partnership statutes required descriptions of the amount ofcapital contributed by
each partner and the circumstances under which capital could be distributed or
withdrawn. In addition, issuance of stock in return for promises to contribute or
promissory notes was prohibited.
Under current credit practices, however, creditors do not rely primarily on statements in
articles of incorporation or certificates of limited partnership. Nor do creditors necessarily
rely on amounts to be contributed by owners. Accordingly, there is no real reason for
LLC statutes to require minimum contributions, nor to prohibit contributions in the form
of services or property.
In calculating the amount to be contributed to the LLC, members should consider the
possible application of the piercing the veil doctrine. Courts may apply this doctrine to
LLCs in a way comparable to how it has been applied to corporations. Under corporate
law, thin capitalization is a factor viewed by courts in detennining whether a corporation
is a sham, and whether corporate protection from liability should be disregarded. Failure
to adequately capitalize an LLC could be viewed in a similar light.
Most LLC statutes require contribution obligations to be in writing and disclosed either in
the LLC's articles oforganization or in separate LLC records. A few LLC statutes
contain record-keeping requirements, but do not require contribution obligations to be in
writing.
There are sound policy reasons for requiring contribution obligations, and for them to be
in writing. In addition to the practical importance ofcontributions in fmancing
operations, contributions provide the default basis under many LLC statutes for sharing
profits, losses and distributions. •
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Liability for Contribution Obligations
Under most LLC statutes, members are liable to the LLC for amounts they have agreed to
contribute to the LLC. This liability can be enforced by the LLC, by creditors ofa
bankrupt LLC, and under some LLC statutes by creditors ofa nonbankrupt LLC. In
addition to cash and property the member agreed to contribute, the liability includes the
cash equivalent ofany unperfonned services that the member agreed to make.
Under most LLC statutes, contribution obligations may be excused or reduced by an
agreement between the obligated member and the LLC, ifapproved by the unanimous
consent ofall other members. However, such agreement can not be enforceable against
creditors who relied on the contribution obligation.
Distributions by Limited Liability Companies
Unless the operating agreement provides otherwise, an LLC member has no right to
receive distributions from the LLC before dissociation or dissolution. The position of
LLC members is comparable to that of general partners of a general partnership, limited
partners of a limited partnership, or stockholders of a corporation.
There are several reasons why members should provide in the operating agreement for
ongoing distributions. .
• LLCs are generally taxed as partnerships. Therefore, members are liable for federal
and state taxes on their percentage ofthe LLC's taxable income, whether or not they
receive any distributions from the LLC.
• As with close corporations and general partnerships, members will want to receive
ongoing income.
Sharing of Distributions
LLC distributions are divided among members as provided in the operating agreement. In
the absence ofsuch a provision, under most LLC statutes, members allocate distributions
on the basis ofrelative financial contributions. Under the Prototype Act, distributions are
on a per capita basis.
The commentary to §601 ofthe Prototype Act supports per capita distributions because
distributions based on fmancial contributions present difficulties. Ifmembers make
nonfinancial contributions, the relative percentages offinancial contributions may not
accurately reflect ownership interests. In addition, LLCs without written operating










































Restrictions on Distributions of In-Kind Property
Distributions of in-kind property by LLCs pose several problems. Most obvious is the
difficulty ofvaluing the property. Another is the potential disproportionate postponement
of recognition ofgain by members receiving such property. LLC statutes address these
problems in two ways.
• Members cannot be required to receive property in a greater percentage than the
percentage oftheir contribution to the LLC; or
• Members have no obligation to receive in-kind distributions.
LLC statutes also generally provide that members have no right to demand non-cash
distributions.
Wrongful Distributions
LLC statutes prohibit distributions by an insolvent LLC, or that would render an LLC
insolvent. Many LLC statutes also prohibit distributions that would interfere with
preferential rights. Under several LLC statutes, the defInition of insolvency is the
inability to pay debts as they become due.
The statutory restrictions on LLC distributions are similar to those on limited partnership
distributions and corporate dividends. These restrictions supplement the creditor
protection under fraudulent conveyance laws. In some cases, LLC statutes provide greater
protection for creditors:
• Fraudulent conveyance statutes have an intent requirement; and
• LLC statutes have a longer statute of limitation.
Liability for Return of Wrongful Distributions
Nearly all LLC statutes require the return ofwrongful distributions. The amount of
liability and liable parties depend on the statute. Under most laws, members who
knowingly receive wrongful distributions must return them. Under other statutes,
members (and in some cases managers) who vote for wrongful distributions are also
liable. Knowledge may not be required.
Creditor protection under several LLC statutes is similar to that under ULPA (Unifonn
Limited Partnership Act). Members ofan insolvent LLC, for instance, may be forced to
return distributions that areretums oftheir capital contributions - even when the LLC
was solvent at the time ofdistribution.
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Management and Control of Limited Liability Companies
The first issue on management and control ofan LLC is who has the power to govern it.
Unless members agree otherwise, members under most statutes manage LLCs. Under a
few statutes, however, unless members agree otherwise, managers manage LLCs.
Under most LLC statutes, members who desire to vary these default rules must do so in
the articles oforganization. Other LLC statutes allow the variance to be in the operating
agreement.
Member-Managed Limited Liability Companies
Members in two cases will manage LLC:
• Under LLC statutes where member management is the default rule, unless members
select manager management in the operating agreement.
• Under LLC statutes where manager management is the default rule, but members
elect member management in the operating agreement.
In a member-managed LLC, there are three main governance issues:
• Matters requiring a member vote;
• Percentage ofvotes required on different matters; and
• \\'hether voting is per capita orpro rata on the basis ofmembers' relative fmancial
interests in the LLC.
The Prototype Act establishes clear rules for these issues. Unanimous affinnative votes
are necessary to amend a written operating agreement, or authorize a manager or member
to perform any act contrary to the written operating agreement. Decisions on other
matters require approval ofa majority ofthe members. Members vote per capita, not pro
rata on the basis oftheir financial interest in the LLC. The unanimous voting provision
may be overridden in a written operating agreement; the majority voting provision may
be overridden in any operating agreement.
A few LLC statutes are silent on voting and management responsibility, where there is no
operating agreement. Ultimately, courts may detennine whether majoIjty or perhaps
unanimous approval is required in su~h cases. In the meantime, the lack ofa default
provision is a substantial gap.




























actions. This includes amendments to a written operating agreement, or to authorize an
act in contravention ofa written operating agreement. Defining what constitutes
extraordinary actions is, of course, difficult.
For LLCs, the Prototype Act is a practical solution. Every amendment of the operating
agreement and every act in contravention of it may not be material. However, given the
difficulty. of detennining which events are important enough to require unanimity, the
Prototype Act rule is clear and relatively simple to enforce. In addition, because it applies
only to LLCs with written operating agreements, members can consider the unanimous
rule at the time the operating agreement is executed.
A provision of the Prototype Act that may be controversial is per capita voting, rather
than voting by percentage of financial interest. Most LLC statutes that address the issues
ofvoting and sharing ofprofits, losses, and distributions have voting and sharing on a pro
rata basis according to members' relative financial interests. The drafters of the Prototype
Act believed that per capita voting was a better default rule, taking into account the
difficulty of determining members' relative fmancial interests in an LLC.
Manager-Managed Limited Liability Companies
Managers in two cases will manage LLCs:
• Under L~C statutes where manager management is the default rule, unless members
elect member management in the operating agreement.
• Under LLC statutes where member management is the default rule, where members
have elected manager management in the operating agreement.
Election of Managers
Managers are elected by a majority ofmembers or by members holding a majority of the
fmancial interests, as provided in the operating agreement or governing law.
A few LLC statutes provide for corporate-type annual meetings for the election of
managers and other corporate-type fonnal procedures. Ofcourse, corporate-type
management is an option for nearly every LLC. Many members fonning LLCs come
from a corporate background and are more at home in an entity governed by a board of
directors and officers than one subject to partnership governance procedures.
Generally, LLC statutes pennit a corporate governance type ofarrangement. Parties
desiring this type ofarrangement, however, must carefully evaluate the statute under
which the LLC is formed. They must pay close attention to whether the "board of
directors" would be equivalent to managers under the statute~ and whether the statute
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would permit managers to name agents (i.e., "officers") to carry on the LLC's business.
In manager-managed LLCs, the operating agreement should cover the election, authority,
and removal ofmanagers. In addition, members may want to retain voting rights over
fundamental matters, such as sales ofsignificant assets or amendment of the operating
agreement.
Ability of Members to Bind a Member-Managed Limited Liability Company
A second LLC governance issue is who has the power to bind the LLC in transactions
with third parties. Under the largest number ofLLC statutes, members' ability to bind an
LLC is comparable to a general partner's in a partnership. An LLC can be bound by any
member "apparently carrying on in the usual way the business" ofthe LLC. The LLC is
not bound, however, if the member had no actual authority and the person with whom it
is dealing knows there is no authority.
This rule attempts to balance the relative interests of the LLC and third parties. For acts
within the LLC's usual business, the rule encourages third parties to transact with the
LLC without investigation. For acts that would appear unusual or extraordinary, the rule
encourages the third party to investigate and demand evidence ofthe member's authority
to bind the LLC.
There will always be close questions whether a particular act was apparently within the
usual business ofan LLC. Because the rule is based on the UPA (Unifonn Partnership
Act), however, a significant body of law exists that can be applied to LLCs.
Ability of Managers and Members of a Manager-Managed Limited Liability
Company to Bind the Limited Liability Company
In manager-managed LLCs, managers have the same basic authority as members in a
member-managed LLC. This means any manager can bind the LLC by an act "apparently
carrying on in the usual way the business" of the LLC.A manager's act is not binding if
the manager has no authority and if the person the manager is dealing with knows there is
no such authority.
In an operating agreement, members may restrict the managers' authority to bind the
LLC. Such a restriction will not be effective against a third party:
• If the manager is carrying on the LLC's usual business; and
• If the person the manager is dealing with is not aware ofthe restriction.



























LLC -- unless the operating agreement provides otherwise. This rule places a significant
burden on persons dealing with LLC members. Before dealing with an LLC member, a
person must detennine:
• Whether the applicable state default rule provides for management by members or
managers;
• Assuming that it provides for member management, whether the articles of
organization and/or operating agreement provide for manager management; and
• Whether the act taken is apparently within the usual business of the LLC.
Accordingly, persons aware of this rule but willing to deal with an LLC must incur
certain transaction costs or risks that the members' act binds the LLC.·
Ownership of the Limited Liability Company and Its Property
LLC property is owned by the LLC, and not by the members individually. Accordingly,
LLC property is not available to satisfy creditors of individual members. In addition, the
right to transfer and deal with LLC property is held by members with management rights
under the operating agreement -- not with individual members -- unless the operating
agreement otherwise provides.
Ownership ofproperty by an LLC is comparable to ownership by a corporation or limited
partnership. In contrast, ownership ofproperty in a general partnership combines entity
and aggregate theory. A general partnership's property is held by partners as a tenancy by
the partnership. However, ownership rights of individual partners are limited.
LLC statutes generally do not define what property is owned by an LLC, although several
refer to property "transferred to or otherwise acquired by" the LLC. Where records are
not kept and property is not held in the name ofthe LLC, there may be confusion about
who owns property. LLC statutes generally do not contain default provisions detennining
ownership ofproperty comparable to those in the UPA and RULPA (Revised Unifonn
Limited Partnership Act).
Members' Interests in a Limited Liability Company
Under most LLC statutes, a member's interest is its financial interests in the LLC.
Financial interests generally include interests in distributions, capital, contributions, and
profits.
A member's interest does not include all rights in the LLC. It does not include, for
instance, manage~ent rights. A member's interest is personal property and assignable,




A member's creditors generally have no right to attach LLC property to satisfy the
member's obligation. However, members may assign or pledge their interests as security
for personal obligations. Since a member's interest is personal property, any pledge ofa
member's interest would be governed by the Unifonn Commercial Code. Because
members have the right to transfer only their financial interests, upon foreclosure a
creditor would have no rights to manage the LLC.
Most LLC statutes pennit unsecured creditors to obtain a charging order (a fonn of
garnishment or attachment) against the member's interest in the LLC. A charging order
gives the creditor the right ofan assignee. This means it can receive distributions and, in
some cases, profits and losses.
Certification of Member's Interests
A number ofLLC statutes pennit LLCs to issue certificates representing membership
interests, as long as other statutes do not prohibit them. Certificates can be an efficient
way ofmanaging ownership interests, especially in an LLC with many owners.
Liability of Members and Managers
The primary reason for using an LLC entity is to limit the liability ofmembers for debts
and obligations, yet receive partnership tax treatment. This liability limitation
distinguishes LLCs from partnerships. In this respect, an LLC is more like a corporation.
Under all LLC statutes, LLC members and managers are not liable for the LLC's debts
and obligations. However, they are only released from liability that arises from their
positions as members and managers. They remain liable for their individual actions,
including torts and negligence in supervising other members or managers.
In nearly all cases, since general partners are liable for the partnership's debts and
obligations, the limited liability feature ofLLCs means they are better choices than a
general or limited partnership.
In some case, LLC members have more protection from liability than even limited
partners of limited partnerships. Limited partners may be held generally liable for
partnership obligations ifthey participate in management ofthe limited partnership.
Statutes based on RULPA have an extensive list ofactions that may be taken without




















provision and be held liable for partnership obligations in extreme circumstances. In
contrast, LLC members do not have to worry about their degree of involvement in LLC
management.
Member Liability for Unpaid Contributions and LLC Distributions
Limited liability under LLC statutes is only for LLC's debts and obligations to third
parties. Members are usually liable to the LLC for unpaid contributions that they agreed
to make.
The liability for unpaid contributions is an obligation to the LLC. However, under many
statutes it may be enforced in a derivative action brought by other LLC members. In
addition, creditors may be able to enforce the obligation if the LLC is bankrupt.
Failure to pay contributions does not mean the member becomes liable for the LLC's
debts. The contribution obligation is limited to the unpaid amount. In addition, under
most LLC statutes, members are liable only if the agreement to contribute is in writing.
Members are also liable to the LLC for wrongful distributions, generally defined as
contributions that render the LLC insolvent. Under many LLC statutes, members and
managers who approved the distributions may also be held liable for such distributions.
Application of the Doctrine of Piercing the Corporate Veil
LLC members may be liable for the LLCs debts and obligations under a piercing the veil
or instrumentality theory. The doctrine is based on an "instrumentality" theory: the
corporation is "so organized and controlled and its affairs are conducted so that it is a
mere 'instrumentality'" of its owner.
In evaluating whether a corporation is an instrumentality of its owners, the primary
factors considered are identity of interest and inadequate capitalization. They are just as
likely to be present in an LLC as in a corporation. A third factor, fail~e to comply with
corporate "fonnalities," is less likely to be present with LLCs, because LLC statutes
require fewer formalities than corporate statutes.
At least one federal court has held that piercing-the-veil theory may be applied to an
LLC. In Abu Nassar v.Elders Futures Inc., the defendant sought to hold the members ofa
Lebanese LLC personally liable on a contract signed by the LLC under a piercing the
corporate veil theory. The court denied plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment. In part,
it found that summary judgment was inappropriate because factual issues existed under
Lebanese and New York corporate veil theories.
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The court treated the LLC as it would have treated a corporation under New York law. It
did not analyze whether a corporate theory such as piercing the corporate veil should be
applied to a Lebanese LLC. It is uncertain whether other courts would apply the theory to
U.S. LLCs. However, LLCs are sufficiently similar to corporations that the theory is
likely to be applied.
Contractual Guarantees by Members of a Limited Liability Company
Often, to obtain financing, members ofan LLC must personally guarantee its debts. In
many cases, the guarantee creates more liability than that ofa general partner in a general
or limited partnership.
Even if such a guarantee is required, however, it is better than general liability for all
obligations ofa partnership. Guarantees are limited to specific debts, and LLC members
are not liable for other LLC debts and obligations.
Litigation Involving Limited Liability Companies
There are several instances where litigation may involve LLCs.
Suits By and Against Limited Liability Companies
Generally, suits by and against LLCs are brought in the name ofthe LLC and not
individual members. Most LLC statutes expressly provide that suits against LLCs are
brought in the LLC's name. Although other LLC statutes may not expressly state that
LLCs may bring suits in the LLC's name, there is substantial support toward that result.
The clear intent ofLLC statutes is that LLCs are entities. That intent should apply to
litigation as it does to other aspects ofLLCs.
However, without an express provision in LLC statutes permitting suits in the LLC's
name, there is a possibility that suits must be brought in the names of individual LLC
members. Based on the aggregate theory, the partnership laws ofmany states require suits
to be brought in the names ofall partners. In states where that is the law, a court could
find an LLC to be an aggregate comparable to a general partnership and require suit to be
brought in all members' names.
In a manager-managed LLC, the power to conduct lawsuits resides in the managers. This
is part oftheir general authority to manage the business ofthe LLC. In member-managed
LLCs, under most LLC statutes, consent ofat least a majority ofmembers (per capita or
based on percentage offmancial interest, depending on the statute) would be required to






















actions outside the LLC's usual business. Depending on an LLC's business and the matter
involved, a lawsuit may not be within the LLC's usual business. Accordingly, it could
require unanimous member consent.
Derivative Lawsuits
Most LLC statutes give members the right to bring a derivative suit on behalf of the LLC.
In states where derivative suits are not explicitly provided for in the statute, they may be
recognized by courts -- under common law or principles of federal civil procedure -- as
they have been with limited partnerships.
The rules for derivative suit in many LLC statutes are similar to those in limited
partnership statutes. There are rules on who has the right to bring suit, whether demand is
required, and, if required, the type of demand required.
Derivative lawsuits are an extraordinary remedy. They are also complicated and
expensive. In a widely-held LLC, the extra expense may be justified. In a closely-held
LLC, however, members generally can sue on their own behalf at less expense and with
less disruption to the LLC.
Individual Lawsuits
As discussed above, suits on behalf ofan LLC must be brought by the LLC. Usually,
members may not bring suit on the LLC's behalf in their own names. LLC members,
however, can make claims on their own behalf against the LLC, other members, and third
parties. The more common claims are for securities violations, indemnification, and
breaches of the LLC's operating agreement.
Members may also bring individual negligence and fraud claims that could be brought
derivatively on the LLC's behalf. To avoid prejudice to members in a similar position and
duplication of lawsuits, courts may require that a claim be brought in a derivative or class
action mode.
Indemnification
Nearly every LLC statute gives members and managers the right to be indemnified by the
LLC for actions taken by them on behalfof the LLC. A number of statutes have
indemnification provisions similar to those in corporate statutes - with the right to
indemnity limited. The largest group, however, provides a general, express right to
indemnify members or managers, and does not impose any limitations.
Indemnification does not exist under all LLC statutes. For LLCs formed under LLC
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statutes that do not have indemnification, indemnification should be included in the
LLC's operating agreement. In LLCs fonned under such statutes without written
operating agreements, indemnification will be limited to what is agreed on at the time
indemnification is requested.
Fiduciary Duties of Managers and Members
Fiduciary duties are standards ofconduct that are expected of, and imposed on, directors.
In some cases they are also imposed on stockholders, general partners and in fewer cases
limited partners. Fiduciary duties generally arise where the conduct of directors,
stockholders, or partners could be:
• Harmful to the corporation or partnership; or
• Beneficial to the directors, stockholders, or partners, but to the detriment of the
corporation or partnership.
Fiduciary duties ofdirectors, stockholders, and partners are based in part on statutes, but
to a greater extent have developed over time in case law.
Because ofthe similarity ofLLCs to corporations and partnerships, courts will apply
fiduciary duties to members and managers ofLLCs comparable to those applied to
directors, officers, stockholders, and partners. By comparing the roles ofmembers and
managers ofLLCs with those of directors, officers, stockholders, and partners, the types
of fiduciary duties can be anticipated.
The type and nature offiduciary duties that will apply to LLC members and managers
will depend on the type ofLLC involved and who manages the LLC. An important
difference is whether the LLC is member managed or manager managed.
Member-managed LLCs are closest to general partnerships. Members, therefore, will
likely have fiduciary duties ofgeneral partners.
Manager-managed LLCs are comparable to corporations. Members and managers in such
LLCs may have fiduciary duties equivalent to corporate stockholders and directors.
Two general categories of fiduciary duties have been applied to directors, officers,
stockholders, and partners:
Duty of care that must be satisfied by a director, officer, or general partner in conducting
corporate or partnership affairs; and
Duty of loyalty that requires a director or general partner to act on behalfof the
corporation or partnership, not on the director or general partner's own behalf: and to























Waiver of Fiduciary Duties
Under most LLC statutes, members and managers may waive their fiduciary duties in the
operating agreement. The extent to which fiduciary duties may be waived varies from
statute to statute. The most common rules are:
• Full waiver of fiduciary duties is pennitted, under the theory that members and
managers have full power to contract;
• Waiver ofall fiduciary duties permitted, except intentional misconduct, criminal acts,
self-benefit, and liability for improper distributions; and
• Limited waiver of the duty of care is permitted.
Securities Law Implications of Limited Liability Companies
In this section we consider whether LLC interests are "securities" under federal and state
law. There are significant implications ifmember interests are securities:
• Unless an exemption exists, they may not be sold without registration under federal
and state securities laws;
• Sellers are subject to federal and state securities fraud laws, whether or not the
interests were registered or sold under an exemption;
• Sellers may be subject to broker-dealer registration laws;
• Purchasers have a statutory right of rescission; and
• Professionals working with LLCs are exposed to greater liability.
Analysis under Federal Law
Under Section 2(1) ofthe Securities Act and Section 3(a)10 of the Securities Exchange
Act, the defInition of"security" includes a "certificate of interest or participation in any
profit-sharing agreement" and an "investment contract." Under case law interpreting this
definition, membership interests in an LLC may be either a certificate of interest or an
investment contract.
In SEC v.Howey, the Supreme Court stated that an investment contract "means a contract,
transaction or scheme whereby a person invests his money in a common enterprise and is
led to expect profits solely from the efforts ofthe promoter or a third party...." Under
Howey, an investment contract involves:
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• Whether the LLC is'involved in an activity in which all members may engage, or is
sophisticated and specialized.
The issuance ofcertificates to evidence the LLC's interests may cause the interests to be a
security. In Landreth Timbercove v.Landreth, the Supreme Court held that under the
Securities Act and Securities Exchange Act stock is a security. Under a similar analysis,
certificates evidencing a membership interest in an LLC may be a "certificate of interest"
in a profit-sharing agreement and, thus, a security.
Whether the interest in a specific LLC is a security depends on the particular facts of the
LLC:
• Interests in several LLCs will undoubtedly be securities.
• Interests in manager-managed LLCs and LLCs that are more widely held are more
likely to be securities than closely-held, member-managed LLCs.
• If members' limited liability causes them to be passive investors, their interests are
more likely to be securities.
In one federal case, the SEC took the position that interests in an LLC are securities. In
SEC v.Parkersburg Wireless Limited Liability Company, the SEC charged the defendant
with numerous violations of Securities Act and Exchange Act for the sale ofLLC
interests. The defendant was found in contempt ofa temporary restraining order that had
previously been granted with respect to the SEC's charges. The opinion did not analyze
whether the interests in the LLC were securities, but for purposes of the temporary
restraining order and contempt citation treated them as such.
The use, ownership, and management ofLLCs, however, may be sufficiently diverse to
preclude generalizations about whether LLC interests are securities.
Analysis under State Laws
Each state has a system ofsecurities laws (referred to as "blue sky" laws), which are
parallel to the federal securities laws. Exemption from federal securities registration or
broker/dealer requirements is not an exemption from state blue sky laws. Failure to
comply with blue sky laws has consequences similar to those under federal laws.
On the federal law level, there are few administrative or court interpretations on the
securities aspect ofLLe interests. On the state level, however, several statutes and blue
sky law administrators have considered the treatment ofLLC interests as securities.
Most states presume that LLC interests are securities for blue sky law purposes, although
























• Expectation ofprofits; and
• Sole reliance on the efforts ofa promoter or third party.
These factors will undoubtedly be present in most LLCs.
The general partnership is the entity most analogous to LLCs for securities law analysis.
Generally, in looking at general partnerships, courts have considered whether partnership
agreements are investment contracts under the Howey test. The outcome depends on the
facts of the general partnership.
The leading case applying the Howey test to general partnership interests is Williamson
v. Tucker. In Williamson, several joint ventures operating as general partnerships
purchased and developed real-estate tracts. The promoter purchased the real estate, sold
the joint venture interests, and was solely responsible for the management and sale of the
real estate. The joint venturers had the power to remove and replace the promoter as
manager of the property and had a veto over certain actions, including sale of the
property.
The court found that the first three elements of the Howey test were satisfied. The joint
venture interests would, therefore, be securities if the joint venturers were expecting
profits solely from the promoter's efforts. The court considered three factors in
determining whether this fourth element was satisfied:
• Was the joint venture structured so similarly to a limited partnership that it left little
power in the hands of the investors;
• Were the investors experienced enough to be capable ofexercising the powers
granted to them under the joint venture agreement; and
• Were the investors dependent on the unique entrepreneurial ability of the promoter, or
could he be replaced?
Under the foregoing analysis, the question ofwhether interests in a specific LLC are
securities will depend on the facts and circumstances ofthe LLC, including some ofthe
following factors:
• Whether the LLC is member-managed or manager-managed;
• Number ofLLC members;
• Powers granted to members and managers under the LLC's operating agreement;
• Extent to which the LLC relies on the expertise and efforts ofcertain members or
managers; and
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LLC interests as securities, although several of them establish circumstances under which
the interests may not be securities. For example, in Indiana, LLC interests are-included
within the definition ofsecurities, but not if all members are actively engaged in
management. In Wisconsin, interests in LLCs are securities unless the LLC has no more
than fifteen members and is member managed.
Some states have limited offering exemptions for sales ofLLC interests. In Kansas, for
example, sales ofLLC interests with 35 or fewer members are exempt from state
securities registration requirements, ifmembers are not solicited through general
solicitation and advertising. .
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In recent decades, professionals base their business form on tax considerations.
Partnership tax treatment is a natural fit for professionals. The professional corporation,
however, has from time to time offered certain tax advantages:
• More favorable tax rate;
• More favorable deductions for medical and health care expenses;
• More pension plan options; and
• Reduced taxes by retaining assets in the corporation.
During recent years, however, liability for malpractice has exploded. Protection from
such liability is now as important as obtaining partnership tax treatment.
Cash Method of Accounting
The use of LLCs by professionals had been limited because of questions regarding the
use of the cash method of accounting by professional service LLCs. Because of the nature
of professional practices, the cash method of accounting has been strongly preferred. If
professionals changing from a general partnership to an LLC were required to change to
the accrual method of accounting, significantly accelerated recognition of income would
result. While the Code exempted professional service corporations and partnerships from
the requirement to use the accrual method ofaccounting, it was silent about LLCs.
The IRS responded to this issue in Private Letter Rulings 9321047 and 9415005. The
Rulings indicated that most professional LLCs would be pennitted to remain on a cash
·basis of accounting. The rulings were based on the facts of the specific fmns seeking the
rulings, however, and questions remained regarding applicability ofthe Service's position
to other professional organizations with different factual circumstances.
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Status of Professionals under Limited Liability Company Statutes
The initial question on the use of an LLC by professionals is whether the use is pennitted
under the applicable LLC statute. A second question is whether professional licensing
authorities pennit professionals to operate as LLCs.
Generally, LLC statutes permit LLCs to be used for any lawful business. Accordingly,
unless the LLC statute specifically prohibits the use of LLCs by professionals, an LLC
could be used for a professional practice.
A number of LLC statutes expressly authorize the use of LLCs by professionals. Several
of these LLC statutes contain detailed provisions regarding governance and operation of a
professional LLC, including special provisions regarding:
• Names ofprofessional LLCs;
• Limitations on members and ownership ofmembership interests; and
• Required purchase of membership interest by the professional LLC upon death of a
member.
The use ofLLCs by professionals has been controversial in several states, and is currently
restricted under a few LLC statutes.
Use of Limited Liability Companies by Accountants
The American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA) determines the entities
that accountants may use. In 1992, AICPA amended the AICPA Code of Professional
Conduct Rule 505 to permit accountants to use LLCs.
Use of Limited Liability Companies by Lawyers
The practice of law is generally governed by the state bar association pr the highest court
of the state. This means that for lawyers authority to practice as an LLC is not sufficient.
The appropriate state regulatory authority must also approve the use ofLLCs. Regulatory
authorities in a number of states, including Colorado, Kansas, Alabama, Virginia,
Louisiana, Montana, and Missouri, have authorized the use ofLLCs by lawyers.
Underlying the question of whether professionals should be pennitted to limit their
liability are significant policy questions. There is concern that if professionals are
pennitted to limit their liability for their co-practitioner's malpractice, the overall quality
of services will diminish. This concern is evidenced in Section 79 (Vicarious Liability) of
the American Law Institute Restatement ofthe Law Governing Lawyers, Tentative Draft






















principals) should be liable for damages caused by principals and employees acting in the
ordinary course ofbusiness or with actual authority.
Others argue that limiting a professional's liability for a colleague's malpractice will not
reduce the quality of services. They point out that all assets of the p~ofessional LLC are
liable for members' malpractice. In addition, the LLC's reputation, arguably its most
significant asset, is at risk. Protecting the LLC's assets and reputation is a significant
incentive for professionals to provide quality services -- whether or not they are
personally liable for colleagues' malpractice.
Real Estate Transactions
LLCs can be useful in real estate transactions. In several respects, the tax treatment of real
property ownership is more favorable for partnerships than corporations. Upon sale (and
certain transfers), the appreciated value of real property owned by a corporation is taxed
at a corporate level; upon distribution from the corporation, it is taxed again at the
stockholder level. This double taxation does not occur with a partnership. In addition,
individual owners can take some deductions that corporations cannot.
On the other hand, there is significant potential liability to owning real estate ownership.
This usually means the owner should be an entity with limited liability. While insurance
and non-recourse financing can reduce real estate liability, there are still insurance gaps
and uninsurable liabilities.
Limited partnerships were often the vehicle of choice for real estate ownership. They
offer partnership tax treatment and limited liability -- at least for limited partners. The
disadvantage is that a general partner is liable for partnership obligations. While many
limited partnerships used a special purpose corporation as the general partner, there were
three difficulties with such an approach:
• Minimal capital requirements;
• Additional administrative expense and difficulty; and
• Risk that creditors of the general partner could pierce the corporate veil and hold the
owners ofthe corporation liable for the partnership's debts.
For real property ownership, an LLC is better than a limited partnership in several
respects:
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• No LLC owner is liable for company obligations, so there is no need to·risk the assets
ofan existing entity (or create a new one) to serve as a general partner.
• Owners of an LLC have more management flexibility. While limited partners cannot
be actively involved in management, all LLC members can be active without risking
personal liability for LLC obligations.
Title insurance for LLCs raises additional issues. As noted earlier, there is a great deal of
flexibility on who may manage and bind an LLC. This means title insurance companies
must conduct a greater level of review than is required for transactions involving
corporations or limited partnerships. Title insurance companies must carefully review:
• Who is authorized under the articles or incorporation, operating agreement, and
applicable LLC law to bind the LLC; and
• Who is or was active in the LLC's management, and has or had apparent authority to
bind the LLC.
LLC promoters should seek in their title insurance policies "Fairway" endorsements, in
response to a case in Ohio by that name. In the case, the original partners of a general
partnership transferred their interests (including financial interests and management
rights) to new partners. The partnership was denied title insurance coverage. The court
found that under Ohio law, the partnership dissolved upon transfer of the partnership
interests, and was effectively reformed with the transferees as new partners. The title
insurance company· successfully argued that it had insured the initial dissolved entity and
not the reformed entity. A similar argument could be raised for LLCs, if under the
operating agreement or state law a transfer causes dissolution of the LLC.
In response, title companies have issued to partnerships Fairway endorsements, which
generally provide that the policy accrues to the entity despite transfers of interests.
Similarly, Fairway endorsements should be requested for LLC title policies.
Venture and Growth Businesses
Growing businesses are complicated enterprises that balance competing interests. The
equity interests are typically in the hands of the original entrepreneurs, who may desire to
use some equity to reward employees and keep them involved in the business as it grows.
Outside investors may demand equity positions, or make loans convertible into equity
positions. The company may also have conventional loans, secured by the business's
assets.
The use of LLCs should be advantageous for new and growing businesses, particularly
those that desire "venture capital" investment. Owners ofsuch businesses generally desire
flow-through or p~ership tax tr~t1llent. In· the early stages of growing businesses,
























addition, the owners and investors may desire to avoid double taxation of the current
income, and appreciation if the business or assets are ultimately sold.
Investors in venture and growth businesses often want to be involved in the management
of the business on a regular or emergency basis. For this purpose, an LLC is a better
investment vehicle than a limited partnership. Unlike a partnership, LLC investors may
be involved in management without being exposed to the LLC's obligations.
An S corporation is an unwieldy vehicle for venture capital investments. A number of
venture capital investors are corporations or limited partnerships, entities that cannot own
S corporation stock. In addition, an S corporation may have only one class of stock,
which creates difficulty in structuring venture capital investments in S corporations. In
contrast, there are no restrictions on who may own interests in LLCs. In addition, LLCs
may have different classes of stock.
Corporate Joint Ventures
Limited liability companies can be useful in corporate joint ventures, which are specific
business activities carried on by two or more businesses. Joint ventures have typically
been structured in one of two ways.
• If the joint venture involves a relatively low-risk activity, corporate participants fonn
a general partnership, with the participants themselves acting as general partners.
• Where the business activity involves greater risk, the corporate venturers may each
fonn a wholly owned single-purpose corporate' subsidiary to act as a general partner
ofa general partnership carrying out the venture's activities.
Partnerships are a preferred vehicle for corporate joint ventures because they feature pass-
through taxation. This avoids a layer of taxation that would be present if the joint venture
was carried out by as a corporation.
If the joint venture entity was owned by or operated as a C corporation, there is a tax
detriment, although it can be reduced by a dividends-received deduction. Alternatively,
an S corporation could act as the joint venture or its partners and pass through taxation.
Unfortunately, restrictions on ownership of S corporation stock, limits the use of an S
corporation as a joint venture vehicle.
An LLC is a better vehicle for a joint ·venture than either a corporation or a general
partnership:
• An LLC features pass-through taxation, making it superior in most cases to use ofa C
corpo~on; .
• There are no limits on ownership ofan LLC, unlike an S 'corporation; an~
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• Because it has limited liability, the LLC can be the joint venture. There is no need to
establish special purpose corporate subsidiaries to own the joint venture, as there is
with partnerships.
Estate Planning
Using a limited partnership or LLC to own and transfer interests in a family's assets can
provide significant benefits:
• Retained control: Parents can control the assets by retaining voting or management
rights, while at the same time transferring economic interests in the assets to other
family members;
• Easy transfers: Only the general partner or LLC manager must execute the necessary
documents. The signatures of all involved family members are not required;
• Flexibility: Interests with different attributes can be issued. Su~ject to limitations
provided in the Internal Revenue Code, parents can maximize the appreciation of
assets in the hands of their children, while retaining income for their own needs.
Disproportionate transfers of interests can differentiate among children on the basis of
their relative contributions to the family and its businesses; and
• Reduced estate tax: The value of the LLC or partnership interests may be discounted
for minority ownership and limited marketability.
What Entity Should Be Used?
C corporations are generally not good choices as estate planning entities. While they
have limited liability, there is a corporate-level tax imposed on C corporations, which
makes them less economically viable than entities with pass-through tax treatment.
Although S corporations provide pass-through tax treatment and limited liability, the
one class of stock restriction on S corporations limits their flexibility and use in estate
planning. For example, where a family wishes to transfer appreciated assets to children
while retaining the stream of income for parents, an S corporation would not work.
A general partnership provides pass-through taxation and flexibility in allocating
interests among family members. If the family assets involve a significant risk of liability,
however, all family members would be liable for the partnership's obligations. In
addition, all family members would have at least the apparent authority to bind the
partnership by their actions. This is generally not desired in family estate planning.
Limited partnerships and LLCs have the principal elements desired in a family .estate
planning entity~ Both provide pass-through taxation and significant flexibility in






















party to be generally liable for the partnership's obligations. Although this requirement
can be satisfied by the creation of a general partner corporation, it involves additional
expense and complication. The advantage of the LLC is that limited liability exists
without having to create a separate corporate general partner.
There are several problems, however, with using LLCs for estate planning. First, under a
number of statutes, members may withdraw from the LLC and demand payment of the
value of their LLC interest. Where the LLC allows parents to distribute family assets
while retaining control during their lifetimes, the right of their children to prematurely
withdraw and demand payment is a serious defect. Because of such potential disruption,
LLCs should not be used as estate planning vehicles where such withdrawal is permitted.
Second, many statutes still require unanimous consent for transfers of interests. Where
parents wish to periodically make transfers to children, they may not want to seek consent
from (or even infonn) non-recipients. LLCs should not be used for estate planning where
such consents are required.
Third, in states that prohibit free transferability of LLC interests, family relationships
among partners or members may be a problem. Under the "lack of separate interests"
theory, a requirement in a partnership agreement that partners consent to transfers is
disregarded if the partners' relationship makes the consent likely. Under the theory, the
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SERIES B PREFERRED STOCK FINANCING
SAl\1:PLE TERl\1: SHEET
March 1, 2001 .
The intent of this document (this "Tenn Sheet") is to describe, for negotiationl
purposes only, some key tenns of the proposed agreement between VC Fund III, L.P.
and/or its affiliates ("VC"), other.potential investors (together, with VC, the "Investo~s")




















Minimum of $15,000,000. Maximum of $25,000,000.
4,285,714 to 7,142,857 shares of Series B Preferred Sitock
("Series B Preferred"), initially convertible into an dRual
number of shares of Common Stock.
$3.50 per share (the "Purchase Price").
The Company \viII use the proceeds from the Series B
Preferred financing for its growth and expansion. No
proceeds will be used to repurchase or cancel any securities
held by any investor.
VC shall serve as the lead investor for this round of
financing and shall purchase approximately $5 millio~ of
Series B Preferred. Other Investors must be acceptablb to
VC and the Company.
The initial closing (the "Closing") shall be on or before
April 31, 2001. There may also be a subsequent closing
(the "Subsequent Closing") for the sale ofup to the balajnce
of the authorized shares of Series B Preferred not solcli at
the Closing. All sales made at the Subsequent Clo$ing
shall be made on the identical tenns and conditions (o_her




This Term Sheet will expire on March 7,2001 unless executed by
Tech Company, Inc. on or prior to that date.
C-3
Capitalization: The capitalization of the Company on a fully-diluted basis
as ofMarch 1, 2001 is as follows:
Common Stock
Series A Preferred Stock




Warrants to purchase Series A Preferred
Options to purchase Common Stock




Note: The Warrants to purchase Series A Preferred do not
include a warrant to purchase up to 175,000 shares of
Series A Preferred at th~ initial exercise price of $1.25 per
share, the exercise of which is contingent upon the
satisfaction ofcertain conditions.
Rights and Preferences of Series B Preferred
Dividend Rights:
Liquidation Preference:
The Series B Preferred will be entitled to an annual per
share dividend equal to 7% of the Purchase Price, payable
when and if declared by the Board of Directors (the
"Board"). The dividends will be non-cumulative and will
be paid prior to the payment of any dividend with respect to
the Common Stock.
In the event of any liquidation, dissolution or winding up of
the Company, the holders of the Series B Preferred will be
entitled to receive a per share amount equal to the Purchase
Price (subject to anti-dilution adjustments) plus all declared
but unpaid dividends, prior to any distribution to the
holders of the Common Stock and Series A Preferred (the
"First Preference Distribution"). If the Company has
insufficient assets to pennit payment in fuil of the
preference amount to which all Series B shareholders are
entitled, then the assets of the Company will be distributed
ratably to the holders of the Series B shareholders in
proportion to the preference amount each such holder
would otherwise be entitled to receive as provided herein.
After payment of the First Preference Distribution has been
made, the holders of the Series B Preferred will be entitled
to receive an additional per share amount equal to the
Purchase .. Price (subject to anti-dilution adjustments) plus
all declated but· 'PIlpaid divid.ends, provided, that such
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payment is made: (i) prior to any distribution to the holders
of the Common Stock, and (ii) concurrently with! any
distribution to the holders of the Series A Preferred in ~ per
share amount equal to the applicable original puwrhase
price (subject to anti-dilution adjustments) for the Se ·es A
Preferred, plus all declared but unpaid dividends. I the
Company has insufficient assets to pennit payment i~ full
of the preference amount to which all Series A and Se es B
Preferred shareholders are entitled, then the assets 0 the
Company will be distributed ratably to the holders of the
Series A and Series B Preferred in proportion tol the
preference amount each such holder would otherwisb be
entitled to receive as provided herein.
In the event of a sale of substantially all of the assets of the
Company or a merger, acquisition or sale of voting cotltrol
in which the shareholders of the Company do not oWn a
majority of the outstanding shares of the surviwing
corporation (a "Change in Control"), the Investors may
elect to treat such a transaction as a liquidation or
dissolution for purposes of detennining amounts to be
received by the Investors and priority of such receipt.
The holders of the Series B Preferred shall have the option
to require the Company to redeem all or any part of ~heir
Series B Preferred shares, at any time after five years *om
the closing, for a price equal to the greater of (a)! the
Purchase Price, plus all [accrued/declared] but unpaid
dividends, or (b) the fair market value per share~ as
detennined by a qualified, independent appraiser
acceptable to both the Company and Investors or, if, the
Company and Investors cannot agree on an appraiser, I the
average of the fair market value per share as detennine~ by
a qualified, independent appraiser selected by the Com any
and the fair market value per share as detennined y a
qualified, independent appraiser selected by the InvestorS.
The holders of the Series B Preferred will have the right to
convert the Series B Preferred into shares of Common
Stock at any time. The initial conversion rate for the Series
B Preferred will be on a one-for-one basis, subject to
adjustments as provided herein.
This Term Sheet "ill expire on March 7, 2001 unless executed by
Tech Company, Inc. on or prior to that date.
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Automatic Conversion: The Series B Preferred will automatically be converted into
Common Stock, at the then applicable conversion rate,
upon the closing of an underwritten public offering of
shares of Common Stock of the Company at a public
offering price of at least $7.00 per share and gross proceeds
to the Company in excess of $25,000,000 (a "Qualified
IPO").
Anti-Dilution Provisions: The conversion price .of the Series B Preferred is subject to
proportional adjustment in the event of (i) any split or
combination of ~he Company's capital stock, (ii) a
declaration of a dividend or distribution of its capital stock,
or (iii) certain consolidation, merger or exchange
transactions.
The conversion price of the Series B Preferred will be
adjusted on a weighted average basis upon the Company's
issuance of additional shares of Common Stock (or
warrants or rights to purchase Common Stock or securities
convertible into Common Stock) for a consideration per
share that is less than the conversion price of the Series B
Preferred. The conversion price of the Series B Preferred
will not be adjusted for issuances of Common Stock upon
(i) the exercise or conversion of any presently outstanding
securities, or (ii) the future issuance of stock options to
employees, officers or directors pursuant to a stock option
plan, so long as such options are granted (a) with the
approval of the Board, and (b) at a fair market value.
Registration Rights: Demand, Piggyback and S-3 Rights: The holders of Series
B Preferred may require, on not more than two occasions
after the earlier of the second anniversary of their
investment, or six months after a Qualified IPO, the
Company to use its best efforts to file a registration
statement covering the public sale of the Company's
securities having an aggregate public offering price of at
least $5,000,000; provided, that the Company will have the
right to delay such demand registration under certain
conditions for a period not to exceed 90 days each time in
any 12 month period.
The holders of Series B Preferred shall be entitled to (i)
unlimited piggyback registration rights to register their
shares i~ any registration of the shares of the Company by
.the Company or'its management, and (ii) three registrations
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per year on Fonn S-3 (minus any demand registrations as
described above).
Expenses: The Company will bear the registration expenses
(excluding underwriting discounts and commissions but
including all other expenses related to the registration) of
all such registrations. .
Tennination: The registration rights will tenninate five
years after the closing of a Qualified IPO, and will not
apply to any holder who can sell all ,of such holder's shares
in any three-month period without registration pursuant to
Rule 144 promulgated under the 1933 Act.
Each share of Series B Preferred will carry a number of
votes equal to the number of shares of Common Stock then
issuable upon its conversion into Common Stock. The
Series B Preferred will generally vote together with the
Common Stock and the other series of Preferred Stock, and
not as a separate class, except as provided below.
Consent of the holders of a majority of the outstanding
Series B Preferred will be required for: (i) any amendment
or change of the rights, preferences, privileges or powers
of, or the restrictions provided for the benefit of, the Series
B Preferred; (ii) any amendment of the Company's Articles
of Incorporation that adversely affects the rights of the
Series B Preferred differently than those of the other series
of Preferred Stock; or (iii) any increase in the number of
authorized shares of the Series B Preferred.
Consent of the holders of a majority of the outstanding
Preferred Stock voting together as a class will be required
for: (i) any purchase or redemption of any shares of
Preferred Stock other than a redemption pursuant to the
Company's Articles of Incorporation; (ii) repurchase or
acquisition of any shares of Common Stock in an amount
greater than $25,000 in any 12 month period, other than
pursuant to the tenns of an equity incentive agreement with
a director, employee, consultant or other service provider
giving the Company the right to repurchase shares upon the
tennination of such services; (iii) any amendment or
change of the rights, preferences, privileges or powers ot:
or the restrictions provided for the benefit ot: the Preferred
Stock, (iv) any action that authorizes, creates or issues
snares' of any class of stock having preferences superior 10
This Term Sheet will expire on March 7, 2001 unless executed by
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Right of First Refusal:
Co-Sale Rights:
Additional Rights:
or on a parity with the Preferred Stock, (v) any action that
reclassified any outstanding shares into shares having
preferences or priority as to dividends or assets senior to or
on a parity with the preference of the Preferred Stock; (vi)
any merger or consolidation of the Company with one or
more other corporations in which the shareholders of the
Company immediately. after such merger or consolidation
hold stock representing less than a majority of the voting
power of the outstanding stock of the surviving
corporation; (vii) the sale of all or substantially all the
Co.mpany's assets; (viii) the liquidation or dissolution of the
Company; (ix) the declaration or payment of a dividend on
the Common Stock; (x) any subsidiary to sell or otherwise
transfer any shares of capital stock to any individual Qr
entity other than the Company or any holder of Preferred
Stock; or (xi) any increase or decrease in the authorized
number of shares of Preferred Stock.
Each holder of Series B Preferred will have a right of first
refusal to purchase up to its pro rata share (based on its
percentage of the Company's outstanding common shares,
calculated on a fully-diluted, as-converted basis) of any
securities offered by the Company (other than securities
issued to employees,directors or consultants or pursuant to
an acquisition), on the same price and tenns and conditions
as the Company offers such securities to other potential
investors.
Until a Qualified IPQ has occurred, if any founder of the
Company or any member of the Company's senior
management who is not a founder, proposes to sell shares
to a new investor, holders of the Series B Preferred shall be
offered the right to sell their shares on a pro rata basis in
such sale; provided, that such member of senior
management who is not a founder, shall be bound by this
provision only until the earlier of the closing date of a
Qualified IPQ, or one year after his or her voluntary or
involuntary tennination ofemployment with the Company.
In the event that any of the Company's existing
shareholders are entitled to any rights, privileges or
protections on tenns more favorable than those herein
afforded to the Series B Preferred, the Series B Preferred
shall be entitled to the benefits of such more favorable
tenns.
This Term Sheet will expire on l\farch 7, 2001 unless executed by
Tech Company, Inc. on or prior to that date.
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Governance, Documentation and Closing
Employment Agreements: Each key officer and employee of the Company will have
entered into acceptable confidential information,
noncompetition, and invention assignment agreements. The
Company will use its best efforts to have the remainder of


























In connection with a Qualified IPO, all holders of Series B
Preferred will agree not to sell or to offer to sell any
securities of the Company for up to 180 days following the
date of the Qualified IPO upon the request of the Company
and its underwriters. All officers and directors, all holders
of Preferred Stock, and any greater than 1.0 % shareholder
will be required to enter into similar lock-up agreements.
The Articles of Incorporation and Byla\vs shall provide that
the"number of Directors be five. Pursuant to the Articles of
Incorporation, the Series B Preferred shareholders (voting
as a class) shall have the right to elect two directors.
Expenses of the Directors incurred in fulfilling their duties
as Directors shall be borne by the Company.
The purchase of shares of Series B Preferred will be made
(i) pursuant to a Stock Purchase Agreement reasonably
acceptable to the Company and the Investors, which
agreement shall contain, among other things, customary
terms and conditions, customary representations and
warranties of the Company, and covenants of the Company
reflecting the provisions set forth herein, and (ii) upon the
occurrence ofappropriate conditions ofclosing, including
the delivery of an opinion ofcounsel for the Company.
The Closing of this transaction is subject to due diligence
(which shall be completed prior to the Closing of this
transaction) and complete satisfaction by the Investors and
Company with the final terms and conditions of all
documents contemplated herein, as well as complete
satisfaction that there has been no material adverse change
in the market, business, financial condition, prospects,
management, ownership or structure of the Company from
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This Term Sheet will expire on l\Iarch 7, 2001 unless executed by





The Company shall obtain key person life insurance on
selected key executives in amounts to be agreed to by
Investors and the Company, with proceeds payable to the
Company.
Prior to the Closing, 10% of the Company's Common
Stock shall be set aside for a management and employee
stock option plan. Stock issued pursuant to the plan shall
vest over a period no shorter than four years.
So )ong as shares of Series B Preferred are outstanding, the
Company will deliver to each holder of Series B Preferred
(i) audited annual financial statements within 120 days of
the end of each fiscal year, (ii) unaudited quarterly financial
statements within 45 days of the end of each fiscal quarter,
(iii) unaudited monthly financial statements within 30 days
of the end of each month, and (iv) an annual budget within
30 days of the end of each fiscal year and following
approval of the Board.
The Company shall pennit each holder of at least 250,000
shares of Series B Preferred to visit and inspect the
Company's properties, to examine its books of account and
records, and to discuss the Company's affairs, finances and
accounts with its officers.
Commencing upon the execution of this Tenn Sheet and
continuing for 60 days thereafter, the Company shall not,
and shall ensure that none of its employees, officers,
directors, affiliates, agents or representatives discuss this
Tenn Sheet, or solicit, initiate, encourage or discuss the
issuance of its capital stock for capital raising purposes, or
other financing transaction, or furnish any infonnation with
respect to, assist or participate in or in any other manner
facilitate any such transaction, except with the prior
approval ofVC or upon the prompt notification by VC to
the Company that it no longer plans to consummate the
transactions contemplated by this Term Sheet; provided,
however, that the foregoing shall not apply to any
communications by the Company, to the extent necessary
to consummate the transaction contemplated by this Tenn
Sheet, with any ofits existing shareholders and the
following potential investors: Strategic Investor 1, VC








Expenses: The Company shall reimburse the Investors for the
reasonable legal fees of its counsel for this transaction, in
an amount not to exceed $25,000, plus direct, out-of-
pocket, reasonable and documented expenses, and for the
direct, out-of-pocket, reasonable and documented expenses
incurred by the Investors in connection with this
transaction, payable at Closing or payable if the Company







Except with respect to the Exclusivity and Expenses provisions above, this Tenn
Sheet shall not constitute a legally binding agreement between us, but is intended to serve
as the basis for the preparation of the agreements contemplated herein. Except for the
Exclusivity and Expenses provisions, no legally binding agreement shall arise until the
agreements contemplated herein, in mutually satisfactory fonn, have been duly
authorized, executed and delivered by both parties.
Furthennore, it is the intention ofboth parties to consummate the transactions
contemplated by this Tenn Sheet on those tenns reflected in this Tenn Sheet.
If the Company is in agreement with the foregoing, it should sign the
ackno\vledgement at the end of this letter.
VC Fund III, L.P.
By _r John Smith, Managing Director
r Acknowledged and agreed to:
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Payment upon Sale of
Compan)T:
Conversion:
TERl\IS OF BRIDGE OFFERING FOR
Cool Company, Inc.
March 1, 2001
Cool Company, Inc. (the· "Company").
VC B~dge Fund II, L.P., Strategic Purchaser X, Inc., and
others to be detennined ("Purchasers").
Demand Convertible Promissory Notes (the "Notes").
$10,000,000 principal amount, with a minimum of $6,000,000
for closing.
Working Capital.
On the earlier ofdemand by holders of66 2/3% of the Notes
or the sale of the Company.
10%, accrued and compounded quarterly.
If the Company is sold or the Notes are paid in cash before
conversion of the Notes, the Purchasers will receive in
payment of the Notes an amount equal to 2x principal plus all
accrued interest.
Purchasers shall convert principal and interest into the next
Series ofPreferred Stock offered by the Company, with the
approval of the Purchasers as required below, without the
payment of any additional consideration by Purchasers. The
Notes will convert at a price equal to the price per share
offered in such preferred equity offering. At the time ofany
such conversion, the Purchasers shall, with the cooperation of
the Company, become parties to the Company's co-sale,
investor rights and stockholder voting agreements with






The Notes will contain negative covenants prohibiting the
following unless approved by holders of a supennajority of
the outstanding Notes, such supennajority percentage to be
detennined in connection with negotiation of the definitive
documents:
--sale or recapitalization of the Company by any method
(merger, sale of substantially all assets etc.) at an enterprise
valuation of less than $250 million;
--any issuance of equity securities or securities convertible
into the Company's equity, with reasonable exceptions for
employee compensation awards approved by the Board of
Directors;
--incurrence of any additional indebtedness, other than
ordinary course trade payables, in an amount exceeding
$200,000 in the aggregate;
--sale of any assets outside the ordinary course ofbusiness;
--any acquisition ofor investment in any other business;
--any transaction, other than transactions negotiated on an
ann's length basis, outside the ordinary course of the
Company's business; or
--any liquidation, dissolution or winding up of the Company.
For each $1 ofNotes purchased, each Purchaser will also
receive nominal warrants to purchase 2.5 shares of common
stock.
The Company will pay all expenses reasonably incurred by
Purchasers in connection with this contemplated transaction,
including, without limitation, all reasonable legal and
accounting fees, subject to a cap of$25,000.
Completion of documentation for this transaction that is
satisfactory to both parties, which includes a representation




























Receipt ofall necessary approvals, including approvals of
Series A, B and C holders and any approvals required for
Purchasers to purchase Notes, including any internal
committee approvals.
Receipt ofcustomary opinions of inside and outside counsel
to the Company.
Completion of satisfactory due diligence by the Purchasers.
Following execution of the Notes, delivery ofmonthly
financial statements to Purchasers within 30 days of each
month end.
Following execution of the Notes, delivery ofmonthly
pipeline reports to Purchasers within 10 days of each month
end.
Board of Directors: Within 30 days of the date of the Notes, the Company shall
fill the vacant seat on its Board of Directors with a person
approved by Purchasers holding a majority of the Notes.
Entire Understanding: This summary ofproposed Terms ofBridge Offering
supersedes all prior discussions, term sheets and
understandings, whether written or oral, regarding the subject
matter hereof.
Non-binding: This summary ofproposed Terms ofBridge Offering, other
than the Company's obligation to pay all expenses reasonably
incurred in connection with this contemplated transaction,
shall not be binding, but shall serve as the basis for
discussions toward a possible transaction and negotiations of







VC Bridge Fund II, L.P.














The Venture Capital Industry
WHAT Is VENTURE CAPITAL
















Venture Cal)ital is Inoncy provided l.,y prl)fessiol1ats \vho in\:cst alongside 111anagcnlent in )!OUllg,
rapidly gro\ving compaJlies that 11a\'C the potential to deve]op illtO signitlcal1t econonlic contributors.
Venture capital is an inlpoltant source of equity for start-up cOlllpanies.
Professionally· lllanaged \-renture Cal.,ital-firtTIs generall)/ are private l,altnershills or closel)'-11eld
corporations funded by private and ])ublic pension funds, cndO\Vn1cnt funds" tCJundations..
~orporations, \vcalthy' individuals" 1l)rcign invcstors. and the \.rcnture capitalists thC111Selvcs.
\'\~nture capitalists gcnerall).':
• Finance nc\v and rapidly gr()\\·~ing cOlnpanics;
• Purchase equity securities;
• i\ssist in the dc\:elc)pmcnt of nc\v })roducts or services;
• ;\dd \:-aluc to the cOll1pany' through active participation:
• l"ake higher risks \vith the expectation of higher re\yards:
• Have a long-tel1n ori~ntatioll
\\-"hen considering an invcstn1ent" venture capitalists carefulJ)! screen the technical and business
il1crits of the proposed c.o111pan)!. \!cnturc cal,italists only invest in. a slllalll,ercen.tage of the
businesses they rcvic\v and ha\'"c a long-tcrnl perspective. Going tor\vard, they activ'ely \vork \vith the
cOlnpan~/s Inanagemcnt b:y conttibuting th.cir eXI,cricnce and husiness sav\-)! gaillcd troln helping
other C01nl)Unies \vit11 sinlilar gro\vth challenges.
Venture ca])jtalists ll1itigatc the risk of \!enture investing t)}' developing a pOltfc)lio ofyoung
cOlllpanics in a single \:-enture fund. lvtany tilnes the)' \vill Co-illvest \vith othcr professional venture
capital firlns. In addition~ n1any venture partnershi.p \vill nlunage Inultiplc funds sinlultancouslj'..For
decades.. venture capitalists hu\'c nurtured the gro\vth of i\111eri~ats lligll technology and
entrepreneurial C01l1n1unities resulting in significant jol) creation, ccononlic gro\vth and intcnlational
conlpetitiveness. COlnpanies such as Digital Equiplnent COll'oration~Apple, Federal Express..
COIllpaq, Sun Ivticros)'stcn1S, Intel, Ivlicrosoft and Gcnentech arc fatnous exanlples of c01l1panics that
received \!enture capital early in their developnlent.
Private Equity Investing
Venture capital investing 113S gro\\~n frotTI a snlall investnlent 1)001 in the 19605 ancl early 1970s to a
n1ainstrealn asset class th.at is a \:ial))e and significant patt (.1fthe institutional and corp(lrate
in\!eSUllent porttolio. ReCe11t))'.. SOine investors lla\'e been referrillg to \-renture in\:esting and 11u):out
i~vesting as "private equity investing." TIlis tenll can lle confusing l,ccause SOlllC in the in,Tcstment
-ltldustry use the term ~~privateequity1! to refer on])! to buyout fund in,·r~stjng. In an}· case, ,an
institutional in\'estor \\!ill allocate 2C}o to 3<}i» of their iIlstitutional p{)rtfolil) for in\·restlllcnt in
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CUI1·cntly, over 50~'o of investlllents in v·enture capital/1Jliv'ate equit), conlCS fi'oln institutional11ublic
(lnd ptivatc pension funds, \vith the balance coming ti·onl cndO\Vnlcnts~ tt1un.dations" insurance
conlpanics~ banks. indi\·riduals and other entities \VllO seek to diversif)' their ])o11t()lio \vith this
invcstlTICnt class.
What is a Venture Capitalist?
The t)-'}lical per~on-on-the-street depiction of a 'lcnture capitalist is that t11' a \\~ealthy financier 'V}lO
\vallts to fund start-up conlpanies. Tile IJercejJtion is that a ]lerSOn \Vl10 develolJs a bran,! ne\v cllange-
thc-\vorld invention needs capital: thus, if they can"t gct capital from a bank or froln t}lcir o\vn.
110ckcts, they' Cll1ist the )lclp of a \:enture capitalist. .
In truth~ venture ~apital and. private equit.y till11S are po·ols of capital. t)-'pical1y ()rganized as a linlited
partnership.. that i.llvests in cOlnpanies that represent tl1e o!)pOl1unity for a high rate of return \vithin
five to sevcn )!cars. T'he venture capitalist ll1ay look at several hundred invcstll1cnt OP.pol1unitics
before investing in 011ly a fe\\-' selected cOl11panies \vith fa\rorable in\;oestInent oppo11ullities. Far tl·onl
being sinlply· passi\!c financiers, venture ca.pitalists foster gro\vth in cOlnpanics through their
involvCll1cnt in the m3nagenlent~ strategic marketing and planning oft11eir investee cOlnt'H1nies. The)!
arc entrepreneurs first and financiers second.
E\'en individuals Ina)! be venture capitalists. In the earl:y days of\:cnture capital jnvcstlnen.t~ in tllC
J950s and 19(jOs~ individual investors \vcre the archct)·'.pal v~nturc investor. \\!'hilc this t)1JC of
individual in\'estnlent did not totally disappear~ tIle nlodcrn \'"enture tirnl enlcrged as tIlt' dcJtn.inant
\'~nturc investnlcnt vehicle. Ho\vever, in the last fe\v ):ears" individuals have again beconle a p()tent
and incrcasingl),r larger part of the carl:y stage start-tip venture Ii f(' cycle. Th.csc "angel invcstors" \vill
111cntor a COll1pany and ])rovidc needed ca.pital and expertise to 'help develop cOlnpanies. l\ngel
investors nlay either be \vealth)! people \vitll tnanagclllcnt eXl-,ertisc or retired business l1len and
\Y0I11Cn \vho seek' the O]Jportunit)! f()r first-hand l}usines~ deve]oplnent.
Investment Focus
\,rcnture capitalists 111ay be generalist or s'pecialist investors depending on their invcstnlcnt strateg):.
\tcnturc capitalists can be generalists" investing in \:arious industry sectors. or various geoh,Tfuphic
lOl;ations, or v·arious stages of a cOlnpany's life. .t\lternati\.:ely, the~y 111ay be specialists in one or t\\'O
industry sectors" or nlay' seek to in\,rcst in onl)! a localized geOhTfa!)hic area.
Not all \;oenture capitalists ill,/est in "start-ups." \Vhile \!enture timls \vill inv'est in conlpanies tllat are
in their initial start-til' tnodes, venture capitalists ,viII also invest in cOln})anies at various stages of the
business life cy'cle..1\. venture cal,it,11ist tnay in\'est before t11ere is a real product or c·onlpany
organized (so called "seed ilt\'csting"), or l11ay IJrovide capital to start up a cOlnpan)! in its ·first or
second stages of developlnent knO\Vll as "earl):, stage investing." Also, tIle \:,enturc capitalist nla):,
provide needed financing to IlClp a C()1l1pany grO\V llcyond a critical 1l1aSS to beconle 1110re sllccessful
(!'cxpansioll stage fillancing").
The venture cal,italist Inay invest in a conlpany tllrougllout the Ctlmpany's life cycle and therefore
some funds fl)CUS on later stage in\Tcstiltg by' l,ro\!iding final)cil1g to help the cOmpatl): gro\v to a
.'critiCa~mass t~~attractl'ublj~ firiancil1gt.hrougha ·stockofferi~£. Altern~ti\-wel)~. the \·'enture ca]Jitalist
n1ay l1elp the compan:y attract a merger.. or acquisition \vitll anotller cOll1pan)f bY·l,rovidi11g liquidit):




At the other end of the spectrum, sonlC venture funds sllccialize in the acquisitiol), tllrllarOUlld or
recapitalizatiou of public and pri'vate cOlnpanies that represent favoral)le investnlent opportunities.
There are \!enture funds that \vill be broadly diversitied and \vill in"rcst in cOlnpanies in \"ariolls
industry sectors as diverse as scn1iconductors 41 so11\vare.. retailing and restaurants and others that rna)"





















\\llilc high technology investll1ent Inakes up nlost of tIle \:enture illvestiIlg ill the U.S., and the
venture industl)' gets a lot of attention tor its high technol~lgy'in\·restlllcntS41 v'enturc capitalists also
invest in COtnlJanies such as construction, industrial products, b·usiness services, etc. There are several
firms that 113ve specialized in retail con~pan)·' investment an{! others tllat have a t'(lCUS ill investing
only in "socially rcsl1onsil,Ieft start-up cndea\~t)rs. .
\!cnturc tlrnls conlC in v'urious sizes fronl s111ull seed sl~ecialist filTI1S of onl}p a fe\v lnillion dollars
und('r Jnanagenlcnt to fi11ns \vith over a billion dollars iTl in.\··csted capital around the \vorlcL The
COnllTIOn dcnonlinalor in all of these t}l)CS of venture investing is that the venture capitalist is not a
passive invcstor~ llut has an active and vested interest in guiding.. leading and gnJ\ving tIle companies
they have invested in. r-fhe:y seek to add \;aluc tl1rougll their eXllcricnce in in,,'csting in tens and
hundreds of COn1l)anies.
SOUle \:enture firlns are suc~essful b): creating synergies bet\\·een the \,warious conlJ,anies the)" ha-ve
invested in; t~)r cxa1l1plc onc C01l1pan)! that has a great soft\vare product l,ut does not have adequate
distribution tcchnologY'1113)/ l,c paired \vith another COlllpany' or its Inanagcll1cnt in the venture
portfolio that has better distribution technology.
Length of Investment
\!.cnture capitalists ,viII help conlpanies gro\\-' .. l,ut they' eventually seek to exit the in\-'cstnlcnt in thrce
to seven Y'ears_ i\n earl}' stage investment nlake take seven to ten )fears to Inature.. \Vllile a later stage
invcstnlent nlatlV (>nlv take a fc\v \-'cars, so the apl:lctite tt)r tIle in\,'cstnlcnt life cvcle nlust 11c
"" .t. .,
congruent \vith the linlited pa11nerships" appetite for liquidit)/. The \renture in\··est:Il1ent is neither a
short tern1 nor a liquid inv'cstnlcnt.. but an investlncnt that n1ust be nladc \vith careful diligencc and
cxpcl1ise.
Types of Firms
There are se·veral 1)rpes of \renture capital firms, but most ll1ainstream finns in\.res1 their caIJital
through funds organized as litnited partncrsllips in \Vllicl1 the v'cnture capital firm serves as the
general partller. The nlost COlllnlon t)'pe of \·penture tinll is an independent vellture fiml tllat 1135 no
affiliations \vith any other financial institution. These arc called "!Jriv'ate independent tinlls". Venture
fillns 111ay also be afliliates or subsicIiaries ofa conlmercial bank, in\:estlnent bank or insurance
cOmpatlY and make illvestments on behalfofoutside in'/cstors or the l~arent fil1n's clients. Still ot}ler
tinlls may be subsidiaries of non-financiaL industrial c.orporations 111akillg il1\:esttnents on behalfof
the parcl1t itself: These latter firms are t)l)ically ca~led "direct in\!cstors" or "corporate venture
iJ1Vestors."
0t11~r()rgal~zatil)llS may' illclude govemtnent affiliated in\7estlnent proga-anls tllat help start Ul)




The Venture Capital Industry Page 4 of7
.Investnlellt C·onlpany Of SBle progranl adnlinistered b}p tIle S111all Business i\dlninistration.. in \vhich
a venture ca~.,ital finn. lllay augtncnt its o\vn funds \vith fedcral funds and lc\:cragc its in\.'cstlllcnt in
qualitied in\-/cstce cOlTI!Janies.
\\!hilc the prcdo111inant forln oforganization is the litllitcd paltncrship" in reccnt j~ears the tax code
has allo\ved the fomlation ofeither Linlited Liability Pal1nerships" (HL.LPs")'1 or Lilnitec1 Lial,ility
Compallies ("LLCs"), as alternative fClrms oforganization. Ho\vever. the limited })artnershi}l is still
the prcdonlinant organizational foml. TIle ad\;oantagcs alld disad\;eantages ofeach lIas to do \\;eith
liability. taxation issues and nlanagement res])onsil,ility. .
The \!enture capital finn \vill organize its l)artnershi~, as a pooled fund: that is, a fund 1llade up of tIle
general pal1ner and tl1e inv'estors or linlited pal1ners. These funds are typically organized as fixed life
partncrsllips. usually Ila\!in.g a life often years. Eacll fund is cal,italized l,y COlllll1itnlents of cal'ltal
ti-onl tlle linlited .pa11ners. Once the partnershi.p 11a5 reacllcd its target size, tIle l)artllersllip is closed to
further invcstlncnt frolll T1C\V invcstors or even existing investors so tI1C fund has a tixed capital pool
froln \VIlicl1 to nlake its in\·;estn1cnts.
Ljkc a tnutuu) fund conlpany, a venture capital tinn Illay· have nlore tllan onc fund in existence...A.
venture firln Inay raise another fund a fc\v ):cars after closing the tirst fund in order to continue to
invest in c01l1.panies and to provide nl0r~ opportunities f{)r existing and nc\v invest()rs. It is not
llnconlmon to see a successful firnl raise six or seven funds consecutively over the span often to
fitlecn years. Each fund is 111anaged separately and has its O\Vn investors or linlited ])artners and its
o\\~n general pal1ner. These funds" investment strategy' nlay be silnilar to other funds in the firln.
Ifo\vever. the firln ll1ay have one fund \vith a specific t()CllS and another \vith a different f{)cus and Y'ct
another \vith a broadly di\·rersified portfolio. Tllis depends on t11e strategy- and focus of the \:enture
tirnl itself.
Corporate Venturing
On~ i{)1111 of itlvcsting tllat \vas popular in the 1980s and is again vcr)'· p('pular is corporate \.'cllturing.
This is usuall)! called "direct investing" in 11ortfolio companies b)! venture capital progranls or
subsidiaries Ofn()llfinancial corporations. These in\·'cst111cnt \"ehicles seek to find qualified in,·:estnlcnt
opportunities that are congruent \vith the parent company's strategic tec]11101ogy or that !Jrovicle
syncrg)' or cost su\.'ings.
These corporate venturing prohTfatn.s lnay l,c loosel}· organized programs affiliated \vith existing
t,usincss develo])lnel1t progranls or ll1a): 11e selt:contained elltitics \vitl1 a strategic charter and 1l1ission
to Inake invcsttnents congnlcnt \vith the l,arent's strategic Inission. There areSOlnc \·'enture finlls that
specialize in ad\'ising., consulting and nlanaging a COl1)Oration's v'enturillg ])rograln.
The t}pical distinction bet\vcen corporate \,'cnturing and other t)l)eS of venture in,·rcstment ,·'chicles is
that corporate \;eenturing is usually pertomled ,vitIl corporate strategic objecti\:es in nliIld \vhile other
venture in\-'cstnlent \tehicles tY1Jically llave investment retlln1 or financial objecti'ves as their prinlat·y'
goal. TIlis may be a generalization as corporate \tenture programs are not itntllUne to financial
considerations.. but the distinction can be lllade.
.The other distinction .ofcorporate \'entu~eproiran1sisthattl1e~/usuallyinvest their l,arcnt'scapital







Because of the risk" lengtll of investment and illitluidit:y involved in venture in\:esting'! and because
the tninilnUtn cOJl1mitinent requirenlcnts are so higll, \.'cnturc Cal)ital fund investing is gcneralJ)! out of
reach t()r the average individual. TIle \:enture fUlld \villlla\:e fi-01TI a fe\v to almost 100 lill1ited
pJt1ners depending on the target size of the fund. Once the till11 has raised enougll C0111n1itnlcnts, it
\vill sta11 111aking in\:estln~nts in t1ortf()lio conlpanies.
t\:laking investlncnts in 110rtfolio conlpanies requires the venture firln to sta11 "calling" its linlited
partners con1n,itn1ents. The tirnl \vill collect Of "call" tIle needed inve~tll1ent capital ti-on1 the linlited
p,trtner in a seri~s oftranchcs cOlnll10111)! kno\vn as "capital calls". These CalJitul calls fronl tlle Iilllited
pal1ners to the v'enturc fund arc sonlctitl1cs called "takedo\vns" or "l)aid-in capital." SOlnc )!ears ago,
the venture fil1n \vould "call" t}lis capital do\vn in three equal instalinlents ov'er a tllree year period.
fvJore recent)}', venture tirlns ha\'c synchronized their funding cycles and call their c.apital on an. as-
needed basis for invest"lllent.
Thc 11roccss tllat venture films go thrOtlgh in seeking inlrestnlcnt cOlTItnitJ.l1cnts froln in\:cstors is
t)1.1ically· called "fund raisil1g." This Sl10u1d not be confused \\:oitll the actual in\:estlncnt in investee or
"portfolio" companies l.,y tIle \:enturc capital firms,: \vhich is also SOl11ctilnes called "fund raising" in
sOlne circles. TIle conlmitlnents of capital are raised ti·onl tl1e in\·restors during the t{)nl1ation of the
fund. A \!enture tim1 \vill set out prt)s})ecting for in\:estors \vith a target fund size. It \vill distribllte a
prl)sJ,ectus to ])otential investors and Inay take frolll severaI"\veeks to several nlonths to raise the
requisite cal,ital. The fund \vi]} seek con1mitln.cnts of capital tl·onl institutional iIlvcstors,
cndo\\·mcnts~ fi)undations and indi\:iduals \\"ho seck to in\fest p~U1 of their portfolio in OP.pol1unitics
\vith a higher risk factor and COlnll1cnsuratc OPPOl1unit)! for higllcr retUtl1S.
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Commitments and Fund Raising



















Lilnitcdpa11ners l11ake these invcstlnents in venture funds kno\vil1g tl1nt tllC invcstnlcnt \viII be 10ng-
tenn. It 111ay take several y'cars bef()re the first in\-'cstnlcnts starts to return })rocceds: in nlan:y cases the
illyested ca}Jital nla)! be tied llIl in an inves1l11ent t<'1f seven to ten years. Lilnited l'Hlrtners understand
that this illiquidity Inust be factored. into th~ir in\,'cstnlent dccision.
Other Types of Funds
r
r Since \:cnture tinlls are l)rivate firlns~ tilere is t}l)icalJy no \va): to exit bet()re thc j)[1l1nership totall.y1l1aturcs or eXl,ires. In recent years~ a nev~: 1l)rm of venture 11n11 lIas evolved: so-called "secondary"paltncrshiJ)s that special ize in purchasing the pOltf()lios of ill\!Cstcc COnlpany' investlnents ()f an
existing venture firm. Tllis t~YJ)e of partnership IJrovicles SOlne liqui(lity for tIle original investors.
These secondary l,artncrsllips.. ex})ecting a large rcturn~ invest in \\-"113t they consider to be
undervalued compallies.
r . Advisors and Fund of Funds
.·E,·ra]uating ,,~hich funds to invest inis ak·j.n t() Cl1()osing a good stock ll1anager or 111utual fUlld. exccll1
the decision to in\~est is a long-tenl1 cOlnn1itn1cnt. This in\~estlnentdecision takes considerable
in\:cstment kno\\:"ledge and titne on tIle part ()f the lilnited partner inv'estor. l"'helarger institutionsr
r http://www.nvca.comldef.html C - 21 2/26/2001
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have inV'estlnents in excess of 100 different v'enture capital and 11uy'out funds and continually' invest in
tlC\V funds as the)' are fonn.ed.
Stllnc Jinlitcd pa11ner investors l11a): lla\:e neither t1le resources nor the expertise to Inanagc and in,,·est
in tnany funds anti thus~ 111av seek to delc1!ute this decision to rUl illvestlnent advisor or so-called. .." "-
"gatekeeper". This advisor ,\fill pool the ,lssets of its \'arious clients and invest tl1ese proceeds as a
linlitcd pa11ncr into a venture or buyout fund cUI1·entl)r raising CalJital. Alternatively, an iIlvestor nlay
in\!cst in a "fund of funds.." \Vl1ich is a partnership organized to in'vest in other partnersIlips.. thus
providing tile lilnited IJartner investor \vith addcddi\!crsification and the ability to invest slnaller
anlounls into a \:ariety of funds.
Disbursements
-rhe investl11ent by venture funds into invcstee }')ortfolio cOl11panies is called "disbursenlents". f\
conlpany \vilJ recei ve capital in one or Ill0rc rounds of tinancing. A venture tirnl n1ay' Ina·kc these
disburscnlcnts b:y itself ()r in many' cases \vill co-invest ill a cOl11pan)! ,vith otller \,-cnture tillns ("co-
invcstnlcnt tt or "s)!ndication"). This s)'ndication pll)\!idcs lTIOre capital resources for the investee
COJllpan):. Fim1s co-invest 11ecause the COll1pan)! investment is cOllgruent \vitll tIle investnlent
strategies of various venture films and caell tinll \vill bring SOllle cotnr,ctiti\:e advantage to the
inv'cstll1ent.
The venture tirnl \vill provid~ capital and 111anagC111cnt expertisc and \vilI usual 1)-' also take a scat on
tIle b'Jard of the C0J11panyp to ensure that the invcsttn.cnt has th.c best chance ofbeing sllccessful. .IA...
pr1l1fc.)]io cOlnpany 111ay receive one round" or in luan,Y cases. several rounds of\:entur~ financing in its
life as needed..A. \!cnturc tinll Inay 110t invest all of its C01111l1itted capital~ but \vill reserve some
capital f()r later in\:cstlnent in SOJne of its successful cOlnpanies \vith additional Cal)ital needs.
Exits
Depending on the invcstnlcnt f~)cus and strategy of the venture fi11n~ it \-vill seek to exit the
invcsttnent in tIle p011folio ccnnpan): \vithin threc to ti\·rc }rears of the initial investnlcnt. \Vllile thc
initial],ublic offering ma,Y b~ tlle 1110St glanl0urous and heralded ty"pe of exit f<)r the venture cH))itaIist
and t)\vncrs of the C·olllpanyr, nlost successful exits of venture iIlvcstlTICnts occur through. a n·lcrger or
acquisition of t11e C0111pany b)! either the original f()undcrs or another C0111pany'. f\gaill, the expertise
of the venture fill1l in succcssfull): exiting its invcstnlcnt \viII dictate thc success of the cxit for
t1le1l1Selves and the o\vner of tIle conlpany.
IPO
The initial public offering is tlle nlost glan10urous and visible t)/pe of exit fc)r a venture investtnent. In
recent )'cars teclll1ology IPOs have been in tIle lill1Clight during the IPO 1100111 of tIle last six Years. At
public offeril1g, tile \'enture firm is considered an itlsider alld \vill recei\~e stock in the COln])an)'. but
tlle film is regulated and restricted in 11()\\' tllat stock can l,c sold or liquidated for several ).rcars .. Once
tllis stock· is freel)! tradable. usual I)' after al,out t\VO )!ears, tIle venture fund \vill distribute this stock Of
cash to its lilnitecl partner in\!est()f \vho Inay tllen 111anage the IJublic stock. as a regular stock }101ding











~'fergers and ,1cquisitions represent the Inost COlntnOn t)lJe of successful exit for 'VeJ1ture investnlents.
Tn the case ()f a lllcrger or acquisition" the '.1enture firm \vill receive stock Of casll fron1 the acq.uiring























L·ike a mutual fund, cacll \.:ellture fund has a net asset \'aIue.. or tIle \"alue of all in'vestor's 110ldings in
that tund at an)' gi,,'en tinle. Ho\vever.. unlike a tnutllal fund~ this ,,'allle is not detcll1lincd tllrougll a
public l11arket transactioJ1, but through a \:aluation of the ul1derlyillg pOl1folio. Remenlber, tl1e
investnlcnt is illiquid and at an)! point, the Jlartnershil' Ina)! have both private conlpanies and the stock
()fpublic conlpanies in its portfolio. These public stocks are usually sul'ject t() restrictions i:Or a
holding period and are thus subject to a"liquidity discount in the IJor1to)io \!aluation.
Each COtnpan)! is valued at an agreed-upon \:alue het\veen thc venture fillns \vhen invested in by the
venture fund or funds. In subsequent quarters" the \:enture investor \vill usual)}r keep this valuation
intact until a material event occurs to change tIle \:a]uc. \Tcnturc irlvcstors try to conservativel)' value
their investnlents using guidelines or standard industry practices and b:y tcrnlS outlined in the
prospectus t)ftJ1C fund. The \tcnture investor is usual})-r conser\:ati\!c in the valuation of cOlnpanics'l
but it is COlnnlon to find that early stage funds may ha\/e an even nlore conservative valuation of their
cornpanies due to tIl'· long Ii ves of their in.vcstIncnts \Vherl C011111arcd to other funds \\"it11 shorter
investnlcnt c)-'eles.
Managem~nt Fees
i\S an investll1cnt n1anagcr~ thc general partner ,viII typicall:y charge a 111anagernent fcc to cover the
C(lsts of Inanaging the C(llnlnittcd capital. The Inallagclllent fce \vill tlsuall)-' be paid qua11cr]yr 1~)r the
life of the fund or it 111a): IJe tapered or curtail~d in the later stages ofa fund's life. l'his is 1110St often
negotiated \\'itll in\'cstors upon fOll11ation of the fund in the tCl1ns an.d conditions of the invcstIncnt.
Carried Interest
nCan'icd irltcrest" is the tCl1n used to denote tIle profit split of~lrocecds to the genera] l,artncr. This is
the general partners' fee f()r carr)-ing t11e 111anagcrnent responsibility plus all the liability and f()r
providing the needed expertise to successfull)-r nlanagc tllC in\-'cstnlent. Therc are as 111any variations
of this pro11t Slllit both in the size and ho\v it is calc·ulated and accrued as tl1ere are firnls.
lnt!~ts1rJ_O..Y_~Y..i~'li i NVCA.Membe(s I Public. POliCY .Agenda i r~1embersn.ip
NVCA Pubiications I Events Calendar f Staff listing I AEEG I Related Links IIiQm~











PricewaterhouseCoopers and VentureOne release results of first joint venture capital
survey
MODERATE SLOWDOWN IN FOURTH QUARTER VENTURE INVESTMENT
TEMPERED BY INCREASES IN BIOTECHNOLOGY AND INTERNET INFRASTRUCTURE
Interestingly. the median amount raised by venture-backed companies in the fourth
quarter hit a record high of $12 million. up from $11.15 million in 30'00. This is due. in
part, to changes in investment by round class. John Gabbert, Director of Research at
VentureOne Corp.• observes, "Fourth quarter saw many later-stage deals that were
smaller than what we've come to expect; conversely. many early-stage financing rounds
were larger than normal." Furthermore. while many speculated that venture capitalists had
pulled back from early-stage investing during the quarter, the percentage of investment by
round remained remarkably consistent with the third quarter.
After five years of consistent growth. investment in Internet-related companies declined as
a percentage of the total for the third consecutive quarter and now constitutes 80% of
overall venture investment. As a whole: Internet companies suffered an ·11 % decline in the
San Francisco and San Jose, Calit.-February 6, 2001-Despite a downturn in the tourth
quarter, 2000 was a record-breaking year for investment in venture-backed companies,
according to the first combined statistics released by the PricewaterhouseCoopers
MoneyTree™ Survey in partnership with VentureOne. Total investment reached $68.8
billion in 2000, an 80% increase over the amount invested by venture capitalists in 1999. It
was a remarkable year for venture-backed Internet companies,as well. These companies
raised $56.9 billion, a 92% gain over 1999. However, fourth quarter's $13.7 billion raised
in 853 venture financing rounds constituted a 9% decrease in the number of financing
rounds and an 18% drop in the amount invested compared with third quarter. This marks
the third consecutive quarter of decline, driven largely by decreases in products and
services investment, which comprised only 23°k of the total amount invested, compared to
400k in the fourth quarter of 1999.
Tracy T. Lefteroff, global managing partner of the Venture Capital Practice of
PricewaterhouseCoopers, commented, "Perspective is important here. Despite the
'dot.bombs' of 2000, and despite the turmoil in the public markets, venture capital
investments were the highest in history. The quarter-to-quarter declines indicate that

































number of financing rounds and a 19% decrease in amount raised, but those focused on
infrastructure saw slight increases. While software/database investment declined only
mildly from its 3Q'00 peak, the remaining Internet sectors fared poorly. Investment in e-
commerce companies decreased 92% from its peak in 4Q'99 and now accounts for only
1% of Internet investment. Business services, which once attracted roughly half of the
Internet dollars, continued its steady decline in the fourth quarter, and is now at half its
10'00 high.
Though information technology companies accounted for a record 66% of the total amount
invested in 40'00, IT experienced. a 13% decrease in amount raised, largely due to
reductions in the dollars allocated to the electronics, software, and information services
segments. In contrast, semiconductor investment remained relatively stable after gaining
steadily throughout the year; in fact, semiconductor investment in 2000 was more than
double 1999's total. Communications and networking investment declined only slightly
from third quarter. Within communications, however, the fiberoptics/photonics industry
experienced a 9% increase in amount raised.
Healthcare ended its record-breaking year with a moderate downturn. Nevertheless,
investment increased in the medical devices and biopharmaceuticals segments.
Biopharmaceuticals companies, which raised $761.9 million in the fourth quarter, have
seen an 86% increase since 40'99. Contributing to this gain was the astounding 70%
increase in biotechnology investment. VentureOne's John Gabbert notes, "This is an
exciting time for biopharmaceuticals companies, and specifically biotechnology. Their
strong showing in the otherwise lukewarm fourth quarter is a testament to their growing
appeal for investors." PricewaterhouseCoopers' Tracy Lefteroff summed it up: "Biotech is
hot. And, we expect the momentum to continue this year."
###
NOTE TO EDITORS: At first reference the survey should be termed "The
PricewaterhouseCoopers MoneyTree Survey in Partnership with VentureOne."
Subsequent references may quote the "MoneyTree Survey." Charts may be sourced
either to the complete name of the surveyor to "PricewaterhouseCoopersNentureOne."
About PricewaterhouseCoopers
The PricewaterhouseCoopers Private Equity & Venture Capital Practice is part of the
Global Technology Industry Group (www.pwcglobaltech.com). The group is comprised of
industry professionals who deliver a broad spectrum of services to meet the needs of fast-
growth technology start-ups and agile, global giants in key industry segments: Networking
& Computers, Internet, Semiconductors, Software, Life Sciences and Private Equity &
Venture Capital. PricewaterhouseCoopers is a recognized leader in each industry
segment with services for technology clients in all stages of growth.
PricewaterhouseCoopers (www.pwcglobal.com) is the world's largest professional
services organization.. Drawing on the knowledge and skills of more than 150,000 .people




























enhance their ability to build value, manage risk and improve performance in an Internet-
enabled world.
PricewaterhouseCoopers refers to the member firms of the worldwide
PricewaterhouseCoopers organization.
About VentureOne
VentureOne, the world's leading venture capital research firm, offers investors and
entrepreneurs the most comprehensive and accurate information on venture-backed
companies, as well as world-class events, industry analysis, and customized research.
VentureOne's products help top-tier venture capital firms, corporate investors, investment
banks and accounting and law firms identify private investment opportunities, perform due
diligence, and evaluate market trends, including company valuations and executive
compensation. VentureOne clients collectively manage close to $175 billion in venture
capital.
VentureOne's wealth of information about venture-backed companies is made available in
VentureSource_4.0, an Internet database containing more than 11,000 venture-backed
companies, over 4,000 investors-including more than 900 traditional and corporate
venture firms with almost 2,200 funds-and more than 31,000 financing transactions and
80,000 key executives. Data on executive compensation is available online via .
CompensationPro, VentureOne's database of salary, bonus, and equity information.
For more information about VentureOne products and services, please visit
www.ventureone.com.
###
The investment figures included in this release are based on proprietary research
conducted by VentureOne and PricewaterhouseCoopers in tracking thousands of U.S.
venture-backed companies through in-depth interviews with company CEOs and CFOs
and their investors.










VENTURE FUNDRAISING IN 2000 DOUBLES FROM PRE\'IOUS YEAR
Annual comnzitnzents to venture capital approach $70 billion, according to VentureOne
San Francisco-February 15, 200I-The year 2000 saw the greatest amount of money in history
committed to venture capital, according to the latest statistics released by VentureOne, the leading
provider ofventure capital infonnation and services. Limited partners contributed a record-
breaking $69.1 billion to 249 funds, doubling from 1999's $34.5 billion invested in 202 funds.· An
astounding 18 funds hit or exceeded the billion-dollar mark in 2000, compared to only three in
1999. Five of these closed in 4Q'00, indicating that current economic uncertainty has not yet
impaired the ability ofventure capital finns with proven track records to attract significant sums
from institutional investors.
Fundraising in the fourth quarter totaled $18.1 billion in new funds, a 5% increase from third
quarter's $17.3 billion, and more than any quarter besides 2Q'00. The number of funds raised
dropped considerably throughout 2000, with S6 funds closing in the fourth quarter, nearly a 4S%
plunge from the peak in 4Q'99, when venture finns closed 81 funds.
John Gabbert, Director of Research at VentureOne, commented, "Funds raised by established
venture capital finns are still extremely attractive for institutional investors. These finns have
repeatedly demonstrated considerable investing acumen and they adapt their strategies to suit the
economic landscape, whether that means anticipating emerging technologies or looking further
afield to overseas opportunities."
The number ofbillion-dollar-plus funds that focus on venture investment increased six-fold from
1999, including three funds that reached the $2 billion mark. TA Associates and New Enterprise
Associates, both ofMenlo Park, CA, closed $2 billion and $2.3 billion funds, respectively, and
Summit Partners of Boston, MA raised a $2.1 billion fund. Over half of the dollars raised for
venture capital funds are now in funds exceeding $500 million, and the median fund size reached
$138 million in 2000, up marginally from $135 million in 1999.
Despite a recent slowdown in venture investment,first-time players in the venture capital arena are
not only increasing in numbers but are also collecting more money from investors. In 2000, 7S
finns raised ini~ial venture capital funds totaling $7.6 billion, compared to $4.5 billion raised for 54
























According to VentureOne's Gabbert, "The record amount raised for venture investment should
provide ample funding for entrepreneurship in the near future, particularly since investors have
grown more cautious over recent months."
• Totals refer to funds focused on venture investment and do not include buyoutfunds or capital
raisedfor strategic corporate development investnlent.
###
About VentureOne
VentureOne, the world's leading venture capital research finn, offers investors and entrepreneurs
the most comprehensive and accurate information on venture-backed companies, as well as world-
class events, industry analysis, and customized research. VentureOne's products help top-tier
venture capital finns, corporate investors, investment banks and accounting and law finns identify
private investment opportunities, perfonn due diligence, and evaluate market trends, including
company valuations and executive compensation. VentureOne clients collectively manage close to
$175 billion in venture capital.
VentureOne's wealth of information about venture-backed companies is made available in
VentureSource™ 4.0, an Internet database containing more than 11,000 venture-backed companies,
over 4,000 investors-including more than 900 traditional and corporate venture finns with almost
2,200 funds-and more than 31,000 financing transactions and 80,000 key executives. Data on
executive compensation is available online via CompensationPro, VentureOne's database of salary,
bonus, and equity infonnation.
For more infonnation about VentureOne products and services, please visit www.ventureone.com.
###
The investmentfigures included in this release are based on proprietary research conducted by
VentureOne in tracking thousands ofu.s. venture-backed companies through in-depth interviews
with company CEOs and CFOs and their investors.











































































































































































































































































































































IState of the Market
InvestmentType! 1998 I 1999 I 2000
Alternative Financing Rounds Raised by Venture-Backed Companies 1998-2000 YTD (SM)
V
enture capitalists continued to pour near-record levels of capital Into startup companies dUring the third
quarter of 2000. Venture capital Investment dipped slightly for the second quarter In a row. declining 6%
in dollars invested and 16% in deals closed compared with the previous quarter. Venture-backed compa-
nies raised a total of $16.12 billion in 879 financing rounds during the third quarter, down from S17.24 billion in the
second quarter, but still well above the ~8.84 billion raised in 3Q99 and every quarter preceding it. Indeed, more ven-
















Financing of Internet-related companies declinednoticeably, echoing the drop from the first to the sec-
ond quarter. Funding of Internet startups fell 12% from
the second quarter, to $13.12 billion, and the number of
deals declined 21 %, to 664 ,rounds of financing. The
Internet sector's share of overall venture investment
declined as well, from 86% in the second quarter to a
still-substantial 81 % in the third quarter, as the decrease
in Internet investment outpaced the overall drop in ven-
ture financing.
The decline in Internet investment during the third
quarter was particularly pronounced in the largest Web-
related sector, business services, which fell by one-third
to S4.64 billion. This drop was somewhat offset by
increases in financing for Internet infrastructure and
software companies. Infrastructure startups raised a
record $3.23 billion in 110 rounds, a 42% increase in
dollars and a 24% increase in rounds closed compared
with the previous quarter. Internet-related software
startups, especially those developing business applica-
tions and communications/connectivity software. rode











187 rounds, a 9% increase in funding compared with the
second quarter.
In venture capital investment overall, the combination
of a small drop in funding and a larger drop in deals
resulted in higher median amounts raised during the third
quarter. The median amount raised by venture-backed
companies rose from S11 million in the second quarter to
S12 million in the third: for Internet-related companies,
this figure rose from S12 million to S12.6 million.
Median premoney valuations also increased, rising
from $25.4 million in the second quarter to S41.2 million
in the third: among Internet-related startups, the median
rose from $26.8 million to S49.5 million. Historically,
however, companies have been slow to report dimin-
ished valuations. and therefore median premoney valua-
tions may decrease substantially as more information
becomes available.
The increase in the median amount raised reflected a
shift toward later-stage financings, which tend to be
larger than early-stage rounds. VCs invested 73% of
their cash in second and later-stage rounds in the third
quarter. compared to 62% in the second quarter and
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equipment makers raised SI.74 billion In 56 rounds,
business applications software providers secured SI.21
billion in 62 rounds of financing, connectivity products
raised S1.11 billion in 35 deals, and connectivity soft-
ware garnered S885.2 million in 58 deals.
RELERA (Denver, CO), a developer and manager of
Internet data centers, received the largest round of fund-
ing among all venture-backed companies in the third
quaner. The company closed a S208 million second round
In July co-led by BA~K OF A~1ERICA l-:APITAL PAR1'~'ERS
and (:I~F~CE:'\DO \!E:'.:·n.~I~Fs, and Joined by BROADBA:'-:()
V'EXTlJRE PART~ERS,CIBC CAPITAL PARI;\ERS, ~:loRCA~
ST.~'LEY DEA:\i \VrrlEH \!E,-rCRE PAI~lSEI~S,NAVIS PART-
~FRS, TFLFCO\·r PART:"ERS, and C:OLlJ\.fBI.), PART1"ERS.
NE:\V E:\l"ERPRJSE I.:\SSOCIr\lES was the most active ven-
ture capital finn during the quaner, closing 48 deals.
CHASE CAPI [AL PAJ~T~EJ~Swas close behind with 47 deals.
BF.SSE\1F.R V'E~Tl:RE PARTXERS and f\-L,\YFlrI.O Fc,o \vere
the third and founh most active venture capital firms dur-
ing the quaner. closing 32 and 31 deals, respectively.
The San Francisco Bay Area retained its perennial sta-
tus as the most favored region for venture investment,
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optics equipment.
Companies providing non-financial business services
secured S3.01 billion in 190 rounds, the greatest num-
ber of dollars and deals of any sector. Fiberoptics
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Most Active Verdin Capital Investors in 3QOO
quarter low of 267 deals in 3QOO.
Within the IT group. the Internet-centric informa-
tion services segment fared no better: investment dollars
fell by one-third to $1.48 billion. The software. semi-
conductors, and electronics and computer hardware
segments experienced slight gains. but not enough to
offset the sharp drop in information services. Overall,
Industry Breakdown
The fall-off in Internet-related investments was reflect-
ed in the overall investment activity of the information
technology (IT) and products and services industry
groups, where Internet companies
tend to be most heavily concen-
trated. Products and services start-
ups raised $4.3 billion, a 21 %
decrease from the second quarter.
This extended a sharp decline from
the first to the second quarter,
when new investment in products
and services dropped 25%. The
total number of rounds in prod-





















capturing 56.58 bUlion of startup
capital during the quarter. Southern
California attracted the second
largest amount of venture dollars.
with S1.28 billion, followed by the
Boston area \vith $836.6 million.
Corporate venture investment fell
slightly from the second quarter. to
$1.45 billion. While it was down
31% from the record first quarter,
corporate investment was still well
ahead of last year's pace, when 5825.5
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Biopharmaceuticals startups raised $663.6 million in
40 rounds. compared with $537.9 million in 43 rounds
during the previous quarter. While biopharmaceuticals
companies enjoyed the greatest amount of funding
within the healthcare group. all healthcare segments
attracted increased venture investment. Medical devices
companies closed 46 rounds-the most of any health-
care segment-and raised $415.3 million. second only to
biopharmaceuticals. Medical information systems start-
ups had an equally strong quarter. raising $412.4 million
in 31 deals.
Number of Deals 296
Amount Invested S2,683.a.c
AmounllnveSled
Number of Deals 35 60
Amount Invested $430.39 S633.35
Amount Invested 4796
NlI'Rber of Deals 49 49
Amcu1t Invested 51,052.49 51,457.44
Amount Invested 3896
the IT group raised $10.16 billion in the third quarter.
down slightly from the $10.48 billion closed In the sec-
ond quarter. Still. IT remained the leading industry
group. garnering 54% of all deals and 63% of all dollars
in the third quarter.
Healthcare companies. led by the biopharmaceutica1s
sector. experienced their best quarter ever. Companies in
this industry group raised $1.63 billion in 126 deals. an
impressive 32% rise in venture capital investment and a
9% increase in deals compared with the previous quarter.
While the gains \vere significant for the healthcare group.
the industry's percentage of overall venture investment
advanced only modestly. to 10% of all dollars invested in
the third quarter and 14% of rounds closed.
Investment in the Internet 3Q99- 3000 (SM)
Liquidity
The venture-backed IPO market returned to pre-
correction levels in the third quarter,
with 70 companies raising $6.59 billion
in public equity. This was more than
·:·;.Bu$.i~~,,~:~)di;·:~£;:":\;.::.:>;'ij~:/i.:;:·f·l.<~;f~:i:~t;1:;;Q~i:;iti~t{?:j~·~:;i·:~::<;~:··;7;;·rU;il~~:i.~:9;!.;~:~i:~;·:;:~t:{~::::;;i;;;t;~{:;;i~:;:::;i1.:;;i·~i1i:~i:~f~~~t~:~~~;Zii1t:·f}twice the $3.06 billion raised in 39
offerings in the second quarter. Though
overall market activity rebounded. in-
vestors remained skeptical of Internet-
based products and services firms.
Instead. the new offerings market \vas
dominated by biopharmaceutlcal com-
panies. software vendors. and commu-
nications and networking companies.
which accounted for 48 of the 70 deals
completed in the quarter.
Communications and networking
startups raised $2.23 billion at IPO-the
most ofany industry space. Much ofthe
segment's new capital was lavished on
COI~\'IS (Nasdaq: CORV), a fiberoptics
equipment developer. which completed
the largest initial offering ever of a
venture-backed company in July. netting
$1.14 billion. Overall. the communica-
tions segment had its second best quarter
for IPOs. matched only by the $2.58 bll-
Uon raised in the fourth quaner of 1999.
t~~~I!;~"~~~! or the 11 companies in the segment that
~~lii~1 ~entpublic.two focus on -Dberoptfcs
13 bfi~(~;iilf~<mM9J~Ir-; and four are· wireless technology finns.
Number of Deats 63 75
Amountlnvested 51,060.19 51.557.66
"Change- AmcuJt inveSted 4796
:C~~W".mil&-1f.~~:fi~;· !=~~[lill~.~I~~1l~i'~Ja5S~111:
Nlmber of Deals .- 14 29 40 27 32
Amount Invested S379.97 S1.379.37 $1,880.17 S1,856.95 S1,279.33
"Change- Amount Invested 2UJ6 3696 • 1~ .•31~
{~~iii~~~i~iJ~~-~iii~i~i(j::~~§~&~~:1~mi.tI&~~~:;
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vices startups fared better
than in the second quarter.
completing eight offerings
that raised S762 million.
Still. this was far below
the more than S2 billion
raised in 19 offerings in the
first quarter. The Internet-
tainted e-commerce and
content sectors remained
wallflo\\·ers at the IPO ball. posting no initial offerings for
the second consecutive quarter.
There "'ere fewer mergers and acquisitions of venture-
backed companies in the third quaner. but activity
remained at historically high levels. A total of 79 compa-
nies merged or were acquired. investing S16.84 billion.
Percentage of Total Amount Invested in 3QOO·Communications and
networking companies
took the greatest share
of IPO revenue. but blo-
pharmaceuticals startups
experienced the greatest
increase In deals. com-
pleting 20 offerings that
raised S1.53 billion. The
number of blopharma-
ceuticals offerings com-
pleted was higher than
any other industry segment in the third quarter. and the
total capital raised was second only to the communica-
tions segment. Software was the only other industry
segment to raise more than 51 billion at IPO in the
third quarter. Seventeen software companies went pub-













slightly dUring the third
quarter, rising to 63%
of all M&A deals, com-




raised S16.44 billion in
new commitments dur-
ing the third quarter, a
19%· decline from the
previous quarter. Even
so, the third quarter
\vas note\vorthy for
the number of billion-
dollar megafunds that
closed. Six of the 41
funds closed during the
quarter raised a billion
dollars or more, and t\VO
of these-T.~ Assoc-
IATES' TA/Advent IX
fund and New Enter-
prise Associates' NEA
10 fund-raised 52 bil-
lion, a record figure for a
venture capital limited
partnership. Other finns that successfully completed bil-
lion-dollar funds were VA~T.~(~EP()]~T \/E:\:·n.;I{E PART~
NERS. lvlENLO VE~"·liRES. REDPOI1\,. \!E:\:Tt;RES, and
PA1RJCOf" & Co. VEl':TLJRES.
Seven new funds were opened for subscription dur-
ing the third quarter. Notably, none of the new funds.
aspires to billion-dollar status: the largest of them,
Ii\."TER\VEsT PART~ER~' InterWest VIII, has set a "mod-
est- goal of $750 million. "'I'
The largest deal was Sycamore Network's (Nasdaq:
SCMR) acquisition of SJROCCO SYSTE~1S (Wallingford.
eT) for $3.49 billion. The total amount paid this year to
date, at $83.31 billion in 272 deals, dwarfs all previous-
ly recorded yearly totals. The decline in both deals and
dollars this quarter was nonetheless significant. as the
number of deals fell 10% and the total amount paid
dropped 26% compared with the second quarter. The
percentage of Internet-related companies completing
Startup 130 $36126 176 S625.89 281 $1,174.96 185 6% 51,357.06 3%
Product Development 564 $3.408.76 601 $4.615.73 885 $9.094.99 944 31% 516,199.69 31%
Shipping Product 1,028 57,035.79 1.139 $8.897.85 1.919 $26,226.76 1,842 61% 533,316.36 64%
Profitable 100 $630.30 91 $724.90 95 S899.21 64 2% $1.1&8.91 2%
Restart 2 $3.50 3 $19.50 5 $15.16 1 0% 57.50 0%
~ Change from Previous Year 1096 m 5B" 157"
Industry Monitor 1997· 2000 YTD (SM)
•
~~.~~t~.~Ri~1i;.rj~il~~,~]~1.~j:1~g:rt;~lt.mi~4~~~··:···Y~: ....~..
ConmJnications &Net~ 252 $2.430.98 309 $3,442.42 398 $8.148.77 421 14% $13.208.20' 25%
Electronics & Computer Hardware 83 1495.34 82 5477.70 73 $7~.85 51 2% S820.08' 2%
Information Services 14-C $783.76 197 $1,496.66 443 $4.628.46 382 13% SS.872.CMI 11%
Semiconductors 70 5460.65 76 559121 94 $993.52 94 3% 51,516.51 3%
Software 515 $2.487.16 509 $3.035.68 664 56.039.66 618 20% $9.075.14 17%
Other Information Technology ° 50.00 ° $0.00 4 $19.00 ° 0% $0.00 0%
'6 Change from Previous Year 1096 36% 4390 12896
Biopharmaceuticals 109 $785.48 137 5991.97 114 $1.203.94 122 4% 51.775.59 3%
Healthcare Services 106 5797.65 83 $628.51 57 $387.90 35 1% $288.46 1%
Medical Devices & Equipment 136 $773.54 129 S809.18 168 $1,202.81 121. 4% 51.026.32 2%
Medical Information Systems 60 $424.64 65 5389.68 73 $584.11 100 3% $1.387.49 3%
"ChangefromPrevi~ Year. '. .. .7% .. ' .1% ~ ..........•. ~ . , .
{.·:.~~.·&.:~'.~;;;i~~i;~;..i0>f~:;-:S;.~~~.:Z:·~l'..~.•~;;:X:;·,<~·;.:. Si~;.;;·;:~~1Al.fj2·'''ii1i~1:i~;1j::~.:~~;J·;~~~~§i;f~~
Consumer &Business Products 50 $299.54 36 $234.97 38 $377.61 30 ,% 5323.30 1%
Consumer & Business 5ervices 186 5955.35 267 51,987.93 857 59.167.57 957 32% $14.769.63 28%
Retailers 78 5551.15 89 $619.98 181 $3.763.85 84 3% S1.810.69 3"-
" Change from Previous Year 25" 57% 174% 368%
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Electronic commerce ("E-Commerce") over the Internet has become a
huge business. With its rapid growth, not just in transactions between businesses
and consumers (B to C transactions) but, perhaps more importantly, in
transactions among businesses (B to B transactions), E-Commerce already
amounts to billions of dollars annually. However, conventional commerce still
dwarfs it. With the rise in volume of E-Commerce, can litigation be far behind?
Of course, not. This is litigious America. Today, there already over 165 reported
cases involving cyberspace jurisdictional issues.
This outline examines the more significant of these cases to expose the
logic of some.of the judicial decisions, to develop some fundamentals of
cyberspace jurisdiction and to suggest some protective actions to avoid being
haled into unanticipated and/or unwelcome forums. The attached Cyberspace
Jurisdiction Case List of Cases Finding No Personal Jurisdiction and of Cases
Finding Personal Jurisdiction contain their citations. The attached Cyberspace
Jurisdiction Articles List discusses many of these cases and the legal concepts
underlying them.
To understand these cases, it is necessary to briefly review the existing
jurisprudence on personal jurisdiction. While doing so, recall that, until the
arrival of the Internet, a territory that defies all boundaries, personal jurisdiction
tracked somewhat closely geographical and territorial boundaries, and, indeed,
was rooted in them and defined by them.
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JURISDICTIONAL FUNDAMENTALS
Personal jurisdiction concerns a court's power to decide a matter in
controversy before it, a.nd the court's authority over the subject matter and the
parties involved in such controversy. In federal courts, issues about personal
jurisdiction may be raised at any time. Indeed, a judgment rendered by a court
without proper personal jurisdiction will not be enforced when properly
challenged.
Personal jurisdiction is of two types: "general jurisdiction" extends to all
cases and controversies that may be brought before the court within the bounds of
legal rights and remedies; "specific jurisdiction" covers only a specified case or
class of cases. More limited in nature than general jurisdiction, specific
jurisdiction requires less proof to establish. Thus far, most u.s. cases concerning
personal jurisdiction over Internet activities have rested on specific jurisdiction.
Traditionally, the courts have considered various facts in determining
whether jurisdiction, general or specific, exists. Absent a Federal statute
expressly conferring jurisdiction over a given matter on a specific court, federal
courts apply the law of the state where the action is brought and use a two-step
analysis to determine if proper personal jurisdiction exists. In such an analysis,
the court first determines if jurisdiction is proper under the State's long-arm
statute. If it is, the court next determines if the exercise of personal jurisdiction
over the defendant comports with due process under the U.S. Constitution.
























Long-arm statutes are of two types: Those that limit a court's exercise of
jurisdiction in one or more ways; and those that permit the exercise of personal
jurisdiction to the full extent permitted by the U.S. Constitution. In states where
the statute pennits full exercise, the court's analysis really consists of a single step
evaluation of whether personal jurisdiction is proper under the due process clause
of the U.S. Constitution.
In now familiar language, International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S.
310 (1945), states that constitutional due process requires that the defendant have
"minimum contacts such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend
'traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice'''. Id. at 316. Later, World-
Wide Volkswagen Com. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980), held the defendant's
minimum contacts must be "conduct and connection with the forum State ...
such that he should reasonably anticipate being haled into court." Id. at 297. Due
process does not require that the defendant have ever been physically present in
the forum. Due process does require that the defendant's contacts be more than
merely "random," "fortuitous" or "attenuated" ones. Burger King Corp. v.
Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462,476 (1985).
Under Hansen v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235 (1958), to establish general
jurisdiction over a defendant, constitutional due process requires a showing that
the defendant's contacts were "substantial" or "continuous and systematic"; in
short, that the defendant "purposely avail[ed] of the privilege of conducting
activities within the forum state, thus invoking the benefits and protection of its
laws." Id. at 253. However, for specific jurisdiction, Supreme Court decisions
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require only that the defendant's efforts are directed toward the forum state. So
","
long as a commercial actor's efforts are "purposefully directed" toward residents
of another state, "jurisdiction may not be avoided merely because the defendant
did not physically enter the forum state." Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, supra,
at 476.
What do these land mark cases tell us about jurisdiction over E-Commerce
on the Internet today? In truth, although these cases supply the language of and
the framework for analysis, their principles are only indirectly related to the
results that the courts reach. An understanding of the function of the Internet, an
ability and willingness to explain it to the court and the creativity to concoct a
persuasive presentation of the facts are important additional requirements for
reaching appropriate results. What emerges is the realization that the case
holdings are somewhat diverse, the principles of analysis are still under
development and consistent results have been (relatively) slow to develop.
Unfortunately, the situation makes it difficult for lawyers for Internet merchants
to advise their clients how to do business on the Internet and to avoid the
jurisdictional reach of a host of states.
APPLYING JURISDICTIONAL FUNDAMENTALS
TO ONLINE CONTACTS
As noted, over 165 cases exist which apply the Jurisdictional
Fundamentals in litigation involving online contacts. In approximately 98 of the
cases on the attached Case List, the Court found no personal jurisdiction. In
another 68, the Court found personal jurisdiction. The pages which follow
























the logic of the decisions, to explain the holdings of various courts and to develop
some fundamentals cyberspace jurisdiction. That done, this paper suggests some
safeguards for persons doing business over the Internet to attempt to avoid
successful assertion ofjurisdiction over them by others.
CASES FINDING NO JURISDICTION
Bensusan Restaurant Corp. v. King
One of the earliest and most widely cited cases in which a court found a
web site did not provide the necessary minimum contacts is Bensusan Restaurant
Corp. v. King, 937 F.Supp.2d 295 (S.D.N.Y. 1996), affd, 126 F.3d 25 (2d Cir.
1997). Bensusan operated "The Blue Note" jazz club in New York City. King
operated "The Blue Note" club in Columbia, Missouri. Bensusan held a federally
registered mark "The Blue Note" to promote his club and ticket sales. King put
up a web site that advertised his Columbia Blue Note with a telephone number
and ticket purchasing information. Bensusan claimed that King's web site
constituted trademark infringement. At issue was whether King's web site
evidenced an intent to sell merchandise in New York justifying personal
jurisdiction over him.
Granting King's Motion to Dismiss For Lack of Personal Jurisdiction, the
Court refused to vIew King's web site as "purposeful availment, " because a New
York resident would have to take several affirmative steps to access and utilize
the web site. Further, the New York resident would actually have to go Missouri
to pick up tickets he purchased because King did not mail tickets to his Columbia,
..
Missouri club to purchasers. The Court rejected Bensusan's claim that King
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should have foreseen that the web site would be viewed in New York. There
were no facts indicating that King encouraged any New Yorkers to access his site.
In response to Bensusan's argument that King should have fo~eseen that
his web site would be viewed in New York, the Court held that "mere
forseeability of an in-state consequence" was not an adequate basis to assert
personal jurisdiction over King. Moreover, the Bensusan court analogized
creating a web site to "placing a product in the stream of commerce," in that its
effects "may be felt nationwide -- or even worldwide -- but, without more, it is
not an act purposefully directed toward to forum state." 937 F. Supp.2d at 301.
In short, King's Missouri web site simply did not rise to the level of doing
business in New York. The Second Circuit affinned the District Court, relying
on the language of the New York Long Ann statute, thus avoiding the due process
issue. The District Court in Bensusan was one of the first to pay close attention to
the facts, analyze them and conclude that the online contacts did not support
personal jurisdiction.
Cybersell, Inc. v. Cybersell, Inc.
In CyberselL Inc. v. CyberselL Inc., 130 F.3d 414 (9th Cir. 1997), the 9th
Circuit concluded that a web site or other electronic contact, alone, was not
"purposeful availment" of the benefits of the forum state. Cybersell, Inc., an
Arizona corporate plaintiff ("Cybersell Arizona"), sued a Florida corporation
(Cybersell Florida) in an Arizona court for alleged trademark infringement
through a web site. Cybersell Florida had no contacts with Arizona. It did not





















It did not solicit business in Arizona. It did not receive any telephone calls from
Arizona. Even so, Cybersell Arizona claimed that its assertion ofjurisdiction met
due process requirements in that Cybersell Florida "should be amenable to suit in
Arizona because cyberspace is without borders and a web site is necessarily
intended for use on a worldwide basis."
Unpersuaded, the Court recognized that anyone could access a web site,
but that fact did not compel a conclusion that the web site alone was an attempt to
target anyone in any specific forum. Here, Cybersell Florida did not intentionally
aim its conduct at Arizona knowing it would cause harm there. The 9th Circuit
recognized that some cases found a web site to be sufficient contact for the
assertion of jurisdiction, but noted there was usually "something more" to show
that the defendant purposefully directed substantial activity to the forum state. In
Cybersell, there were no other contacts between the Florida defendant and the
State of Arizona. In short, it was simply a passive web site. Cybersell Florida did
not undertake any actions that qualified as purposeful activity invoking the
benefits and protections ofArizona.
The cases finding no jurisdiction include ones in which the court declined
to uphold personal jurisdiction based on the mere existence of a web site without
anything more. Indeed, it is now at least somewhat settled that "a mere presence
on the World Wide Web does not support the minimum contacts necessary to
subject a corporation to personal jurisdiction on a worldwide basis." Morantz v.
Hang & Shine Ultrasonics, 79 F.Supp 2d 537, 539-540 (E.D. Pa. 1999). Nearly a
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hundred other cases finding no jurisdiction appear on the attached Cyberspace
Jurisdiction Case List: Cases Finding No Personal Jurisdiction.
As the Cybersell court had stated: "[8]0 far as we are aware, no court has
ever held that an Internet advertisement alone is sufficient to subject the advertiser'
to jurisdiction in the plaintiffs home state...." Cybersell, supra, 130 F.3d at 418.
However, as the Morantz court observed, the jurisdictional jurisprudence of the
Internet contains at least two unfortunate cases where very minimal contacts were
sufficient to establish personal jurisdiction. Inset Systems, Inc. v. Instruction Set,
Inc., 937 F.Supp 161 (D. Conn. 1996), held that maintaining a web site and
telephone number was sufficient to establish personal jurisdiction in every state,
including the forum state. Heroes, Inc. v. Heroes Found., 958 F.Supp. 1 (D.D.C.
1996) found a web site that explicitly solicited donations and provided a toll free
number was subject to the jurisdiction of the court. Fortunately, these misguided
cases have been widely criticized in other opinions and are seldom followed.
However, you can expect to see them if a plaintiff is scrambling to find minimum
contacts to oppose a motion to dismiss.
CASES FINDING JURISDICTION
Compuserve, Inc. v. Patterson
Another early and widely cited Internet jurisdiction case, CompuServe,
Inc. v. Patterson, 89 F.3d 1257 (6th Cir. 1996) occurred close to home.
CompuServe, headquartered in Columbus, Ohio, was an early "information
utility." Patterson, a Texas resident, developed software attractive to











































make Patterson's shareware available to all CompuServe subscribers. Their
agreement was negotiated and consummated bye-mail. Thereafter, Patterson
uploaded (from Texas) to CompuServe (in Ohio) 32 master software files which
CompuServe placed on its server for access by its subscribers.
A couple of years later, CompuServe began to market and sell software
similar to Patterson's. Upon learning of CompuServe's actions, Patterson e-
mailed CompuServe that its efforts constituted an infringement on his common
law trademark rights. CompuServe changed the name of its software. However,
Patterson continued to complain and threaten suit. (Unsurprisingly, Patterson was
a lawyer.) His continued complaints and demands for compensation caused
CompuServe to seek a declaratory judgment in Ohio Federal Court. Patterson
moved to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. The trial court granted his
motion. The 6th Circuit reversed.
In CompuServe, the 6th Circuit noted the crucial federal constitutional
inquiry was whether, given the facts of the case, the non-resident defendant had
sufficient contacts with the forum state that the District Court's exercise of
jurisdiction would comport with "traditional notions of fair play and substantial
justice. [Citations omitted]. The 6th Circuit employed three criteria to make this
determination:
First, the defendant must purposefully avail himself
of the privilege of acting in the forum state or
causing a consequence in the forum state. Second,
the cause of action must arise from the defendant's
activities there. Finally, the acts of the defendant or
consequences caused by the defendant, must have a
substantial enough connection with the forum to
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make the exercise of jurisdiction over the defendant
reasonable. Id. at 1262.
The 6th Circuit concluded that Patterson had knowingly made an effort to market
his products through CompuServe. Accordingly, the 6th Circuit believed it
reasonable to subject Patterson to suit in Ohio, the state which is home to the
computer network service he chose to employ.
Discussing each of the three criteria, the court found that, by his actions,
Patterson took steps that created a connection with Ohio. He subscribed to
CompuServe. He entered into the shareware registration agreement wIlen he
loaded his software onto the CompuServe system for others to use or purchase.
He repeatedly sent his computer software electronically to CompuServe. He
advertised that software on CompuServe. Finally, he initiated the events that lead
to the filing of the suit by making demands of CompuServe by both electronic and
regular mail.
The 6th Circuit found these contacts with Ohio "substantial" enough that
Patterson could reasonably have anticipated being haled into an Ohio court.
Specifically, "although all ofthis happened with the distinct paucity of tangible,
physical evidence, there can be no doubt that Patterson purposely transacted
business in Ohio." Id. at 1264. (Italics supplied here and throughout). Other
events showed that CompuServeand Patterson intended the relationship to be
ongoing. And, Patterson deliberately set in motion an ongoing marketing
relationship with CompuServe that he could have reasonably foreseen would have
consequences in Ohio. Last, Patterson entered into a contract expressly stafing
























The 6th Circuit found that there was a substantial enough connection
between Patterson and Ohio to make it reasonable for an Ohio court to assert
personal jurisdiction over him. Someone like Patterson, who employed a
computer network service like CompuServe to market a product, can reasonably
expect disputes with that service to yield law suits in the service's home state.
Finding Patterson had sufficient contact with Ohio to support the exercise of
personal jurisdiction over him, the 6th Circuit reversed the District Court's
dismissal and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its
opinion.
Zippo Manufacturing CompanY v. ZippoDot Com, Inc.
Another seminal case, Zippo Manufacturing Company v. ZippoDot Com,
Inc., 952 F.Supp. 1119 (W.D. Pa. 1997), is significant because the court offered
an appealing framework to analyze personal jurisdiction in cyberspace, one of the
few courts to do so. That framework has proved popular with other courts, and
many have used it.
Zippo Manufacturing Co. ("Manufacturing ") sued Zippo Dot Com, Inc.
("Dot Com") for several alleged violations of Federal and state trademark
protection laws by use of the domain names "zippo.com," "zippo.net," and
"zipponews.com." Dot Com was incorporated and based in California.
Manufacturing was incorporated and based in Pennsylvania. Almost all of Dot
Com's contacts with Pennsylvania occurred over the Internet. After reviewing
cases and holdings cited in Jurisdictional Fundamentals, supra, the Zippo court
stated:
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Enter the Internet, a global 'super-network' over 15,000 computer
networks used by over 30 million individuals, corporations,
organizations and educational institutions worldwide. [Citations
omitted.] In recent years, businesses have begun to use the Internet
to provide information and products to consumers and other
businesses. [Citation omitted.] The Internet makes it possible to
conduct business throughout the world entirely from a desktop.
With this global revolution looming on the horizon, the
development of the law concerning the permissible scope of
personal jurisdiction based on the Internet use is in its infant
stages. The cases are scant. Nevertheless, our review of the
available cases and materials reveals that the likelihood of personal
jurisdiction can be constitutionally exercised is directly
proportionate to the nature and quality of commercial activity that
an entity conducts over the Internet. This sliding scale is
consistent with well-developed personal jurisdiction principles. At
one end of the spectrum are situations where a defendant clearly
does business over the Internet. If a defendant enters into contracts
with residents of a foreign jurisdiction that involve the knowing
and repeated transmission of computer files over the Internet,
personal jurisdiction is proper. E.g. CompuServe, Inc. v. Patterson,
89 Fed.3d 1257 (6th Circuit, 1996). At the opposite end are
situations where a defendant has simply posted information on an
Internet web site which is accessible to users in foreign
jurisdictions. A passive Web site that does little more than make
information available to those who are interested in it is not
grounds for the exercise of personal jurisdiction. E.g. Bensusan
Restaurant Com. v. King, 397 F. Supp. 295 (S.D. N.Y. 1996). The
middle ground is occupied by interactive Web sites where a user
can exchange infonnation with the host computer. In these cases,
the exercise ofjurisdiction is determined by examining the level of
interactivity and commercial nature ofthe exchange ofinformation
that occurs on the web site. E.g. Maritz, Inc. v. CyberGold, Inc.
397 F.Supp. 1328 (E.D. Mo. 1996). Zippo, supra, at 1123-1124.
The Zippo court went on to say that "... when an entity intentionally reaches
beyond its boundaries to conduct business with foreign residents, the exercise of
specific jurisdiction is proper. [Citation omitted]. Different results should not be
reached simply because business is conducted over the Internet." Id. at 1124.
The Zippo court found Dot Com's claim that its web site was not
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the court found that by receiving and processing subscription applications from
Pennsylvania and then assigning passwords to applicants, Dot Com deliberately
and systematically availed itself of the privileges and benefits of doing business in
Pennsylvania. The court found irrelevant the fact that only 2% of Dot Com's
accounts came from Pennsylvania. It is the nature and quality of forum contacts
that are of primary relevance, not their quantity. Dot Com made a conscious
choice to conduct business with the residents of Pennsylvania and was therefore
on notice that it could be subject to suit there.
Notably, here, as in Patterson, the court was aware tllat the virtual contacts
were buttressed by contracts and other physical, real space contacts. The court
found nothing unreasonable about the exercise ofjurisdiction over Dot Com here.
Dot Com consciously chose to conduct business in Pennsylvania, pursuing profits
from the actions that are in question. "The Due Process clause is not a territorial
shield to inter-state obligations that have been voluntarily assumed." Burger
King, 471 US at 474.
Writing in The Business Lawyer in November, 2000, Jeremy Gillman
aptly stated:
Zippo is significant not because of its facts, which parallel
those of myriad other Internet jurisdiction cases, but because
of the test devised by the court to arrive at its conclusion.
That test, which has been cited like a mantra in almost every
Internet jurisdiction decision that has followed Zippo, is
notable for its simplicity and practicality; it recognizes that




As will be seen, most web sites fall in the middle of
the Zippo spectrum, leaving it up to the courts to determine
on a case-by-case basis whether their interactivity level
qualifies. them for jurisdiction in a forum state. Given
Zippo's flexible and non-formulaic approach, however, it is
not uncommon for similar web sites to yield dissimilar
jurisdictional outcomes. 56 The Business Lawyer 395, 399
(November 2000).
Panavision International, L.P. v. Toeppen
In Panavision International, L.P. v. Toeppen, 141 F.3d 1316 (9th eire
1998), another significant decision on Internet jurisdiction, Toeppen continued his
"business" of obtaining Internet domain names based on the registered trademarks
of various companies, including Delta Airlines, Neiman Marcus, Eddie Bauer,
Lufthansa and over a hundred others. Toeppen had attempted to "sell" tIle domain
names for other trademarks for amounts up to $15,000.
Here, Panavision held registered trademarks to the names "Panavision"
and "Panaflex" in connection with motion picture camera equipment. Panavision
promoted its trademarks through motion pictures and television, not media
advertising. When Panavision attempted to register a web site on the Internet
with the domain name Panavision.com, it failed because Toeppen had already
obtained rights to use Panavision as the domain name for his web site. (Wilen
accessed, Toeppen's web page displayed photographs of the City of Pana,
Illinois.)
In December, 1995, Panavision's counsel sent a letter from California to
Toeppen in Illinois informing him that Panavision held a trademark in the name
Panavision and telling him to stop using that trademark and the domain name





















Panavision.com on the Internet as his domain name and offered to settle the
matter if Panavision would pay him $13,000 in exchange for the domain name.
Toeppen also stated that if Panavision agreed, he would not acquire any other
Internet addresses which are alleged by Panavision Corporation to be its property.
Panavision refused. Toeppen promptly registered Panavision's other trademark as
the domain name Panaflex.com.
Panavision filed this action against Toeppen in the District Court for the
Central District of California alleging dilution of its trademark under Federal and
California law. Panavision claimed Toeppen was in the business of stealing
trademarks, registering them as domain names on the Internet and selling the
domain names to the proper trademark owners. The District Court determined it
had personal jurisdiction over Toeppen and granted summary judgment in favor
of Panavision on both its federal and state dilution claims. Toeppen appealed.
The Ninth Circuit held that simply registering someone else's trademark as
a domain name and posting a web site on the Internet was not sufficient to subject
the party domiciled in one state to jurisdiction in another. Cybersell, 130 F.3d at
418. Rather, the Cybersell court held, there must be "something more" to
demonstrate that the defendant directed his activity toward the foreign state. The
Ninth Circuit concluded that Toeppen engaged in a scheme to register
Panavision's trademarks as his domain name for the purpose of extorting money
from Panavision and that this conduct had the effect of injuring Panavision in
California where it had its principal place of business ~nd where the movie and
telephone industry was centered. Accordingly~under the "effects test," the
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purposeful availment requirement necessary for a specific personal jurisdiction
was satisfied. The Ninth Circuit also found that Panavision's claims arose out of
Toeppen's California related activities and that the exercise of personal
jurisdiction over Toeppen was reasonable. Indeed, the Ninth Circuit placed on
Toeppen the burden to present a compelling case that the presence of some other
considerations that would render jurisdiction unreasonable. Toeppen could not.
The Ninth Circuit concluded "that all of the requirements for exercise of specific,
personal jurisdiction are satisfied. The District Court properly exercised personal
jurisdiction over Toeppen." Toeppen at 1324.
In so holding, the Court noted that in tort cases such as this one,
"jurisdiction may attach if the defendant's conduct is aimed at or has an effect in
the foreign state." As Gillman observes, again aptly: "[u]nderstandably,
Panavision's 'effects test' is commonly invoked by claimants eager to establish
jurisdiction over non-residents. More often t11an not, however, courts seem
inclined to apply Zippo's sliding scale approach rather than Panavision's effects
test when adjudicating jurisdictional disputes." Gillman, 56 The Business Lawyer
at 400.
GTE New Media Services Inc. v. Bellsouth Corp., Et AI.
Two other circuit court decisions also provide useful information. GTE
New Media Services Inc. v. BellSouth Corp., et aI., 199 F.3d 1343 (D.C. Cir.
2000), concerned GTE's suit against five regional telephone operating companies
and affiliates claiming the RBOC's conspired to dominate the Internet business























their claimed monopoly, GTE alleged the defendants obtained exclusive links on
web services such as Netscape and Yahoo. Previously, GTE had had a non-
exclusive contract with Netscape offering various Internet business directories
including GTE's SuperPages, offering Netscape tenninated by removing its links
to GTE's directory.
The familiar battle over personal jurisdiction ensued. Specifically, the
defendants asked the District Court to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. It
denied those motions, finding jurisdiction under the District of Columbia long-
arm statute on the grounds that GTE had sufficiently shown that the defendants'
caused tortuous injury in the District of Columbia by virtue of their acts outside
the District of Columbia. Because there existed a substantial ground for
difference of opinion concerning this ruling, the District Court certified its Order
for immediate interlocutory review.
The D.C. Circuit remanded, rejecting the District Court's finding that
defendants' .conduct outside the District of Columbia was designed to injure GTE
within the District of Columbia by pulling D.C. based users of GTE's business
directories toward their own. The Court found no evidence of record identifying
this specific tortious injury that GTE allegedly suffered in the District nor did it
find support for GTE's claim of lost advertising revenue. The D.C. Circuit held
that just because D.C. residents could access defendants' web sites, standing
alone, did not "show a persistent course of conduct by the defendants in the
District. Acce~s to web site reflects nothing more than a telephone call by District
... residents to the·defendants' computer servers, all ofwhich are apparently operated
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outside the District." 199 F.3d at 1349-50. Labeling the contention "far-fetched,"
the appellate court also rejected GTE's contention that defendants were
"transacting business" in the District whenever a District resident accessed their
yellow pages web sites,
Specifically, the DC Circuit held:
Additionally, personal jurisdiction surely cannot be based
solely on the ability of District residents to access the
defendants' websites, for this does not by itself show any
persistent course of conduct by the defendants in the District.
Access to a website reflects nothing more than a telephone
call by a District resident to the defendants' computer servers,
all of which apparently are operated outside of the District.
And, as this court has held, mere receipt of telephone calls
outside the District does not constitute persistent conduct 'in
the District' within the meaning of the long-ann statute. See
Tavoulareas v. Comnas, 720 F.2d 192,194 (D.C.eir. 1983).
Finally, GTE appears to suggest that, when a District resident
accesses the defendants' Yellow Pages websites, the
defendants are somehow 'transacting business' in the District.
This is a far-fetched claim on this record. Access to an
Internet Yellow Page site is akin to searching a telephone
book - the consumer pays nothing to use the search tool, and
any resulting business transaction is between the consumer
and a business found in the Yellow Pages, not between the
consumer and the provider of the Yellow Pages. In short,
there is nothing here to indicate that District residents
actually engage in any business transactions with the
defendants.
When stripped to its core, GTE's theory of jurisdiction rests
on the claim that, because the defendants have acted to
maximize usage of their websites in the District, mere
accessibility of the defendants' websites establishes the
necessary 'minimum contacts' with this forum. See Br. for.
Appellee at 16. This theory simply cannot hold water.
Indeed, under this view, personal jurisdiction in Internet-
related cases would almost always be found in any forum in
the country. We do not believe thatthe advent ofadvanced
technology, say, tis with the Internet, .should vitiate long-held























Due Process Clause exists, in part, to give 'a degree of
predictability to the legal system that allows potential
defendants to structure their primary conduct with some
minimum assurance as to where that conduct will and will
not render them liable to suit.' World-Wide Volkswagen
Qmk 444 U.S. at 297, 100 S.Ct. 559. In the context of the
Internet, GTE's expansive theory of personal jurisdiction
would shred these constitutional assurances out of practical
existence. Our sister circuits have not accepted such an
approach, and neither shall we.
Ultimately, the D.C. Circuit declined to rule on the merits of its theory of
jurisdiction. Rather, it remanded the case for further jurisdictional discussion.
Once again, Jeremy Gillman gives us a sage observation:
GTE is significant in two respects in that it (i) signifies yet
another federal appeals court's affirfJ1ation of the fact that
the broad reach of the Internet will not defeat time-honored
principles ofpersonal jurisdiction law developed well before
the dawn ofthe computer age, and (ii) reminds litigants that
they need to rely on detailed, case-specific facts rather than
conclusory assertions when presenting their jurisdictional
arguments to the court. Gillman, 56 Business Lawyer at 408.
Intercon, Inc. v. Bell Atlantic Internet Solutions
One final appellate decision remains for discussion. In Intercon, Inc. v.
Bell Atlantic Internet Solutions, 205 F.3d 1244 (10th Cir. 2000), Intercon, an
Oklahoma ISP, had a domain name of Icon.net. Bell Atlantic offered Internet
access through various service providers, one of whom used the domain name
Iconnet.net. Here, Intercon sued Bell Atlantic, a non-resident provider of dial-up
Internet service for unauthorized use of Intercon's e-mail server. For complicated
reasons, defendant had to route its e-mail through other Internet service providers.
However, an addressing problem caused much of that routing to go through
Intercon, severely burdening the·latter mail server. Even after Intercon's president
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contacted Bell Atlantic to explain and complain, Bell Atlantic continued to
provide Intercon's address to new subscribers for a full two months and pennitted
thousands of existing customers to access Intercon's server for an additional seven
weeks, despite having the technological ability to prevent such access
immediately upon discovering the problem. More specifically, beginning in July,
1996, defendant mistakenly routed its customers' e-mail messages to the wrong
domain name, a practice that continued for many months, even after Intercon's
president contacted defendant on several occasions. Defendant finally tenninated
its use of plaintiffs facilities in February, 1997, by completely blocking customer
access to the mail server.
Plaintiff brought this action against defendant in Oklahoma seeking
compensation for defendant's unauthorized use of the mail server and attendant
damages. A battle of affidavits ensued in support of defendant's motion to
dismiss. Finding defendant's contacts with Oklahoma were not purposely
established, a district court granted the motion. Intercon appealed.
Defendant claimed that because it never intended to transmit traffic
through Oklahoma, its inadvertent contacts with Oklahoma were merely
"fortuitous" and, therefore, insufficient to establish personal jurisdiction. The
Tenth Circuit disagreed stating:
Here, accepting plaintiffs evidence as true, we conclude that
plaintiff has shown that defendant purposefully directed its
conduct toward Oklahoma after the end of October 1996. At
that point, defendant had notice that it was routing its
customers' e-mail through the Oklahoma mail server and that
the unauthorized traffic was causing problems for the
Oklahoma-based company_ It is possible that defendant • .






















providing plaintiffs phone number to its customers for
technical support before plaintiff advised defendant of the
problem. Defendant nonetheless continued to provide
plaintiffs address to its new subscribers for a full two
months, until December 31, 1996, and pennitted thousands of
its old customers to access the Oklahoma server for an
additional seven weeks, despite having the technological
ability to prevent such access immediately upon discovering
the problem. Although defendant may have had a legitimate
business reason for not terminating its use of the Oklahoma
mail server immediately - concerns over interrupting its
customers' service - this does not negate the fact that
defendant purposefully availed itself of the Oklahoma server
for almost four months after being notified of the erroneous
address.
Having concluded that the defendant's activities and consequences had a
substantial enough connection with Oklahoma to make the exercise ofjurisdiction
reasonable, the appellate court reversed the judgment of the district court.
Of the cases on the Case List, approximately 98 find no jurisdiction while
approximately 68 find jurisdiction. In those finding jurisdiction, Patterson and
Zippo have provided the analytical framework that a number of later cases have
followed. Although discussion of some or even many of the cases on the
Cyberspace Jurisdiction Case Lists might provide additional information, it would
contribute little additional wisdom.
CYBERSPACE JURISDICTIONAL FUNDAMENTALS
As the preceding discussion shows, courts are applying traditional
jurisdictional rules to determine the existence of personal jurisdiction over the
parties to Internet transactions. From these cases, I submit the following
jurisdictional fundamentals will be true more often than not:
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1. General Jurisdiction based on Internet presence alone is extremely
unlikely. Rather, the court is likely to require a significant amount of forum
contact in both cyberspace and physical space before finding general jurisdiction
exists.
2. In considering the role of the Internet in establishing contacts for
personal jurisdiction, the courts have analogized Internet contacts to more
traditional communication media. However, for all their explanatory usefulness,
analogies can be quite misleading. Even so, the courts have applied a number of
them, analogizing:
a. telephone calls and mail sent to the forum to e-mail;
b. the physical distribution of goods within the forum to the-
electronic distribution of goods;
c. national print or broadcast advertisements and 1-800
numbers to web pages; and,
d. contracts executed in the forum or entered into with its
residents to "point and click" contracts.
As an exercise, think through some of the cases under discussion using
these analogies to see if you feel they give satisfactory results. I submit that
analogizing telephone calls to the Internet contacts is better than most.
3. Specific jurisdiction is unlikely to arise from a mostly or even
predominantly passive web site.
4. Pure Internet advertising cases are unlikely to give rise to a finding




















or transacts business through the web site, or provides goods and services ordered
through the web site, the courts often find specific jurisdiction.
5. In many of the cases where the court found specific jurisdiction,
the court considered as important factors the defendant's non-Internet contacts:
such as contracts with forum residents, toll-free advertisements in forum
publications, mailings into the forum and toll-free telephone numbers.
6. In any case where a defendant has purposefully directed his
activity to the forum state in a substantial way, the courts have been generous in
finding specific jurisdiction, even more so when there exist non-Internet contacts.
7. Last, the incidental activity that typically arises in these specific
jurisdiction cases usually takes the form of either commercial activity or effects
,
directed toward the forum state, i.e., a "targeting" the forum state or one of its
residents.
Finally, in conducting your analysis, be mindful of some of Andrew
Costa's well-founded distinctions in his seminal article Minimum Contacts in
Cyberspace: A Taxonomy of the Case Law. For example, Costa points out that
some courts have had difficulty separating the defendant's conduct from the
medium in which it takes place. Costa believes an important distinction exists
between the Internet itself, as the purposefully availing contact, and the Internet,
as the vehicle for the purposefully availing conduct.
Costa's distinction between the Internet itself and the conduct which takes
place on it illustrates the fallacy in Mantz, Inc. v. Cybergold, supra, where the
court characterized Cybergold's web site as evidence of intent to reach all
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Internet users regardless of geographical location. Similarly, in Inset Systems,
Inc. v. Instruction Set, Inc., the court viewed the defendant's Internet advertising
and toll free numbers as indicating it intended to avail itself of the privilege of
doing business in all states. Costa correctly observes that these cases would
subject those with an Internet presence to suit any of the fifty states. Costa also
accurately observes that where the Internet by itself is viewed as a pervasive
medium that demonstrates an intent to avail oneself of all forum states, the result
cannot be hannonized with the Jurisdictional Fundamentals stated earlier.
Similar cautions are useful to insure that the court making a minimum
contacts analysis does not mistake technological possibility witll foreseeabilty.
The fact that a party can reasonably foresee citizens of each of the fifty states
accessing his web site is not the same thing as that same party reasonably
anticipating that his Internet presence, without more, would render him amenable
to suit in any jurisdiction in th~ United States. After all, a web site is not
automatically projected to a user's computer. Rather, the user, himself, must take
affinnative action to access the web site.
SAFEGUARDS AGAINST ASSERTION OF JURISDICTION
1. Operate a passive, information only, web site with little or no consumer
interaction. Do not solicit or fill orders through the web site. Have the order
solicitation and acceptance occur through more conventional means.























3. Restrict access to the web site to persons from "friendly" jurisdictions, and
decline business from jurisdictions where you do not wish to be subject to
jurisdiction.
4. Put contractual terms on the web site, call them to the attention of web site
users and require web site users to accept them before undertaking significant
activities on, or placing orders through, the web site.
5. The contractual tenns may include, among other things,
a. Contractual choice of forum and choice of law clauses;
b. Jurisdictional disclaimers;
c. Non-judicial remedies in advance of, but in the event of, a dispute
including arbitration or mediation clauses, credit card charge off agreements and
escrow agreements.
CONCLUSION
Cyberspace jurisdiction is indeed a matter of new wine in old bottles. The
new wine, of course, is the detailed case specific facts of internet usage that
appear in the cases discussed here and in the Caselists. The old bottles, of course,
are the time-honored principles of personal jurisdiction developed well before the
dawn of the computer age. For you, as for every advocate, an understanding of
the function of the internet, an ability and willingness to explain it to the court,
and the creativity to concoct a persuasive presentation of the facts are all required
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A SOMEWHAT INTERESTING GUIDE TO TRADEMARKS
1. You are surrounded by trademarks. The automobile you drove to this CLE
bears its manufacturer's trademark in several places. The ieans you wear on the
weekends feature trademarks. So does the can of soda on your desk, the watch on your
wrist, and the newspaper you are reading (when you should be p~ying attention to the
CLEI).
2. Trademarks are among a company's mostvaluable assets. Theydistinguish
that company's goods and services from those of its competitors. They are symbols of
the goodwill consumers have toward the company.
3. A formal definition: A trademark is a word, phrase, symbol or design (see
previous page), or combination thereof, which identifies and distinguishes the source of
the goods of one party from those of others.
4. A service mark is the same as a trademark except that it identifies and
distinguishes the source of a service rather than a product.
5. Normally, a trademark appears on the product or on its packaging while
a service mark appears in advertising for the services.
6. Trademark rights arise from either:
A. Actual use of the mark in commerce, or
B. The filing of an application to register a mark in the United States
Patent and Trademark Office ("U5PTO") stating that the applicant has a bona fide
intention to use the mark in interstate commerce.
7. Federal registration is not required to establish rights in a mark. There are
many valid marks which are not registered. These are called "common law" marks.
8. The owner of a common law mark may use the "TM" symbol next to his
mark; the use of the /lTM" symbol will warn others that you claim rights in that mark.
9. Federal registration does have certain benefits. The owner of a federal
registration:
A. is presumed to be the owner of the mark for the goods and services
specified in the registration,
B. is entitled to use the mark nationwide,
c. is entitled to certain advantages and remedies in federal lawsuits,
and























10. Trademarks may also be registered on a state-by-state basis. In Kentucky,
the Secretary of State handles trademark registrations.
11 . Unlike copyrights or patents, trademark rights can last forever if the owner
continues to use the mark to identify its goods or services. ,
A. The term of a federal trademark registration is 10 years, with 10-
year renewal terms. -
B. The term of a state trademark registration will vary from state to
state.
12. Many persons may use the same trademark as long as there is not a
likelihood of confusion caused by their simultaneous use of the mark. Confusion is
unlikely to occur if (a) the mark is not being used for the same services or goods or (b)
the mark is used by different owners but in different locations.
13. Example of the same mark being used by different owners:
A. The Wyatt, Tarrant & Combs, LLP law firm uses the WYATT mark to
advertise its very reasonably priced legal services.
B. The Wyatt Technology Corporation uses the WYATT mark in
connection with its manufacture and sale of IImulti-angle laser light scattering
equipment" (whatever that means).
c. Both Wyatt Technologies and Wyatt, Tarrant & Combs may use the
WYATT mark. They are not competitors. Aside from Florida voters, no one shopping for
IIlaser light scattering equipment" will be confused by Wyatt, Tarrant & Comb's use of
the WYATT mark.
14. The Internet is one big market without any boundaries. A California cigar
dealer who uses the mark IIHotrods" to advertise his goods on the Internet may cause
confusion with a New York cigar dealer who uses the same mark. The result is dotcom
litigation.
A PARTIALLY INTERESTING GUIDE TO DOMAIN NAMES
15. Domain names are divided into IIhierarchies." The Iitop-level" of the
hierarchy appears after the last dot in a domain name. lI.com" is the most common top
level domain name l and is used to indicate that the domain name is owned by a
commercial enterprise.
16. Other top level domains (IITLD") are:
A. II. org" for non-profit organizations,
B. II.net" for network and Jnternet related organizations,
c. ~/.edu"-forcolleges.-and-universities~
E-3
D. ".gov" for government entities.
17. Virtually every nation also has a TlO, including the following:
[1] ". bs" for Bahamas (though this would be appropriate for
certain politicians),
[2] II.de" for Germany (Deutschland),
[3] II. nr" for Nauru,
[4] II. pS" for Palestinian Territories (though this would be a great
domain for certain letter writers),
[5] ".tv" for Tuvalu (which has been soliciting registrations from
various television companies),
[6] ". uk" for the United Kingdom (England),
[7] ".va" for the Vatican.
". aero" for air transport businesses,
". biz" for businesses,
". COOp" for cooperatives,
". info", unrestricted use,
".museum" for museums, believe it or not,
". name" for individuals,
". pro" for accountants, lawyers and physicians.
[1] The ". pro" domain will be divided into sub-domains which
will allow different professionals with the same name to use that name without
conflicting with others. Example: "iohnstevens. cpa. pro" and
"iohnstevens.law. pro."
[2] The TLD may also add geographic designations within each
profession so professionals with the same name and occupation may use their.
names. Example: "iohnstevens. ky.law. pro" and "iohnstevens. ny.law. pro"
18. The following new TLD's will become operative sometime during the first








19. Here is some advice. Before you sign up to register a name in any of the
new TlDs, please note the following:
A. No companies have been accredited yet to register names in any of
the new TlDs. Registration procedures have not yet been formalized, and there is no
guarantee that any particular organization will be authorized to take registrations for any
particular TLD.
B. No one has been authorized to "pre-register- domain names in the
new TLDs. Persons who attempt to "pre-register- such domain names do so at their own
risk and with no assurance that they will receive the pre-registered names once the TLDs
become operational. The U.S. Federal Trade Commission (FTC) recently issued a
consumer alert warning about "scam ocrti'sfs" offering services along these lines. Among























any domain name pre-registration service that asks for up-front fees, guarantees
particular top level domain names or preferential treatment in the assignment of new
top level domain names. II
20. The "second level" domain name appears to the left of the "dot."
A. "Yahoo" is the second-level domain name in "Yahoo.com"
B. There are now over 15 million "second-level" domain names
registered worldwide.
21. There are three big problems with the domain name system.
A. Two identical second level domain names cannot coexist under the
same top level domain.
B. Domain names have been registered on a first-come, first-served
basis, without any regard to whether the registrant has the right to the name (though
many of the new TlO registrars plan to pre-screen applicants).
C. Internet users assume that a company's domain name will contain
the company's most famous trademark: "A customer who is unsure about a compan'y's
domain name will often guess that the domain name is also the company's name."
Panavision Int'l, l.P. v. Toeppen, 141 F.3d 1316 (9th Cir. 1998).
22. This situation has led to "cyberpiracy" - the registration of trademarks as
domain names by persons with no rights in the marks. Some cyberpirates do this in the
hope of being able to sell the domain names to the owners of those marks, others are
trying to take unfair advantage of the reputation attached to those marks, and others are
doing it to strike at the trademark owners. Examples:
A. peta.org: an organization entitled "People Eating Tasty Animals"
obtained the peta.org domain name, much to the disgust of the better known "People
for the Ethical Treatment of Animals."
B. microsoftwindows.com and microsoftoffice.com: Two individuals
named Kurtis Karr and Kenny Brewer registered eleven Microsoft trademarks as their
domain names, including "microsoftwindows.com" and "microsoftoffice.com." Microsoft
was not amused.
C. mcdonalds.com: This domain name was registered by an author
from Wired magazine who was writing a story on the value of domain names and how
traditional companies were slow to recognize their value. In exchange for returning the




RESOLVING DOMAIN NAME DISPUTES THE CHEAP AND EASY WAY
(THE ICANN DISPUTE RESOLUTION PROCEDURE)
23. In January, 2000, the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and
Numbers ("ICANN") replaced Network Solutions Inc. as the new administrator of the
Internet domain name registry system. ICANN assumed responsibility for managing the
registry system, coordinating new competitive domain name registries and creating new
top-level domains in addition to the lI.com,1I lI.net," and ".org" domains. ICANN also
established a new domain name dispute resolution policy.
24. ICANN's new dispute resolution procedure provides trademark owners with
a speedy and relatively cheap mechanism to resolve domain name disputes. Trademark
owners may resolve their domain name ownership disputes through an administrative
process with any "dispute resolution service providers" approved by ICANN.
25. ICANN has issued the "Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy"
(a.k.a. the "UDRP") which outlines the general goals, limitations and procedures of
domain name dispute resolution proceedings.
26. To be confusing, ICANN has also promulgated the "Rules for Uniform
Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy" ("UDRP Rules").
27. A trademark owner with a domain name dispute may choose from four
dispute resolution providers. ICANN intends to approve many other dispute resolution
service providers, but for now the choice is limited to the following organizations:
A. The World Intellectual Property Organization ("WIPO") based in
Geneva, Switzerland,
B. The National Arbitration Forum in Minneapolis, Minnesota,
C. The eResolution Consortium of Montreal, Canada, and
D. The CPR Institute for Dispute Resolution.
28. A complainant does not need to have a registered trademark in order to
file a proceeding with an ICANN dispute resolution provider. A complainant can base
an action on his "common law" trademark rights.
29. An ICANN dispute resolution works like this:
A. The trademark owner or his attorney picks a dispute resolution
provider and checks that provider's supplemental rules.
B. The trademark owner files a complaint and the required fee with the
dispute resolution provider. The fee varies by provider and also depends on the number





as the Complainant) can choose to have the dispute heard by one arbitrator (for
approximately $750) or by a panel of three arbitrators (for approximately $2,200).
C. The Complainant then serves a copy of the complaint on the
registrant -- the person or entity which has registered the disputed domain name.
D. The registrant (now referred to as the Respondent) has twenty days
to file his response with the dispute resolution provider.
E. The arbitrator or panel of arbittators will review the statements and
documents submitted and render a decision in approximately two weeks.
F. There is a ten-day waiting period after the decision. During that
period, the losing party may file a lawsuit in a court of proper jurisdiction. If no lawsuit
is filed within this time period, the arbitrator's decision becomes binding and the domain
name registrar will abide by the decision.














31. The ICANN proceedings do not involve live testimony; decisions are based
strictly on the documents submitted. The proceedings are intended to be a cost-effective
alternative to the court system. Participants to the proceedings are not required to use
attorneys (but they shouldl).
32. In order to prevail in an ICANN proceeding" the Complainant must prove
each of these elements:
A. That the domain name is "identical or confusingly similar" to the
Complainant's trademark;
B. That the Respondent does not have any "rights or legitimate
interests" in the domain name; and
C. That the domain name "should be considered as having been
registered and being used in bad faith."
33. The following may be evidence of "bad faith":
A. circumstances which indicate that the Respondent registered the
domain name "primarily for the purpose of selling, renting, or otherwise transferring the
domain name registration to the ... owner of the trademark or service mark or to a
competitor of [the owner], for valuable consideration in excess of the Respondent's
documented out-of-pocket costs...."
B. evidence that the Respondent has engaged in aOllpattern of conduct"
of registering domain names "in order to prevent the owner of the trademark or service
mark from reflecting the mark in a corresponding domain name."
c. proof that the Respondent "registered the domain name primarily























34. The Respondent will be entitled to retain the domain name re9ist~
he has a legitimate interest in the domain name. Here are some exampt.I'
legitimate interest: -
A. The Respondent used the domain name "in connection with'd
fide offering of goods or services" before receivi.ng any notice of the domain
dispute; or
B. The Respondent is "commonly known by the domain name"
the Respondent has "acquired no trademark or service mark rights"; or
C. The Respondent is making /la legitimate noncommercial or fair~,u__
of the domain name, without intent for commercial gain to misleadinglyd
consumers or to tarnish the trademark or service mark at issue."
AN INCOMPLETE SAMPLING OF ICANN CASES
D. A showing that the Respondent "intentionally attempted f9'"u:
for commercial gain, Internet users" to the Respondent's web site "by cre
likelihood of confusion" with the Complainant's mark.
IIfHE DOMAIN NAME IS IIDENTICAL OR CONFUSINGLYSIMILAR' TO
THE COMPLAINANT'S TRADEMARK."
35. MICKJAGGER.COM (FA0007000095261). Complainant, Mr. Mick Ja.f~
asserted that he owned a "common law trademark in his famous personal nam.,"·
presented evidence of the continuous commercial use of that mark for more than t
five (35) years." Respondent used the domain name MICKJAGGER.COM as a link~
porno site. The arbitrator found for Complainant, noting that it was not necessaJY~'
Mr. Jagger to have a registered trademark: /lThe UDRP does not require t~Qt..
Complainant have rights in a registered trademark or service mark. Certa;
Complainant held a common law trademark in his famous name, 'Mick Jagger,'
without registration at the United States Patent and Trademark Office."
STING.COM, infra.
36. CITYUTILITIES.COM (D2000-0407). Complainant City Utiliti,
Springfield, Missouri was unable to wrest this domain name away from Responde
individual. The Complainant was commonly known as /I City. Utilities." The Respon
used the domain name as a link to another website which was not related to uti
Nonetheless, the WIPO Arbitration and Mediation Centerfound that the Responden
because lithe term 'city utilities' describes the type of services offered by a·
company within a city, rather than the source of such services. As such, theter~·..•.>~"";i, .. "'''''k~~,.t''i"'





















37. MICROSOF.COM (02000-0548). The Respondent used this domain name
for a site which featured Microsoft and Linux products. Complainant Microsoft
Corporation argued that the domain name MICROSOF.COM was confusingly similar to
its famous trademark. The arbitrator agreed: "The term 'microsof' is very similar to
'microsoft' in its visual impression. Pronunciation of the two terms is very similar. An
Internet user or consumer viewing the term 'microsof' (or 'microsof.com') is likely to
confuse it with the term 'microsoft' (or microsoft.com')." --
38. DIGITALCITYMAP.COM (02000-1 ~83). Complainant Digital City, Inc.
owned numerous registered "DIGITAL CITY" marks. Respondent was a land surveyor.
The arbitrator found that the domain name OIGITAlCITYMAP.COM was not confusingly
similar to the DIGITAL CITY marks because (i) the "domain name comprises a mark and
a suffix," (ii) the "mark is essentially generic within the online world and has not acquired
such distinctiveness as to merit broader protection," and (iii) "the suffix ... does not
relate specifically to the business of the Complainant."
39. 32 NCAA DOMAIN NAMES (D2000-0836). Complainant NCAA owns
several registered NCAA trademarks, such as "NCAA", "NCAA Basketball" and "NCAA
Football." Respondent is not associated with the NCAA but nonetheless registered 32
domain names, each containing the mark "NCAA." Many of the domain names were
obviously in association with gambling, such as NCAABASKETBAlLODDS.COM,
NCAABASKET -BALLPICKS. COM, NCAAFOOTBALLGAMBLI NG. COM,
NCAAFOOTBAllODDS.COM. Others appeared to be informational, such as
N CAAMENSBASKETBAll. COM, NCAABASKETBAlLSCH EDU LEe COM,
NCAABASKETBAllSCORES.COM, and NCAACOllEGEBASKETBAll. COM. The arbitrator
found that the twenty "informational" domain names must be transferred to the NCAA.
However, the twelve "gambling" domain names would not be transferred. The arbitrator
found that there would not be any confusion between the NCAA gambling domain
names because of the NCAA's oppos~tion to gambling: "Given the NCAA's strong
opposition to gambling, it is less likely that these names could lead to any confusion."
IIJHE RESPONDENT DOES NOT HAVE ANY IRIGHTS OR LEGITIMATE
INTERESTS' IN THE DOMAIN NAME."
40. DIRECTLINESUCKS.COM (02000-0583). The Complainant is a British
group of insurance and banking companies which use the DIRECT LINE mark for their
services and products. The Respondent took the names of eighteen well-known British
enterprises, added the word "sucks" to each, and registered them as domain names,
including DIRECTLINESUCKS. The Respondent claimed he registered the
DIRECTLINESUCKS.COM name in order "to help protect enterprises against being
bothered by customer sites at which gri6vances are aired." In the same altruistic spirit,
··the Respondent offered to sell the domain narneto Direct Line for a "'five figure sum'
tobepaiddiredly:to ..Q ..charity chosen ,byfheRespo·ndents"plus .5,000 ·pounds to
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Respondent for its time and expense. The arbitration panel found the Registrant did not
have a legitimate interest in the domain name: "The panel finds that there is no
iustification for the role of officious interferer which the Respondents have taken upon
themselves ...." See also STANDARDCHARTEREDSUCKS.COM (D2000-0681)
(reaching almost identical decision).
-
41. Note: According to an August 20, 2000, story published on CNET.COM,
"arbitrators have sided with trademark owners in nine out of 11 domain name disputes
involving I -sucks' variations on corporate names." The story noted that many
corporations are registering as domain names theirown trademarks in combination with
"sucks" in orderto protect themselves. Verizon Communications, for instance, registered
"VERIZONSUCKS.COM." But that did not dissuade one protestor, who then registered
"VERIZONREALLYSUCKS.COM." When Verizon contacted the registrant and demanded
the transfer of the domain site, the registrant registered the following domain name:
"VerizonShouldSpendMoreTimeFixingltsNetworkAndLessMoneyOnLawyers.Com"
42. MADONNA.COM (D2000-0847). Respondent purchased this domain
name for $20,00'0 and used the name in connection with a site that displayed sexually
explicit photographs and text. The singer called Madonna (a.k.a. Madonna Ciccone),
complained. Respondent had registered MADONNA as a trademark in Tunisia.
A. The panel of arbitrators noted that "it is possible for a Respondent
to rely on a valid trademark Iregistration to show prior rights," but noted that "it would
be a mistake to conclude that mere registration of a trademark creates a legitimate
interest under the Policy." The arbitrators found that Respondent's trademark
registration carried no weight since both the Respondent and Complainant were
Americans and "[a] Tunisian trademark registration is issued upon application without
any substantive examination."
B. Respondent's case was also weakened by the fact that he "has
registered a large number of other domain names ... that matched the trademarks of
others," including "wallstreetiournal.com"
C. Respondent argued that his porn site would not tarnish Madonna's
reputation "because she has already associated herself with sexually explicit creative
work." The arbitrators felt this argument "missed the point." He also noted that
Madonna's reputation could be tarnished because Madonna did not control the
Respondent's sexually explicit content and it "maybe contrary to her creative intent and
standards of quality."
.43. PRIORITYMAIL.COM (FA001 0000095757). The arbitrators held that the
Respondent did not have a legitimate interest in PRIORITYMAIL.COM, PRIORITY-
MAIL.COM, POST-OFFICE.ORGorPOST-OFFICE.NET. Accordingly, they transferred the
domain names to the Complainant, the u.s. Postal Service. In finding an absence of
legitimate interest in these names, the panel noted that the Resp~ndenthadnever used

























has registered over 700 domain names, and that his IIdecision to register multiple
variations of the same name (org and net, hyphen or not) supports a conclusion that the
purpose was to use the name to attract traffic, not to provide consumer services. In any
event, only one such name would have been sufficient."
THE DOMAIN NAME I'SHOULD BE CONSIDERED AS HAVING BEEN
REGISTERED AND BEING USED IN BAD FAITH.'I -
44. WORLDWRESTLINGFEDERATION.~OMThis domain name became the
subject of the first case decided under ICANN's uniform dispute resolution policy
("UDRP"). A California resident had registered the domain name
worldwrestlingfederation.com. He offered to sell the name at substantial profit to the
pro wrestling organization. Rather than sending Hulk Hogan to forcibly retrieve the
domain name, the WWF filed a Complaint with the WIPO. The arbitration panel
directed that the domain name should be transferred to the WWF. It held the domain
name was identical to or confusingly similar to the service marks owned by the WWF;
the California dude had no legitimate interests in the domain name; and the domain
name had been registered and used in bad faith -- as evidenced by the registrant's offer
to sell the name to the WWF.
45. SKUNKWORX.NET & MP3SKUNKWORKS.COM (02000-0799):
Complainant Lockheed Martin Corporation is a large defense contractor and for many
decades has operated the "Skunk Works" research facility. That facility has gained fame
through production of such aircraft as the U2, the SR-71 Blackbird and the F-117 Stealth
Fighter. Respondent registered SKUNKWORX.NET and MP3SKUNKWORKS.COM but
"appears never to have pointed this name at any active web site." He claims that he
never heard of Lockheed, he thought "Skunk Works" was a generic term for a research
facility, and he was contemplating using his domain names for "a space where the
collective creation of audio could take place." When Lockheed contacted him about the
domain names, Respondent offered to sell them for $5,000. The arbitrator found that
Respondent registered and used the domain names in bad faith, despite the fact that
they were never actually "used."
A. Bad faith registration and "use" 'were proved by these facts: (a)
Respondent probably knew of Lockheed's trademarks, (b) he IIhad no bona fide intent
to use that name in the generic sense, (c) by registering "SKUNKWORX.NET" the
Respondent tried to capitalize on Lockheed's trademarks, (d) Respondent sought to block
Lockheed from using "SKUNKWORX.NET" despite Respondent's lack of legitimate
interest in the name, and (e) his conduct was consistent with an intent to engage in
malicious mischief.
B. liThe Policy does not define the term 'bad faith.' The examples of
'circumstances' recognized as 'evidence of bad faith' in Paragraph 4(b) of the Policy
embody an eclectic group of concepts variously reminiscent of unjust enrichment,
misappropriationl·tortiousjnterfer'rnc~with prospediveeconomic advantage, trademark
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infringement, and 'unfair' business behavior in a general sense. The examples all
require that a Respondent have acted with a particular state of mind, such as 'primarily
for the purpose of disrupting the business of a competitor,' or 'in order to prevent the
owner of the trademark or service mark from reflecting the mark in a corresponding
domain name."
46. MICROSOF.COM, supra. The arbitrator explained tnat the "html code for
a webpage also may contain ... its title, description and keywords which are used by
some search engines to determine whether a particular webpage is relevant to an
Internet user's search engine query. The arbitra'tor noted that the MICROSOF.COM
website had the virtually same "source code" or "html code" as that of the
MICROSOFT. COM website. The only difference was that Respondent had omitted the
letter "t" from the word Microsoft. Consequently, the MICROSOF.COM site would be
listed in response to searches looking for Microsoft Corporation. This was further
evidence of the Registrant's bad faith.
47. 37 YAHOO DOMAIN NAMES (02000-0273). Mr. Eitan Zviely, the
Respondent, using a variety of names and shell companies, registered 37 domain names
which incorporated the name YAHOO (e.g. YAHOOUK.COM, KYAHOO,
ATLANTAYAHOO.COM) or phonetic equivalents (e.g. JAHU.COM, YOUHOO.COMand
YUAHOO.COM). Respondent's YAHOO-domains directed users to his own
aOOGo.COM site, which he advertised as "twelve search engines in one." Complainant,
Yahool Inc., pointed to Mr. Zviely's pattern of registering trademark-related domain
names, stating that he "has registered countless other domain names, misspelling at
least 50 well-known trademarks owned by third parties." The arbitrator was persuaded
that Respondent's practice was evidence of his bad faith: "This conclusion is reinforced
by Zviely's pattern of conduct in registering 37 Yahoo-like domain names, as well as
dozens of other trademark-related domain names.... Zviely's only purpose in
registering so many trademark-related domain names must have been to trade on the
good will and fame associated with those marks."
48. STANFORDUNIVERSITY.COM (FA0008000095543). Complainant is the
world-famous Stanford University and owns several registered federal trademarks
incorporating the word "Stanford." Respondent is a California surgeon who claims to
have operating privileges at Stanford University medical Center. The arbitrator found
Respondent's domain name was confusingly similar to Complainant's registered marks
and that Respondent did not have a legitimate use for the mark. Nonetheless, the
arbitrator refused to transfer the domain name because he did not find that Respondent
registered and used the domain name in bad faith. This finding was based primarily on
the fact that Respondent had only registered this one mark and did not have a pattern
of registering marks as domain nam1es in order to deprive the trademarks owners of the
























domain names. Therefore, a finding of bad faith under ICANN Policy 4(b)(ii) can not be
made."
49. STING.COM (02000-0596): Complainant Gordon Sumneris better known
as the musician "Sting." Respondent Michael Urvan is better knowf' as Michael Urvan.
Until being contacted by Complainant, Respondent was not using the domain name. He
then briefly linked it to a site called "GunBroker.com" and offere-a to sell the domain
name to Sting for $25,000. Complainant alleged he had common law trademark rights
in the name "Sting." Respondent claimed that he had used "Sting" as his e-mail name
for eight years. The arbitrator found for the Respondent because the Respondent had
not registered the name in bad faith-- even though the Respondent did not have any
legitimate rights in "Sting." The Arbitrator also questioned whether Sting had any
common law trademark rights in his name, characterizing Sting as having "personality
rights." Though other panels have treated the name of a famous person as constituting
an unregistered trademark, this Arbitrator pointed to the "Report of the WIPO Internet
Domain Name Process", upon which ICANN based the UDRP. This Report stated that
the arbitration procedure would be limited (1) "to cases of deliberate, bad faith abusive
registrations" and (2) to cases involving "trademarks and service marks. Thus,
registrations that violate trade names, geographical indications or personality rights
would- not be considered to fall within the definition of abusive registration for the
purposes of the administrative procedure."
THE RESPONDENT USED THE DOMAIN NAME IIIN CONNECTION
WITH A BONA FIDE OFFERING OF GOODS OR SERVICES" BEFORE
RECEIVING ANY NOTICE OF THE DOMAIN NAME DISPUTE.
50. CISSELL.COM (FA0008000095321). Respondent was a former distributor
of Complainant Cissell and registered this domain name after Complainant permitted
its own registration of the domain name to lapse. Respondent now uses the name to
link to its site where it offers products from Complainant's competitors. Nonetheless, the
arbitrator ruled in favor of the Respondent, finding that it had a legitimate interest in the
domain name when it registered the name and that the Respondent continued to
purchase Cissell products from other sources and to offer those products to its customers.
liThe evidence is unrefuted that Respondent's use of the domain name has been in
connection with a bona fide offering of goods and services."
51. _ SANDALSHONEYMOON.COM DOMAIN NAMES (FA0005000094944).
Respondent, a travel agency, registered nine domain names each containing the word
"SANDAL." Complainant owns and uses the SANDAL trademark in connection with nine
resort hotels in the ·Caribbean. Respondent had been affiliated with Complainant, had
boo.ked many tourists on trips to Sandals resorts (selling 850 rooms in the year 2000),
and Complainant's top. managers had encouraged Respondent's website from jts
inception. But after Co~plainantcreated its own site it so~ghtfogain control over
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Respondent's nine domain names. The arbitrator held the Complainant's had implicitly
consented to Respondent's use of its mark and ruled in favor of Respondent on equitable
grounds: "[T]he Panelist has concluded that Complainant is estopped from terminating
the implied consent which, if allowed, would be inequitable because of Respondent's
reasonable reliance, evaluated in the light of the long-lasting relationship between the
parties."
THE RESPONDENT IS I'COMMONLY KNOWN BY THE DOMAIN
NAME" EVEN IF THE RESPONDENT HAS I'ACQUIRED NO TRADE-
"MARK OR SERVICE MARK RIGHTS"
52. PENGUIN.ORG (0 2000-0204). Respondent Anthony Katz registered the
domain names PENGUIN.ORG, PENGUINLAND.ORG, PENGUINLAND.COM, and
PENGUINLANO.NET. Complainant Penguin Books Limited has registered the PENGUIN
mark in connection with its book publishing business. After Penguin Books contacted Mr.
Katz about, the domain name PENGUIN.ORG, he offered to sell it for $10,000. In
res'ponse to the Complaint, Respondent argued that he was known by the nickname
"Penguin." He also said his wife was known as "Mrs. Penguin." He also claimed that
he registered the PENGUIN.ORG domain name with the intent of registering a site
dedicated to penguins. The arbitration panel ruled in favor of Respondent, finding he
had a legitimate interest in the domain name.
A. /lIt is reasonable for someone to register a domain name based on
a nickname such as /lPenguin" and it follows that the Respondent had legitimate interests
in that name. It is not for this Administrative Panel to decide on whether such use would
in any way infringe any int~lIectualproperty rights of the Complainant and this must be
left to other fora."
B. The panel also noted that it had to accept Respondent's evidence
regarding his nickname /lin the absence of any rebuttal evidence from the Complainant./I
THE RESPONDENT IS MAKING I'A LEGITIMATE NONCOMMERCIAL
OR FAIR USE OF THE DOMAIN NAME, WITHOUT INTENT FOR
COMMERCIAL GAIN TO MISLEADINGLY DIVERT CONSUMERS OR TO
TARNISH THE TRADEMARK OR SERVICE MARK AT ISSUE."
53. 32 NCAA DOMAIN NAMES, supra. The Registrant was found to have a
Illegitimate interest" in the twelve NCAA-gambling domain names: "Complainant notes
that it is lobbying the u.s. government to make Internet gambling "illegal, but does not
suggest that the alleged use is illegal. For purposes of this proceeding, therefore, a web
site devoted to providing information or access to gambling on NCAA games qualifies
as the bona fide offering of goods or services and thus constitutes a legitimate use."
54. ROBOTCOCK.COM{D2000-0900). The Complainant, a Swiss company,






















Respondent, another Swiss company, was a web developer. After the Complainant
refused to pay the Respondent's $128,000 bill for services, the Respondent held the
ROBOTCOCK.COM domain name hostage. The Complainant then filed this ICANN
proceeding, seeking to have the name transferred. Interestingly, the Respondent never
claimed any ownership of the domain name - he admitted that it belonged to the
Complainant. Nevertheless, the panel refused to transfer the domain name: "Since
Respondent, uncontestedly, registered the Domain Name for and on behalf of the
Complainant (albeit in its own name), bad faith at the stage of registration is not
apparent for the Panel. Not even Complainant °c;:ontends bad faith at this stage and
supplies no evidence of it."
55. SCIENTOLOGIE.ORG (02000-0410): This proceeding grew out of a
dispute between the "official" Scientology organization, the American "Religious
Technology Center," and a renegade German group called Freie Zone e.V. ("Free Zone
Association"). The Religious Technology Center filed a Complaint against Free Zone
concerning the latter's registration of SCIENTOLOGIE.ORG. Complainant proved that
Scientology's founder, L. Ron Hubbard, had assigned it all rights to the "SCIENTOLOGY"
trademark, a trademark which it had registered in the U.S.A. and 18 other countries.
Respondent was formed in 1982 by Captain Bill Robertson, L. Ron Hubbard's former
"right arm." In 1995 Respondent purchased all rights to a 1934 German book entitled
"Scientologie - Wissenschaft von der Beschaffenheit und Tauglichkeit des Wissens"
("Scientology - Science of the Constitution and Usefulness of Knowledge"). Respondent
maintains that it uses the domain name for a website which promotes the philosophy of
that book's author, Dr. Anastasius Nordenholz. Under German law, Respondent owns
the word IIScientologie" as a "work title." Respondent's website has a disclaimer; it
explicitly states that it is not connected with Complainant, the "official" Scientology
organization. The arbitrator refused to transfer the domain name, finding that
Respondent was legitimately using the domain name in connection with Dr.
Nordenholz's book: "The copyrights and other rights in this book have been licensed to
Respondent by Dr. Nordenholz's heirs, and these rights appear to be even older than
Complainant's trademarks. Under these circumstances, it cannot be said that
Respondent has no right whatsoever and no legitimate interest in the Domain Name."
MISCELLANEOUS NOTES ABOUT ICANN PROCEEDINGS
56. The ICANN rules provide for the submission of a Complaint and a
Response. They do not provide for other pleadings, such as a Reply or Surreply.
57. The rules do provide that the Panel may request further documentation: IIln
addition to the complaint and the response, the Panel may request, in its sole discretion,
further statements or documents from either of the Parties." UDRP Rule 12.
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58. Many parties have filed replies and surreplies without first asking leave to
file. Some of these have been considered; others have been returned unread.
A. In PENGUIN.ORG, supra, the arbitrator considered the Complaint,
the Response, a Reply, and a Sur-Reply, even though the parties did not ask for
permission to file the additional pleadings.
B. In SCIENTOLOGIE.ORG, supra, the arbitrator considered the
Complaint, the Response, and four more unsolicited submissions. iiAlthough not bound
to do so under the Rules, the Panelist accepts and considers the Parties' further
submissions after the Complaint and Response."· .
C. In STING.COM, supra, the arbitrator returned the numerous
unsolicited pleadings which were filed after the·Complaint and Response. He stated that
further pleadings should not be considered except in extraordinary cases. To routinely
consider other pleadings would frustrate the administrative procedure which "allows for
more rapid and cost effective resolution of domain name challenges." Before filing an
additional pleading, the party should request leave: "If a Party wishes to submit a further
statement, the better practice under the Rules would be to first seek consent from the
panel, with an explanation of why a further statement i~ warranted. Appropriate reasons
may include the existence of new, pertinent facts that did not arise until after the
submission of the complaint, or the desire to bring new, relevant legal authority to the
attention of the Panel."
59. The rules do not specify the standard of proof. More than one arbitrator
has stated that the Complainant bears the same burden as that of a plaintiff in a civil
lawsuit: "[W]e believe the appropriate standard for fact finding is the civil standard of
a preponderance of the evidence.... Under the 'preponderance of the evidence'
standard a fact is proved for the purpose of reaching a decision when it appears more
likely than not to be true based on the evidence." MADONNA.COM, supra.
60. It is a mistake to think of the "Complaint" as the equivalent of a Complaint
in a civil law suit. Think of the Complaint as a motion for summary iudgment. Attach
sworn proof, i.e. affidavits from persons with firsthand knowledge. Otherwise, your
assertions are mere argument: "In view of the contradictory contentions made by
Complainant and Respondent and the failure of Complainant to support its position by
declaration based on identified personal knowledge, the Panel is unable to conclude that
Lockheed has proved, by a preponderance of the evidence, that Respondent registered
'SKUNKWORX.NET" primarilyfor the purpose of selling, renting or otherwise transferring
the domain registration to the Complainant.'" SKUNKWORX.NET, supra.
61. The Respondent's failure to file a Response does not remove the Complain-
ant's burden of proof: "Respondents' failure to respond does not relieve Yahool of its
burden of proof on this element or on either of the two other elements of Paragraph 4(0)

























62. The scope of an ICANN proceeding is limited. A panel will decide whether
to cancel or transfer a domain name. That's it.
A. liThe remedies available to a complainant pursuant to any
proceeding before an Administrative Panel shall be limited to requiring the cancellation
of your domain name or the transfer of your domain name registration to the
complainant." UDRP 4(i). If you want additional relief, go to court.
B. In 37 YAHOO DOMAIN NAME-S, supra, the Camplainant asked the
Arbitrator to compel the Respondent lito produce a full list of domain names he has
registered incorporating and/or misspelling the YAHOOI mark." The arbitrator stated,
lilt is doubtful that the panel has authority to grant 'such relief." It was not doubtful - the
panel clearly did not have such authority.
C. The dispute in ROBOTCOCK.COM , supra, concerned a bad debt.
The Respondent refused to transfer the domain name until the Complainant paid for
Respondent's services in registering the name and hosting the ROBOTCOCK.COM
website for 18 months. The panel recognized it was not equipped to adjudicate the
merits of this controversy: liThe purpose of the Policy is to prevent the misuse of the
domain name system by so-called cybersquatters, but not to handle any contractual
disagreements of two parties in connection with a domain name registration. The Panel
is lacking both the power and the legal means to deal with questions concerning an
underlying contractual relationship, blackmailing, etc."
63. An ICANN proceeding does not limit your rights in a subsequent lawsuit.
A. liThe mandatory administrative proceeding requirements ... shall
not prevent either you or the complainant from submitting the dispute to a court of
competent jurisdiction for independent resolution before such mandatory administrative
proceeding is commenced or after such proceeding is concluded./I UDRP 4(k).
B. "[T] his decision does not bar either party from submitting the dispute
to a court. Thus, if Complainant believes that registration of these domain names is a
violation of u.s. AntiCybersquatting Consumer Protection Act - as cited in the Complaint
- Complainant may bring such an action in u.s. court./I 32 NCAA DOMAIN NAMES,
supra.
64. An ICANN decision is not binding on a court. In the arbitration proceeding
concerning the "eREFEREE.COM, eREFEREE.ORG, eREFEREE.NET" domain names
(FA0004000094707 ), the Complainant owned the federally registered trademark of
"REFEREE" for a magazine. It complained that the Respo~dent'smarks were confusingly
similar to REFEREE and should be transferred. The arbitrator ruled in favor of
Respondent, finding that the Respondent had a legitimate interest in the domain name
in view of his sports background, that Respondent had not attempted to suggest an
affiliation with the Complainant, and that Complainant could not preempt all uses of the
word "REFEREE." According to a Feb. 16, 2001, story on CNET.COM, a federal iudge
in Wisconsin, C.N. Clevert, overturned the ICANN decision and issued an injunction
prohibiting Re$po~dentfrom using its domain ncimes and from using the term IIreferee"
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at all, IIeither alone or with other words 1/ in its"domain names, directory names or other
such computer addresses. II The iudge apparently accepted Complainant's argument that
Respondent's site would deceive viewers into believing it was affiliated with Complaint
and that Respondent's trademark was confusing similar to Complainant's mark.
65. The ICANN dispute resolution process has proven popular because of its
low cost (generally less than $2000) and its quick turn around time-(approximately three
months). Here are some statistics from ICANN, current as of January 2001:
A. There have been 2,780 proceedings'filed involving 4,952 different
domain names.
B. In 1,537 proceedings, the arbitrators held in favor of the Complain-
ants and transferred 2,677 names.
C. In 372 proceedings involving 476 domain names, the arbitrators
ruled for the Respondents.
D. Other proceedings were settled (52), dismissed without prejudice
(169), disposed of without a decision or otherwise terminated.
A DRY INTRODUCTION TO THE
ANTICYBERSQUATTING CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT
66. Not to be left out of the act, Congress provided trademark owners another
method of obtaining conflicting domain names when it passed the AntiCybersquatting
Consumer Protection Act (the "ACPA"), 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d).
67. ELEMENTS OF CAUSE OF ACTION: The ACPA enables the owner of a
distinctive orfamous trademark (including personal names used as marks) to bring a civil
action in federal court against any person who:
A. "has a bad faith intent to profit from that mark, including a personal
name which is protected as a mark" and
B. "registers, traffics in, or uses a domain name that"
[1] is "identical or confusingly similar" to a distinctive trademark,
or
[2] "is identical or confusingly similar to or dilutive" of "a famous
mark." 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(1 )(A).
68. BAD FAITH INTENT: In determining whether "a bad faith intent" is
present, a court may consider any relevant evidence, including the following:
A. lithe trademark or other intellectual property rights of the person,
if any, in the domain name;
B. the extent to which the domain name consists of the legal name of





















c. the person's prior use, if any, of the domain name in connection
with the bona fide offering of any goods or services;
D. the person's bona fide noncommercial or fair use of the mark in a
site accessible under the domain name;
E. the person's intent to divert consumers from the ,mark owner's online
location to a site accessible under the domain name that could harm the goodwill
represented by the mark, either for commercial gain or with the intent to tarnish or
disparage the mark, by creating a likelihood of confusion as to the source, sponsorship,
affiliation, or endorsement of the site;
F. the person's offer to transfer, ·sell, or otherwise assign the domain
name to the mark owner or any third party for financial gain without having used, or
having an intent to use, the domain name in the bona fide offering of any goods or
services, or the person's prior conduct indicating a pattern of such conduct;
G. the person's provision of material and misleading false contact
information when applying for the registration of the domain name, the person's
intentional failure to maintain accurate contact information, orthe person's prior conduct
indicating a pattern of such conduct;
H. the person's registration or acquisition of multiple domain names
which the person knows are identical o·r confusingly similar to marks of others that are
distinctive at the time of registration of such domain names, or dilutive of famous marks
of others that are famous at the time of registration of such domain names, without
regard to the goods or services of the parties; and
I. the extent to which the mark incorporated in the person's domain
name registration is or is not distinctive and famous ...."15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(1 )(8).
69. THE DEFENSE: "Bad faith intent ... shall not be found in any case in which
the court determines that the person believed and had reasonable grounds to believe
that the use of the domain name was a fair use or otherwise lawful."
70. IN REM JURISDICTION: The trademark owner may use the ACPA to file an
in rem civil action against the domain name. The in rem proceeding is available if:
A. If the trademark owner /lis not able to obtain in personam jurisdiction
over a person who would have been a defendant in a civil action," or
B. "through due diligence was not able to find a person who would
have been a defendant in a civil action." 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(2)(A).
71.. The in rem proceeding can be useful when dealing with foreign
cybersquatters.
72. IN REM VENUE: The in rem proceeding can be brought in one of two
places:
A "in the judicial district in which the ... domain name authority that
,r~9iste~edor assigned the domain nam~ is located/(15U.S.C. ~§ .1125{d)(2)(~»),or
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B. "in the judicial district in which ... documents sufficient to establish
control and authority regarding the disposition of the registration and use of the domain
name are deposited with the court." 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(2)(C).
73. Domain name authorities are required to provide a court with documents
sufficient to establish the court's control and authority regarding the disposition of the
registration and use of the domain name" upon receipt of "a filea, stamped copy of a
complaint filed by the owner of a mark in a United States district court." 15 U.S.C. §
1125(d)(2)(D).
74. IN REM REMEDIES: Because the in rem proceeding is against the domain
name itself, and not the registrant, there are no monetary damages available. The only
remedies available are:
A. "a court order for the forfeiture or cancellation of the domain name
or
B. the transfer of the domain name to the owner of the mark." 15
U.S.C. § 1125{d)(2)(D).
75. REMEDIES: There is no limitation on remedies for an "in personam" action.
In addition to obtaining a court order requiring the transfer or cancellation of the domain
name, the owner of a federally registered trademark may also be entitled to recoyer "(1 )
defendant's profits, (2) any damages sustained by the plaintiff, and (3) the costs of the
action." 15 U.S.C. § 1117(0). The court may award treble damages and, "in
exceptional cases," the prevailing party's attorney's fees. !sl.
76.. In Heathmount A.E. Corp. v. Technodome.com, U.S.D.C., E.D. Va.,
(7/24/00), the American Plaintiff owed the trademarks "Technodome" and "Destination:
Technodome." The Canadian Defendant owned the domain names "technodome.com"
and "destinationtechnodome.com." The American Plaintiff was not able to obtain
personal:i:urisdiction over the Canadian Defendant. The federal district court permitted
the American Plaintiff to bring a suit against the domain names themselves pursuant to
the ACPA.
77. The ACPA does not mean that a trademark owner can necessarily stop a
third party's use of a domain name which is identical to the owner's trademark. This is
because that third party may have a legitimate right to use that domain name.
A. As noted earlier, in the brick-and-mortar world it is common for
merchants to use the same trademark for different goods or services. A company may
register a trademark as its domain name, even if that prevents others who have
legitimate rights in that mark from using the mark as their Internet address.
B. Wyatt Technologies, the developers of the lithe first multi-angle light
scatter~n9 (MALS) instruments for absolute macromolecular and particle characteriza-






















Wyatt, Tarrant & Combs cannot use the ACPA to wrest the domain name from Wyatt
Technologies (though it has inquired as to whether Hulk Hogan might intercede).
78. PREVENTIVE MEASURES: There are at least two steps which a business
might take to protect its trademark from cybersquatters.
A. First, the business might register its trademar~_under multiple top-
level domain nam~s. For example, the Yahoo web'site can be found under yahoo.com,
yahoo.web, or yahoo.net.
B. Second, the business owner might obtain domain registrations for
names which sound similar to his domain name and which consumers might mistakenly
enter into their computers. .
WHY BOTHER?
79. A trademark owner must control the use of his trademark. That is because
the trademark's value lies in its ability to identify the owner's goods or services. If others
use that mark for different goods or services, the trademark loses its meaning and the
trademark owner has lost his rights in that mark. The Internet is a two-edged sword.
It makes trademark abuse easier than ever before, but it also makes the discovery of
trademark infringement easier.
80. Courts may well hold that because Internet searching is relatively easy,
trademark owners have the duty to periodically police the Internet. If an infringer of a
mark should have been discovered through routine diligence, yet was allowed to go
























Rules for Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy
(the "Rules")
(As Approved by ICANN on October 24, 199~J
Administrative proceedings for the resolution of disputes under the Uniform Dispute
Resolution Policy adopted by ICANN shall be governed by these Rules and also the




Complainant means the party initiating a complaint concerning a domain-name
registration.
ICANN refers to the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers.
Mutual Jurisdiction means a court iurisdiction at the location of either (a) the
principal office of the Registrar (provided the domain-name holder has submitted
in its Registration Agreement to that iurisdiction for court adjudication of disputes
concerning or arising from the use of the domain name) or (b) the domain-name
holder's address as shown for the registration of the domain name in Registrar's
Whois database at the time the complaint is submitted to the Provider.
Panel means an administrative panel appointed by a Provider to decide a
complaint concerning a domain-name registration.
Panelist means an individual appointed by a Provider to be a member of a
Panel.
Party means a Complainant or a Respondent.
Policy means the Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy that is
incorporated by reference and made a part of the Registration Agreement.
Provider means a dispute-resolution service provide'r approved by ICANN. A list
of such Providers appears at www.icann.org/udrp/approved-providers.htm.
Registrar means the entity with which the Respondent has registered a domain
name that is the subject of a complaint.
Registration Agreement means the agreement between a Regisfrar and a
domain-name~hoJder.. .
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Respondent means the holder of a domain-name registration against which a
complaint is initiated.
Reverse Domain Name Hijacking means using the Policy in bad faith to
attempt to deprive a registered domain-name holder of a dom~in name.
Supplemental Rules means the rules adopted by the Provider administering a
proceeding to supplement these Rules. Supplemental Rules shall not be
inconsistent with the Policy or these Rules and shall cover such topics as fees,
word and page limits and guidelines, the means for communicating with the
Provider and the Panel, and the form of cover sheets.
2. Communications
(a) When forwarding a complaint to the Respondent, it shall be the Provider's
responsibility to employ reasonably available means calculated to achieve actual
notice to Respondent. Achie~ing actual notice, or employing the following
measures to do so, shall discharge this responsibility:
(i) sending the complaint to all postal-mail and facsimile addresses (A)
shown in the domain name's registration data in Registrar's Whois
database for the registered domain-name holder, the technical contact,
and the administrative contact and (8) supplied by Registrar to the Provider
for the registration's billing contact; and
(ii) sending the complaint in electronic form (including annexes to the
extent available in that form) bye-mail to:
(A) the e-mail addresses for those technical, administrative, and
billing contacts;
(B) postmaster@<the contested domain name>; and
(C) if the domain name (or IIWWW.II followed by the domain name)
resolves to an active web page (other than a generic page the
Provider concludes is maintained by a registrar or ISP for parking
domain-names registere.d by multiple domain-name holders), any
e-mail address shown or e-mail links on that web page; and
(iii) sending the complaint to any address the Respondent has notified the
Provider it prefers and, to the extent practicable, to all other addresses
provided to the Provider by Complainant under Paragraph 3(b)(v).
(b) Except as provided in Paragraph 2(a), any written communication to























preferred means stated by the Complainant or Respondent, respectively (see
Paragraphs 3(b)(iii) and 5(b)(iii)), orin the absence of such specification
(i) by telecopy or facsimile transmission, with a confirmation of transmis-
sion; or
(ii) by postal or courier service, postage pre-paid and r1!turn receipt
requested; or .
(iii) electronically via the Internet, provided. a record of its transmission is
available.
(c) Any communication to the Provider or the Panel shaH be made by the means
and in the manner (including number of copies) stated in the Providers
Supplemental Rules.
(d) Communications shall be made in the language prescribed in Paragraph 11 .
E-mail communications should, if practicable, be sent in plaintext.
(e) Either Party may update its contact details by notifying the Provider and the
Registrar.
(f) Except as otherwise provided in these Rules, or decided by a Panel, all
communications provided for under these Rules shall be deemed to have been
made:
(i) if delivered by telecopy or facsimile transmission, on the date shown on
the confirmation of transmission; or
(ii) if by postal or courier service, on the date marked on the receipt; or
(iii) if via the Internet, on the date that the communication was transmitted,
provided that the date of transmission is verifiable.
(9) Except as otherwise provided in these Rules, all time periods calculated under
these Rules to begin when a communication is made shall begin to run on the
earliest date that the communication is deemed to have been made in accor-
dance with Paragraph 2(f).
(h) Any communication by
(i) a Panel to any Party shall be copied to the Provider and to the other
Party;
(ii) the Provider to any Party shall be copied to the other Party; and
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(iii) a Party shall be copied to the other Party, the Panel and the Provider,
as the case may be.
(i) It shall be the responsibility of the sender to retain records of the fact and
circumstances of sending, which shall be available for inspection by affected
parties and for reporting purposes.
(i) In the event a Party sending a communication receives notification of non-
delivery of the communication, the Party shall.promptly notify the Panel (or, if no
Panel is yet appointed, the Provider) of the circumstances of the notification.
Further proceedings concerning the communication and any response shall be as
directed by the Panel (or the Provider).
3. The Complaint
(a) Any person or entity may initiate an administrative proceeding by submitting
a complaint in accordance with the Policy and these Rules to any Provider
approved by ICANN. (Due to capacity constraints orfor other reasons, a Providers
ability to accept complaints may be suspended at times. In that event, the
Provider shall refuse the submission. The person or entity may submit the
complaint to another Provider.)
(b) The complaint shall be submitted in hard copy and (except to the extent not
available for annexes) in electronic form and shall:
(i) Request that the complaint be submitted for decision in accordance with
the Policy and these Rules;
(ii) Provide the name, postal and e-mail addresses, and the telephone and
telefax numbers of the Complainant and of any representative authorized
to act for the Complainant in the administrative proceeding;
(iii) Specify a preferred method for communications directed to the
Complainant in the administrative proceeding (including person to be
contacted, medium, and a~dress information) for each of (A) electronic-
only material and (B) material including hard copy;
(iv) Designate whether Complainant elects to have the dispute decided by
a single-member or a three-member Panel and, ·in the event .Complainant
elects a three-member Panel, provide the names and contact details of
three candidates to serve as one of the· Panelists (these candidates may be
drawn from any ICANN-approved Providers list of panelists);
(v) Provide the name of the Respondent (domain-name holder) and all





















telefax numbers) known to Complainant regarding how to contact
Respondent or any representative of Respondent, including contact
information based on pre-complaint dealings, in sufficient detail to allow
the Provider to send the complaint as described in Paragraph 2{a);
(vi) Specify the domain name{s) that is/are the subject of th~ complaint;
(vii) Identify the Registrar(s) with whom .the domain name(s) is/are
registered at the time the complaint is filed;
(viii) Specify the trademark(s) or service mark(s) on which the complaint is
based and, for each mark, describe the goods or services, if any, with
which the mark is used (Complainant may also separately describe other
goods and services with which it int~nds, at the time the complaint is
submitted, to use the mark in the future.);
(ix) Describe, in accordance with the Policy, the grounds on which the
complaint is made including, in particular,
(1) the manner in which the domain name(s) is/are identical or
confusingly similar to a trademark or service mark in which the
Complainant has rights; and
(2) why the Respondent (domain-name holder) should be consid-
ered as having no rights or legitimate interests in respect of the
domain name(s) that is/are the subject of the complaint; and
(3) why the domain name(s) should be considered as having been
registered and being used in bad faith
(The description should, for elements (2) and (3), discuss any aspects of
Paragraphs 4(b) and 4(c) of the Policy that are applicable. The description
shall comply with any word or page limit set forth in the Providers
Supplemental Rules.);
(x) Specify, in accordance with the Policy, the remedies sought;
(xi) Identify any other legal proceedings that have been commenced or
terminated in connection with or relating to any of the domain name(s)
that are the subiect of the complaint;
(xii) State that a copy of the complaint, together with the cover sheet as
prescribed by the Providers Supplemental Rules, has been sent or
transmitted to the Respondent (domain-name holder), in accordance with
Paragraph 2(b);
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(xiii) State that Complainant will submit, with respect to any challenges to
a decision in the administrative proceeding canceling or transferring the
domain name, to the iurisdidion of the courts in at least one specified
Mutual Jurisdiction;
(xiv) Conclude with the following statement followed by the signature of
the Complainant or its authorized representative: -=-
"Complainant agrees that its claims and remedies concerning the
registration of the domain name, the" dispute, or the dispute's
r~solution shall be solely against the domain-name holder and
waives all such claims and remedies against (a) the dispute-
resolution provider and panelists, except in the case of deliberate
wrongdoing, (b) the registrar, (c) the registry administrator, and (d)
the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers, as well
as their directors, officers, employees, and agents."
"Complainant certifies that the information contained in this
Complaint is to the best of Complainant's knowledge complete and
accurate, that this Complaint is not being presented for any
improper purpose, such as to harass, and that the assertions in this
Complaint are warranted under these Rules and under applicable
law, as it now exists or as it may be extended by a good-faith and
reasonable argument..'; and
(xv) Annex any documentary or other evidence, including a copy of the
Policy applicable to the domain name(s) in dispute and any trademark or
service mark registration upon which the complaint relies, together with a
schedule indexing such evidence.
(c) The complaint may relate to more than one domain name, provided that the
domain names are registered by the same domain-name holder.
4. Notification of Complaint
(a) The Provider shall review the complaint for administrative compliance with the
Policy and these Rules and, if in compliance, shall forward the complaint (together
with the explanatory cover sheet prescribed by the Providers Supplemental Rules)
to the Respondent, in the manner prescribed by Paragraph 2(a), within three (3)
calendar days following receipt of the fees to be paid by the Complaina,nt in
accordance with Paragraph 19.
(b) If the Provider finds the complaint to be administratively deficient, it shall
promptly· notify the Complainant and the Respondent of the nature of the





















which to correct any such deficiencies, after which the administrative proceeding
will be deemed withdrawn without prejudice to submission of a different
complaint by Complainant.
(c) The date of commencemenfof the administrative proceeding shall be the date
on which the Provider completes its responsibilities under Paragraph 2(a) in
connection with forwarding the Complaint to the Respondent.--
(d) The Provider shall immediately notify the C;omplainant, the Respondent, the
concerned Registrar(s), and ICANN of the .date of commencement of the
administrative proceeding.
5. The Response
(a) Within twenty (20) days ,of the date of commencement of the administrative
proceeding the Respondent shall submit a response to the Provider.
(b) The response shall be submitted in hard copy and (except to the extent not
available for annexes) in electronic form and shall:
(i) Respond specifically to the statements and allegations contained in the
complaint and include any and all bases forthe Respondent (domain-name
holder) to retain registration and use of the disputed domain name (This
portion of the response shall comply with any word or page limit set forth
in the Provider's Supplemental Rules.);
(ii) Provide the name, postal and e-mail addresses, and the telephone and
telefax numbers of the Respondent (domain-name holder) and of any
representative authorized to act for the Respondent in the administrative
proceeding;
(iii) Specify a preferred method for communications directed to the
Respondent in the administrative proceeding (including person to be
contacted, medium, and address information) for each of (A) electronic-
only material and (B) material including hard copy;
(iv) If Complainant has elected a single-member panel in the Complaint
(see Paragraph 3(b)(iv)), state whether Respondent elects instead to have
the dispute decided by a three-member panel; .
(v) If either Complainant or Respondent elects a three-member Panel,
provide the names and contact details of three candidates to serve as one
of the Panelists (these candidates may be drawn from any ICANN-
approved Provider's list of panelists);
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(vi) Identify any other legal proceedings that have been commenced or
terminated in connection with or relating to any of the domain name(s)
that are the subject of the complaint;
(vii) State that a copy of the response has been sent or transmitted to the
Complainant, in accordance with Paragraph 2{b); and
(viii) Conclude with the following statement followed by the signature of
the Respondent or its authorized representative:
"Respondent certifies that the information contained in this Response
is to the best of Respondent's knowledge complete and accurate,
that this Response is not being presented for any improper purpose,
such as to harass, and that the assertions in this Response are
warranted under these Rules and under applicable law, as it now
exists or as it may be extended by a good-faith and reasonable
argument."; and
(ix) Annex any documentary or other evidence upon which the Respondent
relies, together with a schedule indexing such documents.
(c) If Complainant has elected to have the dispute decided by a single-member
Panel and Respondent elects a three-member Panel, Respondent shall be
required to pay one-half of the applicable fee for a three-member Panel as set
forth in the Providers Supplemental Rules. This payment shall be made together
with the submission of the response to the Provider. In the event that the required
payment is not made, the dispute shall be decided by a single-member Panel.
(d) At the request of the Respondent, the Provider may, in exceptional cases,
extend the period of time for the filing of the response. The period may also be
extended by written stipulation between the Parties, provided the stipulation is
approved by the Provider.
(e) If a Respondent does not submit a response, in the absence of exceptional
circumstances, the Panel shall decide the dispute based upon the complaint.
6. Appointment of the Panel and Timing of Decision
(a) Eac~ Provider shall maintain and publish a publicly available list of panelists
and their qualifications.
(b) If neither the Complainant nor the Respondent has elected a three-member
Panel (Paragraphs 3{b){iv) and 5{b){iv)), the Provider shall appoint, within five (5)
calendar days following receipt of the response by the Provider, or the lapse of





















panelists. The fees for a single-member Panel shall be paid entirely by the
Complainant.
(c) If either the Complainant orthe Respondent elects to have the dispute decided
by a three-member Panel, the Providershall appoint three Panelists in accordance
with the procedures identified in Paragraph 6{e). The fees for a three-member
Panel shall be paid in their entirety by the Complainant, except where the election
for a three-member Panel was made by the Respondent, in which case the
applicable fees shall be shared equally between the Parties.
(d) Unless it has already elected a three-rtJember Panel, the Complainant shall
submit to the Provider, within five (5) calendar days of communication of a
response in which the Respondent elects a three-member Panel, the names and
contact details of three candidates to serve as one of the Panelists. These
candidates may be drawn from any ICANN-approved Providers list of panelists.
(e) In the event that either the Complainant or the Respondent elects a three-
member Panel, the Provider shall endeavor to appoint one Panelist from the list
of candidates provided by each of the Complainant and the Respondent. In the
event the Provider is unable within five (5) calendar days to secure the appoint-
ment of a Panelist on its customary terms from either Party's list of candidates, the
Provider shall make that appointment from its list of panelists. The third Panelist
shall be appointed by the Provider from a list of five candidates submitted by the
Provider to the Parties, the Providers selection from among the five being made
in a manner that reasonably balances the preferences of both Parties, as they
may specify to the Provider within five (5) calendar days of the Providers
submission of the five-candidate list to the Parties.
(f) Once the entire Panel is appointed, the Provider shall notify the Parties of the
Panelists appointed and the date by which, absent exceptional circumstances, the
Panel shall forward its decision on the complaint to the Provider.
7. Impartiality and Independence
A Panelist shall be impartial and independent and shall have, before accepting
appointment, disclosed to the Provider any circumstances giving rise to iustifiable doubt
as to the Panelist's impartiality or independence. If, at any stage during the administra-
tive proceeding, new circumstances arise that 'could give rise to justifiable doubt as to
the impartiality or independence of the Panelist, that Panelist shall promptly disclose
such circumstances to the Provider. In such event, the Provider shall have the discretion
to appoint a substitute Panelist.
8. Communication Between Parties and the Panel
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No Party or anyone acting on its behalf may have any unilateral communication with the
Panel. All communications between a Party and the Panel or the Provider shall be made
to a case administrator appointed by the Provider in the manner prescribed in the
Provider's Supplemental Rules.
9. Transmission of the File to the Panel
The Provider shall forward the file to the Panel as soon as the Panelist is appointed in the
case of a Panel consisting of a single member, or as soon as the last Panelist is
appointed in the case of a three-member Panel.
10. General Powers of the Panel
(a) The Panel shall conduct the administrative proceeding in such manner as it
considers appropriate in accordance with the Policy and these Rules.
(b) In all cases, the Panel shall ensure that the Parties are treated with equality
and that each Party is given a fair opportunity to present its case.
(c) The Panel shall ensure that the administrative proceeding takes place with due
expedition. It may, at the request of a Party or on its own motion, extend, in
exceptional cases, a period of time fixed by these Rules or by the Panel.
(d) The Panel shall determine the admissibility, relevance, materiality and weight
of the evidence.
(e) A Panel shall decide a request by a Party to consolidate multiple domain name
disputes in accordance with the Policy and these Rules.
11. Language of Proceedings
(a) Unless otherwise agreed by the Parties, or specified otherwise in the
Registration Agreement, the language of the administrative proceeding shall be
the language of the Registration Agreement, subject to the authority of the Panel
to determine otherwise, having regard to the circumstances of the administrative
proceeding.
(b) The Panel may order that any documents submitted in languages other than
the language of the administrative proceeding be accompanied by a translation
in whole or in part into the language of the administrative proceeding.
12. Further Statements
In addition to the complaint and the response, the Panel may request, in its sole
























There shall be no in-person hearings (including hearings by teleconference, video-
conference, and web conference), unless the Panel determines, in its sole discretion and
as an exceptional matter, that such a hearing is necessary for deci~ing the complaint.
14. Default
(a) In the event that a Party, in the absence of exceptional circumstances, does not
comply with any of the time periods established by these Rules or the Panel, the
Panel shall proceed to a decision on the c~mplaint. '
(b) If a Party, in the absence of exceptional circumstances, does not comply with
any provision of, or requirement under, these Rules or any request from the
Panel, the Panel shall draw such inferences therefrom as it considers appropriate.
15. Panel Decisions
(a) A Panel shall decide a complaint on the basis of the statements and
documents submitted and in accordance with the Policy, these Rules and any rules
and principles of law that it deems applicable.
(b) In the absence of exceptional circumstances, the Panel shall forward its
decision on the complaint to· the Provider within fourteen (14) days of its
appointment pursuant to Paragraph 6.
(c) In the case of a three-member Panel, the Panel's decision shall be made by a
majority.
(d) The Panel's decision shall be in writing, provide the reasons on which it is
based, indicate the date on which it was rendered and identify the name{s) of the
Panelist(s).
(e) Panel decisions and dissenting opinions shall normally comply with the
guidelines as to length set forth in the Provider's Supplemental Rules. Any
dissenting opinion shall accompany the majority decision. If the Panel concludes
that the dispute is not within the scope of Paragraph 4{a) of the Policy, it shall so
state. If after considering the submissions the Panel finds that the complaint was
brought in bad faith, for example in an 'attempt at Reverse Domain Name
Hijacking or was brought primarily to harass the domain-name holder, the Panel
shall declare in its decision that the complaint was brought in bad faith and
constitutes an abuse of the administrative proceeding-.
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16. Communication of Decision to Parties
(a) Within three (3) calendar days after receiving the decision from the Panel, the
Provider shall communicate the full text of the decision to each Party, the
concerned Registrar(s), and ICANN. The concerned Registrar{s) shall immediately
communicate to each Party, the Provider, and ICANN the date fs>r the implemen-
tation of the decision in accordance with the Policy.
(b) Except if the Panel determines otherwise (see Paragraph 4(i) of the Policy), the
Provider shall publish the full decision and the date of its implementation on a
publicly accessible web site. In any event, the portion of any decision determining
a complaint to have been brought in bad faith (see Paragraph 15(e) of these
Rules) shall be published. .
17. Settlement or Other Grounds for Termination
(a) If, before the Panel1s decision, the Parties agree on a settlement, the Panel
shall terminate the administrative proceeding..
(b) If, before the PanePs decision is made, it becomes unnecessary or impossible
to continue the administrative proceeding for any reason, the Panel shall
terminate the administrative proceeding, unless a Party raises justifiable grounds
for objection within a period of time to be determined by the Panel.
18. Effect of Court Proceedings
(a) In the event of any legal proceedings initiated prior to or during an administra-
tive proceeding in respect of a domain-name dispute that is the subiect of the
complaint, the Panel shall have the discretion to decide whether to suspend or
terminate the administrative proceeding, or to proceed to a decision.
(b) In the event that a Party initiates any legal proceedings during the pendency
of an administrative proceeding in respect of a domain-name dispute that is the
subject of the complaint, it shall promptly notify the Panel and the Provider. See
Paragraph 8 above.
19. Fees
(a) The Complainant shall pay to the Provider an initial fixed fee, in accordance
with thOe Provider's Supplemental Rules, within the time and in the amount
required. A Respondent eleding under Paragraph 5{b)(iv) to have the dispute
decided by a three-member Panel, rather than the single-member Panel elected
by the Complainant, shall pay the Provider one-half the fixed fee for a three-
member Panel. See Paragraph 5(c). In all other cases, the Complainant shall bear





















appointment of the Panel, the Provider shall refund the appropriate portion, if
any, of the initial fee to the CC?mplainant, as specified in the Providers Supple-
mental Rules.
(b) No action shall be taken by the Provider on a complaint until it has received
from Complainant the initial fee in accordance with Paragraph "19(0).
(c) If the Provider has not received the fee within ten (1 0) calendar days of
receiving the complaint, the complaint shall be deemed withdrawn and the
administrative proceeding terminated.
(d) In exceptional circumstances, for example in the event an in-person hearing
is held, the Provider shall request the Parties for the payment of additional fees,
which shall be established in' agreement with the Parties and the Panel.
20. Exclusion of Liability
Except in the case of deliberate wrongdoing, neither the Provider nor a Panelist shall be
liable to a Party for any act or omission in connection with any administrative proceeding
under these Rules. .
21. Amendments
The version of these Rules in effect at the time of the submission of the complaint to the
Provider shall apply to the administrative proceeding commenced thereby. These Rules

























15 U.S.C. §§1125. False designations of origin; false description or representa-
tion
(a) (1) Any person who, on or in connection with any goods or services, or any container
for goods, uses in commerce any word, term, name, symbol, - or device, or any
combination thereof, or any false designation of origin, false or misleading description
of fact, or false or misleading representation of f~ct, which-- .
(A) is likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive as to the
affiliation, connection, or association of such person with another person, or as
to the origin, sponsorship, or approval of his or her goods, services, or commercial
activities by another person, or
(8) in commercial advertising or promotion, misrepresents the nature, characteris-
tics, qualities, or geographic origin of his or her or another person's goods,
services, or commercial activities, shall be liable in a civil action by any person
who believes that he or she is or is likely to be damaged by such act.
(2) As used in this subsection, the term "any person" includes any State, instrumental-
ity of a State or employee of a State or instrumentality of a State acting in his or her
official capacity. Any State, and any such instrumentality, officer, or employee, shall
be subiect to the provisions of this Act in the same manner and to the same extent
as any nongovernmental entity.
(3) In a civil action for trade dress infringement under this Act for trade dress not
registered on the principal register, the person who asserts trade dress protection has
the burden of proving that the matter sought to be protected is not functional.
(b) Any goods marked or labeled in contravention of the provisions of this section shall
not be imported into the United States or admitted to entry at any customhouse of the
United States. The owner, importer, or consignee of goods refused entry at any
customhouse under this section may hav~ any recourse by protest or appeal that is given
under the customs revenue laws or may have the remedy given by this Act in cases
involving goods refused entry or seized.
(c) (1) The owner of a famous mark shall be entitled, subiect to the principles of equity
and upon such terms as the court deems reasonable, to an injunct.ion against another
person's commercial use in commerce of a mark or trade name, if such use begins after
the mark has become famous and ·causes dilution of the distinctive quality of the mark,
and to obtain such other relief as is provided in this subsection. In determining whether




(B) the duration and extent of use of the mark in connection with the goods or
services with which the mark is used;
(C) the duration and extent of advertising and publicity of the mark;
(0) the geographical extent of the trading area in which the' mark is used;
(E) the channels of trade for the goods or services with which the mark is used;
(F) the degree of recognition of the mark·in the trading areas and channels of
trade used by the mark's owner and the person against whom the injunction is
sought; .
(G) the nature and extent of use of the same or similar marks by third parties; and
(H) whether the mark was registered under the Act of March 3, 1881, or the Act
of February 20, 1905, or on the principal register.
(2) In an action brought under this subsection, the owner of the famous mark shall
be entitled only to injunctive relief as set forth in section 34 unless the person against
whom the injunction is sought willfully intended to trade on the owners reputation
or to cause dilution of the famous mark. If such willful intent is proven, the owner of
the famous mark shall also be entitled to the remedies set forth in sections 35(a) and
36, subject to the discretion of the court and the principles of equity.
(3) The ownership by a person of a valid registration under the Act of March 3, 1881,
or the Act of February 20, 1905, or on the principal register shall be a complete bar
to an action against that person, with respect to the mark, that is brought by another
person under the common law or a statute of a State and that seeks to prevent
dilution of the distinctiveness of a mark, label or form or advertisement.
(4) The following shall not be actionable under this section:
(A) Fair use of a famous mark by another person in comparative commercial
advertising or promotion to identify the competing goods or services of the owner
of the famous mark.
(B) Noncommercial u~e of a mark.
(C) All forms of news reporting and news commentary.
{d)(l )(A) A person shall be liable in a civil action by the owner of a mark, including a
personal name which is protected as a mark under this section, if, without regard to the





















(i) has a bad faith intent to profit from that mark, including a personal name
which is proteded as a mark under this sedion; and
(ii) registers, traffics in, or uses a domain name that--
(I) in the case of a mark that is distinctive at the time of registration of the
domain name, is identical or confusingly similar to that mark;
(II) in the case of a famous mark that is famous at the time of registration
of the domain name, is identical or confusingly similar to or dilutive of that
mark; or
(III) is a trademark, word, or name protected by reason of section 706 of
title 18, United States Code, or section 220506 of title 36, United States
Code.
(B){i) In determining whether a person has a bad faith intent described under
subparagraph (A), a court may consider factors such as, but not limited to--
(I) the trademark or other intellectual property rights of the person, if any,
in the domain name;
(II) the extent to which the domain name consists of the legal name of the
person or a name that is otherwise commonly used to identify that person;
(III) the person's prior use, if any, of the domain name in connection with
the bona fide offering of any goods or services;
(IV) the person's bona fide noncommercial or fair use of the mark in a site
accessible under the domain name;
(V) the person's intent to divert consumers from the mark owners online
location to a site accessible under the domain name that could harm the
goodwill represented by the mark, either for commercial gain or with the
intent to tarnish or disparage the mark, by creating a likelihood of
confusion as to the source, sponsorship, affiliation, or endorsement of the
site;
(VI) the person's offer to transfer, sell, or otherwise assign the domain
name to the mark owner or any third party for financial gain without
having used, or having an intent to use, the domain name in the bona fide
offering of any goods or services, or the person's prior conduct indicating
a pattern of such conduct;
(VII) the person'~provision of ~aterial and misleading false contact
information when applying for. the registration 'of the domain name., the
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person's intentional failure to maintain accurate contact information, orthe
person's prior conduct indicating a pattern of such conduct;
(VIII) the person's registration or acquisition of multiple domain names
which the person knows are identical or confusingly similar to marks of
others that are distinctive at the time of registration of such domain names,
or dilutive of famous marks of others that are famous at the time of
registration of such domain names, without regard to the goods or services
of the parties; and
(IX) the extent to which the mark incorporated in the person's domain
name registration is or is not distinctive and famous within the meaning of
subsection (c)(l) of section 43.
(ii) Bad faith intent described under subparagraph (A) shall not be found in any
case in which the court determines that the person believed and had
reasonable grounds to believe that the use of the domain name was a fair use
or otherwise lawful.
(C) In any civil action involving the registration, trafficking, or use of a domain
name underthis paragraph, a court may orderthe forfeiture or cancellation of the
domain name or the transfer of the domain name to the owner of the mark.
(0) A person shall be liable for using a domain name under subparagraph (A)
only if that person is the domain name registrant or that registrant's authorized
licensee.
(E) As used in this paragraph, the term "traffics inll refers to transactions that
include, but are not limited to, sales, purchases, loans, pledges, licenses,
exchanges of currency, and any other transfer for consideration or receipt in
exchange for consideration.
(2)(A) The owner of a mark may file an in rem civil action against a domain name in
the judicial district in which the domain name registrar, domain name registry, or
other domain name authority that registered or assigned the domain name is located
if--
(i) the domain name violates any right of the owner of a mark registered in the
~atent and Trademark Office, or protected under subsec;tion (a) or (c); and
(ii) the court finds that the owner--
(I) is not able to obtain in personam jurisdiction over a person who would





















(II) through due diligence was not able to find a person who would have
been a defendant in a civil adion under paragraph (1) by--
(aa) sending a notice of the alleged violation and intent to proceed
underthis paragraph to the registrant of the domain name at the postal
and e-mail address provided by the registrant to the registrar; and
(bb) publishing notice of the action as the court may direct promptly
after filing the action.
(B) The actions under subparagraph (A)(ii) shall constitute service of process.
(C) In an in rem action under this paragraph, a domain name shall be deemed
to have its situs in the judicial district in which--
(i) the domain name registrar, registry, or other domain name authority that
registered or assigned the domain name is located; or
(ii) documents sufficient to establish control and authority regarding the
disposition of the registration and use of the domain name are deposited with
the court.
(D) (i) The remedies in an in rem action under this paragraph shall be limited to
a court order for the forfeiture or cancellation of the domain name or the transfer
of the domain name to the owner of the mark. Upon receipt of written notification
of a filed, stamped copy of a complaint filed by the owner of a mark in a United
States district court under this paragraph, the domain name registrar, domain
name registry, or other domain name authority shall--
(I) expeditiously deposit with the court documents sufficient to establish the
court's control and authority regarding the disposition of the registration
and use of the domain name to the court; and
(II) not transfer, suspend, or otherwise modify the domain name during the
pendency of the action, except upon order of the court.
(ii) The domain name registrar or registry or other domain name authority
shall not be liable for injunctive or monetary relief under this paragraph except
in the case of bad faith or reckless disregard, which includes a willful failure
to comply with any such court order.
(3) The civil action established under paragraph (1) and the in rem action established
under paragraph (2), and any remedy available under either such action, shall be in
addition to any other civil action or remedy otherwise applicable.
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(4) The in rem iurisdiction established under paragraph (2) shall be in addition to any
other iurisdiction that otherwise exists, whether in rem or in personam.
(Amended Nov: 16, 1988, 102 Stat. 3946; Oct. 27, 1992, 106 Stat. 3567; Jan. 16, 1996, 109 Stat. 985; Aug. 5, 1999,
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- Focus on Three Megatrends
• The Public Infrastructure
~ • New Employment Rules
• Globalization of E Business









• Risks Can Be lIigh and Dumb











• Are All of the Building Blocks Ready for Prime
Time?
• KEY ISSUE IS "BUSINESS CONTINUITY"
- Gartner Group Expects 60% of the Approx. 500 ASP's
In Existence to Fail This Year ( Info Week)
_. Bankruptcy or Acquisition
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Business Issues
• Technology Seems To Be Ready For Some App's
• Most Buyers Wants Small Company Pricing and
Big Company Business Continuity Reliability and
Security
~
~ • Vendors Are Relatively Small and Possibly
Transient
• How Fast Should We Go in Migration?
• How Do We Manage Individual Outsourcing?





• The Internet is Free - "+'s & "-'s"





• Radio and TV stations
_. Can vendors make enough money
• Right now the pricing point seems to be "Free"
• No competitive advantage from:
- Investment in solely owned infrastructure
- Intellectual Property











- Mass Independence-technology Enabled
Employees
• Private Outsourcing
• Individual Has Complete Control Of Company
Data And Applications
FREEAGENCYPHENOMENUM
- In A Wired Society There Are No Secrets
- Implications For Business
• Policies To Address These Issues
~ • Companies Must Provide Easy, Fast, Up
To Date Solutions For Employees To
Minimize Free Agency
-Examples
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• Fi Ie manager
• Secure Internet fi Ie
storage
• Ability to work
onli ne or offli ne
ThinkFree Office™ i5 &inywhere,
anytime computing. Nowyou can 6it
down at any computer with a web
broweer an:d. rU'n our
Microsoft® Office™-compatible
application6~. Store your filea in your
ThinkFree Cyberdrfve
and. work on the'm whe'reve'r
you are, whenever you
need them.
- ~
Copyright 2000. ThinkFree Corp. All rights reserved.
Prh/3C'1 Policy
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v' Schedule web meetings
.t/ Present and demonstrate
. / Interact in real-time
.A New Communications Medium
.. for LIVE, Interactive MEETINGS
over the INTERNET.
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Public Infrastructure Migration
The Migration
• Revenue Stream Will Drive Trend From Vendor
Perspective
---" Equipment Purchases and Leases Are Not Cost:
Effective
~ • Moores Law
co
• Machines Outpacing Our Ability to Use Them
• Software Has Not Kept up
- Transition From Product Revenues to Service Revenues
• Rapid Change in This Direction
• Open Source Software Will Become Trend
• Free "Technology" Will Set Pricing Point
l,;,
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Impact





., 'Companies Will Have to Deal With Multiple Vendors
o'n the Web
-' Offering Slices of the Infrastructure
- No Single Source Solution to Date
-' Interoperability? Not Soon / Maybe Never
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• Requires Businesses to Develop and Have a
Much More Flexible Perspective
- Ability to Move From One Vendor to
Another Quickly
- Multiple Vendors to Provide Cushion
- Ride Evolution of Technology to Meet New
Business Needs
- Business Continuity - a Key Issue








• Voiding of Contracts















• Limitation of Liability
• Warranties
• Generally Vendors Want No Risk
• Indemnify Vendors for Vendors Negligence!!!
- Confidentiality, License, Service & Other
Agreements May Not Be Sufficient
- Vendor Cooperation / Integration Provisions








- Like I.T. Outsourcing
• Constant Negotiation
• Long Term Vs. Short Term Agreement
• Pricing Issues After Commit to
Outsourcer
• Cost of Managing Relationship
• Performance Goals









- Ownership of Data
• E.G. E Mails, Stored Data, Faxes
• Assignment of Rights/Restrictions on Use
- Business Method Patent - the Big Wild Card!
- Can A Company Base a Long Term Business on Informational
Intellectual Property?
- Intel. Prop. Registrations, Contract Limitations May Not Be
Enough
• Difficult to Advise Clients
• Costs to Defend Rights
• Likelihood of Success
• Law Is Unsettled in Many Areas




- Company Secrets on Non Company Systems
-- Restrictions on Use and Access by Vendor
~ and 3rd Parties - Confidentiality
N
Ut
- Violations of Company Privacy Policy
- Vendor Employee Leaves Company
-Hackers
- Businesses Will Have to Reorient and Not






~ " Legal Issues ..,&. •
• Privacy
- Data Transfer Agreements
• ED Directive On Data Protection
- Vendor Audits
- Collection of Information- Notices and Consents
• Judgement Proof Vendors
- You Get What You Pay for I!!
- Start Up's Historically Not Worried About Legal
Implications
• Educating Clients









• New Employment Rules !!!!!
- The Just in Time Employee - the ''New Phenom"
• Labor Auctions on the Web
• Skilled New Economy Workers Day Trading Their
Careers
• Based on Scarce Talent Re Demographics
• Career Is a Series of Projects Rather Than a Static
Job
• Less Tolerance for Hangers on




• Key Employees Kept Within Company
• Everything Else Outsourced
~
I
~ • Still Most Will Think of Themselves As
Free Agents
• Impact
-Lonely & Insecure Workers?
-Law of Jungle?





~~, You b.. ld th, ".om,
Monster.com
Want to work on your own terms?
V~elcome to the ,i. prOject: marl<etplace












~ I=~eled Category- I
• Post your e portfolio to showcase your talents
•.H-~~_ag~_nts__








& New Emlllorment Rules
• Legal Implications
- Co-employment & Benefits
- Use of Systems for Both Private and Work Activities
• Who Owns IP Rights to "Employee " Created
Content
• Liability for Workers Actions
• Legal Responsibility for Use of Services, Content,
Etc.






- More Litigation With Less Employee Loyalty
~
~ - Trade Secrets
- Employee Monitoring Issues
- Privacy Issues
- Internet Use Policy- Any Use?
Trends
• Globalization
- "E Commerce" to "G Commerce"
• E Commerce Work Raises More Fundamental
Changes in Legal Practice!!




• Need for Global Business and Legal
Perspective
• How Provide Global Advice?
- E.G. Commercial Law Affiliates
• Http://www.claonline.Org
• New European Alliance
l. I;
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• Legal Implications
- 'Lawyers Not Trained to Think or Work
Globally
• All Commercial Lawyers Will Have to Become
~ , More Globally Oriented
~
• Learn to Work ,As Part of Global Legal Team
• More Legal Resources Will Be Needed
• Attorney Retooling
'. Client Education
• Networks of Lawyers
.• Business Opportunity for Legal Profession
Globalization
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• Opacity Index "the 0 Factor"
- PWC Launches First Global Index 'That
Measures the Impact of Business, Economic,
~
~ Legal and Ethical Opacity on Cost of Capital
Around the World' ,
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-Check List for "Globalized" Commercial
Lawyers
- Basics of Civil Law System
- International Contract Law
- Customs and Trade Law
- Competition and Trade Practice Law
- Intellectual Property Law





• Preliminary Steps To Take
- Increase Interaction Between International
Specialists and Domestic Colleagues '
• In House and Out Side Counsel
~ :- Presentations on International Legal Subjects
~ Have in House Attorneys Participate in Outside
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Terms and Conditions, Internet User Agreements and Click-
Wrap Agreements
With the movement of old economy brick and mortar businesses on-line and the
creation ofnew business concepts as a result of the capabilities of the Internet, businesses
are looking for a means to establish guidelines with respect to the use of their web sites
and the conduct of business through such sites. Accordingly, the vast majority of
companies have placed on their web sites some form of notice or agreement that purports
to govern the relationship between the web site owner and the user. These notices or
agreements (later referred to as "User Agreements"), which businesses hope will prove
binding upon a web site user, go by several different titles including "Terms &
Conditions" "Internet User Agreement" "Terms of Use" "Terms of Service" "Legal, " ,
Disclaimers", "Conditions of Use" and so on. They also range in content from a mere
restatement of applicable law to an agreement to arbitrate disputes between the parties.
As Internet commerce has increased, the sophistication of these User Agreements has
correspondingly increased and the provisions of these agreements appears limited only by
the imagination ofa good contract lawyer.
This Article will discuss the enforceability of User Agreements and will then
survey the various types of User Agreements currently in use and the category of web
sites for which the various User Agreements are appropriate. Finally, this article will
provide sample provisions for various types of sites and discuss the applicability of the
Digital Millennium Copyright Act to web site providers.
1. Enforceability
To properly begin a discussion on the enforceability of User Agreements, we
must first begin with a discussion of ProeD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3rd 1447 (7th eire
1996). The ProCD case was the first significant case relating to the enforceability of
shrink-wrap agreements and other similar agreements. In the ProeD case, the Circuit
Court held that user terms contained on the inside of a user's manual and on the CD-Rom
product itself that restricted the use of the product to non-commercial use were
enforceable. The ProeD product consisted of telephone directories that the defendant
posted on a web site and licensed to subscribers. The court confirmed that the vec
applied to the transaction and that. the terms contained inside the packaged product were
enforceable as Zeidenberg did not reject the product after inspecting the product and the
terms. The court concluded that "shrinkwrap licenses are enforceable unless their tenns
are objectionable on grounds applicable to contracts in general (for example, if they
violate a rule ofpositive law, or if they are unconscionable.)" Id. at 1449.
The next important case is Hill v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 105 F. 3M 1147 (7th Cir.
1997), cert denied, 118 S. Ct. 47 (1998). This case is significant for two reasons. First,
-. the case involved a consumer as opposed to a commercial transaction, and second, the
Cop)Tight-2001 Cynthia L Stewart
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Court specifically upheld the enforceability ofan arbitration clause. In this case, Mr. Hill
ordered a Gateway computer by phone and paid with a credit card. Contained in the box
in which the computer was shipped were contract terms that provided, among other
terms, certain representations and warranties of Gateway, a mandatory arbitration clause
and the right to return the computer for a full refund within 30 days of receipt. Mr. Hill
did not return the computer within that time frame, and the Seventh Circuit mandated
arbitration for the .parties. The enforcement of the arbitration clause by the Seventh
Circuit blocked the certification of a class action by Gateway computer purchasers and
thereby effectively blocked any additional actions against Gateway on a consumer level.
The court noted that "a contract need not be read to be effective; people who accept take
on the risk that unread terms may in retrospect prove unwelcome." Id. at 1148..
In Hotmail Corporation v. Van Money Pie Inc., et aI., 47 U.S.P.Q. 2d (BNA)
1020 (N.D. Ca., April 16, 1998), the contract in question was, for the first time, a click-
through agreement. Hotmail offers free e-mail, but to obtain the service, a user is
required to click through a terms' of service agreement that, among other restrictions,
prohibited spam. The defendant in this case used the Hotmail email service to send spam
that advertised pornographic materials. The court issued a preliminary injunction in
favor of Hotmail, indicating that Hotmail would likely prevail on the merits with respect
to its breach ofcontract claim.
Next comes Ticketmaster Corp., et a1. v. Tickets.com, Inc., 54 U.S.P.Q. 2d (BNA)
(C.D. Cal. 2000) in which the District Court held that simply posting Terms and
Conditions at the bottom of a web site that provided that use of the web site constituted
assent to the Terms and Conditions did not create a contract. Tickets.com was deep-
linking to pages in Ticketmaster's site for the purpose of permitting customers of
Tickets.com to access event tickets that Ticket.com could not provide. Ticketmaster's
Terms and Conditions forbade deep linking and the commercial use of Ticketmaster's
site and information. Although the District Court dismissed Ticketmaster's claim of
breach of contract, several other of Ticketmaster's claims survived, including unfair
competition and reverse passing off In addition, the court granted Ticketmaster the
opportunity to amend its complaint to show that Ticket.com had knowledge of the terms
set forth in the Terms and Conditions and had manifested its agreement to those terms.
Finally, a recent and interesting case on the subject is Register.com, Inc. v. Verla,
Inc., 126 F. Supp. 2d 238 (S.D.N.Y. December 11, 2000). In this case, Verio used a
search robot to regularly search the WHOIS database of Register.com to ascertain
information regarding domain name registrants. Verla used this information to market its
web site development and other selVices to the registrants. The Register.com agreement
provided as follows: "By submitting a WHOIS query, you agree that you will use this
Data only for lawful purposes and that, under no circumstances will you use this Data to:
(1) allow, enable, or otherwise support the transmission of mass unsolicited, commercial
advertising or solicitations via e-mail (spam); or (2) en~ble high volume, automated,
,electronic processes that apply to Network Solutions (or its systems}..... By
·.submitting this query, you agree to abide 'by this policy." This language appears on the


























preliminary injunction in favor of Register.com upholding other claims in addition to
breach of contract and indicating that clicking "I agree" in this circumstance was not
necessary. Verlo had manifested its consent by proceeding to submit a WHOIS query in
light of the clearly provided terms ofuse restrictions.
2. Types or User Agreements
Generally speaking, there appear to be three ways that on-line businesses make
use of User Agreements. First, although this approach is becoming less common, some
e-businesses merely post a notice outlining (and sometimes enhancing) current copyright
and trademark law and reminding users of the application of those laws to that entity's
web site. This version of a User Agreement is typically referenced only at the bottom of
a home page and is accessible only by clicking on the User Agreement link. While this
type of User Agreement may be used for many different types of web sites, it is most
appropriately used for the "brochure ware" category ofweb sites that provide information
or self promotion only and do not provide goods or seIVices through the site. An
enhanced version ofthis approach often includes a disclaimer of all warranties that might
othelWise apply to the web site. A sample of such a User Agreement is set forth below.
Legal Disclaimers
Copyright and Use of Materials. The information and
materials contained in this site are protected under Unites States copyright
laws along with world wide copyright laws and treaty provisions.
Contents of this site are owned by XYZ.com or other third parties. Copies
of pages of the XYZ.com web site may be downloaded for personal,
noncommercial use only; provided, however, that there is no deletion or
changes in any copyright or trademark notices. In addition, permission
must be obtained from XYZ.com for any other use of the materials. You
may not distribute, transmit, reuse, report or use the content of this site for
public or commercial purposes. In no case may any type of hyperlink be
created to any portion of the site without the prior written consent of
XYZ.com.
Trademarks. "XYZ.com" is a registered service mark of
XYZ Corp. and protected under state and federal law. .
Disclaimer. THE MATERIALS IN TInS SITE ARE
PROVIDED "AS IS" AND WITHOUT WARRANTIES OF ANY KIND
EITHER EXPRESS OR IMPLIED. TO THE FULLEST EXTENT
PERMISSffiLE PURSUANT TO APPLICABLE LAW, WE DISCLAIM
ALL WARRANTIES, EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING, BUT
NOT LOOTED TO, IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOltA PARTICULAR
·~PURPOSE. WE ·DONOT WARRANT THATTmS SITE AND/OR
THE MATERIALS ON nus SITEWlLL BE PROVIDED IN AN
UNINTERRUPTED OR ERROR-FREE MANNER, THAT DEFECTS
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WILL BE CORRECTED, OR THAT TInS SITE OR THE SOFTWARE
OR HARDWARE UNDERLYING THE SITE ARE FREE OF VIRUSES
OR OTHER HARMFUL COMPONENTS. WE DO NOT WARRANT
OR MAKE ANY REPRESENTATIONS REGARDING THE USE OF
THE MATERIALS ON THE SITE IN TERMS OF THEIR
CORRECTNESS, ACCURACY, RELIABILITY, OR OTHERWISE.
YOU ASSUME THE ENTIRE COST OF ALL NECESSARY
SERVICING, REPAIR, OR CORRECTIONS THAT ARE REQUIRED
AS A RESULT OF YOUR USE OF TInS SITE. APPLICABLE LAW
MAY NOT ALLOW THE EXCLUSION OF IMPLIED WARRANTIES,
SO THE ABOVE EXCLUSION MAY NOT APPLY TO yOU.
The second approach that e-businesses take with respect to User Agreements is to
attempt to impose on users terms and provisions that can be quite extensive. These User
Agreements are typically attached as a link to the home page and provide that use of the
site constitutes agreement to the terms. Alternatively, or sometimes in addition, prior to a
user being able to complete a transaction on a web site a notice is provided indicating
that by completing the transaction, the user is subject to the web site User Agreement.
These User Agreements often provide for a particular judicial forum, a choice of law,
mandatory arbitration, a limitation of liabilities and a disclaimer of warranties that may
include products provided by the company itself: as opposed to third party suppliers.
Please refer to Exhibit A to this Article for a copy of the Amazon.com Conditions of Use
and the Target.com Terms and Conditions.
The third type of User Agreement is a full blown agreement with terms that are
typical in business transactions. This type of agreement is generally implemented as a
click through agreement in the context of a business to business transactional site. As
discussed below, the use of User Agreements in this context provides a significant
opportunity for e-businesses to shift some negotiating power from the purchser to the
provider.
3. Use of User Agreements for Business to Business e-Commerce
Assuming the overuse of User Agreements in the business to consumer context
does not bring on unduly harsh legislation or court rulings, the User Agreement in the e-
commerce context provides tremendous opportunity for the e-commerce business to
benefit from well-drafted provisions. In this context, both parties are sophisticated, so
there is no unfairness or unconscionability. However, in exchange for the convenience of
conducting business through a web site, the user must yield to the set terms and
conditions of the e-business. The offer and acceptance of terms in this case is
impersonal, and the e-business typically does not interact with clients who might not like
the terms of the User Agreement. Further, there is no opportunity for the "battle of the
forms'" to take place. The service or product is ordered .instantly and is subject to the
provider's. ~ser Agreement,withnoopj>orturiityorforWnforobjection or providing























To better ensure that the e-business terms and conditions are enforceable,
however, the User Agreement should be click through. This approach has been
legislatively endorsed by the E-Sign Act. Ifa User Agreement is not clicked through but
is merely a tiny link at the bottom of a home page, a user of the site has ammuni~ion to
argue that the user did not receive reasonable notice of the terms of the User Agreement.
Because many B to B traIl$actions are significant and not the type that can be easily
unwound, this is a risk to be avoided. On the other hand, in-house and outside counsel
may face significant resistance from e-businesses with respect to click through
agreements. Many e';'businesses believe click through agreements to be counter to the
smooth flow of e-commerce. E-businesses do not want to slow down or complicate a B
to B transaction with a click-though agreement. At this point, the issue is one of risk
tolerance. If the risk of not having an agreement in place is high, then the e-business
should use a click through agreement or resort to the traditional method of manual
signatures. If the risk is not so high, then the e-business may want to use the
Amazon.com method described above or merely post the terms and conditions as a link.
Record Keeping. A second complication is the record keeping component of
click through agreements. Under the E-Sign Act and general principals of contract law,
the e-business must keep sufficient records with respect to clicked through agreements to
establish that the user did in fact click through the agreement. The e-business must also
be able to produce the version of the agreement that was agreed to. The' record keeping
component of this process is as important as any other aspect, because with no evidence
ofan agreement to produce, there is no agreement. Version control and record keeping is
especially important because click through agreements tend to change fairly regularly.
4. Sample Provisions for B to B User Agreements.
In light of the above observations, set forth below are sample·provisions that all B
to Be-commerce companies should consider. Even though the terms and conditions are
in a business context, the author still recommends using plain English as much as
possible in drafting User Agreements. In addition, the provisions set forth below can be
strengthened or watered down, depending on what the particular market will bear. Even
in a B to B context, the market is competitive and some providers attempt to get an edg~
by not offering offensive or overreaching click through agreements.
Sample Provisions
The Rules. First, an e-commerce company has the opportunity to establish the
basic rules for the operation of the B to B site. This is a significant opportunity that
couId often not be accomplished in other contexts, such as when conducting business by
phone. This is an opportunity for the business to describe in user friendly terms how the
business works, thus explaining why it is appropriate for Certain limits to be placed" on
.liability, for the user to assuinecertainrisks and 'for certain"warranties to be disclaimed.
G-5
To use the XYZ site and our Services, you must complete a
registration form on behalf of yourself or the company (the "User") that
will use our Services. By submitting the registration form, you are telling
us that you are authorized to sign for and bind the User. You agree to
provide to us current, complete and accurate information and to update
your information to keep it current. If the User is a company or other
entity, the representative of the company or other entity who will be the
primary contact as between the company or entity and XYZ (the "Primary
Contact") must identify to XYZ those individuals ("Authorized
Representatives") who, in addition to the P~mary Contact, are authorized
to act for the company or other entity with respect to transactions and
communications with XYZ or through the XYZ site. A User that is a
company or other entity may commu.nicate to or through and otheIWise
use the XYZ site only through a Primary Contact or an Authorized
Representative.
The XYZ site allows you the opportunity to correct or update your
information, and change or add Authorized Representatives, on-line as a
feature of the site. XYZ may reject an applicant if it determines (in its
sole discretion) that the User is not an appropriate User or is not making,
nor has not in the past made, proper use of the SelVices or the site. XYZ
need not provide a reason for its rejection.
Additional Rules. In addition, the provider of a B to B site may want to layout
certain rules of behavior for it users. A violation of these rules may also be a criminal or
civil violation, but by putting the restrictions in a click through agreement, the violation is
also a breach ofcontract.
Offensive, Libelous or Unlawful l\fessages; Copyright and
Other Restrictions on Use of Service.
(a) No Offensive Content. You agree that you will
not use, or allow others to use your account, to post, transmit, promote,
or facilitate the distribution of any threatening, abusive, libelous,
defamatory, obscene, pornographic, profane or otherwise objectionable
information ofany kind.
(b) No Dlegal Material Or Encouragement Of nlegal
Behavior. You agree that you will not use, or allow others to use, your
account to post, transmit, promote, or facilitate the distribution of any
unlawful or illegal material, including but not limited to material that
would constitute or encourage a criminal.offense, give rise to civil liability
or otherwise violate any applicable loca~ state, national or international
law. You agree that you Will .Dot use tliissite to ~mmit a crime~or to





















(c) No Violation or Copyright, Trademark Or
Trade Secret Rights. You agree that you will not use the site to publish,
post, distribute or disseminate another's proprietary information, including
but not limited to trademarks, trade secrets or copyrighted information,
without the express authorization ofthe rights holder.
(d) No "Spammin2." Advertisements Or Chain
Letters. You agree that you will not use, or allow others to use your
account, to post, transmit, promote, or facilitate the distribution of any
unsolicited advertising (including but not limited to mass or bulk e-mail),
promotional materials or other forms of solicitation to other individuals or
entities. You will not post or transmit requests for money to persons not
personally known to you, petitions for signature, chain -letters or letters
relating to pyramid schemes. Except as specifically permitted by this Site,
you will not post or transmit any advertising, promotional materials or any
other form of solicitation. We reserve the right, in our sole discretion, to
determine whether such post or transmission constitutes an advertisement,
promotional material or any other form ofsolicitation.
(e) No "Hacking." You agree that you will not use, or
allow others to use your account, to unlawfully access other computers or
services, or to cause a disruption of service to other on-line users.
(f) No System Disruption. You may not use, or allow
others to use, your account to cause disruption of the normal use of the
system by others including without limitation disrupting our backbone
network, nodes, or services.
(g) No Impersonation Of Others. You agree that you
will not impersonate another user or otherwise falsify one's user name in
e-mail or in any post or transmission to any newsgroup or mailing list or
other similar groups or lists.
(h) No "Viruses." You agree that you will not use, nor
allow others to use, your account to intentionally transmit computer
"viruses," or other harmful software programs and that you will use your
best efforts to prevent the unintentional transmission of such viruses or
other harmful software programs.
XYZ's Right to Remove. XYZ reserves the right not to
post any data or materials to, or to remove any data or materials from, its
site, without notice to a User and without liability to XYZ. You agree to
release XYZ from any claims or allegations that may result from such
removal. Further, you agree to release XYZfrom any-liability or cost
-.arising,out4f~y.ifdionorinaCtion,ofany other user ofthe site thatis in
violation of law or of this ·or ot~c;r. ~greementswith XYZ. ·1£ you are a
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California resident, you waive California Civil Code § 1592, which says:
"A·general release does not extend to claims which the creditor does not
know or suspect to exist in his favor. At the time of executing the release,
which if known by him must have materially affected his settlement with
the debtor."
Other Standard Provisions. Set forth below are several other standard
provisions that an e-business should consider for its User Agreement.
Indemnity. User hereby agrees to, at its own expense~ indemnify,
defend and hold XYZ harmless from and against any loss, cost, or
damages, liability and/or expense arising out of or relating to (a) a third-
party claim, action or allegation of infringement based on information,
data, files or other content submitted by User, (b) any fraud, manipulation,
or breach of this Agreement by User, or (c) any third-party claim, action
or allegation brought against XYZ arising out of or relating to a dispute
between one or more Users.
NO 'VARRANTY. YOU AGREE THAT YOU USE TInS
WEB SITE AT YOUR OWN RISK. WE HAVE TAKEN
COMMERCIALLY REASONABLE STEPS TO PROVIDE A SECURE
AND EFFECTIVE WEB SITE, HOWEVER, WE ARE SO:METIMES
AT THE MERCY OF THIRD PARTIES, ACTS OF GOD AND/OR
TECHNOLOGY. THEREFORE, WE DO NOT GUARANTEE
CONTINUOUS, UNINTERRUPTED OR SECURE ACCESS TO OUR
SITE. FURTHER, WE AND OUR SUPPLIERS PROVIDE THE
XYZ.COM WEB SITE AND OUR SERVICES AND PRODUCTS "AS
IS" AND WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY OR CONDITION, EXPRESS
OR IMPLIED, UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED. OUR SUPPLIERS
MAY MAKE SOME EXPRESS WARRANTIES WITH RESPECT TO
THEIR. PRODUCTS OR SERVICES, AND TO THE EXTENT THOSE
EXIST, SUCH SUPPLIERS WILL SEPARATELY PROVIDE THOSE
WARRANTIES TO YOU IN WRITING OR NOTE THEM ON TInS
SITE. WE AND OUR SUPPLIERS SPECIFICALLY DISCLAIM THE
IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF TITLE, :MERCHANTABILITY,
FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND NON-
INFRINGEMENT WITH RESPECT TO TInS SITE AND ANY GOODS
OR SERVICES OFFERED OR SOLD THROUGH TInS SITE. Some
states do not allow the disclaimer of implied warranties, so the foregoing
disclaimer, may not apply to you. Check your local laws for any
restrictions or limitations regarding the exclusion ofimplied warranties.
LIMIT OF LIABILI1Y. YOU AGREE THAT IN NO
EVENT WILL WE OR OUR SUPPLIERS (OR ANY OF 'OUR
SH.AREHOLDERS~ MEMBERS, OFFICERS, DIRECTORS OR


































PROFITS OR ANY SPECIAL, INCIDENTAL OR CONSEQUENTIAL
DAMAGES ARISING OUT OF OR IN CONNECTION WITH YOUR
USE OF TInS WEB SITE OR THE PURCHASE OF GOODS OR
SERVICES THROUGH TInS WEB SITE, EVEN IF WE HAVB BEEN
ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY THAT SUCH DAMAGE WILL
OCCUR FURTHER YOU AGREE THAT NEITHER WE NOR OUR
SUPPLIERS (OR ANY OF OUR SHAREHOLDERS, MEMBERS,
OFFICERS, DIRECTORS OR EMPLOYEES OF THE FOREGOING)
WILL BE LIABLE FOR ANY TECHNICAL, HARDWARE OR
SOFTWARE FAILURE OF ANY KIND, ANY INTERRUPTION IN
THE AVAILABILITY OF OUR SITE, ANY DELAY IN OPERATION
OR TRANSMISSION, ANY INCOMPLETE OR GARBLED
TRANSMISSION, COMPUTER VIRUS, LOSS OF DATA, OR OTHER
SIMILAR LOSS.
YOU AGREE THAT OUR LIABILITY TO YOU IN ANY CASE
(WHETHER IN CONTRACT OR TORT) WILL NOT EXCEED
AMOUNTS PAID TO US (IF ANY) FOR THE GOODS OR SERVICES
OUT OF WInCH THE LIABILITY AROSE. TO THE EXTENT WE
MAY HAVB BREACHED ANY TERM OF TIllS AGREEMENT, YOU
AGREE THAT YOUR ONLY OTHER REl\1EDY IS TO
DISCONTINUE USE OF TIllS WEB SITE.
If you are a California resident, you \vaive California Civil Code § 1592,
which says: "A general release does not extend to claims which the
creditor does not know or suspect to exist in his favor. At the time of
executing the release, which if known by him must have materially
affected his settlement with the debtor."
Governing Law. You agree that this Agreement is governed by
the laws of the Commonwealth of Kentucky, excluding any application of
conflicts of laws rules or principles. You agree that the sale jurisdiction
and venue for any litigation arising from your use ot: or purchase of
products or services through, our site shall be an appropriate federal or
state court located in Louisville, Kentucky.
Arbitration. You agree that at any claim or controversy relating
to this Agreement or this web site will be settled by binding arbitration in
accordance with the Commercial Arbitration Rules of the American
Arbitration Association. You agree that any claim or controversy you may
have will be arbitrated on an individual basis and will not be consolidated
in any arbitration with any claim or controversy of any other party. You
agree that the arbitration will be conducte~ in Louisville, Kentucky and
that judgment on the arbitration award may be enforced by .any court
having proper jurisdiction. You agree that the costs of conducting the
aibitration will be divided' equally between you and XYZ.com. You or
XYZ.com may seek interim or preliminary relief from a court for the
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purpose or protecting your or our rights pending the completion of the
arbitration; provided, however, that you agree that any legal proceeding
arising out of or in connection with this Agreement or our site will be
brought by you or us in the appropriate state or federal court in Louisville,
Kentucky.
s. Digital Millennium Copyright Act Notice
In October of 1998, Congress enacted the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (the
"DMeA"), which addressed many copyright issues pushed to the forefront by the
prevalence of the Internet. In particular, the DMCA provides to "service providers"
certain safe harbors from monetary damages in the case of vicarious copyright
infringement if the service provider meets certain criteria. To begin the analysis, the
author notes that the DMCA provides two defInitions of "service provider". One
defmition is clearly meant to include traditional internet service providers. 17 U.S.C. §
512 (kXI)(A). However, the other defInition in the DMCA for "service provider" is
quite broad including any "provider of online services or network access, or the operator
of facilities therefor". 17 U.S.C. § 512 (k) (I)(B). This defInition is broad enough to
include businesses that provide networked systems, in addition to practically all
companies that maintain a publicly accessible web site.
Generally, under the DMCA, a service provider (defined in the broader sense) can
qualify for the DMCA safe harbor (meaning the service provider will not be liable for
monetary damages as a result ofa copyright infringement) if the seIVice provider: (1) did
not have actual knowledge that the material was infringing; (2) was not aware offacts or
circumstances from which infringing activity would be apparent; (3) upon obtaining such
knowledge or awareness, acted expeditiously to remove, or disable access to, the
material; (4) did not receive a financial benefit directly attributable to the infringing
activity; and (5) upon notification of the claimed infringement responded promptly to
remove, or disable access to, the material claimed to be infringing. 17 U.S.C. § 512 (c)
(1). To receive the benefit of the safe harbor, however, the service provider must provide
on its web site a means for those who believe their copyright to have been infringed to
provide notice to the seIVice provider through a designated agent. 17 U.S.C. § 512 (c)(2)
(See Exhibit 2 for sample notices.) In addition, the service provider must file with U.S.
Copyright Office the name of the designated agent and other information requested by
the Copyright Office. Id. (See Exhibit 3 for the most recent version of the information
form that can be used to convey the required information to the Copyright Office.)
In a case of fIrst impression on the notice issue, the Fourth Circuit recently held
that a notice from a complaining party with respect to alleged copyright infringement that
substantially complies with the notice requirements is all that is needed to alert the
service provider that it needs to take action. ALS Scan Inc. v. Remarq Communities Inc.,
41h Cir., No. 00-1351, 1/6/02). In the ALS Scan case, ALS Scan notified Remarq, an
internet service provider, that two newsgroups to which Remarq provided access
',contained hundreds of'postingsbyusers·that ·infiinged ALSS~'s copyrights. Remarq









































identify them C~th sufficient specificity". ALS Scan stated that the newsgroups
contained more than 10,000 infringing images and requested that the newsgroups be
discontinued. The District Court held that ALS Scan's notice was sufficient to provide
notice to Remarq under the DMCA and Remarq was therefore required to act in
compliance with the DMCA to preserve its immunity to monetary damages for copyright
infringement under the DMCA Id.
While the DCMA was in large part a codification of existing common law, the
safe harbor discussed above provides an additional method to reduce risk. While
available with little downside from a legal perspective, the author has found some clients
reluctant to take advantage of the safe harbor due to the significant increase in the length
of the User Agreement as a result of the notice and as to the perception that the risk is
relatively low in most cases. To avoid lengthening the User Agreement, an e-business
should consider referencing the notice in the User Agreement and then providing a
separate link for the notice.
In conclusion, the User Agreement can be an opportunity and effective tool for e-
businesses to minimize the risk ofconducting business on-line, and at this stage, the










































.!1;; Help> Privacy & Security > Privacy Notice> Conditions of Use
Conditions of Use
Welcome to Amazon.com. Amazon.com and its affiliates provide their services to you subject to the
following conditions. If you visitor shop at Amazon.com, you accept these conditions. Please read
them carefully. In addition, when you use any current or future Amazon.com service (e.g., Friends &.
Favorites, e-Cards, Auctions, and Honor System) or visit or purchase from any business affiliated with
Amazon.com, whether or not included in the Amazon.com Web site, you also will be subject to the
guidelines and conditions applicable to such service or business.
PRIVACY
Please review· our Privacy Notice, which also governs your visit to Amazon.com, to understand our
practices.
COPYRIGHT
AIl content included on this site, such as text, graphics, logos, button icons, images, audio clips, digital
downloads, data compilations, and software, is the property ofAmazon.com or its content suppliers and
protected by United States and international copyright laws. The compilation ofall content on this site is
the exclusive property ofAmazon.com and protected by U.S. and international copyright laws. All
software used on this site is the property ofAmazon.com or its software suppliers and protected by
United States and international copyright laws.
TRADEMARKS
AMAZON.COM; AMAZON.COM BOOKS; EARTH'S BIGGEST BOOKSTORE; IF IT'S IN PRINT,r IT'S IN STOCK; MOODMATCHER; I-CLICK; and other marks indicated on our site are registered
trademarks ofAmazon.com, Inc. or its subsidiaries, in the United States and other countries. EARTH'S
r...
... BIGGEST SELECTION, PURCHASE CIRCLES, SHOP THE WEB, ONE-CLICK SHOPPING,
" AMAZON.COM ASSOCIATES, AMAZON.COM MUSIC, AMAZON.COM VIDEO,
AMAZON.COM TOYS, AMAZON.COM ELECTRONICS, AMAZON.COM e-CARDS,
r'.. AMAZON.COM AUCTIONS, zSHOPS, CUSTOMER BUZZ, AMAZON.CO.UK, AMAZON.DE,'.' BID-CLICK, GIFT-CLICK, AMAZON.COM ANYWHERE, AMAZON.COM OUTLET, BACK TO
BASICS, BACK TO BASICS TOYS, NEW FOR YOU, AMAZON HONOR SYSTEM, PAyPAGE,
r.
.... UNPAY, and other Amazon.com graphics, logos, page headers, button icons, scripts, and service names
.' are trademarks or trade dress ofAmazon.com, Inc. or its subsidiaries. Amazon.com's trademarks and
trade dress may not be used in connection with any product or service that is not Amazon.com's, in any
r manner that is likely to cause confusion amo.ng customers, or in any manner that disparages or discredits: Amazon.com. All other trademarks not qwned by Amazon.com"or"its subsidiaries that appear on this site
.aretheproperty,oftheirrespectiveowners, who may or may notbe "affiliafed With, connected to, orr ..sponsored by Amazon.rom or its subsidiaries.
PATENTS
r G-15
Amazon.com: Help I Privacy &. Security I Privacy Notice I Conditions orUse http://www.amazon.com!exec!obidosltglbro\\·se!-IS08088/107-6045831-3887742
One or more United States and international patents apply to·this site, including without limitation: U.S.
Patent Nos. 5,715,399; 5,727,163; 5,826,258; 5,960,411; 5,963,949; and 5,999,924.
LICENSE AND SITE ACCESS
Amazon.com grants you a limited license to access and make personal use ofthis site and not to
download (other than page caching) or modify it, or any portion ofit, except with express written
consent ofAmazon.com. This license does not include any resale or commercial use ofthis site or its
contents; any collection and use ofany product listings, descriptions, or prices; any derivative use ofthis
site or its contents; any downloading or copying ofaccount information for the benefit ofanother
merchant; or any use ofdata mining, robots, or similar data gathering and extraction tools. This site or
any portion ofthis site may not be reproduced, duplicated, copied, sold, resold, visited, or otherwise
exploited for any commercial purpose without express written consent ofAmazon.com. You may not
frame or utilize framing techniques to enclose any trademark, logo, or other proprietary information
(including images, text, page layout, or form) ofAmazon.com and our affiliates without express written
consent. You may not use any meta tags or any other "hidden text" utilizing Amazon.com's name or
trademarks without the express written consent ofAmazon.com. Any unauthorized use terminates the
permission or license granted by Amazon.com. You are granted a limited, revocable, and nonexclusive
right to create a hyperlink to the home page ofAmazon.com so long as the link does not portray
Amazon.com, its affiliates, or their products or services in a false, misleading, derogatory, or othelWise
offensive matter. You may not use any Amazon.com logo or other proprietary graphic or trademark as
part of the link without express written permission.
YOUR ACCOUNT
Ifyou use this site, you are responsible for maintaining the confidentiality ofyour account and password
and for restricting access to your computer, and you agree to accept responsibility for all activities that
occur under your account or password. Amazon.com does sell products for children, but it sells them to
adults, who can purchase with a credit card. Ifyou are under 18, you may use Amazon.com only with
involvement ofa parent or guardian. Amazon.com and its affiliates reselVe the right to refuse selVice,
terminate accounts, remove or edit content, or cancel orders in their sole discretion.
REVIEWS, COMMENTS, COl\fl\iUNICATIONS, AND OTHER CONTENT
Visitors may post reviews, comments,.and other content; send e-cards and other communications; and
submit suggestions, ideas, comments, questions, or other information, so long as the content is not
illegal, obscene, threatening, defamatory, invasive ofprivacy, infringing ofintellectual property rights, or
otherwise injurious to third parties or objectionable and does not consist ofor contain software viruses,
political campaigning, commercial solicitation, chain letters, mass mailings, or any form of "spam." You
may not use a false e-mail address, impersonate any person or entity, or otherwise mislead as to the
origin ofa card or other content. Amazon.com reserves the right (but not the obligation) to remove or
edit such content, but does not regularly review posted content.
Ifyou do post content or submit material, and unless we indicate otherwise, you grant Amazon.com and
its affiliates a nonexclusive, .rQyalty-free.,·.. perpetUal, irrevocable, .·and "fully sublice~ble right to use, .
reproduce, modifY, adapt., publish, translate, create derivative works from, distribute, and display such
content throughout the world in any media. You grant Amazon.com and its affiliates and sublicensees
the right to use the name that you submit in connection with such content, if they choose. You represent
and warrant that you own or otherwise control all ofthe rights to the content that you post; that the
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content is accurate; that use ofthe content you supply does not violate this policy and will not cause
injury to any person or entity; and that you will indemnify Amazon.com or its affiliates for all claims
resulting from content you supply. Amazon.com has the right but not the obligation to monitor and edit
or remove any activity or content. Amazon.com takes no responsibility and assumes no liability for any
content posted by you or any third party.
COPYRIGHT COMPLAINTS
Amazon.com and its affiliates respect the intellectual property ofothers. Ifyou believe that your work
has been copied in a way that constitutes copyright infringement, please follow our Notice and
Procedure for Making Claims ofCopyright Infringement.
RISK OF LOSS
All items purchased from Amazon.com are made pursuant to a shipment contract. This means that the
risk ofloss and title for such items pass to you upon our delivery to the carrier.
PRODUCT DESCRIPTIONS
Amazon.com and its affiliates attempt to be as accurate as possible. However, Amazon.com does not
warrant that product descriptions or other content of this site is accurate, complete, reliable, current, or
error-free. Ifa product offered by Amazon.com itselfis not as described, your sole remedy is to return it
in unused condition.
OTHER BUSINESSES
Parties other than Amazon.com and its subsidiaries operate stores, provide services, or sell product lines
on this site. For example, drugstore.com is our Health & Beauty merchant, and other businesses and
individuals offer products in zShops and Auctions. In addition, we provide links to the sites ofaffiliated
companies and certain other businesses. We are not responsible for examining or evaluating, and we do
not warrant the offerings ot: any ofthese businesses or individuals or the content oftheir Web sites.
Amazon.com does not assume any responsibility or liability for the actions, product, and content of all
these and any other third parties. You should carefully review their privacy statements and other
conditions ofuse.
DISCLAIMER OF WARRANTIES AND LIMITATION OF LIABILITY
TIllS SITE IS PROVIDED BY AMAZON.COM ON AN "AS IS" AND "AS AVAILABLE" BASIS.
AMAZON.COM MAKES NO REPRESENTATIONS OR WARRANTIES OF ANY KIND, EXPRESS
OR IMPLIED, AS TO THE OPERATION OF TIllS SITE OR THE INFORMATION, CONTENT,
MATERIALS, OR PRODUCTS INCLUDED ON TIllS SITE. YOU EXPRESSLY AGREE THAT
YOUR USE OF TIllS SITE IS AT YOUR SOLE RISK.
TO THE FULL EXTENT PERMISSmLE BY APPLICABLE LAW, AMAZON.C.OM DISCLAIMS
fr .~ ALL WARRANTIES, EXPl.ffiSS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING" BUT NOT LIMITED TO, IMPLIEDWARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FORA PARTICULAR PURPOSE.- .~.' . -
AMAZON.COM DOES NOT WARRANT THAT TIllS SITE~ ITS SERVERS, OR E-MAIL SENT
r FROM AMAZON.COM ARE FREE OF VIRUSES OR OTHER HARMFUL COMPONENTS.• AMAZON.COM WILL NOT BE LIABLE FOR ANY DAMAGES OF ANY KIND ARISING FROM
THE USE OF TIllS SITE, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO DIRECT, INDIRECT,r G-17
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,
http://www.amazon.comlexcclobidosltglbro...sc!-IS08088/107-604S831-3887742 ,t
INCIDENTAL, PUNITIVE, AND CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES.
CERTAIN STATE LAWS DO NOT ALLOW LIMITATIONS ON ThfPLIED WARRANTIES OR .,
THE EXCLUSION OR LIMITATION OF CERTAIN DAMAGES. IF THESE LAWS APPLY TO
YOU, SOME OR ALL OF THE ABOVE DISCLAIMERS, EXCLUSIONS, OR LIMITATIONS MAY
NOT APPLY TO YOU, AND YOU MIGHT HAVE ADDITIONAL RIGHTS. ~
APPLICABLE LAW ..,
By visiting Amazon.com, you agree that the laws ofthe state ofWashington, without regard to
principles ofconflict oflaws, will govern these Conditions ofUse and any dispute ofany sort that might
arise between you and Amazon.com or its affiliates. .,
DISPUTES
Any dispute relating in any way to your visit to Amazon.com or to products you purchase through
Amazon.com shall be submitted to confidential arbitration in Seattle, Washington, except that, to the
extent you have in any manner violated or threatened to violate Amazon.com's intellectual property
rights, Amazon.com may seek injunctive or other appropriate reliefin any state or federal court in the
state ofWashington, and you consent to exclusive jurisdiction and venue in such courts. Arbitration
under this agreement shall be conducted under the rules then prevailing of the American Arbitration
Association. The arbitrator's award shall be binding and may be entered as a judgment in any court of
competent jurisdiction. To the fullest extent permitted by applicable law, no arbitration under this
Agreement shall be joined to an arbitration involving any other party subject to this Agreement, whether
through class arbitration proceedings or otheIWise.
SITE POLICIES, MODIFICATION, AND SEVERABILITY
Please review our other policies, such as our Pricing and Availability policy, posted on this site. These
policies also govern your visit to Amazon.com. We reserve the right to make changes to our site,
policies, and these Conditions ofUse at any time. Ifany ofthese conditions shall be deemed invalid,
void, or for any reason unenforceable, that condition shall be deemed severable and shall not affect the






Did this help? Continue shopping.
















Review and Submit Your Order--the Last Step!
Please check all the information below to be sure it's correct.
Important: By placing your order, you agree to Amazon.com's privacy notice and





















Total for this Address: $21.25

















Shipping method: Standard Shipping
























These Terms and Conditions ~'ay Change
tThis Website is Operated bV target.direct LLC
IThe target.com Website is operated by target.direct LLC, a subsidiary of Target Corporation. Th
Imailing address for target.dlrect LlC is 33 South Sixth Street, P.O. Box 13921 Minneapolis, MN!55440-1392.
!Your Use of This Vlebsite is Governed by These Terms and Conditions
Flease take a few minutes to reviev, these Terms and ConditIons. Your use of the target.coln vv
constitutes your agreement to follo\'\' these rules and to be bound by them. If you do not agree
any of these Tern1S and Conditions, do not use the target.com WebsIte.
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target.direct LLC reseives the right to update or rnodify these TerniS and Conditi·,ns at any tirne
wIthout pnor notice. Your use of the target.com VVebsite followIng any such change constitutes
agreement to follovv and be bound by the Ten"s and CondItIons as changed. For thIs reason, V'I
encourage you to revievl these Terms and ConditIons whenever you use this Vvebsite.
J
. Copyright Notice
Ail of the Content you see and hear on the target.com Website, including, for exanlple, ali of th
headers/ Inlages, illustratIons, graphIcs, audio clips, video ciipsr and text, are subject to tiadem
servIce mark, trade dress, copyright and/or other !nt~flectuaJ property rights or licenses he:d by
target.direct L.LC, one of Its affiliates or by third parties \tvho have licensed their nlaterials to
target.direct LLC. The entire Content of the target.ccr'n \:Vebsite is copyrighted as a co!lectiv~ vV
under U.S. copyright la~vs/ and t2rget.direct LLC cv,ns a copyright in the selection, coorclinat:on{
arrangenlent and enhancenlent of the Content.
The Content of the target.com vvebsite, and the site as a \I.,ho!e, are intended sofely fer persona
noncon1rllercial use by the userS of our site. You rnay dovvnload, print and store sefected portion
the Content: provided you (l) only use these copies of the Content for your own personal,
; non-conlnlerc:al use, (2) do not copy or post the Content on any neb·vorl\. computer or brcadcas
Content in any n1edla, and (3) do not n10dlfy or alter the Content in any v.Jay, or delete or chan





No right, title or interest in any dovvnloaded materials IS transferred to you as a res~lt of any su
dovlnloading. target.direct LLC reserves corT1plete tlt!e and full intellectua: property rights i~ any
Content you do;vnfoad from thIs \AJebsite. J
Except as noted above, you niay not copy, dov;nload/ reproduce/ modify, publish, dIstribute, tra
transfer or create derivative V'lorks from the Content WIthout first obtaining wntten pern1iSs!On f
taiget.direct LLC. J
Submissions
. \Ve welcome your conlnlents regarding ths target.conl \~ebslte. However, any corllrnents, feedb
. notes, messages, ideas, suggestions or other communications (collectively, "Conlnlents" ) sent t
target.com shall be and remain the exclUSIve propert)1 of target.dlrect LLC. Your 5wbmlss!ci: of =
: sucn Comments shall constItute an assIgnment to target.dlrect LLC of aU \tvorld\vlde rights, ttes
interests in all copyrights and other ,ntelieetual property rights in the Com:i1ents. target.dlrect L
be entitled to use, reproduce, disclose, publish and distribute any n1atenal you subrn!t fOi any
purpose whatsoever, Without restriction and without compensating you in any way. FOi thIS rea
we ask that you not send us any comments that you do not wish to aSSign to us, inciud:ng any
confidential inforn1ation or any original creative materials such as, stoneSI product jdeasl con1pu
~ code or original artwork. '
Colors
We have done our best to display as accurately as possible the colors of the products sho\\rn on
taiget.conl Website. However, because the colors you see wilt depend on your n1onitor, \y~ can





























Correction of Errors and Inaccuracies
The inFormation on the target.com V1ebsitemay contain typographical errors or inaccuracies an
not be complete or current. We therefore reserve the right to correct any errors, inaccuracies Or
omissjons and to change or update inforrnation ~t any t,n1e without prior notice (,ncluding aftei
have subn1itted your order). Please note that such errors/ inaccuracies or omissions may iefate
product descriptiOn/ pricing and availability. \f-le apologize for any inconvenience this may c·suse
If you are not fully satisfied with your target.con, purchase you n1ay return it \vith the original
target.com packing receipt \ovithin 90 days of the order date. Please see our Return Pol!ey.
DISCLAIMERS
THE TARGET.COM VJEBSITE IS OPERATED BY target.direct LLC, A SUBSIDIARY OF TARGET
CORPORATION, ON AN "AS IS," "AS AVAILABLE" BASIS/ \tVITHOUT REPRESENTATIONS OR
ViARRANTIES OF ANY KIND. target.direct LLC, TARGET CORPORATION, TARGET BRANDS, INC.
THEIR AFFILIATES (COLLECTIVELY, THE \\TJl.RGET CORPORATION BUSINESSES") DiSCLAltl1 ANY
ALL REPR.ESENTATIONS AND \rVAR.RAJ~TIES 'vVITH RESPECT TO THIS SITE AND !TS CONTENTS,
VJHEThER EXPRESS, IMPLIED, OR STATUTORY, INCLUDING, BUT NOT UMITED TO, 'vVARRANTIE
TITLE, MERCHANTABIUTY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.
WITHOUT LIMITING THE FOREGOING, THE TARGET CORPORATION BUSINESSES D!SCLAIfvi .C:.J\jY
ALL WARRANTIES, EXPRESS OR IMPLIED/ FOR ANY rw1E~CHANDISEOFFERED ON THIS SITE. THI
DISCLAlr·..1ER DOES NOT A.PPLY TO ANY PRODUCT VJARRANlY OFFERED BY THE MANUFA.CTURER
THE ITEM.
VJITHOUT LIMITING THE FOREGOING, THE TARGET CORPORATION BUSINESSES DO NOT REPRE
OR "JARRANT THAT THE INFORr~1.ATIONON THE TARGET.COM \AJE85!TE IS ACCURATE, COr"'lPLE
CURRENT OR TH;A.T THE TA.RGET.COM VJEBSITE VVILL OPERATE V·/ITHOUT INTERRUPTION OR ER
VJITHOUT LIMITING THE FOREGOING, THE T~.RGET CORPORATION 6USINESSES D!SCLA.lt"l A.NY
LIABILITY AS TO THE ACCURACY OR CO(--1PLETENESS OF EACH ITEM DESCRIPTION. A~L P~ODU
DESCRIPTIONS ORIGINATE FROr"l THE MANUFACTURER OF THE ITEM.
THE TARGET COR?OR.~TIONBUSINESSES CO NOT ENDORSE NOR r..1Al<E ANY VY.ARPANTIES OR
REPRES=NTATIONS ABOUT ANY vVESSITE YOU M.~Y ACCESS THROUGH TtiE TARGET.COM "VES
LINKS TO OTHER SITES ARE PROVIDED FOR. CONVENIENCE ONLY. YOU NEED TO MAKE YOUR 0
DECISIONS REGARDING YOUR INTER~CnONS OR COfVlMUNICA110NS VV!TH ANY OTHER \VEBSI
THE TARGET CORPOR-ATION BUSINESSES r,.1AKE NO F,EPRESENTATION THAT CONTENT PROVID
THE TARGET.CO~1 ~VEBSITE IS APPLICABLE OR APPROPRI,!o,TE FOR USE IN LOCATIONS OUTSIDE
THE UNITED STATES.
LIMITATION OF LIABILITY
UNDER NO CIRCUi\;lSTANCES, SHALL THE: TARGET CORPOR.A.TION BUSIN=SSES OR ANY OF THE
EMPLOYEES, DIRECTOR.S, OFFICERS, A.GE:NTS, VENDORS OR SUPPLIERS BE LI.~,BLe FOR ANY DI
OR INDIRECT LOSSES OR DAr"lAGES ARISING OUT OF OR IN CONNECTION \tVITH THe USE OF 0
IN.A.BILITY TO USE THE TARGET.COM 'YVEB SITE.
THIS IS A COMPREHENSIVE LIr~lITA110N OF LIABIUTi THAT APPUES TO ALL LOSSES AND D.~l\·l
OF ANY KIND (WHETHER GENERAL, SPECI,A.L, CONSEQUENTIAL, INODENTAL, EXEf'1PLA.RY OR
OTHER\f'JISE, INCLUDING! WITHOUT Llf\rlITA110N/ LOSS OF DATA, INCOME OR PROFITS), "vVHET
IN CONTRACT/ NEGUGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION/ EVEN IF AN AUTHORIZED
REPRESENTATIVE OF ANY TARGET CORPORATION BUSINESS HAS BEEN ADVISED OF OR SHOU
HAVE KNO"/N OF THE POSSIBILllY OF SUCH DA"'JAGES.
IF YOU ARE DISSATISFIED 'IJITH THE TARGET.cor.., WEBSITE OR ANY CONTENT ON THE SITE..
WITH THE TARGET.COM TERJ'.'1S AND CONDITIONS, YOUR SOLE AND EXCLUSIVE REMEDY IS TO
DISCONTINUE USING THE TARGET.COM VYEBSITE. YOU ACKNOWLEDGE/ BY YOUR USE OF THe
TARGET.COM WEBSITE, THAT YOUR USE OF THE SITE IS AT YOUR SOLE RISK.
APPLICABLE LAW MAY NOT ALLOW THE LIMITATION OFUABILI1Y SET FORTH ABOVE, SO THIS
LIMITATION OF UABIUTY MAY NOT APPLY TO you. IF ANY PART OF THIS LIMITATION ON UABI
IS FOUND TO SE INVAUD O.RUN~NFORCEABt..E FOR ANY REASON~ THEN THe AGGREGATE LIAS
OF THE TARGET CORPORATlON BUSINESSES UNDER SUCH CRCUMSTANCES FOR UABILmes
01lieR~JISEVvOULD HAVE B~EN- Uf'r1ITfO SHALL NOT EXCEED ONE tiUNDRfO OOLLARS($l00)
ENFORCEMENT OF TERMS AND CONDITIONS
G-21
target.com Terms and Cooditioos
• ••••••••••... 0" •..:.::::: Q :.'... ;:W~:L ~ :~ .Guest:tGftf:::~imttCenI:n
v.rysiwyg1110Slhttp11www.targetcomn'argc...cssionidSAJOESWAAAAS4K1CTCSVSFEZAKMKKYIVs
BY ACCESSING AND USING THE TARGET.COM V'JEBSITE, YOU AGREE THAT YOUR ACCESS TO A
USE OF THE TARGET.COM WE6SITE IS SUBJECT TO THESE TERMS AND CONDITIONS, AS VvELL
ALL APPUCABLE LAWS, AS GOVERNED AND INTERPRETED PURSUANT TO TriE LAWS OF THE ST

















































NOTICE AND PROCEDURE FOR MAKING CLAIMS OF
COpymGHTINFRWGEMENT
We may give notice to our users by means of a general notice on any
ltVDlG Site. electronic mail to a user's e-mail address on our records, orby
written communication sent by first class mail to a user's address on our
records.
Pursuant to Title 17, United States Code, Section 512(c)(2), notifications
of claimed copyright infringement should be sent to Service Provider's
Designated Agent. See Notice and Procedure for Making Claims of
Copyright Infringement.
Notification must be submitted to the following Designated Agent:
o Service Provider(s): Infoseek Corporation and WDIG
o Name of Agent Designated to Receive Notification of
Claimed Infringement: Laurence J. Shapiro
o Full Address of Designated Agent to Which Notification
Should be Sent: 500 South Buena Vista Street, Burbank,
CA 91521-7710
o Telephone Number of Designated Agent: (818)623-3200
o Facsimile Number of Designated Agent: (818)623-3637
o Email Address of Designated Agent:
designated.agent@dig.com
o Email Address of Designated Agent for ESPN.com:
http://espn.go.com/sitetools/s/terms.html
To be effective, the notification must be a written communication that
includes the following:
1. A physical or electronic signature of person authorized to act on
behalf of the owner of an exclusive right that is allegedly infringed;
2. Identification of the copyrighted work claimed to have been
infringed, or multiple copyrighted works at a single online site are
covered by a single notification, a representative list of such works
at that site;
3. Identification of the material that is claimed to be infringing or to
be the subject of infringing activity and that is to be removed or
access to which is to be disabled, and information reasonably
sufficient to permit the service provider to locate the material;
4. Information reasonably sufficient to permit the service provider to
contact the complaining party, such as an address, telephone
number, and if available, an electronic mail address at which the
complaining party may be contacted;
5. A statement that the compJainingparty has a good faith belief that
use of the material in the manner complained of is not authorized
by the copyright owner. its agent, or the law;
6. A statement that the information in the notification is accurate,
and under penalty of perjury, that the complaining party is
authorized to act on behalf of the owner of an exclusive right that
is allegedly infringed. G _25
Digital Millennium Copyright Act Notice
NOTICE TO COPYRIGHT OWNERS
XYZ Corp. respects the intellectual property of others, and we ask our users to do
the same.
If you believe that. your work has been copied in a way that constitutes copyright
infringement, you must provide XYZ's Copyright Agent the following information,
which must be in writing:
i) A physical or electronic signature of a person authorized to act on behalf
of the owner of an exclusive right that is allegedly infringed.
ii) Identification of the copyrighted work claimed to have been infringed, Of,
if multiple copyrighted works at a single online site are covered by a
single notification, a representative list of such works at that site.
iii) Identification of the material that is claimed to be infringing or to be the
subject of infringing activity and that is to be removed or access to which
is to be disabled, and information reasonably sufficient to permit XYZ
Corp. to locate the material.
iv) Information reasonably sufficient to permit XYZ Corp. to contact the
complaining party, such as an address, telephone number, and, if
available, an e-mail address at which the complaining party may be
contacted.
v) A statement that the complaining party has a good faith belief that use of
the material in the manner complained of is not authorized by the
copyright owner, its agent, or the law.
vi) A statement that the information in the notification is accurate, and under
penalty of perjury, that the complaining party is authorized to act on
behalfof the owner ofan exclusive right that is allegedly infringed.
XYZ Corp.'s Designated Agent for Notice of claims of copyright infringement is
_____, who can be reached as follows:
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Yahoo! respects the intellectual property ofothers, and we ask our users to
do the same. Yahoo! may, in appropriate circumstances and at its discretion,
terminate the accounts ofusers who infringe the intellectual property rights
ofothers.
Ifyou believe that your work has been copied in a way that constitutes
copyright infringement, please provide Yahoot's Copyright Agent the
following information:
1. an electronic or physical signature of the person authorized to act on
behalfof the owner ofthe copyright interest;
2. a description of the copyrighted work that you claim has been
infringed;
3. a description of \vhere the material that you claim is infringing is
located on the site;
4. your address, telephone number, and email address;
5. a statement by you that you have a good faith belief that the disputed
use is not authorized by the copyright owner, its agent, or the law;
6. a statement by you, made under penalty of perjuIY, that the above
information in your Notice is accurate and that you are the copyright
owner or authorized to act on the copyright owner's behalf
Yahoot's Copyright Agent·for Notice of claims of copyright infringement



























































Interim Designation of Agent to Receive Notification
of Claimed Infringement
Full Legal Name of Service Provider: _
Alternative Name(s) of Service Provider (including all names under \vhich the service
provider is doing business): _
Address of Service Provider:--------------------
Name ofAgent Designated to Receive
Not~cationofCla~edIn~nge~ent:---------------~
Full Address of Designated Agent to \vhich Notification Should be Sent (a P.O. Box




Signature of Officer or Representative of the Designating Service Provider:
________________ Date: _
Typed or Printed Name and Title: __~~~__~~_~~~ _
Note: This Interim Designation Must be Accompanied by a 520 Filing Fee
Made Payable to the Register ofCop)'rights.
G-31
Amended Interim Designation of Agent to Receive Notification
of Claimed Infringement
Alternative Name(s) of Senice Provider (including all names under \vhich the senice
provider is doing business): _
Address of Service Provider:--------------------
Name ofAgent Designated to Receive
~tfficationofCb~edIn~ngement~~~~~~-~~~--~~~~
Full Address of Designated Agent to \,rhich Notification Should be Sent (a P.o. Box





Identify the Interim Designation to be Amended, by Service Provider Name and Filing
Date, so that it may be Readily Located in the Directory Maintained by the Copyright
Office:---------------------------
Signature of Officer or Representative of the Designating Service Provider:
_~ ~ ~ Date: _
Typed or Printed Name and Title: _-----__~ ~ _
Note: This Amended Interim Designation Must be Accompanied by a $20 FUing Fee























Home • Forms • Records • Registration · Law • Comments · Library of Congress
Directory of Service Provider Agents
for Notification of Claims of Infringement
The following service providers have filed designations ofagents for notification ofclaims of
infringement pursuant to Section 512(c) of the Copyright Act. The Copyright Office's current
directory ofagents consists ~f this list, with links to copies, in PDF format, ofthe designations
filed on behalfofservice providers. You must have the Adobe Acrobat Reader installed on
your computer to view and print the forms. The Adobe Acrobat Reader is available for free
from Adobe Systems Incorporated.
Go To: ABC 0 E F G H ! .J K 1: M N 0 P Q R STU V W X Y Z
Numerals/Symbols
Service Provider Agents List
-A- A S Billing
A S Networks
A S Networks, LLC
A&E Television Networks
A+Net Internet Services









AAL Capital Management Corporation
AALCMC
AALFBS
AAL Member Credit Union (Appleton, WI)
AALMCU
AAL Trust CompanY























































































































































































Advance Magazine Publishers, Inc.
Advance News Service, Inc.
Advance Publications Internet
Advanced Building Networks
Advanced Computer Concepts, Inc.
ADVANCED INTERNET TECHNOLOGIES, INC.

































Agriculture Program, Texas A&M University
agriculture.com
agricultureonline.com










Aims College (Greeley, CO)
Aims College Corporate Education Center (Greeley, CO)
Aims Community College (Greeley. CO)
Aims Community College Continuing Education Authority (Greeley, CO)
Aims Community College Foundation (Greeley, CO)




































AIT (Advanced Internet Technologies)










Albany Division of Time Warner Entertainment-Advance/Newhouse Partnership
Albany Herald
Albany Herald Publishing Company, Inc.









Alfred State College (NY)
Alfred University (NY)












u.s. Copyright Office, DirectoryA of Ser...or Notification ofClaims of Infringement http://W\vw.loc.gov/copyrightlonlinespllistfmdex.html
Alleghenv College (Meadville, PAl
Allen Technology, Inc.
Allentown College of St. Francis De Sales (Center Valley, PAl
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American Academy of Otolarvngology--Head and Neck Surgery Foundation, Inc.
American Academy of Pediatrics
American Academy of Family Physicians
American Association of Pharmaceutical Scientists
American Broadcasting Companies
American City Business Journals
American City Business Journals, Inc.
American College of Rheumatology (Atlanta)
American Computer
American Express Bank. Ltd.
American Express Company
American Express Financial Advisors
American Express Travel Related Services Company
American InfoMetrics, Inc.
American Institute for Chartered Property Casualty Underwriters
American Institute for Chartered Property Casualty Underwriters. Institute
Research Council
American Institute of Physics. Inc.
AMERICAN PHOTO
American Society for Quality
American Society for Quality, Inc.
American Society of Composers, Authors and Publishers
American Society of Interior Designers, Inc.
American Tourister, Inc.
























































































































Arapahoe Community College (Littleton, CO)
ARBIS
ARBIS, Inc.


















Arkansas Hearst-Argyle Television, Inc.
Arkansas Tech (Russellville)





Arlington Hills Branch library (Saint Paul)


































ArtManager Online Services, LLC
artnet.com
Artnet Worldwide Corporation
artscLwustl.edu (Washington University. St. Louis, MO)




















Associated Information Services, Inc.














AT&T Global Network Services





























































Augusta State University (GAl
Augustana College (Sioux Falls. SD>
augustaonline.com
Austin Community College



























u.s. Copyright Office, DUectoI)'A ofSer...or Notificatioo ofClaims of InfriDgement
aworldofbooks.com
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Ethical Issues Raised in the Practice of Law
Kurt X. Metzmeier and James A. Becker
©2001
I. General Background to the Ethics of Internet Use in the Practice of Law





B. Human Issues Raised by The Use of Computer Networks




C. Ethics and the Nonlawyer Assistants
1. KRPC 5.3 requires that lawyers supervising nonlawyers "employed or retained by or
associated with" a law practice have "in effect measures giving reasonable assurance" that these
employees uphold the KRPC. This applies to computing staffl Supervising attorneys have an
ethical obligation to assure that computing and networking staff are trained on the obligations of
the KRPC, especially those relating to client communications
2. Preventative measures for all nonlawyer employees including information systems
staff:
a. New employee orientation on KRPC
b. Employee manuals (signed)
C. Computer use policies (for all employees) (signed)
3. Ethics and IT Staff
Computer personnel need special attention. They have far more access to client information than
any other employees. The computing culture is very different from the law firm culture and
fosters the belief that "information wants to be free." IT personnel need to be educated as to the
importance of confidentiality, especially in regards to client records.
4. Special measures for IT personnel
a. Take care to hire well
b. Be as careful as if the ITjob involved handling large sums ofmoney
c. Check references
H-1
5. Rules also apply to contract employees and consultants. Preventative measures include
choosing reputable consultants with strong references and contractual language incorporating
confidentiality assurances
6. Social Engineering
A common hackers tool that takes advantage of the naivete. The hacker calls a low level
employee and uses plausible details that the acquire from public sources (web site, phone books)
to convince them to divulge passwords
7. Misconduct
Computer security experts agree that the most serious risk for disclosure of
confidential communications is through employee misconduct. The most famous disclosure of
client information in Kentucky, the Brown & Williamson case, occurred this way (though
without computers).
II. Ethical Issues Relating to Email
A. Encryption
1. Not Required (KBA E-403) "unless unusual circumstances require enhanced security
measures"
2. Should be considered for highly sensitive communications
3. PGP -- Difficult to configure
4. Encryption of attached documents using Microsoft Word & Corel Word Perfect
effective for many concerns
B. Inadvertent Disclosure
1. Mis-addressed e-mail far more serious likelihood than interception




This e-mail message.togetherwithanyattachments.isintended only for
the personal and confidential use of the recipient(s) named above. This
message may be an attorney-client communication and as such is
privileged and confidential. Ifyou are not the intended recipient, you are
hereby notified that you have received this document in error and that any
review, dissemination, distribution, or copying of this message is strictly
prohibited. Ifyou have received this message in error, please notify us
immediately ... and delete the message from your computer.
c. Email and Solicitation, Advertising
1 "Unless the lawyer uses the Internet or other electronic mail service to direct messages
to a specifi~ recipient {in which case the rules governing.solicitation would apply] only
























advertising [KRPCs 7.10, 7.20, and the so-called advertising rules set forth at KRPCs
7.01-7.08] should apply... " (KBA E-403)
2. Solicitation Issues
a. Mass mailings (Spam)
b. Lawyer participation in listservs
c. Lawyer participation in "chat rooms"
3. Spam
a. Unsolicited commercial e-mail
b. Disliked by both e-mail users and Internet Service Providers (ISP's)
c. CompuServe has successfully sued commercial e-mailers under theory that
they abused computer facilities owned by the ISP
d. Shapero v. KBA, 486 US 466
e. RPC 7.30 bars all solicitation when
(2)(a) client makes desire known that he or she does not want it
(2)(b) it involves coercion, duress or harassment
(3) Written solicitation must follow 7.10 advertising rules
4 Listservs
a. What is a listserv?
*Listserv is a server that distributes e-mails to all list members
*Members post public messages to entire list
*Only limited anonymity
*Very valuable tool for keeping up on breaking developments
b. The participation of lawyers on listservs raise a number ofissues:
* Solicitation
*Inadvertent creation of an attorney-client relationship
·Unauthorized practice of law (in jurisdictions where they are not
licensed)
c. Listservs: Solicitation
KRPC 7.02(1)(f) states that: "Any communication by a lawyer to third
parties that is published or broadcast by a third party who is not in any way
controlled by the lawyer, and for which publication or broadcast the
lawyer pays no consideration, shall be exempt from all the provisions of
these Rules except Rule 7.10 [barring "false, deceptive or misleading"
information]."
The participation by lawyers on listservs maintained by third parties is
consistent with KRPC7.02(1)(f) and KBA opinions regarding appearances
by lawyers on radio' and TV programs (KBA E-50, E-270).
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d. Listservs: Establishment of an Attorney-Client Relations
*Will tum on what the "client" reasonably perceives
*Lawyers should be wary of seeming to respond to specific questions
e. Listservs: Avoiding the Establishment of an Attorney-Client Relations
*Include disclaimer in signature line
*Lawyers should avoid going "off-list" to discuss specific problems
* Seek out "lawyer's only lists"
*Avoid lists where non-lawyers tend to trade in bad legal advice
5. Chat rooms et al
*Anonymous real-time discussion forums
*Regularly exercised option to take public discussions private
*Hosted by users ISP (traditionally AOL strength) or by free websites like Yahoo!
*While none of the published state opinions on the use of e-mail specifically bar
attorney's from participating (as lawyers) in chat rooms, the atmosphere of
anonymity and privacy intensifies the dangers suggested for listserv participation.
III. Ethics and the World-Wide Web
A. Web Pages as Advertising
1. KBA E-403 indicates that web pages are to be considered advertising in most
situations
2. In general, web pages should follow KRPC 7.01 - 7.25, in particular:
a. Must submit copies for approval (KRPC 7.05(1) and (2))
b. Need to label pages as advertising (KRPC 7.25)
c. Must carry the name of one lawyer licensed in Kentucky (KRPC 7.20 (3))
d. Cannot be false or misleading (KRPC 7.10)
B. Other Issues Raised by Web Pages
1. Domain names
2. Hidden indexing & metatags
3. Client confidentiality and client testimonials
4. Solicitation issues
a. Web boards
b. Emailed web pages
5. Privacy
a. Rights of Adults
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Appendix I: KBA E-403
Question 1:
Maya lawyer use electronic mail services including the Internet to communicate \vith clients \vithout encryption?
Answer:
Yes, unless unusual circumstances require enhanced security measures.
Question 2:
Is the creation and use by a lawyer of an Internet "web site" containing information about the lawyer and the la\vyer's services
that may be accessed by Internet users, including prospective clients, a communication falling within KRPCs 7.09 [Prohibited
Solicitation] or 7.30 [Direct Contact With Prospective Client]?
Answer:
Qualified No. Unless the lawyer uses the Internet or other electronic mail service to direct messages to a specific recipient [in
which case the rules governing_solicitation \vould apply] only the general rules governing communications regarding a lawyer's
services and advertising [KRPCs 7.10, 7.20, and the so-called advertising rules set forth at KRPCs 7.01-7.08] should apply to a
lawyer's ''\veb-site'' on the Internet.
References: Illinois Ope 96- 10 (1997); Kurt Metzmeier & Shaun Esposito, Ho\v to Avoid Losing Your License on the
Information Superhigh\vay: Ethical Issues Raised by the Use of the Internet in The Practice of La\v (Kentucky Bench & Bar,
Spring 1998).
OPINION
Despite widespread use of the Internet, the Committee has received few inquiries regarding its use. Still, the Committee is of the
view that this opinion should be issued to provide some guidance and some comfort. The subject is addressed in a recent article
cited in the references, which is available from the UK La\v Library, and \vhich has been submitted for publication in the Bench
& Bar.
The Committee finds persuasive the comprehensive and thoughtful opinion of the Illinois State Bar Association, ISBA Advisory
Opinion No. 96-10, excerpts of which we attach as an Appendix.
APPENDIX
ILLINOIS STATE BAR ASSOCIATION
ISBA Advisory Opinion on Professional Conduct
Opinion No. 96-10
May 16, 1997
Topic: Electronic communications; confidentiality of client information; advertising and solicitation.
Digest: Lawyers may use electronic mail services, including the Internet, without encryption to communicate with clients unless
unusual circumstances require enhanced security measures. The creation and use by a la\vyer of an Internet "web site" containing
information about the lawyer and the lawyer's services that may be accessed by Internet users, including prospective clients, is
not "communication directed to a specific recipient" within the meaning of the rules, and therefore only the general rules
governing communications concerning a la\vyer's services and advertising should apply to a la\vyer "web site" on the Internet. If
a lawyer uses the Internet or other electronic mail service to direct messages to specific recipients, then the rules regarding
solicitation would apply.
Ref.: Illinois Rules of Professional Conduct, Rules 1.6, 7.1, 7.2, 7.3 and 7.4
ISBA Opinion Nos. 90-07 and 94-11
Electronic Communications Privacy Act, 18 USC §2SI0, et seq.
QUESTIONS
The Committee has received various inquiries regarding ethical issues raised by use of electronic means of communication,
including electronic mail and the "Internet," by lawyers. These inquiries usually involve two general areas of concern. The first
is whether electronic mail may be used to communicate with clients regarding client matters in view of a lawyer's duty under the
ethics rules to maintain the confidentiality ofclient information. The second is whether the creation and use of a ''\veb site" and
other forms ofcontract with prospective clients may be conducted by lawyers on the Internet, and if so, \vhether the rules
regarding "in person" soHcitation should apply to such contact.
.Because ofthe technical nature-ofthe discussion, the Committee will use the following commonly accepted definitions in this
opinion. The lntemt:t is a supernetwork ofcomputers" that Jinks together individual computers.and computer netwQrks located.at
academic, commercial, government and military sites worldwide, generally by ordinary local tel"epho~e'lines and long-distance
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transmission facilities. Communications between computers or individual net\vorks on the Internet are achieved throughout he
use of standard, nonproprietary protocols.
Electronic mail, commonly known as e-mail, is an electronic message that is sent from one computer to another, usually through
a host computer on a network. E-mail messages can be sent through a private or local area network (within a single firm or
organization), through an electronic mail service (such as America Online, CompuServ or Mel Mail), over the Internet, or
through any combination of these methods.
A bulletin board service (sometimes called a "BBS") is an electronic bulletin board on a network \vhere electronic messages may
be posted and browsed by users or delivered to e-mail boxes. A "ne\vsgroup" is a type of bulletin board service in which users
can exchange information on a particular subject. A "chat" group is a simultaneous or "real time" bulletin board or ne\vsgroup
among users who send their questions or comments over the Internet.
The World Wide Web is that part of the Internet consisting of computer files written in a particular format (the "HTML" format)
that includes "hyperlinks" (text or symbols that the user may click on to switch immediately to the item identified) as \vell as
graphics and sound, to enable the creation of complex messages. A "home page" is a computer file containing text and graphics
in the HTML format usually continuing information about its owner, \vhich can be obtained over the Internet and viewed by
transmitting it from the owner's computer to the user's terminal. A "web site" is a set of computer files containing text and
graphics in the HTML format and organized around a central home page.
The Electronic Communications Privacy Act, 18 USC §2510, et seq. (the "ECPA"), is the federal codification of the intrusion
arm of the common la\v tort of invasion of privacy applied to electronic communication and provides criminal and civil penalties
for its violation. The ECPA is actually the 1986 revision of the federal wiretap statute originally enacted in 1968, but the term
ECPA is now commonly used to refer to the entire statute, as amended.
OPINION
The first issue, \vhether a la\vyer may use electronic mail services including the Internet to communicate \vith clients, arises out
of a lawyer's duty to protect confidential client information. Rule 1.6(a) of the Illinois Rules of Professional Conduct provides
that"...a la\vyer shall not, during or after termination of the professional relationship \vith the client, use or reveal a confidence
or secret of the client kno\vn to the la\vyer unless the client consents after disclosure." AS the Terminology provisions of the
Rules state, the information a la\vyer must protect includes information covered by the la\vyer-client privilege (a "confidence")
as well as information that the client wishes to be held inviolate or the revelation of \vhich \vould be embarrassing or detrimental
to the client (a "secret").
The duty to maintain the confidentiality of client information implies the duty to use methods of communication with clients that
provide reasonable assurance that messages \vill be and remain confidential. For that reason, the Committee concluded in
Opinion No. 90-07 (November 1990) that a la\vyer should not use cordless or other mobile telephones that \vere easily
susceptible to interception \vhen discussing confidential client matters. The Committee also opined that a la\\'yer conversing \vith
a client over a cordless or mobile telephone should advise the client of the risk of the loss of confidentiality.
With the increased use of electronic mail, particularly electronic mail transmitted over the Internet, have come suggestions that
electronic messages are not sufficiently secure to be used by la\vyers communicating \vith clients. At least t\VO state ethics
opinions have concluded that because it is possible for Internet or other electronic mail service providers to intercept electronic
mail service providers to intercept electronic mail messages, lawyers should not use electronic mail for "sensitive" client
communications unless the messages were encrypted or the client expressly consented to "non-secure" communication. South
Carolina Bar Advisory Opinion 94-27 (January 1995); Iowa Supreme Court Board of Professional Ethics and Conduct Opinion
96-1 (August 29, 1996). After reviewing much of the available literature on this issue, the Committee disagrees \vith these
opinions.
Among the numerous recent articles regarding a lawyer's use ofelectronic mail, the Committee found three to be particularly
useful and informative. These are: Joan C. Rogers, "Malpractice Concerns Cloud E-Mail, On-Line Advice," ABA/BNA La\vyers'
Manual on Professional Conduct (March 6, 1996); Peter R. Jarvis & Bradley F. Tellam, "High-Tech Ethics and Malpractice
Issues," 1996 Symposium Issue of the Professional Lawyer, p. 51 (1996); David Hricik, "Confidentiality and Privilege in High-
Tech Communications," 8 Professional Lawyer, p. 1 (February 1997). From these and other authorities, there is a clear
consensus on two critical points. First, although interception of electronic messages is possible, it is certainly no less difficult
than intercepting an ordinary telephone call. Second, intercepting an electronic mail message is illegal under the ECPA.
Courts and ethics committees have 'uniformly held that persons using ordinar.Y telephones for confidential communications have
aleasonable expectation ofprivacy. The three common types of electronic mail messages appear no less secure. For example.
electronic messages that are carried on a local area or pnvatenetwork may only be accessed from \vithin the organization o\vning





















Other electronic messages are carried by commercial electronic mail services or networks such as America Online, CompuServ
or MCI Mail. Typically, these services transmit e-mail messages from one subscriber's computer to another computer "mailbox"
over a proprietary telephone nem·ork. Typically, the computer mailboxes involved are pass\vord-protected. Because it is possible
for dishonest or careless personnel of the mail service provider to intercept or misdirect a message, this form of electronic mail is
arguably less secure than messages sent over a private network. AS a practical matter, ho\vever, any ordinary telephone call may
also be intercepted or misdirected by dishonest or careless employees of the telephone service provider. Again, this possibility
has not compromised the reasonable expectation of privacy of ordinary telephone users. The result should be the same for
electronic mail service subscribers.
The third type of electronic mail, that carried on the Internet, typically travels in another fashion. Rather than moving directly
from the sender's host computer to the recipient's host computer, Internet messages are usually broken into separate "packets" of
data that are transmitted individually and then re-assembled into a complete message at the recipient's host computer. Along the
way, the packets travel through, and may be stored temporarily in, one or more other computers (called "routers") operated by
third parties (usually called an "internet service provider" or "ISP") that help distribute electronic mail over the Internet.
Unlike a cordless cellular telephone message, for example, an Internet e-mail is not broadcast over the open air waves, but
through ordinary telephone lines and the intermediate computers. When an Internet message is transmitted over an ordinary
telephone line, it is subject to the same protections and difficulties of interception as an ordinary telephone call. To intercept an
Internet communication \vhile it is in transit over telephone lines requires an illegal wiretap.
Consequently, the real distinction bet\veen an Internet electronic message and an ordinary telephone call is that Internet messages
may be temporarily stored in, and so can be accessed through, a router maintained by an ISP. It is possible that an employee of
an ISP (as part of the maintenance of the router) could la\vfully monitor the router and thereby read part or all of a confidential
message. As in the case of telephone and proprietary elt=ctronic mail providers, it is also possible for dishonest employees of an
ISP to intercept messages unla\vfully. The Committee does not believe that the opportunity for illegal interception by personnel
of an ISP makes it unreasonable to expect privacy of the message.
As noted above, it is also clear that unauthorized interception of an Internet message is a violation of the ECPA, which was
amended in 1986 to extend the criminal \viretapping la\\!s to cover Internet transmissions. As part of the 1986 amendments,
Congress also treated the issue of privilege in 18 USCA §2517(4), as follo\vs:
No othenvise privileged \vire, oral, or electronic communication intercepted in accordance \vith, or in violation of, the provisions
of this chapter shall lose its privileged character.
This provision demonstrates that Congress intended that Internet messages should be considered privileged communications just
as ordinary telephone calls.
In summary, the Committee concludes that because (I) the expectation of privacy for electronic mail is no less reasonable than
the expectation of privacy for ordinary telephone calls, and (2) the unauthorized interception of an electronic message subject to
the ECPA is illegal, a lawyer does not violate Rule 1.6 by communicating \vith a client using electronic mail services, including
the Internet, without encryption. Nor is it necessary, as some commentators have suggested, to seek specific client consent to the
use of unencrypted e-mail. The Committee recognizes that there may be unusual circumstances involving an extraordinarily
sensitive matter that might require enhanced security measures like encryption. These situations \vould, ho\vever, be of the
nature that ordinary telephones and other normal means of communication \vould also be deemed inadequate.
With respect to the second general issue, the extent to which a la\vyer may use Internet \veb site to communicate with clients and
prospective clients, the Committee believes that the existing Rules of Professional Conduct governing advertising, solicitation
and communication concerning a la\vyer's services provide adequate and appropriate guidance to a la\vyer using the Internet. For
example, the Committee vie\vs an Internet home page as the electronic equivalent of a telephone directory "yello\v pages" entry
and other material included in the \veb site to be the functional equivalent of the firm brochures and similar materials that
lawyers commonly prepare for clients and prospective clients. An Internet user who has gained access to a la\vyer's home page,
like a yellow pages user, has chosen to view the lawyer's message from all the messages available in that medium. Under these
circumstances, such materials are not a "communication directed to a specific recipient" that \vould implicate Rule 7.3 and its
provisions governing direct contact \vith prospective clients. Thus, \vith respect to a \veb site, Rule 7.1, prohibiting false or
misleading statements concerning a lawyer's services, and Rule 7.2, regulating advertising in the public media, are sufficient to
guide la\vyers and to protect the public.
On the other hand, lawyer participation in an electronic bulletin board, chat group, or similar service, may implicate Rule 7.3,
which governs solicitation, the direct contact with prospective clients. The Committee does not believe that merely posting
,general comments on a builetin board or chat group should be, considered solicitation. However~ ofa la\vyer seeks to initiate an
unrequested contact With a specific person or group as"a result ofparticipation in a bulletin board or chat group; then·thela\vyer
would be subject to the requirements of Rule 7.3. For example,-ifthe la\vyer sends unrequested electronic messages (including
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messages in response to inquiries posted in chat groups) to a targeted person or group, the messages should be plainly identified
as advertising material.
Finally, lawyers participating in chat groups or other on-line services that could involve offering personalized legal advice to
anyone \\'ho happens to be connected to the service should be mindful that the recipients of such advise are the la\\'yer's clients,
with the benefits and burdens of that relationship. In Opinion No. 94-11 (November 1994), the Committee addressed an
analogous situation arising out of a "call-in" legal advice service as follows:
The committee believes that callers to the legal advice service are clients of the la\v firm \vho are entitled to the protection of
clients afforded by the Rules of Professional Conduct. However, it does not appear that either the law firm or the cellular
telephone service makes any effort to determine the identity of the callers and check for potential conflicts of interest prior to the
time that the callers' questions are asked and the legal advice is given. (Presumably the callers' identities are revealed after the
advice is rendered through the billing process. If the cellular telephone company handles the billing for the la\v firm, this
procedure may also violate client confidences. See ISBA Opinion No. 93-04) Under these circumstances, it \vould be possible
for the law firm to give legal advice to callers whose interest are directly adverse to other firm clients, including other callers, in
violation of Rule 1.7(a), or whose interests are materially adverse to the firm's former clients, including other callers, concerning
the same or a substantially related matter, in violation of Rule 1.9
La\vyers participating in similar activity over the Internet \vould be subject to the same concerns expressed in Opinion No. 94-
11.
For these reasons, the Committee believes that Illinois lawyers may appropriately make use of the Internet in serving and






















Appendix II: Sample Forms
Form 11-1. Confidentiality Warning Disclaimer for E-mail Signature
This e-mail message, together with any attachments, is intended only for the personal and
confidential use of the recipient(s) named above. This message may be an attorney-client
communication and as such is privileged and confidential. If you are not the intended recipient,
you are hereby notified that you have received this document in error and that any review,
dissemination, distribution, or copying of this message is strictly prohibited. If you have received
this message in error, please notify us immediately by telephone (555-555-5555) or by return e-
mail and delete the message, along with any attachments, from your computer. Thank you.
Form 11-2. Sample Warning to Computing Staff
The Rules of Professional Responsibility that bind all practicing lawyers in Kentucky make
attorneys responsible for ensuring that tllese rules of ethical conduct are followed by the "non-
lawyers" they employ. Therefore, Gates, Jobs & Ellison warns all employees upon their hiring
that the willful violation of any ethical rule is grounds for immediate termination and that the
firm will not rule out criminal or civil remedies for serious violations.
The most relevant of these rules is the rule barring the disclosure of any "client information,"
even information that would not be considered confidential to the layperson. The Kentucky Bar
Association's Committee on Ethics has advised that even the unauthorized disclosure of the
names of current and former clients violates this ethical trust.* Therefore, it is the firm policy of
Gates, Jobs & Ellison to immediately terminate any employee who intentionally discloses any
client information to persons not authorized to receive such information. It is the responsibility
of the network administrators, desktop support specialists and all other computing personnel to
not only personally adhere to this policy, but to ensure that all reasonable security measures are
in place to ensure that client information is not disclosed.
*A widely used treatise of legal ethics notes that the "general obligation" under Rule 1.6 "gives rise to a number of
duties." Charles W. Wolfram, Modem Legal Ethics §6.7.5 (1986). Among these duties is a duty "to see that the
client's interest in full confidentiality of information is adequately protected.... The lawyer's files should be
confidentially maintained, and nonlawyer employees should be instructed, and periodically reminded, to keep all
office matters strictly confidential." Generally, all client communications, even those that are not "confidences," fall
under this general obligation. See, KBA E-253 (1981 ) (committee advised that even the very existence of an
attorney-client relationship should be held confidential).
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Form 11-3. Sample Computer Use Policy
Preface
To protect the integrity of the computer system against unauthorized or improper use and to
protect authorized users from the effects ofunauthorized or improper usage of the system, the
law firm of Gates, Jobs & Ellison reserves the rights to limit or restrict any account holder's
usage, and to inspect or remove any data, file, or system resources which may undermine the
authorized use of that system, without notice to the user. The Firm also reserves the right to
periodically check the system and any other rights necessary to protect the Firm's computer
facilities.
Users of the Firm's facilities are required to comply with the Computer Use Policy, and by using
the system, the user agrees to comply with and be subject to the Policy and these Conditions of
Use. Serious violations of the Policy by nonlawyer employees are subject to immediate
termination. Attorney-employees are also subject to dismissal or severance of the partnership
relationship.
The Firm reserves the right to amend this statement at any time with or without notice.
Computer Use Policy
I . You must use only those computer accounts, files or directories that have been authorized
for your use. The unauthorized use of another's account, files or directories, as well as the
, providing of false or misleading information for the purpose of obtaining access to computing
facilities, is strictly prohibited and may be regarded as grounds for immediate termination of
employment.
2. You may not authorize anyone to use your account for any reason. You are responsible for
all usage on your account(s). You must take all reasonable precautions, including password
maintenance and file protection measures, to prevent use ofyour accounts by unauthorized
persons.
3. You must use your accounts only for the purposes for which they were authorized. Firm
accounts must not be used for private consulting or any other commercial use without prior
approval from the Managing Attorney. You must not use your accounts for unlawful purposes,
such as the installation of fraudulently or illegally obtained software.
4. You must not access or copy files that belong to another account without prior authorization
from the account holder. All requests for access to files or directories should go through the
Managing Attorney who will request the Network Administrator to make such changes. Files
may not·be taKen to other sites withQut.permission from the m~aging attorney. Improper use











5. You must not use the system irresponsibly, or needlessly affect the work of others. This
includes transmitting or making accessible offensive, annoying or harassing material;
intentionally damaging the system; intentionally damaging information not belonging to you; or
intentionally misusing system resources or allowing misuse of system resources by others.
6. You are responsible for reporting to the Network Administrator any violation of these
guidelines by another individual, especially any violation that may compromise client
information. You are also encouraged to report any information relating to a flaw in, or bypass
of, computer facilities security.
Failure to comply with the above guidelines, or the unauthorized or illegitimate use of Gates,
Jobs & Ellison's computing facilities or resources, shall constitute a violation ofpolicy and will






I have read tIle Computer Use Policy. I agree to follow the rules contained in tllis Policy. I











Signature _ Date ------
r
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Form 11-4. Disclaimer for E-mail Signature for Use on La,v-Related Listservs
This email expresses only the generalized personal opinion of the writer and is not meant to be
construed as legal advice. Nothing in this message is to be construed as creating a lawyer-client





To Require a password to open a Word file,
To assign a password to a Word Perfect 5.0, 5.1, 6.0, 6.1, 7.0, 8.0 file,
III. Simple Password Protection of Microsoft Word and Corel Word Perfect Documents
I Click File, Save As.
2 Specify the file you want to password-protect.
3 Make sure the file format is Corel WordPerfect 5 or later.
4 Click Password protect, then click Save.
S Type the password you want to use, then click OK.
6 Retype the password, then click OK.
Open the document.
On the File menu, click Save As.
Click Options.
In the Password to open box, type a password, and then click OK.
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SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE IN PATENT CASES
©2001 by
Timothy P. Walker
Preston Gates & Ellis LLP
I. Introduction
One of the most significant challenges in any patent case is explaining the technology to
the decision-maker, whether that is a judge or a jury. This presentation will cover two distinct
aspects of that challenge: the special rules of evidence applicable to scientific evidence and,
particularly, to expert testimony; and the manner in which scientific evidence is frequently
presented, particularly techniques for effectively presenting that evidence.
The basic problem is that the decision-maker is, in general, not familiar with the
technology at issue. Inventions claimed in patents and the devices accused of infringing those
claims are frequently the result ofwork by engineers or scientists applying years of specialized
training. As an attorney in a patent case, you have only hours or, at most, a few days, to
communicate to the decision-maker the salient aspects of the body of knowledge applied by
those engineers and scientists.
While challenging, educating the judge or jury can be done. The rules of evidence allow
testimony by experts in the field, who serve as the teachers. There are techniques for presenting
such testimony so that it is watchable and understandable, including the use of visual aids and
demonstrations:
To successfully present scientific evidence, the attorney must first learn the technology,
because there is no substitute for knowing what you are talking about. The attorney must then
exercise judgment concerning what aspects of the technology need to be presented.
Some judges or jury members may have an aversion to learning technology at the
beginning of the case. This aversion can be overcome by applying several specific techniques:
(I) showing respect for the intelligence of the audience; (2) using analogies to devices or
concepts that are within the more common experience ofpeople; and (3) explaining the "how
and why" of the technology.
II. Rules of Evidence Applicable to Scientific Evidence
A. What Is "Scientific Evidence"?
Strictly speaking, one cannot really dis~inguish "scientific" evidence from any other kind
~ .....
·ofevidence. In its broadest sense,the word "science" refers to a continuing process by which we
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gather information about our universe and try to explain what we have gathered. All evidence
can be characterized as "scientific" in some sense.
Conventionally, however, certain fields of endeavor are viewed as "technological" or
~'scientific," including all subjects having names that include the words "engineering,"
"computer," "medicine," "biology," "physics" or "chemistry." The subject matter of patents is
similarly viewed as "technological," even though many patents relate to subjects as ordinary as
picture frames and chairs.
B. "Expert Witnesses" May Give "Opinion" Testimony
Although the presentation of"scientific" evidence conjures up (appropriately, in general)
the image of a court-qualified "expert witness," it should always be kept in mind that the need
for an "expert" witness under the Federal Rules ofEvidence is governed by the opinion nature of
the testimony to be given, not whether the subject matter is "scientific." The Federal Rules of
Evidence give special treatment to "opini~n" testimony.
Federal Rule of Evidence 701 sets forth the general rule that the opinion testimony of
most witnesses "is limited to those opinions or inferences which are (a) rationally based on the
perception of the witness and (b) helpful to a clear understanding of the witness' testimony or the
determination of a fact in issue."·
Federal Rule of Evidence 702 sets forth the exception to Rule 701, authorizing "a witness
qualified as an expert" to testify "in the fonn of an opinion or otherwise.,,2 Rule 702 authorizes
the use of expert opinion testimony "[i]f scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will
assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue." To qualify as
an expert witness, Rule 702 requires tllat the witness have pertinent "knowledge, skill,
experience, training, or education."
c. Expert Testimony Must Be Reliable and Relevant
Case law respecting the standards for admissibility of expert testimony is extensive, and a
comptetereview is beyond the scope of this presentation. There is now a difference between
federal court standards and some state court standards.
The split between federal and state standards arose in the wake of the U.S. Supreme
Court's decision in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 113 S.Ct. 2786
I Federal Rule of Evidence 701 provides in full: "If the witness is not testifying as an expert, the witness' testimony
in the form ofopinions or inferences is limited to those opinions or inferences which are (a) rationally based on the
perception of the witness and (b) helpful to a clear understanding of the witness' testimony or the detennination ofa
fact in issue."
2 Federal Rule ofEvidence 702 provides in full: "Ifscientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist
the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to detennine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by





















(1993). There, the U.S. Supreme Court held that Federal Rule of Evidence 702 had superceded
what had to that point been the leading expert testimony case, Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013
(1923).
Under the venerable Frye's test, expert opinion based on a scientific technique is
inadmissible unless the technique is "generally accepted" as reliable in the relevant scientific
community. Virtually every state subsequently adopted the Frye's test.
The Daubert decision changed the standard for admissibility of expert evidence to one
that is superficially more flexible, but in practice is often more restrictive. "General acceptance"
is no longer a necessary precondition to the admissibility of scientific evidence, but the trial
judge is charged with the "gatekeeping" function of ensuring that an expert's testimony both
rests on a reliable foundation and is relevant. Evidence of "general acceptance" (or lack thereof)
can be a factor in determining the reliability (or lack thereof) of the proposed testimony, but it is
no longer determinative by itself.
Other factors identified by the Daubert decision include:
• Whether a theory or technique can be (or has been) tested;
• Whether it has been subjected to peer review and publication; and
• Whether, in respect to a particular technique, there is a high known or potential
rate of error and whether there are standards controlling the technique's operation.
This was a non-exclusive list, which the District Court could apply as appropriate.
The underlying facts in Daubert happened to involve the admissibility of various
scientific tests and analyses on whether Benedictin caused birth defects. There followed some
debate over the scope of the Daubert test, particularly whether it applied to any expert testimony,
or only to "scientifc" studies.
That controversy was resolved (in federal court) by the U.S. Supreme Court in Kumho
Tire Company v. Charmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 119 S.Ct. 1167 (1999). In Kumho Tire, the
Supreme Court made clear that Daubert's "gatekeeping" obligation applies to all expert
testimony. Again, it was emphasized that the District Court could flexibly apply the Daubert
factors, or other appropriate factors, a~ relevant.
Some, but not all, states have chosen to apply the Daubert/Kulnho Tire standard to expert
testimony in state court.
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D. Bases for Expert Opinions
Under Federal Rule of Evidence 7033, the expert may draw upon three sources for the
factual basis of opinions: (1) the expert's own perceptions; (2) facts or data "made known" to
the expert before or at the hearing; and (3) facts or data otherwise inadmissible but "of a type
reasonably relied upon by experts in the particular field in forming opinions or inferences upon
the subject."
Rule 703's reference to the expert's own perceptions simply means that the expert may,
like a percipientt witness, rely upon the expert's own personal knowledge. A simple example is
an experiment performed by the expert personally.
Facts or data "made known" to the expert refers to permitting the expert to assume
hypothetical facts. Hypotheticals are used in two distinct ways. One way, typically on direct
examination, is to match the facts of the hypothetical to the facts to be proven, so that the
expert's opinion on the hypothetical may be applied to the facts proven. Another way,
frequently used on cross-examination, is to explore the outer limits of the reasoning the expert is
applying, generally in an attempt to force the expert to take an unreasonable position on
hypothetical facts, thereby discrediting the expert's reasoning.
While the expert can certainly rely upon facts proven with admissible evidence, the
expert is also allowed to rely on inadmissible evidence "[i]f of a type reasonably relied upon by
experts in the particular field in forming opinions or inferences upon the subject." This
liberalization of the bases upon which an expert opinion may be fonned is a useful way to
streamline the presentation but is also subject to attempted abuse.
A simple example of the proper use of evidence "of a type reasonably relied upon" is a
medical doctor providing an opinion based on a patient's X-ray film. Strictly applied, the rules
of evidence would require significant foundational testimony regarding how the X-ray was
taken, what equipment was used, who the technician was, and a chain of custody on the film.
However, because doctors make life and death decisions based on such films if generated in the
normal course at their office or hospital, Rule 703 permits the expert to rely on the X-ray with
the more limited foundation specified in the rule, namely that the evidence is "of the type
reasonably relied upon" by the expert in the field.
While liberalized, there remains the requirement that the evidence be shown to be "of the
type reasonably relied upon" by experts in the field. In order to meet this foundational
requirement, the expert's opinion in general must be the type of opinion given by experts in the
field using that type of evidence. Accordingly, while it may be pennissible for a physician to
give a diagnostic opinion based on an X-ray film with a limited foundation, it might be improper
for an "X-ray machine" expert to give an opinion concerning the operation of the X-ray camera
based on a film that is not fully authenticated.
3 Federal Rule ofEvidence 703 provides in full: "The facts or data in the particular case upon which an expert bases
.an opinion or inference m~yb~ those perceived by or made know to the expert at or before the hearing. If ofa type
reason~bly relied upon by experts in the particular field in fonning opinions or inferences upon~ the subject, the facts
























It is also important to note that such evidence may be the basis for an opinion, but is not
proof of the underlying facts. The physician may rely upon the X-ray to opine that the person
depicted in the X-ray film has a certain condition, but the X-ray film must still be tied to an
injured plaintiffusing admissible evidence.
E. Opinions on Ultimate Issues Are Permissible
Federal Rule of Evidence 704(a) expressly permits the expert to testify in the form of an
opinion to an ultimate issue to be decided by the trier of fact.4 Thus, for example, in a patent
case, experts may directly opine on whether an accused device infringes a patent claim or
whether a prior art reference anticipates a patent claim.
F. Testifying to the Opinion First
Federal Rule of Evidence 705 allows the expert to give the opinion testimony and reasons
without first testifying to the underlying facts or data, unless the court otherwise orders.s As a
practical matter, this allows a streamlined direct examination that starts with the ultimate
opinion, without getting bogged down in the details of the underlying data. The rule is premised
on the right of opposing counsel to obtain, through expert discovery, the underlying data for use,
as appropriate, on cross-examination.
G. The Role of Discovery
The procedure for expert discovery is central to the presentation of technical infonnation
at trial. In effect, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require a full disclosure of the work the
expert has done to fonn the opinion, all bases for the opinion, and the opinion itself. Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 26(a)(2). Failure to provide such full disclosure can be grounds for
excluding all or part of the expert's testimony.
III. Presentation of Scientific Evidence
The real task at hand is to educate the judge or jury sufficiently about a field of
knowledge to enable the judge or jury to evaluate the facts that give rise to the case. In "non-
scientific" cases, the facts of the case are of common enough experience that no special
4 Federal Rule of Evidence 704(a) provides: "(a) Except as provided in subdivision (b) [relating to opinions on the
state ofmind ofcriminal defendants], testimony in the form ofan opinion or inference otherwise admissible is not
objectionable because it embraces an ultimate,issue to be decided by the trier of fact."
'Federal Rule ofEvidence 70S ,provides:' "The.expe~ may testify in te~ ofopinion or inference and give reasons
therefore without first tes~fying to the underlyins facts or data, unless the court requires otherwise. The expert may
in any event be required to disclose the underlying facts or data on cross-examination.
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education is required. What distinguishes the "scientific" case is the need for special education
on the background against which to evaluate the facts of the case.
A. Non-Opinion Testimony on Scientific Principles
Although typically an expert witness is used, scientific or technical evidence can be
presented by either "expert" witnesses under Rule 702 or "percipient" witnesses under Rule 701.
Because the evidentiary distinction between "expert" and "percipient" testimony involves the
permitted scope of opinion testimony, non-opinion testimony on the background of technology
can be provided by a knowledgeable "percipient" witness who has not necessarily been qualified
as an "expert" for giving opinion testimony. This is an important tactical consideration because
the rules and procedures applicable to discovery of "experts" and "percipient" witnesses are
quite different. In general, a testifying "expert" must write a fonnal report and all work the
expert did to reach the expert opinions rendered is discoverable, making the testifying expert an
"open book." Non-expert witnesses are not subject to these special discovery rules.
Even if an expert witness is used, although an expert is allowed to give opinion
testimony, the expert's testimony will generally include a great deal of non-opinion testimony.
Indeed, properly presented, the non-opinion testimony can be more persuasive than the ultimate
opinion itself. The comments to Federal Rule of Evidence 702 recognize this:
Most of the literature assumes that experts testify only in
the form of opinions. The assumption is logically unfounded. The
rule accordingly recognizes that an expert on the stand may give
a dissertation or exposition of scientific or other principles
relevant to the case, leaving the trier of fact to apply them to
the facts. Since much of the criticism of expert testimony has
centered upon the hypothetical question, it seems wise to recognize
that opinions are not indispensible and to encourage the use of
expert testimony in non-opinion form when counsel believes
the trier can itself draw the requisite inference.
Advisory Committee Notes, Rule 702 (emphasis added.)
As a practical matter, qualified "expert" witnesses are often used to give even the non-
opinion technical background because their "expert" credentials provide credibility and the
particular witness can be selected specifically for his or her presentation skills. The scientific or
technical evidence is often presented in the fonn of a direct examination of the witness through
which the witness provides a non-opinion tutorial on the basics of the relevant technical field.
Properly orchestrated, this presentation can be made very watchable and the technology can be

























One of the clearest and most direct ways to present technical evidence is with a sample of
the technology. If there is a key device that can be brought into court, do so. If there are
peripheral pieces of equipment, bring them, too. If it is software, load it onto a computer and
bring that to court.
Once the sample is in the courtroom, the expert can run it through its paces in a
demonstration. Seeing the device in question in action is a powerfulleaming experience.
From an evidentiary standpoint, the sample and its demonstration can be made admissible
as evidence by laying an appropriate foundation for the sample.
2. Graphics and Models
Not all technology is embodied in a device that is susceptible to being demonstrated in
the courtroom. Models and graphics can be used to illustrate such technology, but models and
graphics raise evidentiary issues that must be carefully tllought through.
From an evidentiary standpoint, the problem with any model or graphic is that it is a
surrogate for the real thing and is, therefore, different from the real thing. As such, in order for a
model or graphic to be admissible as evidence, an appropriate foundation must establish that the
model or graphic accurately depicts certain features of the real device or technology.
An appropriate foundation will be impossible if care is not taken in the preparation of the
model or graphic to make it as accurate a depiction of the real thing as possible. For example,
the model or graphic should be to scale, based on accurate measurement of the dimensions of the
thing depicted. You should have available for trial a witness with personal knowledge of tIle
dimensions of the thing (for example, by direct measurement) and a witness who can testify to
the preparation of the model or graphic by scaling those actual dimensions.
Where the measurement of the actual dimensions are by something other than a ruler, a
whole layer of additional foundation can be required. The method of measurement may require
explanation as well as testimony that the measurement method was properly conducted.
3. Special Problems with Animations
Animations have become very popular'fonns of graphics, but extraordinary care is
required in their preparation if they are to be admissible into evidence or even shown at all. The
... stakes ,can be" high, 'because such animations are expensive to prepare, take time to prepare,and,
once prepared, can be difficult to alter quickly.
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The person preparing the animation is typically not a lawyer, but an artist, who will
suggest taking certain artistic licenses to create images that will convey a particular point to the
judge or jury. But even simple deviations from reality, such as the use of artificial colors for
contrast or emphasis, can be a ground for objection that the animation is misleading. That is not
to say such a technique is not appropriate or permissible with a particular graphic, but the lawyer
must be aware of the risks and prepare for possible objections, perhaps by having alternative
versions of the animation prepared.
4. Aids to Testimony That Are Not Admitted into Evidence
The differences between a model or graphic and the thing depicted frequently raise a
serious barrier to actually admitting the model or graphic into evidence. An alternative use of
models and graphics is as a "demonstrative exhibit," which is a testimonial aid that is not itself
admitted into evidence. Because they are not admitted into evidence, the court will typically
allow more latitude for artistic license to enhance viewability, but even that latitude will not
extend to pennitting use of a model or graphic that is misleading. Accordingly, counsel should
always strive to make such models or graphics as accurate as possible, even if they are not being
offered as admissible evidence.
c. Practical Techniques for Teaching the Judge and Jurors
1. The Technophobic Audience
Almost by definition, an expert witness is needed because the judge or jury does not
know the technology. Because the typical judge or juror is old enough to have had an
opportunity to learn technology, it is a fair inference that at least some judges and jurors have
deliberately chosen not to learn technology. Overcoming any aversion a judge or juror has to
learning technology is a distinct challenge to the presentation of scientific evidence.
It is the author's personal view that many of those with an aversion to learning
technology learned that aversion because typical teaching methods used in schools to teach
science are not as effective as they could be. For example, although people learn easily through
story-telling, scientific principles are generally not presented in story form. For reasons that may
or may not be valid in a particular course, many science teachers deliberately present the
material, and test the students' comprehension, in a fashion designed more to filter those with an
aptitude for the material than to make the material accessible to all.
As a litigator, you cannot make up for past defiencies in the science curriculum to which




























2. Expect the Judge and Jurors to Learn
Experienced litigators all agree on one thing about the vast majority ofjudges and jurors:
they want to get it right. Accordingly, no matter how averse they are to learning technology, at
the beginning of the trial, they are motivated to learn whatever they have to learn in order to
reach a just result. But that early motivation can be lost if not immediately capitalized upon.
First and foremost, respect the ability of the judge or juror to learn what needs to be
learned. Some lawyers take the view that judges and jurors are incapable of learning the material
and must instead be emotionally manipulated to the desired conclusion. That approach is
guaranteed to leave the judge or juror uneducated about the technology-by you. That approach
is not necessarily going to stop your opponent from educating the judge and jury, and in a close
case, the judge or jurors may find their sympathies leaning toward the advocate who trusted them
with the knowledge required for them to make an informed decision.
A particular judge or juror may not know technology, but he or she will have been around
enough to know whether a lawyer's approach to explaining the technology is intended to lead to
understanding as a foundation for an informed decision or is instead a simple hard sell intended
to coerce a result. The animosity people typically express for the "hard sellers" we encounter,
such as car salesmen-and even lawyers-suggests that the better way is to make tIle effort to
teach.
There is no shortage of evidence that people rise, or fall, to expectations. If you as a
lawyer assume the judge and jurors can learn what you are going to teach, they will sense your
confidence in them and respond by making the effort to learn. If, on the other hand, you·
communicate pessimissim about their ability to grasp the material, they will sense that as well,
and quickly give up.
3. Engage the Judge's and Jurors' Curiosity by Teaching "Holv and
Why"
In talking to the judge or jury, for example in opening statement, it is a mistake to
characterize the technical material as difficult or hard. Avoid apologizing for it.
Instead of apologizing, take a positive approach, stating simply that part of the evidence
will include an explanation of how and why something works. This "how and why" approach
will engage a quality that almost everyone has, whether they think of themselves as averse to
technology or not: their curiosity. Almost everyone has wondered why the sky is blue. Tell the
judge and jury that you are about to answer that question for them.
Of course, the issue is probably not the color of the sky. Instead the issue is how
messages are transmitted to a computer, or how silicon wafers are prepared for becoming the
brains of a computer, or how DNA is sequenced to unravel the genome.
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The issue will always be susceptible to such a characterization. No one is going to pay
you to try a case involving purely theoretical matters. The technology at issue is being used to
achieve a practical result that the judge and jury will be able to grasp. You can spark curiosity
about how that result is achieved, and that curiosity will reinforce tIle desire of the judge and
jurors to get it right, providing the motivation to learn what you need to teach.
The key to making any technical material accessible is to explain "why." Scientific
principles are our best explanation for how the universe works. As an explanation, it has a
reasonable logic. Engineering is the application of scientific principles to solve practical
problems. There is a practical reason for all engineering solutions.
Explaining the "why" will help the judge and jurors understand the technological issue.
In general, there is little need to get into complicated math or equations or to use a lot of
scientific jargon. Instead, explain "why" in story form, where a protaganist (e.g., your client) has
an obstacle to overcome, and the technology is the solution.
4. Use Analogies
Another way to make technology accessible is by drawing analogies to things that are
more familiar to the judge and jurors. However, choose the analogy carefully. It must fit well
enough not to be turned around by your opponent or misapplied by the judge and jurors.
5. Get It Right
As noted above, the judge and jurors want to get it right. The lawyer must get it right,
also. Simplification should not imply inaccuracy. In general, technical material can be
presented accessibly, yet right.
This is particularly important if, as a good advocate should, the lawyer sincerely believes
in the client's position. Inaccuracy for the sake of simplification can back-fire in a number of
ways. First, inaccuracies might be brought out by one's opponent, impeaching one's credibility.
Second, inaccuracies might create an opportunity for the opponent to make an improper
argument that would not be viable if the technical presentation had been sound.
This means working closely with the technical witnesses, including the designated
"experts" and any other engineer or scientist who might testify, to make sure they are not, for
example, unilaterally inaccurately oversimplifying, on the assumption that lawyers are too dumb
to understand the technology. Stress to all the technical witnesses that they should resist the
temptation to "dumb down" where that leads to inaccuracy. Instead, work to find a way to























Presenting scientific evidence is challenging from an evidentiary and persuasive
standpoint. The presentation must be presented in a form that is consistent with the rules of
evidence, particularly the rules applicable to expert opinion testimony and demonstrative
exhibits. It must also be made accessible to a judge and jurors who, in general, lack the technical
background and may even be averse to learning technology.
The rules of evidence place constraints on the form of the presentation, but not on the
substance (assuming the substance is sufficiently well grounded to be found reliable). Key
elements of the presentation are the selection of an expert who can make a good presentation and
preparation of demonstrative evidence to illustrate the technology.
Though initially uninformed, typical judges and jurors are motivated to learn by their
desire to decide the case correctly. That motivation to learn can be reinforced by taking a
positive attitude toward the teaching process and engaging the curiosity of the judge and jurors
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I. Introduction
One of the most significant challenges in any patent case is explaining the technology to
the decision-maker, whether that is a judge or a jury. This presentation will cover two distinct
aspects of that challenge: the special rules of evidence applicable to scientific evidence and,
particularly, to expert testimony; and the manner in which scientific evidence is frequently
presented, particularly techniques for effectively presenting that evidence.
The basic problem is that the decision-maker is, in general, not familiar with the
technology at issue. Inventions claimed in patents and the devices accused of infringing those
claims are frequently the result ofwork by engineers or scientists applying years of specialized
training. As an attorney in a patent case, you have only hours or, at most, a few days, to
communicate to the decision-maker the salient aspects of the body of knowledge applied by
those engineers and scientists.
While challenging, educating the judge or jury can be done. The rules of evidence allow
testimony by experts in the field, who serve as the teachers. There are techniques for presenting
such testimony so that it is watchable and understandable, including the use of visual aids and
demonstrations:
To successfully present scientific evidence, the attorney must first learn the technology,
because there is no substitute for knowing what you are talking about. The attorney must then
exercise judgment concerning what aspects of the technology need to be presented.
Some judges or jury members may have an aversion to learning technology at the
beginning of the case. This aversion can be overcome by applying several specific techniques:
(I) showing respect for the intelligence of the audience; (2) using analogies to devices or
concepts that are within the more common experience ofpeople; and (3) explaining the "how
and why" of the technology.
II. Rules of Evidence Applicable to Scientific Evidence
A. What Is "Scientific Evidence"?
Strictly speaking, one cannot really dis~inguish "scientific" evidence from any other kind
~ .....
·ofevidence. In its broadest sense,the word "science" refers to a continuing process by which we
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gather information about our universe and try to explain what we have gathered. All evidence
can be characterized as "scientific" in some sense.
Conventionally, however, certain fields of endeavor are viewed as "technological" or
~'scientific," including all subjects having names that include the words "engineering,"
"computer," "medicine," "biology," "physics" or "chemistry." The subject matter of patents is
similarly viewed as "technological," even though many patents relate to subjects as ordinary as
picture frames and chairs.
B. "Expert Witnesses" May Give "Opinion" Testimony
Although the presentation of"scientific" evidence conjures up (appropriately, in general)
the image of a court-qualified "expert witness," it should always be kept in mind that the need
for an "expert" witness under the Federal Rules ofEvidence is governed by the opinion nature of
the testimony to be given, not whether the subject matter is "scientific." The Federal Rules of
Evidence give special treatment to "opini~n" testimony.
Federal Rule of Evidence 701 sets forth the general rule that the opinion testimony of
most witnesses "is limited to those opinions or inferences which are (a) rationally based on the
perception of the witness and (b) helpful to a clear understanding of the witness' testimony or the
determination of a fact in issue."·
Federal Rule of Evidence 702 sets forth the exception to Rule 701, authorizing "a witness
qualified as an expert" to testify "in the fonn of an opinion or otherwise.,,2 Rule 702 authorizes
the use of expert opinion testimony "[i]f scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will
assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue." To qualify as
an expert witness, Rule 702 requires tllat the witness have pertinent "knowledge, skill,
experience, training, or education."
c. Expert Testimony Must Be Reliable and Relevant
Case law respecting the standards for admissibility of expert testimony is extensive, and a
comptetereview is beyond the scope of this presentation. There is now a difference between
federal court standards and some state court standards.
The split between federal and state standards arose in the wake of the U.S. Supreme
Court's decision in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 113 S.Ct. 2786
I Federal Rule of Evidence 701 provides in full: "If the witness is not testifying as an expert, the witness' testimony
in the form ofopinions or inferences is limited to those opinions or inferences which are (a) rationally based on the
perception of the witness and (b) helpful to a clear understanding of the witness' testimony or the detennination ofa
fact in issue."
2 Federal Rule ofEvidence 702 provides in full: "Ifscientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist
the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to detennine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by





















(1993). There, the U.S. Supreme Court held that Federal Rule of Evidence 702 had superceded
what had to that point been the leading expert testimony case, Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013
(1923).
Under the venerable Frye's test, expert opinion based on a scientific technique is
inadmissible unless the technique is "generally accepted" as reliable in the relevant scientific
community. Virtually every state subsequently adopted the Frye's test.
The Daubert decision changed the standard for admissibility of expert evidence to one
that is superficially more flexible, but in practice is often more restrictive. "General acceptance"
is no longer a necessary precondition to the admissibility of scientific evidence, but the trial
judge is charged with the "gatekeeping" function of ensuring that an expert's testimony both
rests on a reliable foundation and is relevant. Evidence of "general acceptance" (or lack thereof)
can be a factor in determining the reliability (or lack thereof) of the proposed testimony, but it is
no longer determinative by itself.
Other factors identified by the Daubert decision include:
• Whether a theory or technique can be (or has been) tested;
• Whether it has been subjected to peer review and publication; and
• Whether, in respect to a particular technique, there is a high known or potential
rate of error and whether there are standards controlling the technique's operation.
This was a non-exclusive list, which the District Court could apply as appropriate.
The underlying facts in Daubert happened to involve the admissibility of various
scientific tests and analyses on whether Benedictin caused birth defects. There followed some
debate over the scope of the Daubert test, particularly whether it applied to any expert testimony,
or only to "scientifc" studies.
That controversy was resolved (in federal court) by the U.S. Supreme Court in Kumho
Tire Company v. Charmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 119 S.Ct. 1167 (1999). In Kumho Tire, the
Supreme Court made clear that Daubert's "gatekeeping" obligation applies to all expert
testimony. Again, it was emphasized that the District Court could flexibly apply the Daubert
factors, or other appropriate factors, a~ relevant.
Some, but not all, states have chosen to apply the Daubert/Kulnho Tire standard to expert
testimony in state court.
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D. Bases for Expert Opinions
Under Federal Rule of Evidence 7033, the expert may draw upon three sources for the
factual basis of opinions: (1) the expert's own perceptions; (2) facts or data "made known" to
the expert before or at the hearing; and (3) facts or data otherwise inadmissible but "of a type
reasonably relied upon by experts in the particular field in forming opinions or inferences upon
the subject."
Rule 703's reference to the expert's own perceptions simply means that the expert may,
like a percipientt witness, rely upon the expert's own personal knowledge. A simple example is
an experiment performed by the expert personally.
Facts or data "made known" to the expert refers to permitting the expert to assume
hypothetical facts. Hypotheticals are used in two distinct ways. One way, typically on direct
examination, is to match the facts of the hypothetical to the facts to be proven, so that the
expert's opinion on the hypothetical may be applied to the facts proven. Another way,
frequently used on cross-examination, is to explore the outer limits of the reasoning the expert is
applying, generally in an attempt to force the expert to take an unreasonable position on
hypothetical facts, thereby discrediting the expert's reasoning.
While the expert can certainly rely upon facts proven with admissible evidence, the
expert is also allowed to rely on inadmissible evidence "[i]f of a type reasonably relied upon by
experts in the particular field in forming opinions or inferences upon the subject." This
liberalization of the bases upon which an expert opinion may be fonned is a useful way to
streamline the presentation but is also subject to attempted abuse.
A simple example of the proper use of evidence "of a type reasonably relied upon" is a
medical doctor providing an opinion based on a patient's X-ray film. Strictly applied, the rules
of evidence would require significant foundational testimony regarding how the X-ray was
taken, what equipment was used, who the technician was, and a chain of custody on the film.
However, because doctors make life and death decisions based on such films if generated in the
normal course at their office or hospital, Rule 703 permits the expert to rely on the X-ray with
the more limited foundation specified in the rule, namely that the evidence is "of the type
reasonably relied upon" by the expert in the field.
While liberalized, there remains the requirement that the evidence be shown to be "of the
type reasonably relied upon" by experts in the field. In order to meet this foundational
requirement, the expert's opinion in general must be the type of opinion given by experts in the
field using that type of evidence. Accordingly, while it may be pennissible for a physician to
give a diagnostic opinion based on an X-ray film with a limited foundation, it might be improper
for an "X-ray machine" expert to give an opinion concerning the operation of the X-ray camera
based on a film that is not fully authenticated.
3 Federal Rule ofEvidence 703 provides in full: "The facts or data in the particular case upon which an expert bases
.an opinion or inference m~yb~ those perceived by or made know to the expert at or before the hearing. If ofa type
reason~bly relied upon by experts in the particular field in fonning opinions or inferences upon~ the subject, the facts
























It is also important to note that such evidence may be the basis for an opinion, but is not
proof of the underlying facts. The physician may rely upon the X-ray to opine that the person
depicted in the X-ray film has a certain condition, but the X-ray film must still be tied to an
injured plaintiffusing admissible evidence.
E. Opinions on Ultimate Issues Are Permissible
Federal Rule of Evidence 704(a) expressly permits the expert to testify in the form of an
opinion to an ultimate issue to be decided by the trier of fact.4 Thus, for example, in a patent
case, experts may directly opine on whether an accused device infringes a patent claim or
whether a prior art reference anticipates a patent claim.
F. Testifying to the Opinion First
Federal Rule of Evidence 705 allows the expert to give the opinion testimony and reasons
without first testifying to the underlying facts or data, unless the court otherwise orders.s As a
practical matter, this allows a streamlined direct examination that starts with the ultimate
opinion, without getting bogged down in the details of the underlying data. The rule is premised
on the right of opposing counsel to obtain, through expert discovery, the underlying data for use,
as appropriate, on cross-examination.
G. The Role of Discovery
The procedure for expert discovery is central to the presentation of technical infonnation
at trial. In effect, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require a full disclosure of the work the
expert has done to fonn the opinion, all bases for the opinion, and the opinion itself. Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 26(a)(2). Failure to provide such full disclosure can be grounds for
excluding all or part of the expert's testimony.
III. Presentation of Scientific Evidence
The real task at hand is to educate the judge or jury sufficiently about a field of
knowledge to enable the judge or jury to evaluate the facts that give rise to the case. In "non-
scientific" cases, the facts of the case are of common enough experience that no special
4 Federal Rule of Evidence 704(a) provides: "(a) Except as provided in subdivision (b) [relating to opinions on the
state ofmind ofcriminal defendants], testimony in the form ofan opinion or inference otherwise admissible is not
objectionable because it embraces an ultimate,issue to be decided by the trier of fact."
'Federal Rule ofEvidence 70S ,provides:' "The.expe~ may testify in te~ ofopinion or inference and give reasons
therefore without first tes~fying to the underlyins facts or data, unless the court requires otherwise. The expert may
in any event be required to disclose the underlying facts or data on cross-examination.
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education is required. What distinguishes the "scientific" case is the need for special education
on the background against which to evaluate the facts of the case.
A. Non-Opinion Testimony on Scientific Principles
Although typically an expert witness is used, scientific or technical evidence can be
presented by either "expert" witnesses under Rule 702 or "percipient" witnesses under Rule 701.
Because the evidentiary distinction between "expert" and "percipient" testimony involves the
permitted scope of opinion testimony, non-opinion testimony on the background of technology
can be provided by a knowledgeable "percipient" witness who has not necessarily been qualified
as an "expert" for giving opinion testimony. This is an important tactical consideration because
the rules and procedures applicable to discovery of "experts" and "percipient" witnesses are
quite different. In general, a testifying "expert" must write a fonnal report and all work the
expert did to reach the expert opinions rendered is discoverable, making the testifying expert an
"open book." Non-expert witnesses are not subject to these special discovery rules.
Even if an expert witness is used, although an expert is allowed to give opinion
testimony, the expert's testimony will generally include a great deal of non-opinion testimony.
Indeed, properly presented, the non-opinion testimony can be more persuasive than the ultimate
opinion itself. The comments to Federal Rule of Evidence 702 recognize this:
Most of the literature assumes that experts testify only in
the form of opinions. The assumption is logically unfounded. The
rule accordingly recognizes that an expert on the stand may give
a dissertation or exposition of scientific or other principles
relevant to the case, leaving the trier of fact to apply them to
the facts. Since much of the criticism of expert testimony has
centered upon the hypothetical question, it seems wise to recognize
that opinions are not indispensible and to encourage the use of
expert testimony in non-opinion form when counsel believes
the trier can itself draw the requisite inference.
Advisory Committee Notes, Rule 702 (emphasis added.)
As a practical matter, qualified "expert" witnesses are often used to give even the non-
opinion technical background because their "expert" credentials provide credibility and the
particular witness can be selected specifically for his or her presentation skills. The scientific or
technical evidence is often presented in the fonn of a direct examination of the witness through
which the witness provides a non-opinion tutorial on the basics of the relevant technical field.
Properly orchestrated, this presentation can be made very watchable and the technology can be

























One of the clearest and most direct ways to present technical evidence is with a sample of
the technology. If there is a key device that can be brought into court, do so. If there are
peripheral pieces of equipment, bring them, too. If it is software, load it onto a computer and
bring that to court.
Once the sample is in the courtroom, the expert can run it through its paces in a
demonstration. Seeing the device in question in action is a powerfulleaming experience.
From an evidentiary standpoint, the sample and its demonstration can be made admissible
as evidence by laying an appropriate foundation for the sample.
2. Graphics and Models
Not all technology is embodied in a device that is susceptible to being demonstrated in
the courtroom. Models and graphics can be used to illustrate such technology, but models and
graphics raise evidentiary issues that must be carefully tllought through.
From an evidentiary standpoint, the problem with any model or graphic is that it is a
surrogate for the real thing and is, therefore, different from the real thing. As such, in order for a
model or graphic to be admissible as evidence, an appropriate foundation must establish that the
model or graphic accurately depicts certain features of the real device or technology.
An appropriate foundation will be impossible if care is not taken in the preparation of the
model or graphic to make it as accurate a depiction of the real thing as possible. For example,
the model or graphic should be to scale, based on accurate measurement of the dimensions of the
thing depicted. You should have available for trial a witness with personal knowledge of tIle
dimensions of the thing (for example, by direct measurement) and a witness who can testify to
the preparation of the model or graphic by scaling those actual dimensions.
Where the measurement of the actual dimensions are by something other than a ruler, a
whole layer of additional foundation can be required. The method of measurement may require
explanation as well as testimony that the measurement method was properly conducted.
3. Special Problems with Animations
Animations have become very popular'fonns of graphics, but extraordinary care is
required in their preparation if they are to be admissible into evidence or even shown at all. The
... stakes ,can be" high, 'because such animations are expensive to prepare, take time to prepare,and,
once prepared, can be difficult to alter quickly.
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The person preparing the animation is typically not a lawyer, but an artist, who will
suggest taking certain artistic licenses to create images that will convey a particular point to the
judge or jury. But even simple deviations from reality, such as the use of artificial colors for
contrast or emphasis, can be a ground for objection that the animation is misleading. That is not
to say such a technique is not appropriate or permissible with a particular graphic, but the lawyer
must be aware of the risks and prepare for possible objections, perhaps by having alternative
versions of the animation prepared.
4. Aids to Testimony That Are Not Admitted into Evidence
The differences between a model or graphic and the thing depicted frequently raise a
serious barrier to actually admitting the model or graphic into evidence. An alternative use of
models and graphics is as a "demonstrative exhibit," which is a testimonial aid that is not itself
admitted into evidence. Because they are not admitted into evidence, the court will typically
allow more latitude for artistic license to enhance viewability, but even that latitude will not
extend to pennitting use of a model or graphic that is misleading. Accordingly, counsel should
always strive to make such models or graphics as accurate as possible, even if they are not being
offered as admissible evidence.
c. Practical Techniques for Teaching the Judge and Jurors
1. The Technophobic Audience
Almost by definition, an expert witness is needed because the judge or jury does not
know the technology. Because the typical judge or juror is old enough to have had an
opportunity to learn technology, it is a fair inference that at least some judges and jurors have
deliberately chosen not to learn technology. Overcoming any aversion a judge or juror has to
learning technology is a distinct challenge to the presentation of scientific evidence.
It is the author's personal view that many of those with an aversion to learning
technology learned that aversion because typical teaching methods used in schools to teach
science are not as effective as they could be. For example, although people learn easily through
story-telling, scientific principles are generally not presented in story form. For reasons that may
or may not be valid in a particular course, many science teachers deliberately present the
material, and test the students' comprehension, in a fashion designed more to filter those with an
aptitude for the material than to make the material accessible to all.
As a litigator, you cannot make up for past defiencies in the science curriculum to which




























2. Expect the Judge and Jurors to Learn
Experienced litigators all agree on one thing about the vast majority ofjudges and jurors:
they want to get it right. Accordingly, no matter how averse they are to learning technology, at
the beginning of the trial, they are motivated to learn whatever they have to learn in order to
reach a just result. But that early motivation can be lost if not immediately capitalized upon.
First and foremost, respect the ability of the judge or juror to learn what needs to be
learned. Some lawyers take the view that judges and jurors are incapable of learning the material
and must instead be emotionally manipulated to the desired conclusion. That approach is
guaranteed to leave the judge or juror uneducated about the technology-by you. That approach
is not necessarily going to stop your opponent from educating the judge and jury, and in a close
case, the judge or jurors may find their sympathies leaning toward the advocate who trusted them
with the knowledge required for them to make an informed decision.
A particular judge or juror may not know technology, but he or she will have been around
enough to know whether a lawyer's approach to explaining the technology is intended to lead to
understanding as a foundation for an informed decision or is instead a simple hard sell intended
to coerce a result. The animosity people typically express for the "hard sellers" we encounter,
such as car salesmen-and even lawyers-suggests that the better way is to make tIle effort to
teach.
There is no shortage of evidence that people rise, or fall, to expectations. If you as a
lawyer assume the judge and jurors can learn what you are going to teach, they will sense your
confidence in them and respond by making the effort to learn. If, on the other hand, you·
communicate pessimissim about their ability to grasp the material, they will sense that as well,
and quickly give up.
3. Engage the Judge's and Jurors' Curiosity by Teaching "Holv and
Why"
In talking to the judge or jury, for example in opening statement, it is a mistake to
characterize the technical material as difficult or hard. Avoid apologizing for it.
Instead of apologizing, take a positive approach, stating simply that part of the evidence
will include an explanation of how and why something works. This "how and why" approach
will engage a quality that almost everyone has, whether they think of themselves as averse to
technology or not: their curiosity. Almost everyone has wondered why the sky is blue. Tell the
judge and jury that you are about to answer that question for them.
Of course, the issue is probably not the color of the sky. Instead the issue is how
messages are transmitted to a computer, or how silicon wafers are prepared for becoming the
brains of a computer, or how DNA is sequenced to unravel the genome.
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The issue will always be susceptible to such a characterization. No one is going to pay
you to try a case involving purely theoretical matters. The technology at issue is being used to
achieve a practical result that the judge and jury will be able to grasp. You can spark curiosity
about how that result is achieved, and that curiosity will reinforce tIle desire of the judge and
jurors to get it right, providing the motivation to learn what you need to teach.
The key to making any technical material accessible is to explain "why." Scientific
principles are our best explanation for how the universe works. As an explanation, it has a
reasonable logic. Engineering is the application of scientific principles to solve practical
problems. There is a practical reason for all engineering solutions.
Explaining the "why" will help the judge and jurors understand the technological issue.
In general, there is little need to get into complicated math or equations or to use a lot of
scientific jargon. Instead, explain "why" in story form, where a protaganist (e.g., your client) has
an obstacle to overcome, and the technology is the solution.
4. Use Analogies
Another way to make technology accessible is by drawing analogies to things that are
more familiar to the judge and jurors. However, choose the analogy carefully. It must fit well
enough not to be turned around by your opponent or misapplied by the judge and jurors.
5. Get It Right
As noted above, the judge and jurors want to get it right. The lawyer must get it right,
also. Simplification should not imply inaccuracy. In general, technical material can be
presented accessibly, yet right.
This is particularly important if, as a good advocate should, the lawyer sincerely believes
in the client's position. Inaccuracy for the sake of simplification can back-fire in a number of
ways. First, inaccuracies might be brought out by one's opponent, impeaching one's credibility.
Second, inaccuracies might create an opportunity for the opponent to make an improper
argument that would not be viable if the technical presentation had been sound.
This means working closely with the technical witnesses, including the designated
"experts" and any other engineer or scientist who might testify, to make sure they are not, for
example, unilaterally inaccurately oversimplifying, on the assumption that lawyers are too dumb
to understand the technology. Stress to all the technical witnesses that they should resist the
temptation to "dumb down" where that leads to inaccuracy. Instead, work to find a way to























Presenting scientific evidence is challenging from an evidentiary and persuasive
standpoint. The presentation must be presented in a form that is consistent with the rules of
evidence, particularly the rules applicable to expert opinion testimony and demonstrative
exhibits. It must also be made accessible to a judge and jurors who, in general, lack the technical
background and may even be averse to learning technology.
The rules of evidence place constraints on the form of the presentation, but not on the
substance (assuming the substance is sufficiently well grounded to be found reliable). Key
elements of the presentation are the selection of an expert who can make a good presentation and
preparation of demonstrative evidence to illustrate the technology.
Though initially uninformed, typical judges and jurors are motivated to learn by their
desire to decide the case correctly. That motivation to learn can be reinforced by taking a
positive attitude toward the teaching process and engaging the curiosity of the judge and jurors
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NET\VORK A~l) COlVlPUTER SECURITY
Network and computer security is not just a software problem or just a
hard\vare problem. It is a people problem. The risks are real and can lead to
significant problems.
La\vyers should care about security issues because tlleir clients may
be liable or may sustain losses tllat are recoverable from third parties or the
responsible parties. Either \vay, common risk management principles appI)'
to Ilelp avoid problems.
Worse, if tIle client's net\\'ork or computer is not secure, it cOllld
compromise the value of electronic records and signatures so that the
integrity of electronic records is at stake. Further, nenvork and COlnputer
security, and attacks on eitller, could become discovery issues. La\\yers can
llelp by alerting clients to business risks suell as net\vork do\\'ntime; viruses
and Trojan horse and denial of service attacks; loss of data; and exposure of
data eitller trade secrets or confidential customer data.





PriceWaterllouseCoopers surve)' suggested tilat the greatest threat \\'as from
insiders such as current and former employees, on-site contractors,
consulta.)lts and ·'OEIvrs~ vendors, suppliers and even strategic partners.
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Other potential threats come from "outsiders" StIch as hackers or "crackers,"
competitors, shareholders/speculators, the media and Go\remments, e.g.
Ecilion and Carnivore.
Companies fail to pllig \vell kno\\)'n technological holes \vhich account
for a great number of tIle successful break-ins. The SANS Institute
(Cert.org) is a center of Internet Secllrity Expertise located at tIle Sofuvare
Engineering Institute operated by Carnige Mellon University. Among other
tilings, it tracks security holes in operating systelns, e-mail bro\vsers and
atller common sofuvare. More specifically, CERTICC studies internet
secllrity \ulnerabilities, provides instant response services to sites that llave
been the victims of attack, publishes a variety of securit), alerts, does
research in wide area net\\rork cOlnputing and develops information and
training to help companies improve secllrity at tlleir sites. Treat )'ourself to a
visit to tIle SANS Institute website at celt.org.
In addition to the technological holes that account for a great number
of sllccessful break ins, SANS says people do their share as \vell. Their
short paper "Mistakes People Make That Lead to Security Breaches" lists
TIle Five Worst Security Mistakes End Users Make, TIle Seven Worst
SeCllrity Mistakes Senior Executives Make and The Ten Worst Security



















number eleven: "allowing untrained, uncertified people to take responsibility
for securing important systems."
For a truly chilling experience, browse the CERTICC site at
\\'W\v.cert.org, access the document "State of the Practice of Intnlsion
Detection Technologies," read Sectioll 1 ·'Intrusion Detection - Wllat Is It
and WIlY Is It Needed." Section 1.1 "The Seriousness of Cyber Attacks"
documents about a dozen significant attacks between September 1998 and
October 1999 including ones where hackers apparently working from Russia
11ad systematically broken into U.S. Defense Department computers for
more tllan a year: raided tlnclassified cOmptlter networks at U.S. Energy
Department nuclear \veapons and research labs at NASA and lnany
university research facilities. Several friglltening exalnples are described.
Also, consider denial of service ("DoS") attacks. A DoS attack
"floods" a network \vith bogus information or information requests tilat
prevents legitimate nenvork traffic tllereby disrupting connections benveen
t\vo machines, preventing access to service or preventing a particular
individual from accessing a sen'ice or disrupting service to a specific system
or person. Ho\vever, service o\'erloading and message flooding are but t\VO
-of several ways that DoS attack may occur. .
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Writing In the Ricllffiond Journal of Law and Technology, Jeff
Nemerofsky states:
There are several \vays a denial of service attack
may occur-service overloading and message
flooding are but nvo -and these attacks may be
directed against either a user, a host computer~ or a
network. Tllese attacks have a vernacular all tlleir
own and can be categorized as "fork bombs,"
"mailoe bombs " "SYN flood" and "mail bombs ", ,
with specific names such as "Ping of Death,"
"Teardrop," "Baing," "New Tear" and "IceNe\vk."
For instance, one attack paints a lluge black
\vindo\v on tIle user's screen in suell a \vay tllat tIle
user can no lon~er access the remainder of tlleir
"'"
screen.
61.L. & Teell. 23 (Spring 2000)
For )'our o,vn and your client's sakes, get your guard
up.
THE COlVlPUTER FRAUD AND ABUSE ACT
In response to tllese and otller tlrreats, Congress enacted the frrst
COmptlter Fraud and Abuse Act in 1984 and has amended it from tilne to
time thereafter, in 1986, 1994 and 1996. In its present fonn, the Act
provides:
(a) Whoever-(5)(A) through means of a computer
tlsed in interstate comlnerce or communications,
knowingly causes the transmission of program,
information, code, or command to computer or
computer .system if- .(i) the person caUsing the



















(I) damage, or cause damage to, a computer,
computer system, network infonnation, data, or
program; or (II) withhold or deny, or cause the
withholding or denial, of the use of a computer,
computer services, system or network,
information, data, or program; and (ii) the
transmission of the harmful component of the
program, infonnation, code, ot command- (I)
occurred witllout the authorization of the persons
or entities \vho o\vn or are responsible for the
computer system receiving the program,
information, code, or command; and (II)(a) causes
loss or damage to one or more other persons of
value aggregating $1,000 or more during any 1-
)'ear period; ... sllall be punislled ....
In 1998, Robert MOlTis~ a 23 year old first )'ear gradtlate at Cornell
University's Computer Science program created a computer program later
known as the internet "\vorm~' or "vinls." Morris intended to release the
worln into university, government or military computers around the country
to demonstrate the inadequacies of the tllen current security measures.
Ho\\'ever, after releasing his \vonn, Morris discovered it \vas actually
infecting many other machines eventually causing computers at over 6000
edtlcational institutions and military sites around the country to cease
functioning. U.S. v. Morris, 928 F.2d 504 (2nd Cir. 1991)
Morris was prosecuted and found guilty of violating tIle Computer
Fraud and Abuse Act, Section 1030 (a)(S)(A) \vhich prohibited intentional~
unauthorized access to federal computers and sentenced· to three years
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probation, four hundred hours of community service, fined $10,500 and the
cost of 11is supervision. Id. at 506
Morris claimed that the statutory language "intentionally accesses a
Federal interest computer without autllorization, and by means of one or
more instances of such conduct, alter, damages, or destroys infonnation in
any such Federal interest computer, ..." reqllired the Government to prove
that he intentionally accessed the Federal computer and intentionally altered
information or prevented its use. The 2nd Circuit agreed with the District
Court tl1at tIle intent required applied anI)' to the act of accessing tIle systeln,
not tile alteration of information or pre\1ention of authorized use, and let
Morris' convictions stand. Id. at 510-11.
In 1994, Congress amended the 1986 COInputer Fraud and Abuse Act
to broaden tIle FederaIla\vs that related to computer -'\vorms" and "vinlses."
Coverage of tIle Act \vas expanded to include computers tlsed in interstate
commerce. TIle requirement of an unauthorized access was removed so that
company insiders and authorized uses could be held liable and certain types
of reckless conduct and intentional acts \vere deemed criminal.
Tllen in 1996, Congress further expanded the 1994 act to include
computers in the private sector, called protected computers, as well as tllose














statute covers protected computers, or computers no longer strictly under
government domain.
Not unexpectedly, America Online, Inc. has been involved in a
number of cases involving the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act and other
statutes. For example, in AJ11el·ica Online, fnc. v. LSG1\1, fIle., et al., 46
F.Supp. 2nd 444 (E.D.Va. 1998), AOL sued website operators and their
principals alleging tIlat they sent unauthorized and unsolicited bulk e-mail
ad\'ertisements to AOL customers. TIle district court Ileld that tIle operators'
use of providers' internet dOlnain name violated Lanham Act prohibitions on
false designations of origin, operators' use of domain name constituted
diIlltion and operators violated Compllter Fraud and Abuse Act and the
Virginia Computer Crimes Act. Moreover, the operators' conduct amoul1ted
to trespass to chattels under Virginia law. Specifically, AOL estimated that
defendants in concert witll their "site partners" transmitted more than 92
million unsolicited and bulk e-mail messages advertising their pornographic
\vebsites to AOL members for approximately Jllne 17, 1997 to January 21,
1998. Indeed, defendants admitted that they sent approxitnately 300,000 e-
mail messae:es a day at various intervals from their Michi2an offices.
~ . ~
Furtller, defendants admitted to maintaining AOL memberships to llarvest or
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and e-mail Pro/Stealth Mailer extractor programs to collect e-mail address of
AOL members and to using software to evade AOL's filtering mechanisms.
Defendants also forged the domain information "aol.com." in tIle thumbline
of e-mail messal!es sent to AOL members and committed a number of other
"'"
violations of AOL's Terms of Service.
According to the COtlrt, the defendants violated 18 U.S.C.
§1030(a)(2)(C) of the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act \Vllich prollibits
individuals from "intentionally accessing a computer \vitllout authorization
or exceeding authorized access, and thereby obtaining infonnation from any
protected cOlnputer if tIle conduct invol\'ed interstate or foreign
communication." Also, defendants exceeded atlthorized access in violating
tIle Computer Fraud and Abuse Act. Similarly, defendants impaired
computer facilities by their conduct in violation of the Computer Fraud and
Abuse Act damaging AOL's cOmptlter net\vork, reputation and good \vill.
Also see Cyber Prol11otions, Inc. v. America Online, Inc., 948 F.Supp. 436
(E.D. Pa. 1996); AJ11erica Online, Inc. v. National Healthcare DiscOllnt, Inc.,
121 F.Supp. 2nd 1255 (N.D. Iowa 2000); America Online, Inc. v.
Greatdeals.net, et al., 949 F.Supp. 2nd 851 (E.D. Va. 1999); and America

























I have attached a Cybercrime Case List which identifies
approximately 25 ci\ril or criminal \vhich involve tIle Computer Fraud and
Abuse Act.
THE ECONOi\IIC ESPIONAGE i\CT
AltII0Ugh the Economic Espionage Act contains several sections, tile
first two define the elements of an EEA violation. Specifically, Section
183 I applies to violations b)T a foreign agent, \\'llile Section 1832 applies to
botil foreign and domestic violations. In either instance, tile six fundamental
elements to an EEA violation are:
• Stealing or, \vitll0l1t alltllorization, misappropriating or obtaining
information;
• When the defendant knows or substantially is certain that the
information is a proprietary trade secret or of acttlal or potential
independent economic ,talue;
• When the defendant acts \vith a purpose of economic quick benefiting
someone atller tllan the o\vner of the infonnation;
• \V1len the defendant acts \vith knowledge tilat the offense \vould injure
the o\v'ner of tile trade secret;
• Wllere the information is related to or included in a product that is
produced or placed in interstate or foreign commerce; and
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• Where the o\vner has taken reasonable steps to keep the information
secret under the EEA, it is critical to establish tllat the information
stolen or misappropriated was in fa~t a "trade secret" as defined in
Section 1839(3).
Otller provisions of the EEA are significant. Section 1835 of tIle Act
expressI)' provides for "order to preserve confidentiality." Under Section
1835, district court has authority to enter orders that are '-necessary and
appropriate to preserve tIle confidentiality of trade secrets'~ in any
prosecution or other proceeding under the act. Ho\\'ever, such orders must
be consistent \vitll the Federal Rules of Civil and Criminal Procedure, tile
Federal Rules of Evidence and "all other applicable la\vs." Already, this
qualification lIas generated tensions bet\\'een tIle rights of defendants to
discovery and the prosecution's obligation to protect the proprietary nature
of tile information at iSStle.
Next, Section 1836 permits the Department of Jllstice to obtain a civil
injunction against the violation of tIle Act and confers original jurisdiction
on U.S. district courts. This civil remedy provides an additional means of
protecting a company's trade secrets that have been misappropriated.
TIle Justice Department has adopted a "c~ear violations" policy. In






















maintenance for PPG Indllstries. The brothers stole and then attempted to
sell customer lists, blueprints, secret formulas, product specifications and
videotapes of new machinery to PPG's competitor, Owens-Coming.
Owens-Coming alerted PPG. Undercover agents caught the brothers. Each
was convicted.
TIle first international prosecution was brOtlgllt against Taiwanese
nationals who attempted to steal information from Bristol-Myers Squibb
Compan)p related to tIle developlnent of tlleir anti-cancer drug "TaxoI." U.S.
v. HSll. One was convicted and sentenced to time served. The otller
remained in Taiwan \vllicll has no extradition treaty \vith tIle United States.
In several subsequent prosecutions, employees or contractors have
misappropriated information and offered it to competitors. Ilnprisonment
and substantial fines llave often restllted.
In these cases, obviousI)', tIle existence of a trade secret is very
important. U.S. companies \vho would seek the protection of such
prosecutions should adopt a ·viable policy for trade secret protection
including at least the following:
• Designate a corporate security officer
• Establish o\vnership of developments early and often
J -11
• Have emplo)tees Sign certification pages quarterly or semi-
annually
• Encrypt proprietary information
• Adopt access restrictions
• Carefully restrict access ofvendors and consultants
• Treat business plans with special care
• Perfonn entrance and exit intervie\vs \vitll the company' security
officer
• Perform periodic "trade secret" audits
• Do not lise cell pllones for bllsiness use
• When flying, carry documents and laptops in the overhead bin
• Use polarized or LCD laptop screens
CONCLUSION
As tllis short discussion SllO\VS, nehvork and computer security is a
vital step to protecting oneself from hackers, crackers, snoopers,
do\\~nloaders, tamperers, spoofers, jammers or flooders and virus mongers.
As aI\vays, an ounce ofprevention is \vorth a pound of cure.
Ho\vever, the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act as presently dra\vn



























violate it in any of the several ways the Act forbids and, where theft of trade
secrets are at issue, the Economic Espionage Act can provide a remedy.
Mr. Kenneth J. Tuggle
Frost Bro\vn Todd LLC
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THE CO~fPUTER FRAUD AND ABUSE ACT
US Code: Title 18. Section 1030 US Code
Sec. 1030. Fraud and related acti,ity in cOIUlection \\ith computers
(a) \Vhocver -
(1) having kno\,·ingly accessed a computer \\ithout authorization
or exceeding authorized access, and by means of such conduct
having obtained infonnation that has been detennined by the
United States Go\"eroment pursuant to an Executi,-e order or
statute to require protection against unauthorized disclosure for
reasons ofnational defense or foreign relations, or any
restricted data. as defined in parclgrnph y. of section 11 of the
Atolnic Energy Act of 19S-I, \\ith reason to believe that such
infonnation so obtained could be used to the injury of the United
States, or to the advan~age of any foreign nation \\illfully
C0J11mtmicates, delivers, transmits, or causes to be communicated~
delivered~ or transmitted, or attempts to conununicate, deliver~
transluit or cause to be communicated, deIivered~ or transmitted
the same to any person not entitled to recei,-e it, or \\illfully
retains the same and fails to deliver it to the officer or
employee of the United States entitled to receive it;
(2) intentionally ascesses a computer \\ithout authorization or
exceeds authorized access~ and thereby obtains -
(A) infonnCltion cOlltClined in a financial record of a
financial institution. or of a cClrd issuer as defined in
section 1602(n) of title 15, or contained in a file of a
consumer reponing agency on a consumer. as such tenns are
defined in the Fair Credit Reponing .~ct (15 U.S.C_ 1681 et
seq.);
(B) infonnation from any depanment or agency of the United
States; or -
(e) infonnation from any protected computer if the conduct
in,·olved an interstate or foreign communication;
(3) intentionally, ,vithout authorization to access any
nonpublic computer of a department or agency of the Uruted
States. accesses such a computer of that department or agency
that is exclusively for the use oCtile Go,·emnlent of the United
States or, in the case ofa computer not exclusively for such
use, is used by or for tJle Go,~emment of the United States and
such conduct affects that use by or for the Government of the
United States;
(-l) kno"oingly nnd \\ith intent to defraucL accesses a protected
computer "ithout authorization, or exceeds authorized access, and
by means of such conduct furthers the intended fraud and obtains
an~1hing oC,·alue, unless the object of the fraud and the thing
obtained consists only ofthe use of the computer and the value
of such use is not more than S5,000 in any I-year period;
(5)
(A) kno\\ingly causes the translnission ofa program.
infom13tion. code. or comman~ and as a result of such conduc~
intentionall~' causes damage \\ithout authori23tio~ to a protected
comp~
(B)" intcnlion~l1)- accesses 3PfQteelt;d. computer \\ithout
authorimtion, and as a result of such conduc~ recklessly causes
J -17
~or
(C) intelltionally accesses :l protected computer \vilhaut
authoti1.3tion, and as a result of such conduet~ causes damage;
(6) knoaiDgly and \\ith intent to defraud traffics (as defined
in sectira 1029) in an)p pass\\"ord or similar information through
\vhich a amJpuler may be accessed \\ithout authorization, if •
(A) such tlafticking affects interstate or foreign commerce;
or
(B) such computer is used by or for the Government of the
UnitedSlates; (1)
(7) \\ith iDtent to e~1ort from any person. timl. 3ssochltion.
educatioaal institutio~ fmancial institution, goycrrunent
entit)·, orother legal entity~ any money or other thing ofyalue.
transmits in interstate or foreign conlnlerce any conununication
containiDgany threat to cause damage to a protected computer; shall be
punishedasprmided in subsection (c) of this section.
(b) Wh~attempts to commit an offense under subsection (a) of this section
shall be puoished as prcnided in subsection (c) of this section.
(c) The pUDishment for an offense under subsection (a) or (b) of this section
is -
(1)
(A) a fine under tllis title or iInprisonnlent for not more
than ten~ or bota in the case of an offense under
subsection (a)( I) of tins section \\"hich does not occur after a
conviction for another offense under this section. or ali attempt
to comnut ClI1 off~nse punishable under this subparJgraph: and
(B) a fine under this title or imprisoIUl1ent for not more than
l\\'enty YClrs. or both. in the :use of an offense under subsection
(a)(I) oflhis section \vhich occurs after a conyictioll for
another offense under tIns section~ or 3n attenlpt to conullit an
offense punishable under tIus subparagraph~
(2)
(A) a fme under tltis title or inlprisonment for not nlore
than one ~·ear, or both. in the case of an offense under
subsection (a)(2)~ (a)(3)~ (a)(5)(C), or (a)(6) of this section
\vhich does not occur after a conviction for another offense under
this seetioa, or an attempt to commit an offense punishable under
this subparagmph; and [2]
(B) a fine under this title or imprisonment for not nlore than 5
)"ears, or both. in the case of an offense under subsection
(a)(2), if-
(i) the offense \vas committed for purposes of commercial
advant:lge or private fmancial gain;
(ii) the offense \\-as committed in furtherance of any criminal
or tortious act in violation of the Constitution or la\vs of the
United States or ofany State; or
(iii) the \3Je of the infonnation obtained exceeds $5,000;
(3)
(e) a tine UDder this title or imprisonment for not more than
ten yea~ or both. in the case ofan offense under subsection
(a)(2)~ (a)(3) or (a)(6) of this section \vhich occurs culer a
conviction for another offense under this section~ or an attempt
to commitan offense punishable under tins subparagrnph: and
(3)(.~) a fiDe under this title· or imprisonment for not 'Dore
tbanfi,-e ~1:3IS.. ·orboth. in the case ofan offense under





















sedion \,plUch does not occur after a con\iction for another
offense under this sectio~ or an attempt to commit an offense
punishable Wider this subpanlgraph; and
(B) a fme under this title or imprisonment for not more than
teD years. or bo~ in the case ofan offense under subsection
(aJ(-I), (a)(S)(A)!t (a)(S)(B), (a)(S)(C)~ or (a)(7) of this
section \vhich occurs after a con,iction for another offense under
thissection, or 3D attempt to commit an offense punishable under
this subparagraph; and [4]
(d) The United States Secret Service shall~ in addition to any other agency
baring such :luthority, have the authority to inyestigate offenses under
subsections (a)(2)(A), (a)(2)(B),
oThe United States Secret SelVice shall, in addition to any of tbe United
SUles Secret Senice shall be exercised in accordance \\'ith 311 agreement
,,-hich shall be entered into by the Secretary of the Treasury and tIle
AUome~· General.
(e) As used in this section -
(1) the tenn "computer" Dleans an electronic. nlagnetic,
optical, electrochemical, or other high speed data processing
de\ice perfonning logical, arithmetic, or starage functions. and
includes any data storage facility or communications facility
directly related to or operating in conjunction "ith such de\pice~
bat such tenn does not include an automated type\\Titer or
1Jpesctter, a portable hand held calculator:- or other similar
de\ice:
(1) the tenn "protected call1puter'' nleans a COIllputer -
(A) exclusively for the use of a financial institution or the
United States Government, or~ in the case of a COInputer not
exclusi\"ely for such use~ used by or far a financial
institution or the United States Go,"emment and the conduct
constituting the offense affects that use by or for the
financial institution or the Government: or
(B) \vhich is used in interstate or foreign commerce or
communication;
(3) the tenn "State" includes the District of Columbia~ the
Common\vealth of Puerto Rico, and any other conunoI1\vealth,
possession or territary of the United States:
(-I.) the tenn "fmancial institution" means -
(..~) an institution" \vith deposits insured by the Federnl
Deposit Insurance Corpomtion;
(B) the Federal Resenpe or a member of the Federal Reserve
including any Federal Reserve Bank;
(el a credit wlion \\ith accounts insured by the National
Credit Union Administmtion;
(D) a member of the Federal home loan bank system and any
Iaome loan bank;
(E) any institution of the Fann Credit System under the Fann
Credit Act of 1971;
(f) a broker-dealer registered \vith the Securities and
Exchange Conunission pursuant to section 15 of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934;
(G) tbe Securities Investor Protection Corporation;
(H) a branch or agency ofa foreign bank (as such tenns are
tined inparngrnphs (l)·and (j) ofsectiQn 1(b) ofthc
lDIemationalBanking Act of 1978)::md
(J) an orgnnization operating under·section~5 or section
J.-19
2S{a) [5] of the Federal Reserve Act. [6]
(5) the tenn "financial record" means information deri\"ed
from an}· record held by a financial institution pertaining to a
customer's relationship \lith the fmancial institution;
(6) the tenn "exceeds authorized access" means to access a
computer \\ith authorization and to use such access to obtain or
alter information in the computer that the accesser is not
entided so to obtain or alter;
(7) the tenn "department of the United States" means the
legislative or judicial branch of the Govenunent or one of the
executi,·e depanments enunlcrated in section 101 of title .5: and
[7]
(8) the tenn "dam3ge" means any impainnent to the integrity
or availability of data, a program, a system, or informatio~
that -
(A) causes loss aggregating at least $5,000 in value during
any l-)Year period to one or more individuals;
(B) modifies or impairs, or potentially modifies or impairs,
the medical examination, diagnosis, treatment, or care of one
or more indi\iduals;
(C) C3uses physical injury to any person; or
(0) threatens public health or safety; and
(9) the tenn "govenunent entity" includes the Government of
the United States, any State or political subdivision of the
United States, any foreign country, and any state.. pro,;nce..
municipality, or other political subdivision of a foreign
country.
(f) This section does not prohibit any la\\fully authorized in,"estigath"e..
protective, or intelligence activity of a la\\" enforcelnent agency of the
United States~ a State.. or a political subdiyision of a State~ or of an
intelligence agency of the United States"
(g) Any person ,,"ho suffers damage or loss by reason" of a \iolation of tlus
section may maintain a civil action against the violator to obtain
compensatory damages and injunctive relief or other equitable relief.
Damages for violations involving damage as defined in subsection (e)(8)(.~)
are limited to economic damages. No action may be brought under this
subsection unless such action is begun \\ithin 2 years of the date of the act
complained of or the date of the discovery of the damage.
(11) TIle Attorney General and the Secretary of tile TreasUI)' shall report to
the Congress annually~ during the first 3 years foIlo\,ing the date of the
enactment of this subsection, concerning investigations and prosecutions
Wlder subsection (a)(5).
Footnotes
11] So in original. Probably should be follo\\'ed by "or".
[2] So in original. TIle \vord "and" probably should not appear.
[3] So in original. Probably should be follo\\'ed by "and".
[-I) So in original. TIle "; and" probably should be a period,
(51 See References in Te:\l, note be10\'".
[6] So in original. TIle period probably should be a semicolon.




























THE ECONO~C ESPIONAGE ACT
US Code: Title 18~ Section 1831 US Code
Sec. 1831. Economic espionage
(a) In General. - \Vhoeyer.. intending or krio\ving that tIle offense "i11 benefit
any foreign gover1Unent~ foreign instruntentality, or foreign agent kno\vingly -
(1) steals. or \\lthout authorization appropriates! takes,
carries a\\ClY, or conceals, or by fraud, artifice, or deception
obtains a trade secret;
(2) \vithout authorization copies, duplicates, sketches, dra\\"s~
photogr:lphs, do\\"nloads, uploads, alters~ destroys. photocopies..
replicates. transmits.. delivers, sends~ mails~ communicates. or
con\Oeys a trdde secret;
(3) receives, buys, or possesses a trade secret~ kno\\ing the
same to have been stolen or appropriated, obtained~ or con,·erted
\\Oithout authorization;
(4) attempts to conlmit any offense described in any of
paragraphs (1) through (3); or
(5) conspires ,vith one or tnore other persons to cOInInit any
offense described in 31ly of paragraphs (1) tlrrough (3), and one
or more of such persons do any act to effect the object of the
conspiracy, shall~ except as provided in subsection (b), be fined not nlore
than $500,000 or imprisoned not more than 15 years, or both.
(b) Organizations. - Any organization that commits any offense described in
subsection (a) shall be fined not more than SI0,000~OOO.
US Code: Title 18, Section 1832 US Code
Sec. 1832. Theft of trade secrets
(a) 'Vhoe\·er~ \VitIl intent to convert a trade secret. that is related to or
included in a product that is produced for or placed in interstate or foreign
commerce, to the economic benefit of anyone other than the o\vner thereof, and
intending or kno\\"ing that the offense \\ill, injure any o\vner of that trade
secret, kno\vingly -
(1) steals~ or \\lthout authorization appropriates. takes~
carries a\\'ay~ or conceals, or by fraud, artifice, or deception
obtains such infonnation;
(2) \vilhout authorization copies, duplicntes, sketches, dra\vs.
photographs, do\\'Il1oads, uploads, alters, destroys~ photocopies~
replicates, transmits, delivers, sends, mails, commlJIlicates, or
conveys such infoI1llCltion;
(3) receives, buys, or possesses such infonnation. kno\\"ing the
same to have been stolen or appropriated, obtained~ or con,·erted
,\ithout authorization;
(4) attempts to commit any offense described in paragraphs (1)
through (3): or
(5) conspires \lith one or more other persons to conunit any
offense described in parngraphs (1) through (3)~ and one or more
of such persons do any act to effect the object of the
conspiracy, shall, except as provided in subsection (b), be fined under this
title or imprisoned not more than 10 )"ears.. or both.
(b) Any organization tlyn' commits any offense descnbed in subsection (a)
. shall be:finednotmore than SS,OOO~ooo. "
US Code: Title 18, Section 1833 US Code
J - 21
Sec. 1833. E~ceptions to prolu1>itions
This chapter does not prohibit •
(1) any othetwise la\\ful activity conducted by a governmental
entity of the United States, a State, or a political subdi\ision
ofa State; or
(2) the reponing of 11 suspected yiolation of la\\" to any
govcnunental entity of the United States. a State. or a political
subdivision ofa State. if such entity has la\\ful authority \\ith
respect to that \iolation.
US Code: Title 18~ Section 1834 US Code
Sec_ 1834. Criminal forfeiture
(a) TIle coon!' in imposing sentence on a person for a violation of tIlis
chapter, shall order, in addition to any other sentence imposed:, that the
person forfeit to the United States -
(I) any property constituting, or derived from~ any proceeds
the person obtaine~ directly or indirectly. as the result of
such violation: and
(2) any of the person's propeny used. or intended to be used.
in any manner or part, to comntit or facilitate the conlmission of
such violatio~ if the court in its discretion so detennine5~
taking into consideration the nature~ scope, and proportionality
of the use of the property in the offense.
(b) Propert}· subject to forf~iture under this sectio~ any seizure and
disposition thereot: and any administnltiye or judicial proceeding in relation
thercto~ shall be goYerned by section 413 of tIle Comprehensi\-e Drug .~buse
Pre\l'entionand Control Act of 1970 (21 U.S.C. 853), except for subsections (d)
and (j)of such section. \\"hich shall not apply to forfeitures under this
section.
US Code: Title 18, Section 1835 US Code
Sec. 1835. Orders to presenpe confidentiality
In :my prosecution or other proceeding under this chapter, the court shall enter
suell orders and take such other action as may be necessary and appropriate to
prescn·e the confidentiality of trade secrets. consistent \\"ith the requirements
of the Federal Rules of Crinlinal and Ciyil Procedure~ the Federnl Rules of
E\idence,. and all other applicable la\\'s. An interlocutory appeal by the United
States shall lie from a decision or order ofa district conn authorizing or
directing tbe disclosure of any trnde secret.
US Code: Title IS!, Section 1836 US Code
Sec_ 1836. Ci\il proceedings to enjoin \iolations
(a) The Attorney General may, in a civil actio~ obtain appropriate injunctive
relief 3g:linSl any,;olation of t1lis section.
(b) TIle disttiet couns of the United States shall haye exclusive original
jurisdiction ofcivil actions under this subsection.
US'Code: Title 18~ Section 1837 US<:odc
. -
Sec. lS3i.. Applicabilit)··to conduct outside the l:llitcdSl;lt~































(1) the offender is a natural person \vho is a citizen or
permanent resident alien of the United States~or an organization
organized under the Ia\VS of the United States or a State or
political subdivision thereof; or
(2) an act in furtherance of the offense \\'as committed in the
United States.
US Code: Title 18, Section 1838 US Code
Sec. 1838. Construction with other la\\-S
1b.is chapter shall not be construed to preempt or displace any other remedies!,
\,"bether civil or criminal~ pro\ided by United States Federal, State,
COmmOD\\-ealth, possession~or territor~; la,," for the misappropriation of 3 trade
secret, or te affect the othenvise la\\ful disclosure of infonu41tion by any
Government employee under section 552 of title 5 (commonly kno"n as the Freedom
of Information Act).
US Code: Title 18: Section 1839 US Code
Sec_ 1839. Definitions
As used in this chapter -
(1) the- tenn "foreign instrumentality" means any agency,
bureau, ministry, componen~ institution, association, or any
legal, commercial. or business organizatio~ corporatio~ ~
or entity that is subs"tantially o\\ned~ controlled. sponsorecl
commanded. managed, or dominated by a foreign government;
(2) the tenn "foreign agent" means any officer. employee.
pro~·y, sel'"\(lnt, delegate!, or representative ofa foreign
government;
(3) the tenn "trade secret" means all forms and ~l'es of
financial, business, scientific, technical, economic~ or
engineering infonnation, including patterns, plans, compilations,
program de\ices, formulas, designs, prototypes~ methods,
techniques, processes, procedures, programs~ or codes, \\·hether
tangible or intangible, and ,,"hether or ho\\' stored. compiled~ or
memorialized physically, electronically, graphically,
photographicall}Y, or in \vriting if-
(A) the O\\l1er thereof bas taken reasonable measures to keep
such information secret; and
(B) the infonnation derives independent economic value,
actual or potential. from not being generally kno\'n to, and not
being readily ascenainable through proper means by, the
public: and
(4) the tenn "o\\"ner't, \\"ith respect to a trnde secre~ means
the person or entity in \vhom or in \\"hich rightful legal or
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At the start of fiscal year 2000, we
announced that Oracle would become
an e-business, and in doing so, save one
billion dollars. In other words, we would
use our own application software-the
Oracle E-Business Suite-to put every
aspect of our business on the Internet.
The success of our move into the 'new
economy' would be measured the 'old
economy' way. The question was-once
Oracle became an e-business, would our
margins improve enough for us to save a
billion dollars? The answer turned out to
be no~ We're going to save a lot more.
Oracle Corpqration reprint ~ 200D
K-17
LAWRENCE J. ELLISON
ORACLE CHAIRMAN & CEO
A billion dollars in annual savings translates to
a la-point improvement in our operating margin.
We've already exceeded that goal. In the fourth
quarter, our operating margin was up nearly 14
points to over 41 %. For the full year, net income
without investment gains increased 61 % to over $2
billion. Net income including investment gains was
over $6 billion. Cash went from $3 billion to $8
billion. Sales topped $10 billion. The stock was up
500%. Oracle's market capitalization approached
a quarter of a trillion dollars. It was a good year.
Not everything went up. Revenue went up from
$8.8 billion to $10.1 billion, but headcount went
down from 44,000 to 41,000. Application sales
went up 61 % in Q4, but quarterly expenses went
down. We're selling more. We're spending less.
And we're only half-way through our e-business
transformation. How much faster can sales grow?
How much more can we save? We'll find out this














Germany didn't cooperate with France.
It was lack of shared information
limiting cooperation between groups
Oracle-not cultural differences or
human nature. And lack of cooperation
led to duplication of effort and int~rrl.cl.tl1..
cy. To eliminate this inefficiency, we had
to make information easier to find and
easier to share. But how?
The soluti~n was quite simple. If
put all our information in one nUllra--' ":'
a global database on the In1terlr1et:--·tn~I!D••·•
everyone would know where to look:'••,},;,)
find the information they needed. W,. "
conceptually simple, this single, until
database approach required fundam
changes to our application software.,l
turned out to be a massive engineerill8
effort involving thousands of COmPUtlr"
programmers. But when we finisheeJ.t,
Oracle E-Business Suite, it was the •.u'.~,~+",;., •..•
and only set of applications to work
with a single global database.
We also developed several new
applications, so that the E-Business
Suite would be complete. Today, the:s
includes every application you need~qt
your business-marketing, sales, sUPP'1
chain, manufacturing, customer servltet '
accounting, human resources-every"
thing. It works in every country and in
every language. The E-Business Suite
is the first and only complete set of
applications ever to have been built.
Before Oracle released a complete
suite of applications, customers had no
alternative to acquiring application soft-
ware from multiple vendors. Customers
had to carefully analyze and choose the
'best' application software for each
of their company. For example, a cu~st(J~Met··:>·.",,·
might choose Epiphany for mclrketlnQ,.
Siebel for sales, Broadvision for the
store, Clarify for service, Ariba for pro-
curement, i2 for supply chain, SAP for
manufacturing and accounting, and
PeopleSoft for human resources.
But what is an e-business
anyway? It's all about the Internet
and globalization.
An e-business uses a global network
-the Internet-and a global database
to integrate all aspects of doing business.
Every business function-marketing,
sales, supply chain, manufacturing,
customer service, accounting, human
resources, everything-uses the same
global network and the same global
database. An e-business runs on one
unified computer system. 'Everybody
is connected. And all the information is
in one place.
Oracle was the first software compa-
ny to move its application products to
the Internet. In fact, we started moving
all our software to the Internet back in
1995. So we've been using our own
Internet application software to run our
business for the past couple of years. Our
Internet systems were a big improvement
over the old client/server systems they
replaced. Having all our customers, sup-
pliers and employees online made Oracle
a more responsive and efficient organiza-
tion. But the huge productiVity gains we
were looking for somehow eluded us.
All our applications were on the Internet.
Everyone was connected. What was
the problem?
Our information was scattered across
hundreds of separate databases. That was
the problem! Each one of our organiza-
tions-marketing, sales, service, etc.-
had its own computer system. Each com-
puter system had its own database. We
had hundreds of databases around the
world. Our data was so fragmented,
it was difficult for people to find the
information they needed to do their jobs.
Separate databases also made it
difficult to share information between
organizations. And if groups can't share
information, they don't cooperate. So,
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Choosing between a unified suite
of applications or a multiple-vendor
approach is not simply a matter of soft-
ware strategy. It's not just about how
well your .software works together. It's
about how well your organizations work
together. Sharing information is key to
eliminating duplication of effort. Sharing
information is key to achieving special-
ization and economies of scale. Sharing
information is key to standardizing busi-
ness processes and implementing best
practices. Sharing information between
employees, distribution partners, and
customers has already helped Oracle
save over a billion dollars.
Now, everyone is excited about the
prospect of saving more. But when we
first began to move our business processes
to the Internet and our information into a




But I felt that if we
didn't move fast, we
were going to miss the
biggest opportunity in
the history of business.
It took a while for me to
understand that chang-
ing technology was the
easy part of becoming an
e-business. Convincing
people to change the way
they worked-that was
the hard part.
Before you can change, you have to
admit you have a problem, you have to
understand your problem, and you have
to communicate the problem clearly so
everyone understands why the change is
needed. In our case, the problem was
quite clear: our information was so frag-
mented, people didn't have access to the
information they needed to do their jobs.








Unfortunately, these products were
not designed or built to work together.
And it's not the responsibility ofthe
software vendors to make their different
products work together. Instead, you, the
customer, are responsible for making all
the different products work together. It's a
process called systems integration. Systems
integration consists of connecting the dif-
ferent vendors' systems-a kind of gluing
them together-in the hope of making
them work like a unified system. IBM heavi-
ly promotes this multi-vendor systems
integration approach. And IBM employs
130,000 consultants to help you make
it work.
Systems integration is an enormously
complex, expensive and time-consuming
process. And there are serious limits to
the level of integration you can achieve
with a multi-vendor system. The biggest
problem is that every
vendor's applications
are engineered to work





a single database. So,
if you choose five soft-
ware vendors, you get
five separate and dis-
tinct databases. And
that's if you operate in
just one country. If you
operate globally, the data fragmentation
problem multiplies.
Of course, it would be much easier
if all your applications were designed and
built to work together. Then no systems
integration would be necessary. Then
information would be easy to find and
share, because it would be in one global
database. That's what you get when you
choose the unified set of applications that



























management technology, this was espe- e-mail databases. The list went on
cially embarrassing. But it was intriguing, and on.
too. If we were having trouble with our Every country had its own data
internal computer systems-and we're ter filled with computer hardware.
supposed to be experts-how well were data center had its own IT staff mat
other companies doing? ing separate systems for marketing:
I talk with CEOs almost every day. service, etc. We were paying top d~1I
Virtually none of them have acceSs to all maintain hundreds of separate comp
the information they need, even though systems and hundreds of separate d.
all of them are spending a fortune on es around the world. The more we'~
information technology (IT). Ifwe could the worse it got. Every time we aeJeI'
solve our internal business systems prob- new computer system and database·
lems, we would be in an ideal position to information got more fragmented.
help our customers better understand and more databases we had, the harder it
solve their problems. Solving our prob- to get information about our business~
lems would not only help us save money, We had another problem. Sincee
it would demonstrate that we really were organization within Oracle had ItsD
experts-not just in technology-but computer system, every organiZation
in using technology to efficiently run could invent its own business proc
a business. and then tailor its computer systems
Back to the problem. Au of Oracle's automate those processes. Marketing
information was in databases-of France invented its own marketing
course-but there were processes and tall(;r
too many of them. We ..-----~,~~-- ~~..:. its marketing corDI?'
QUARTERLY REVENUE PER EMPLOYEE
had hundreds of large ($ thousands) system to suit.
server computers Germany did theM
managing hundreds 90 So did the U.K. An
81
of separate databases. on. Every country,'
For example, Oracle 10 invented its own b'
had six separate cus- ness processes for
tomer databases- 60 ~~ 58............... keting, sales, servic,
marketing, Web store, 50 everything-and o'~'~
telesales, field sales, ed the way it d~med
accounting and servic- 40 01 Q2 best. Everything viJas"4
Q3 04 ~
es. And that was just ~ non-standard
in the United States. fY20DD __---l The duplicat~onot
Around the world effort was appalli'l,~.
we had over a hundred customer databas- To solve our problems, theonlj;t' ~
es. France had six customer databases. we really had to do was move our b
So did Japan and Brazil. Virtually every ness processes to the Internet. and OUr'
country we did business in had multiple information to a global database. Btit"
customer databases. Scattering our we wanted to do more than simply sO!
customer information across more than old problems-however big they were.
a hundred separate customer databases We wanted to use the Internet to
was our worst data fragmentation prob- new opportunities. To do that. we
lem. but not our only one. We had 140 would have to do more than s;z}()baIUie
product and pricing databases, 70 sepa- our computer systems. We would


























changing the way we were organized and
managed. The Internet global network
and global database were simply the tech-
nologies that made globalization possible.
Oracle has always been organized
hierarchically by geography. The business
is divided into four geographic regions-
North America. Europe. Asia Pacific and
Latin America. Each region was managed
by a senior executive with a regional
headquarters staff. Each country had a gen-
eral manager plus teams of people doing
marketing, sales, service. accounting.
legal, etc. Every regional headquarters
and every country had its own computer
systems to support its activities.
These distributed computer systems,
along with divided management responsi-
bility, conspired to create our duplication
of effort problems. Marketing was a typi-
cal example. We had a marketing group
at corporate headquarters. We had another
marketing group at European headquar-
ters. We had a marketing team in every
country. In the end, our country man-
agers would invent the marketing
strategy they felt was best for each of
their countries. So, every country had
different marketing policies, processes
and programs.
Take a simple matter like pricing.
For a long time I headed a group at
Oracle headquarters that set global prices
for our products. Or so I thought. In
actuality, my pricing'decisions' were first
reviewed by the corporate headquarters
marketing group. second by our European,
headquarters marketing group, and then
by every country's marketing team. The
price could get changed several times-
sometimes up, sometimes down-before
it got to the customer. Some countries
would decide not to sell the product
at all.
Oracle was in effect a feudal opera-
tion run by a group of autonomous gener-
al managers. We could set global prices
and other global policies at corporate
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headquarters, but it was difficult to mon-
itor or enforce them. For years, our gener-
al managers set their own prices, invented
their own policies and procedures, and
ran their own computer systems. As long
as they delivered adequate profit, we left
them alone to run their businesses.
This loose federation of independent
organizations had worked reasonably well
for a long time. But in an era of increas-
ing globalization, it was breaking down.
Our customers wanted us to offer the same
prices, products and services around the
world. And we wanted to eliminate dupli-
cation of effort. We wanted to set a price
once-not 150 times. We wanted to devel-
op a marketing program once-not 150
times. We wanted to develop a business
process once-not 150 times. We needed
to globalize the business.
The very first organizational change
we made was globaliZing IT. We decided
to move all the IT people from the coun-
tries and regional headquarters to a new
Global IT organization. Our general man-
agers fiercely resisted this change. They
were not enthusiastic about relying on
corporate headquarters for their essential
automation systems. They were used to
being self-sufficient. How could we con-
vince them to support our globalization
program?
We changed their compensation
plans. Our general managers have always
been paid a bonus based on how much
they increased sales and profits. If they
continued to run their own IT depart-
ments, they had to pay for it out of their
budgets, thus lowering their profit margin
and their annual bonuses. Or. they could
use our new Global IT systems for 'free.'
We would not charge them for global
services. Resistance diminished,
but it didn't go away. Our general
managers just didn't trust a corporate
headquarters organization to deliver




















Global IT first had to prove itself.
The proof came with the highly
visible success of Global IT's very first
project-global e-mail. When Global IT
started the project, Oracle had 97
client/server e-mail systeJru) running on
97 large server computers located all over
the world. Every country had its own
e-mail system and its own team of people
to manage it. The new Global IT organi-
zation replaced all 97 of the old e-mail
systems with a single Internet e-mail
system running entirely on two comput-
ers in our global data center in California.
(For safety, we have copies of all our data
plus stand-by computers in our backup
data center in Colorado.)
The global e-mail project was a
stunning success. We used the Internet
and our own database technology to link
everyone in the company to a single,
unified e-mail system. The new e-mail
system is one-tenth the cost of all the
systems it replaced. It's faster than the
old in-country e-mail systems. It's more
reliable and more secure. It supports all
local languages. It's much easier to use.
And it's 'free' to the country managers.
Oracle saves over $30 million a year
as a result of the Internet e-mail project.
And in the process, the new Global IT
organization had proven itself. We no
longer had to push for people to be trans-
ferred from the countries to Global IT. The
country managers loved the idea of com-
puter systems that just worked, especially
when they didn't have to pay for them.
As we completed the globalization
of IT, we gained huge economies of scale
not only in labor, but also in purchasing
computer equipment and network
services. The best example of this was
our newly upgraded global network.
It cost less than our old network, yet
the new network is much faster and
more reliable. And that's just what
we needed for the next phase of our
e-business transformation.
K- 22
Global e-mail had been relatively'
qUick and easy. The improvements in;
e-mail were immediately visible to ey
one in the company. We proved~
Internet thing actually works and
money. But the cheap thrills were 9,
The next computer systems to go 81
the Internet were marketing and sall$JI
We decided to globalize therp,~
ing organization as well as the rna
computer systems. We left the ~~.
people in the countries, but theyno\y,
reported to a Global Marketing e~-i
tive-not the country or regional ..:
managers. In the end, only sales and
associated consulting services still re
to our country managers. And even
activities are automated and monitor
by our new global computer systems..~<?
Oracle has abandoned the model of ·
distributed general management.
Management specialization was part
of our globalization process.
The deal with the country rna
was always the same. The marketinl; :
changes were no exception. If the cou
managers kept their marketing peOple,
and marketing computer systems. the
paid for them. Marketing services~ .
people and systems- prOVided by g10
organizations were 'free.' Trust in c
rate headquarters and confidence ,in· ~ /.
Internet technology had grown drama
cally as a result of the recent success'
Global IT. In a very short time, rnosf;··J
marketing people around the world~~:·
were voluntarily moved to the Global:)
Marketing organization.
The benefits were immediate.
Marketing costs went down because
duplication of effort was eliminat~d.
Every country stopped designing its ~;;
marketing programs, because we used
Internet to implement the same mat
ing programs all over the world.
Every country stopped doing its own"

























official price list at our global Web store
at oracle.com. The prices we set at head-
quarters were instantly visible all over the
world. No more delays. No more duplica-
tion of effort. No more bureaucracy.·
No more ignoring policy.
But Global Marketing's most impor-
tant set of accomplishments centered
around using the Internet to increase the
reach of our marketing programs. For
example, generating leads via e-mail is
a thousand times cheaper than using
conventional direct mail, and we get a
better response rate-even in Colombia,
South America. It works all over the
world. Today, we spend less to generate
leads. We generate more and better quali-
fied leads. And e-mail is environmentally
more friendly than direct mail-even if
you use brown paper.
Global Marketing moved our product
seminars to the Internet. Internet semi-
nars cost about two dollars per attendee,
while a hotel seminar costs a hundred
times more. Internet seminars are better
attended because they consume less time
for everyone involved-prospects, refer-
ences and product experts alike. Now our
best product experts and our best cus-
tomer references meet regularly with
large numbers of prospects from all over
the world, and it only takes an hour out
of their day. Most people don't miss
traveling to hotel seminars. And nobody
misses the food.
We moved all of our product
demonstrations to the Internet. So now
we demonstrate our software products at
our Internet seminars and on our Web
store. Anyone can see how our latest
products work by simply clicking a
button. If they like what they see, they
can get more information or buy with
another click. Internet product demon-
strations and our Web store delivered
big productiVity gains to our sales force.
But that was just the beginning.
Our new Internet sales system has
made our entire sales process more
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uniform and automated. When prospec-
tive customers come to our Web site, we
collect information about them and then
immediately route them to the latest
information about the products and
services that interest them. In a day or
two, the system automatically follows up
with additional information via e-mail
and, optionally, regular mail. And the
system keeps the salesperson informed
through every step of the process.
Ideally, we make the sale at our Web
store without assistance from a salesper-
son. Everyone agrees it's ideal because
Oracle's costs are minimized and the
salesperson's time is conserved. And
there's no conflict, because we pay
the salesperson the same commission
regardless of how we sell-Web store,
on the telephone, or face-to-face.
Our Internet sales system automates
and enforces a step-by-step process for
selling our products. It's a global system
so the sales process is the same all over
the world. The system tracks every lead
from capture, through every stage of the
sales process, up to the close. This gives
us a highly accurate view of sales activity,
so we can forecast the quarter with much
greater accuracy than ever before.
And our sales force is about to
become even more productive, because
of a level of cooperation with distribution
partners that was impossible before the
Internet. The newest version of our online
sales system allows us to share leads with
distribution partners. We just began
sharing leads with a leading computer
manufacturer and large consulting firm.
Our respective sales teams will work
cooperatively throughout the entire sales
process. Our Internet sales system is a
sales force multiplier. Our one sales force
just became many.
And our many service organizations
are becoming one-on the global
Internet. Our 6,000 person customer
support organization had been divided









































database. We unified all our separate
computer systems using the
E-Business Suite.
Shared information enabled people
to communicate more clearly and work
together better-as a team. Since our
new unified computer systems were
interdependent, groups using those
systems become dependent upon one
another. With interdependency came
cooperation, specialization and economies
of scale. When we globalized our busi-
ness, our operational inefficiencies began
to melt away. It was amazing.
The introduction of Internet technol-
ogy led us to globalization which, in
turn, gave rise to even deeper changes
at Oracle-changes in the culture and
values of the company and its manage-
ment. Oracle had been a company made
up of many independent business groups,
managed by self-reliant generalists who
valued their autonomy. Oracle has
become a company of interdependent
business groups, managed by specialists
who value their knowledge and excel
at teamwork.
As a result, it's more fun to work at
Oracle these days. There's less manage-
ment conflict, because decisions are based
on up-to-date, shared information. Facts,
not force of personality, rule the day.




group had its own computer systems and
its own support database. Sound familiar?
Last year customer support submitted a
plan for more hiring and lower margins.
The plan was not approved. Instead we
used the Internet to improve customer
service and satisfaction without hiring
any additional people.
First, we moved all of our service
information onto our Web site. That gave
all our customers immediate self-service
access to most of the information they
needed.. Now ·we are moving all of our
customer support people to a single glob-
.lsystem on the Internet. Once we com-
plete that process later this year, we will
be able to organize our thousands of sup-
port service people by product expertise
rattier than geography. That means our
most qualified people will work on
cUStomer problems, regardless of where
in the world the problem occurs. We
will track problems around the clock
8{l~around the globe. Our support
people will be more productive and
our customers more satisfied.
", A year ago, education was our worst
~ per:fprming organization. They submitted
a budget with margins targeted at a dis-
mal 13%. I thought education was capa-
ble of margins of 50%-but they would
biV:e~ to move aggressively to the Internet.
They would have to market and sell
classes on the Internet, register students
on the Internet and teach classes on the
Internet. Education is doing all of this
and more. By the end of the year their
margins hit 33%. When we complete
oure-business transformation, I bet
they'll be at 50%.
I could go on and on. There are
numerous additional examples of
improvement at Oracle. But Virtually
every improvement was a result of the
same strategy. We standardized our
business processes and moved them to the
Internet. We consolidated all our
separate databases into a single global
. ONate Corporation reprint C200D
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